Kenyan Leaders Owe Us Insightful Autobiographies

I wrote this article after reflecting on some of the Kenyan autobiographies I have read, some recently. Autobiographies, in the case of Kenya, are mostly written in a person’s sunset years. This is usually after retirement from a high-profile public life.

Overall, I have read a good number of autobiographies and biographies in my adult life. I found some compelling and insightful. Others turned out average, and disappointingly, some do not measure up for a second reading or recommendation to someone else to read.

The first book I read in January 2025 was Francis Ole Kaparo’s memoir, Calming the Storms. This book by Kenya’s second-longest serving Speaker of the National Assembly did not match my expectations. Kenyan libraries, publishers, and readers need to do some soul-searching and write brutally honest book reviews before books get to the shelves.

Kaparo stands out as one of Kenya’s best parliamentary speakers alongside his successor Kenneth Marende. The bar has since fallen so low in the post-Kaparo and post-Marende eras. Despite their respective memberships to their parent political parties KANU and ODM, Kaparo and Marende were largely impartial when presiding over parliamentary business.

This is unlike the bias demonstrated by their successors. I detest President William Ruto’s remarks labelling Justin Muturi as fairly incompetent during his tenure as the Attorney General. Is there any state officer who demonstrates incompetence than William Ruto? Anyway, Muturi was quite incompetent as a Speaker of the National Assembly. He was tyrannical and unprofessional. He subverted the principle of separation of powers as envisaged in the Constitution; Muturi permitted the Executive’s control over the Legislature.

Muturi’s successor and university mate, Moses Wetang’ula, has so far treated us to sycophantic and unconstitutional fits at the National Assembly. Wetang’ula first declared the minority Kenya Kwanza as the majority coalition party instead of the Azimio La Umoja following his election as Speaker. He still maintained this snobbish stance after the courts ruled against his decision! What’s even more unappealing constitutionally is the fact that Wetang’ula serves as the leader of the now-weak FORD Kenya party. You want to know how competent a Kenyan politician is? Do not look any further than the party he or she leads. FORD Kenya under Wetang’ula has fast regressed to a political outfit that cannot win any seats beyond the Bukusu-dominated counties of Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia.

The 2013-2017 Senate Speaker Ekwee Ethuro was a supremely uninspiring figure. His temperament was measured but there is little to write home about any heroic accolades attributed to his leadership in the Senate. His successor, Ken Lusaka, was a mark-timer who treated the speakership as a strategic retreat before seeking to recapture the Bungoma gubernatorial seat. Lusaka’s successor, Amason Kingi, is too superficial and this reflects in his leadership.

Kaparo’s autobiography is quite generic. It is more of a life history text or some extensive eulogy with the author not deeply dissecting historical events that readers would be intrigued to read. First, there are numerous grammatical and factual errors in the book. The author may not have done sufficient proofreading. The second and third parties he may have engaged for editorial and proofreading roles probably did so little to catch these errors. I’m not sure if they were motivated enough or were out to soothe Kaparo’s ego.

A current or former high-profile public figure or state officer deserves to go beyond the usual life history accounts when penning an autobiography. An autobiography is a grand opportunity to strongly project one’s philosophical beliefs and write successes and regrets memorably.

Regrettably, Kaparo’s explanations of critical historical junctures are relatively short and generic and do not offer any new information or perspective. Politicians or high-profile personalities who have been in political corridors should first think of bringing out unknown details or new perspectives when working on their autobiographies. They need to understand that Kenya’s history is patched up and this is a gap they should seek to fill.

Kaparo had a glorious opportunity to give readers and historians tangible stuff in chapters six, seven, eight, and ten. In chapter six, Kaparo reflects on his decision to contest for the speakership. He also uncovers the 1991 KANU conference in which former President Daniel Moi went against the wishes of the delegates to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution. Why would Kaparo squeeze the details of such important historical events into five to six pages?

I admire Oginga Odinga’s and Raila Odinga’s autobiographies save for the latter’s back-handed undemocratic political arrangements with ruling parties and coalitions. In Not Yet Uhuru, Oginga Odinga takes his time to thoroughly reflect and write on historical events, particularly the struggle for independence and the post-colonial era poor governance.

Not Yet Uhuru enriches Kenya’s historical discourse and literature. One reads it and certainly feels compelled to constantly reference it. Raila Odinga’s, The Flame of Freedom, is immaculate. Developments related to the post-Kenyatta era, the 1982 coup attempt, the fight for the Second Liberation, the multiparty era, the NARC years, the 2005 referendum, the post-election violence, and the Grand Coalition Government are comprehensively written.

Kaparo is either mean with words, economical with the truth, or he was perhaps ostracised by the deep state not to have much information on the historical events he attempts to write about. Chapter six would be rich and engrossing had Kaparo documented the unknown intrigues during his time as Speaker and the struggle leading to the re-introduction of multipartyism. Chapter seven is not worth reading. It is a complete waste of time. Chapter eight is also underwhelming. Fifteen pages are too few as so much happened between 2002 and 2007.

In chapter ten, Kaparo writes about the founding and his chairmanship of the URP party led by William Ruto from around 2012 to 2017. Kaparo’s claims on what led to the formation of URP are quite ridiculous. He purports that URP’s founders were motivated by the need to field candidates countrywide and present it as a national party. He goes ahead to chide parties such as ODM, Wiper, FORD Kenya, FORD Asili, FORD People, and the Democratic Party for being ethnic-based outfits. Kaparo selectively sidesteps the fact that URP was formed to bring together the interests of the so-called pastoralist and Nilotic ethnic groups. URP’s ethnic base was among the Kalenjins and ethnic communities in the North Eastern region.

What’s more, Kaparo grandiosely claims that only KANU had a national appeal. This demonstrates his lack of appreciation of historical facts. What contributed to KANU having a nationwide presence? The events of August 1, 1982, transformed Moi from a somewhat humble and despised politician to a ruthless, authoritarian, paranoid one. A consequence of Moi’s insecurities and paranoia was the declaration of Kenya as a single-party state de jure (by law). Kaparo overlooks this in his criticism of the aforementioned parties as tribal outfits. Facts are stubborn; ODM had a much more nationwide presence compared to URP.

There are several half-witted, misrepresented, and outrageous arguments written by Kaparo in his memoirs. His argument for settling on the name of the URP party, especially the word “republican” (URP stands for United Republican Party), took me aback. According to Kaparo, URP founders were driven by the ambition to defeat the formation of a federalist (majimbo) system of government in Kenya. Mark you this was around two years after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution that institutionalised devolution and not federalism.

Kaparo goes ahead noting that the URP founders were worried about the introduction of socialism and communism in Kenya through the backdoor. This is extremely superficial and denotes a lack of intellectual wherewithal. Kaparo posits that the URP founders were uneasy about the Kenyan version of federalists merging American federalism with aspects of the former USSR’s governance, hence his unfounded claims on communism and socialism.

I squirmed while reading this bit and felt I had enough of such half-witted reflections from Kaparo. During the Cold War, there were attempts by the USSR just like the US to strengthen geostrategic interests in Kenya. But I think communism and socialism innuendos in Kenya are exaggerated. These were the outcomes of propaganda linked to the British and American governments and press after independence. One can easily conclude that URP was not in favour of the implementation of the 2010 Constitution. And you do not need to look far with its leader, William Ruto, having led campaigns against it prior to the 2010 referendum. So, we should not be surprised by the performance of the Ruto-led administration.

Leaders should give us compelling autobiographies that would significantly contribute to Kenya’s knowledge base. This is not limited to politicians. We have leaders in different sectors or areas; business, not-for-profits, security and defence, sports, and education among others.

I have had enough of reading sub-par books from personalities widely exposed in different sectors in Kenya. Kaparo’s Calming the Storms reminds me of Lee Njiru’s President’s Pressman. Lots of grammatical errors and superficial documentation of historical events. Njiru would rather not have written his memoirs.

And I will not fall short of expressing my displeasure against public figures who have retired, about to retire, or died without writing autobiographies. Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa, George Saitoti, and other high-profile politicians and non-political personalities who died without penning autobiographies failed Kenya. Autobiographies should not be post-retirement adventures. I hope to soon read some good ones from individuals I consider influential in my life. But they are showing little to no effort!

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Hosting Sudan’s RSF Armed Group Highlights Kenya’s Geostrategic Dilemma

On February 17, 2025, I found information on X (Twitter) indicating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies intending to hold a meeting in Nairobi. The meeting’s objective was to ratify agreements leading to the formation of the so-called Government of Peace and Unity (GPU). This is a parallel government rivaling an inclusive one, soon-to-be established by the RSF’s antagonist, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The RSF’s plans to form a government in the territories it controls. This is amid the paramilitary group losing huge chunks of its controlled areas to the SAF over the last two months. The RSF’s GPU is perhaps a strategy to delegitimise an SAF-led government, or to heighten the stakes of ceasefire negotiations with the hope of getting a significant share of a transitional government. Recall that the RSF wielded political and military power as a principal partner in the transitional government before the commencement of the war in April 2015.

Hosting the RSF indicates the wicky-wacky nature of Kenya’s foreign policy under the William Ruto administration. This is yet another diplomatic misstep committed by the Ruto administration. A year ago, Nairobi rolled out a red carpet for the RSF leader Hemedti Dagalo. This was later followed by the Sudanese government rejecting President Ruto’s nomination by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in June 2024 to lead ceasefire negotiations. Nonetheless, Nairobi plays to the whims of the RSF. In January this year, the RSF canceled a press conference in Nairobi at the eleventh hour. No reasons were given but it could have been due to the successful SAF offensive against it.

The reputation of Ruto’s administration in its foreign policy engagements is disastrous. This regime’s projection of Kenya’s geostrategic interests is half-witted, erratic, sketchy, and lacks strategic depth. From a Machiavellian sense, Ruto’s administration could be justified to pursue its interests. Realistically, though, prevailing regional dynamics should be considered when the administration cuts opportunistic deals with genocide-committing armed groups such as the RSF.

It is not sensible to host an armed group perpetrating crimes against humanity in Sudan by targeting civilians. The RSF has its origins in the Darfur War that lasted almost two decades. The killing of around 100 protesters and injuring 500 others by the RSF in June 2019 during anti-government protests is one of the group’s high-profile human rights violations. In October 2024, around 433 civilians were killed by the RSF in the Alseriha locality in Al-Jazirah (Gezira) State. Over 200 civilians were killed by the RSF in the Al-Kadaris and Al-Khalwat localities in White Nile State from February 15 to February 17, 2025. These are few examples. Hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands injured by the RSF in other areas in Sudan since the war broke out.

Geostrategic Interests Dictating the RSF-Nairobi Relations

Why is Nairobi becoming a second home to the RSF? Well, Kenya has historically played similar roles to warring factions from Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan (before the south seceded), South Sudan, and Somalia. While these historical events cannot be ignored, it is critical to understand the context of the relations between the RSF and the Ruto-led administration. First, the UAE supports the RSF financially and militarily though it denies doing so. This aid is mostly disbursed through proxies in Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and Uganda.

The Ruto administration has lately been courting the UAE for financial and technical support for critical infrastructure projects. The Kenyan government recently signed an agreement with the Emirati Al-Dahra agribusiness firm to develop the Galana-Kulalu Food Security Project. The Emirati royal family is a major owner of Al-Dahra. In January this year, Kenya and the UAE commenced discussions for the latter to avail finances to extend the Chinese-built standard gauge railway to Uganda and South Sudan. In mid-January this year, Kenya and the UAE signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). This CEPA seeks to enhance trade, investment, and economic cooperation between the two countries.

The bigger picture of the UAE’s increasing influence in Kenya is Abu Dhabi’s expanding geostrategic footprints in Africa. While most geopolitical and geoeconomic commentaries and analyses focus on China, the US, and Russia in Africa, little attention is paid to the UAE. The UAE is currently Africa’s largest development partner and investor with Emirati companies committing USD 100 billion for projects between 2019 and 2023.

Emirati companies, especially DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports have massively invested in seaports and dry ports in Tanzania, Rwanda, Somaliland, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sudan, Angola, the Congo Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. Emirati firms have also set up or are establishing special economic zones in Somaliland and Namibia. The UAE is also a leading investor in renewable energy having invested around USD 9 billion over the last ten years.

The UAE’s geopolitical and geoeconomic engagements align with its interests of enhancing maritime security in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The ports in Berbera (Somaliland), Bosaso (Somaliland), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), and Maputo (Mozambique) are promoting the UAE’s maritime security objectives. The proposed ports of Abu Amama (Sudan) and Nacala (Mozambique) will further enhance the UAE’s maritime security ambitions.

Additionally, the UAE’s support for the DRC government against the M23 rebels, the RSF in Sudan, and the General Khalifa Haftar-led armed groups in Libya project Abu Dhabi’s broader security and geostrategic interests.

Rent-seeking motives by Kenya’s political and economic establishment could also be a primary factor underlining relations between the RSF and the Ruto-led administration. The RSF controls several gold mines in Sudan and the proceeds finance the group’s operations. Money laundering is common in wartime and Sudan is no exception. Part of the money laundering proceeds could be having channels in Kenya.

Kenya’s Foreign Policy: A Fork in the Road

Ruto’s administration has made multiple foreign policy missteps, including maintaining relations with the RSF. Others include deploying police officers to Haiti under the Multi-national Security Support Mission, hosting the M23-led Congo River Alliance, supporting Israel at the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, engaging French President Emmanuel Macron following the fall of Goma to the M23 rebels, and withdrawing the recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Republic among others.

These diplomatic gaffes are outcomes of rewarding failed and uneventful career politicians as well as inexperienced professionals with appointments in the foreign affairs docket. Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, who doubles up as the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, has been an average performer in the ministries he has led since his first appointment in 1988. His predecessor, Alfred Mutua, is well-known for his publicity stunts than high performance. The Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Korir Sing’oei is a human rights lawyer with no meaningful professional and academic experience in diplomacy, international relations, and geopolitics.

Raila Odinga’s recent loss of the African Union Commission Chairperson election to Djibouti’s long-time Foreign Minister Mahmoud Youssef is a reminder of Kenya’s lackluster foreign policy. The fact that Kenya has lost this election twice in the last eight years demonstrates the lack of strategic depth by Nairobi in its diplomatic engagements. It is a habit of Kenyan presidents to appoint political failures as high-ranking officials and ambassadors in the Foreign Ministry. Career diplomats and highly qualified Kenyans are overlooked.

Kenya’s official foreign policy document first published in 2014 and revised in 2024 is uninspiring and uneventful. It is too generic and does not demonstrate any intellectual knack or pragmatic ambitions. It passes for any time-wasting write-up and is not fit to drive the republic’s 21st century aspirations and power projections to confront present and future geopolitical challenges. Time is ripe to rip apart Kenya’s foreign policy and reconstruct it. But this is unlikely under the current government.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Insecurity Surges in the Sahel amid Anti-Imperialism Fervour

The Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger triggered some excitement in several parts of Africa in the aftermath of military coups. Perhaps coups were not the ideal way to institutionalise power transfer. However, there were frustrations with the inability of civilian governments to decisively address insecurity in the region. Insecurity is the main cause of these coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Burkina Faso had two coups in 2022; in January and September. Several coup attempts have also been reported over the last two years. Mali had three coups between 2012 and 2021. Niger’s military takeover occurred in July 2023.

Insecurity is worsening in these countries. Terrorist groups active in the region, including the Islamic State Sahel Province (previously Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and others seem to be expanding their territorial reach. The fact that armed groups, including terrorists, are intensifying their activities highlights the failure of the military juntas to successfully combat them. These governments have noble intentions to fight insecurity but this remains a Herculean task given their limited resources among other factors.

The Fall of Gaddafi: An Accelerator of Insecurity in the Sahel

Muammar Gaddafi was a misunderstood personality. Perceptions about his so-called dictatorial and anti-West nature were shaped largely by Western propaganda. Ten years ago, I read Gaddafi’s “Green Book”, a brief text elaborating his political philosophy. Well, he was some intellectual of sorts. Obviously, his book is likely to be quickly dismissed for a propaganda instrument. Nonetheless, he explains the organisation and philosophy of his leadership.

In a world accustomed to Western standards of life, including political institutions, Gaddafi’s argument for popular conferences and people’s committees as better alternatives to modern-day parliaments kind of makes sense. It is drawn from the socio-political organisation of ancient societies. Rightly, traditional Africa, Arabic, and Asian societies chose rulers either through communal consensus or naturally via a kingship system. A host of Western societies also practiced such. But colonialism introduced and reinforced a system of governance that was contrarian to beliefs and practices of Africans and other nationalities in the Global South.

Anyway, NATO accomplished its long-held imperialistic dream of getting rid of Gaddafi, but this turned out to be another failed mission by Washington. Former President Barrack Obama has admitted his administration’s foreign policy failures in Libya. In hindsight, Gaddafi was arm-twisted by the US and its allies not to enrich Libya’s military-industrial complex. When the onslaught commenced, Gaddafi had no reliable warfare to counter NATO’s. He was exposed and relied on mercenaries from Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. It is estimated 10,000 mercenaries were recruited by Gaddafi.

These mercenaries retreated to their backyards with Gaddafi’s ouster and death in 2011 sealing their fate financially. Their retreat implied a flow of weapons across the region. Don’t get it wrong; terrorist networks and armed groups existed in several parts of Africa prior to Gaddafi’s fall. However, Libya’s rupture and the movement of these groups exacerbated the threat of insurgency.

Mali was the first casualty following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion which resulted in a military coup in the same year. Tuaregs formed the largest contingent of mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi. The rebellion further evolved into widespread terrorism. Terrorists took advantage of the political situation to expand their operational reach. The situation also worsened in Burkina Faso from 2015 due to political instability.

Unpopular Foreign Military Interventions

The Sahel military regimes blame foreign military interventions, especially by France, for insecurity. This perhaps stems from French troops cooperating with some armed groups as a strategy to prevent the spread of insurgency, especially in Mali. France takes the blame for the political and economic exploitation of Francophone African states. Historically, France has masterminded coups, rigged elections, and sucked the economies of these countries. The anti-French stances adopted as the official foreign policy of these junta states have roots in the imperial French colonial past.

A critical issue to think about at this juncture is whether military interventions failed in the Sahel region or not. Partly, yes. Partly, no. Affirmatively, Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane, particularly the latter, were perceived as France’s occupation instead of interventions aimed at combating insurgencies. Commonsensically, Operation Barkhane would be expected to be successful after its eight-year presence. But terrorist groups gained more ground in this period across the region. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) failed to restore security in Mali despite its ten-year presence.

In the wake of the failures of these interventions, the governments of Sahel countries shift blame to France, MINUSMA, and other external entities. They are responsible for the deteriorating security in the region. This highlights why the region has become a coup belt. Nonetheless, the military-led governments are yet to improve the security situation having previously blamed civilian-led regimes for not aggressively combating armed groups. This illustrates that military governments are not solutions to weaknesses in statecraft.

Alternative Security Arrangements Not Promising

Security initiatives hatched by the Sahel states seem ineffective. While foreign military interventions failed to combat armed groups, local and regional-driven measures have not improved the security situation. For instance, the G5 Sahel Joint Force was unsuccessful in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Fingers were pointed to France’s support of this joint force one of the reasons for its failure. However, none of these states want to take responsibility for persisting insecurity. Mali withdrew from the G5 in May 2022 and was later followed by Burkina Faso and Niger which exited in November 2023. These three states accused the joint force of failing to combat insurgents. But they did not assertively allocate enough resources towards the joint force. The military regimes and their supporters will quickly blame the civilian-led governments at that time but this is a lame argument since they have not improved the security situation. This issue will also cripple the operations of the joint force formed by the three countries under the Alliance of Sahel States.

The Sahel juntas anticipated strategic assistance from Russia through defense and security cooperation, which has increased over the last three years. Moscow has delivered more military equipment. Russia has organized strategic training and other capacity-building and development initiatives for the Sahel forces. Russian mercenaries have been deployed in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Yet, the security situation remains precarious. The juntas perhaps anticipated the mercenaries to succeed as they did in the Central African Republic. However, they ignored the dynamics of these comparative security environments.

At the time of the deployment of the first contingent of Wagner mercenaries in Mali in December 2021, the Russo-Ukrainian war had not broken out. It is possible the situation could be different if there was no war. The Sahel states would be almost guaranteed near-unfettered access to the Russian military-industrial complex’s weapons and personnel. Who knows if Russian military personnel would be deployed on Sahelian soil? Quite cagey though as Moscow prefers mercenaries to avoid reputational hazards associated with troop deployment and misconduct. Maybe huge armies of mercenaries could be deployed instead of Russian soldiers. But these mercenaries are on the frontlines in the war. Even in the long run, the mercenaries do not hold any magic bullet in helping the Sahel states combat armed groups.

The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is a lame institution with respect to addressing insecurity in the region. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States illustrates slow progress or none in improving the security situation by the ECOWAS. ECOWAS loudly threatened military intervention against the military regime in Niger prior to Burkina Faso and Mali ratifying their exit from the West African regional bloc. These were tantrums at best given that ECOWAS has all along been spineless since insurgencies intensified over a decade ago. At this moment and in the long term, ECOWAS can at best cooperate with the Alliance of Sahel States against insecurity in the region. Such cooperation seems unlikely due to multiple interests and factors.

The African Union (AU) lacks ambition and purpose against armed conflict. The AU excels at formulating policy blueprints regarding the continent’s future. However, the AU lacks the intellectual, personnel, and financial commitment to implement these blueprints. The Agenda 2063 formulated in 2013 envisaged the silencing of guns across Africa by 2020. Five years after the deadline, armed conflicts are a norm across Africa. Apart from the insurgencies in the Sahel, wars persist in Sudan and eastern DRC. Terrorism is on an upward trajectory in Somalia, Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique, and eastern DRC among other regions. Rebellions continue threatening Ethiopia’s unity. Libya’s instability and insecurity seem not to give sleepless nights to the AU’s hierarchy. The AU’s complacency is not shocking though. For a continental institution whose headquarters was built by China and whose members are unbothered to fully finance its operations, nothing much can be expected from it. The AU’s response to armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel is poor.

Outlook

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are technically on their own to address insecurity. Their best shot at meaningful cooperation to enhance joint counter-insurgency operations is Russia. But Moscow is entangled in a war against Ukraine. The anti-French sentiments fundamentally echo anti-cooperation with Western countries. The US is unlikely to take the front seat to attempt to succeed where the French failed. The prospects are so low for Trump’s administration to meddle in additional armed conflicts in Africa. On February 11, the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Washington’s partners in Africa must take the lead on their security. China’s involvement in such conflicts is unthinkable. Turkiye could be tempted but it is currently best placed to be a supplier of military equipment for its emerging military-industrial complex.

Terrorism will persist in the Sahel. This implies that political instability will continue in the region. Additional coups and coup attempts are certain. The joint force by the Alliance of Sahel States is not a security nostrum. This effort must be backed up with broad, well-coordinated security operations by ECOWAS and the AU. It is important to note though that tackling insecurity in the Sahel should not be an isolated affair. Pursuing and restoring stability in Libya, Sudan, the Lake Chad region, the Horn, and other parts of Africa is critical for Sahel’s stability. Yet, African state and non-state agencies are not acting fast enough to stem the insecurity crisis in the Sahel. The region’s military governments are attempting to thrive on the anti-imperialism mantra. But time is catching up with them on this amorphous management of state affairs. They may not be competent enough to transform their countries.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Goma’s Fall to M23 Amid Competing Geostrategic Interests

The advance of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels in North Kivu Province over the last year signaled Goma’s fall sometime in the future. The capture of Minova and Sake towns on January 21 and January 23 highlighted the rebels’ intent to take over Goma. This brings to light the defence posture of Congolese forces and the operational reach of the M23.

In November 2012, the M23 rebels took control of Goma town. This is a recurring issue whose stakeholders are not keen to resolve. Historically, the 2012 M23 uprising arose from a rebellion by former National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) militia group fighters. The fighters accused the DRC government of failing to integrate ethnic Tutsi fighters into the Congolese army, unevenly distributing resources, and not protecting minorities contrary to a 2009 peace agreement.

The M23 promotes the protection of Tutsi interests and other minorities. This protection is not only from other powerful entities in the DRC but also against the Hutu rebel groups that escaped from Rwanda to the DRC in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Also, consider that Rwanda, through the M23, is after the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group. The FDLR is made up of ethnic Hutus and fights alongside the Congolese forces and the Wazalendo militia group.

It is naive to consider M23’s interests as only focused on guarding the interests of the Tutsi. The dynamics of the Tutsi interests have evolved. The M23 is a proxy of the Rwandan government. Defining the interests of the Tutsi is a grey area. The appearance and operational capabilities of this rebel group indicate an organized proxy militia with clear objectives of promoting and protecting the politico-economic interests of an external power player.

The DRC’s rich endowment of minerals historically is a primary cause of the endless strife in the country. Belgium’s colonial ambitions in the DRC were motivated by its natural resources. The 1960-1963 Katanga secession conflict was due to the desire of the secessionists to prevent other parts of the country from benefiting from the region’s mineral wealth. The subsequent armed conflicts during the presidencies of Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila, and Felix Tshisekedi were caused by greed over mineral-generated wealth.

A host of armed groups are formed by local communities aggrieved by benefiting less from the exploitation of minerals. As such, global and regional powers are complicit in robbing the Congolese people. The US has for many decades controlled the mines of the Congo. China is now a powerful player in the DRC’s mining sector. But the regional powers are never mentioned loudly. Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Burundi are some of the countries that profited from the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Rwanda and Uganda still benefit from the chaos in the eastern part of the DRC mostly through proxies.

Rwanda exports significant amounts of gold and coltan yet huge quantities of these minerals are smuggled from the DRC. The M23 is entangled in these clandestine supply chain links. In 2024, the UN estimated that the M23 generated around USD 300,000 per month in revenue raised from taxes on coltan production in Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu. For context, Rutshuru is approximately 68.4 km from Goma. Masisi lies around 78.4 km from Goma.

Three factors largely contributed to the fall of Goma. First, is political leadership. Disorganised political leadership leads to poor outcomes. The DRC is yet to have organised political leadership over six decades after independence. Leadership matters at any level or spectrum of life whether in small, basic units such as a family to more complex and dynamic institutions and formations like governments. Paul Kagame has mastered the basics of geostrategic power moves. He seems a keen student of history and strategy. President Tshisekedi’s decisions demonstrate his naivety in handling high-stakes issues.

If Tshisekedi was strategic, he would not have pressurised the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF) to withdraw from North Kivu by December 2023. Tshisekedi then issued an ultimatum for the EACRF troops to attack the M23 rebels or exit the country. He demanded an offensive mandate for the EACRF. Tshisekedi also called for the exit of UN peacekeepers by December 2024 but later rescinded following escalations by armed groups, including the M23. With hindsight, Tshisekedi was acting emotionally and not logically given the precarious nature of the security situation.

Suppose the EACRF attacked the M23 to appease Tshisekedi, what would be the likely outcomes? Perhaps a full-blown war involving multiple entities. Conflict resolution is not all about combat. Creating buffer zones to contain the advance of an enemy while attempting to negotiate for a win-win situation is sometimes more beneficial. The results could materialise in the long-term via this strategy but it is critical in the wake of increased inter-connectedness in regional and global economies. Such a strategy would reduce the degree of geopolitical risks as opposed to combat.

Tshisekedi intended to draw the EACRF into a proxy war against Rwanda. A scenario of the EACRF troops fighting the M23 and Rwandan forces is unthinkable. Kigali has relatively good relations with countries that contributed troops to the EACRF; Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Burundi. Rwanda occasionally has diplomatic spats with Uganda and Burundi but mutual respect prevails. Tshisekedi is not a shrewd strategist and no wonder Goma has fallen. The deployment of the EACRF could have prevented the advancement of the M23.

President Tshisekedi may have smiled broadly at the offensive responsibilities granted to the EACRF’s successor, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). However, the SAMIDRC has failed to contain the M23. This is mostly due to limited resources and unfamiliarity with the geography of the combat zones. It is illogical to anticipate a quickly assembled force to succeed in an unfamiliar geographical area against opponents who have mastered the entire of North Kivu’s features.

Second, military organisation or the lack of it – depending on whether it is the DRC or M23 – led to the fall of Goma. Military organisation and discipline go hand in hand with political leadership. Effective political leaders are often great strategists and they understand the essence of having powerful militaries. Well, Tshisekedi does not comprehend this, and if he does, then perhaps not clearly.

The Congolese military officers are not sharp and disciplined compared to Rwanda. The DRC military looks like a mass assembly of militias and rebels. Its level of professionalism is relatively low. Strength in numbers seldom works as a strategy in modern warfare. But Tshisekedi’s DRC religiously hangs on this chasing illusory victories against multiple armed groups.

It is embarrassing that the M23 rebels dress in much better fatigues and are more well-armed than Congolese soldiers. One would mistake the M23 for a country’s military and the Congolese forces for polished rebels. Well, this indicates the DRC’s struggles with transitioning the military to a formidable institution with first-world operational capabilities. Nonetheless, the dressing and arming of the M23 in a way affirms Rwanda’s funding of the group. Rebel groups in Africa are hardly organised and disciplined. They are usually shoddy in appearance and have limited tactical and strategic organisation. It is not enough to proclaim M23’s enhancing its operations and discipline through the proceeds from minerals.

A June 2024 UN report revealed the presence of 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in DRC territory. The report also highlighted the presence of 3,000 M23 rebels in the DRC. Rwandan troops are instrumental in sharing intelligence with the M23, hence the rebels’ strategic advancements. But this demonstrates the weak intelligence capabilities of the DRC military thus its poor organisational capabilities.

Third, the geographical dynamics of North Kivu and generally the eastern part of the DRC contributed to the fall of Goma. Geography is key to understanding warfare. But it is even more instrumental in comprehending geopolitics and geostrategic ambitions and maneuvers of state and non-state actors. The DRC is the second biggest country in Africa. For context, the DRC is bigger than Spain, France, and Germany combined. Closer home, the DRC is bigger than Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi combined.

Consider the distance between the capital Kinshasa (seat of the government) and Goma, the besieged city; approximately 2,600 km. This is almost 1,000 km more than the distance from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kampala, Uganda. It is still longer than the distance from Dar es Salaam to Uganda’s northernmost town, Moyo (1,835 km). Think about the distance from Kigali to Goma; approximately 162 km. Congolese nationals in Goma and across North Kivu are closer to Rwanda than their capital, Kinshasa. Were it not for colonial-drawn boundaries, the people of eastern DRC would derive higher benefits from the economic geography of being nearer to Kigali.

Ethnically, culturally, and linguistically, a significant population of North Kivu (including Goma) is similar or the same for Rwandans across the border. The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa tribes are found in Rwanda and the DRC thanks to colonial boundaries. A member of any of these tribes in the DRC is much closer socio-culturally and geographically to Rwanda than other far-flung parts of the Congolese territory. The M23 practically finds it easier to thrive in North Kivu in light of these factors.

The endowment of the eastern DRC with minerals like other parts of the country is a geographical factor that puts it at risk of eternal wars. Armed groups and foreign powers capitalise on the expansive geography and the existence of weak state institutions to exploit natural resources. Furthermore, M23 rebels have mastered the geography of North Kivu and other eastern provinces. As earlier stated, this is enabled by strong intelligence sharing, a notable challenge for the Congolese military. This is probably one of the main reasons why the Congolese forces rely on the FDLR and the Wazalendo militia who seem more knowledgeable of the region’s geography. Among other factors, limited geographical familiarity seems to be working against foreign forces in eastern DRC. The UN peacekeepers and SAMIDRC are struggling with this issue.

Kinshasa and Kigali should commit to fully implementing the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes. The lack of commitment is evident. Controversially, expansive countries unable to govern themselves should consider splitting into multiple independent states. While eastern Congolese are socialised to belong to DRC proper, geographical and socio-cultural dynamics ought to lead to the creation of a sovereign state(s). Perhaps such a state would relate better with Rwanda and the remnant of the DRC. We should not hesitate to review troubled colonial boundaries. Toxic state cohabitations do not work. Such considerations should also be allowed in conflict-prone regions in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Angola among others.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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A Post-Ruto Kenya is Taking Shape, and Quite Fast!

Kenya under President William Ruto is a blueprint of how leaders fail and fail fast. Transformational leadership is not a cup of tea for any Tom, Dick, or Harry, nor is it for any Mary, Juliet, or Angela. Ruto has chosen to literally fail. His two-year old administration has demystified the genius and politically smart tags associated with him for a long time.

Ruto severally coveted and referenced Kibakinomics during the election campaigns and shortly after taking office. The late President Mwai Kibaki attempted to transform Kenya, but he largely failed. Corruption, tribalism, and vote rigging flourished under his watch. And the fact that a significant number of Kenyans identify Kibaki with some semblance of transformation indicates our low leadership standards as a country. Anyway, Ruto’s reference to Kibakinomics was motivated by his desire to revamp the Kenyan economy in light of the abysmal trajectory engineered by the UhuRuto administration.

Well, the UhuRuto administration was incompetent in economic management. This was manifested by unnecessary pile ups of public debt, of which a significant portion went into the wrong hands. Look at the Eurobond fiasco; the UhuRuto administration could not account for the 2014 USD 2.8 billion Eurobond. Switch lanes and consider the borrowing spree of the UhuRuto administration. Public debt spiraled upwards by around 353% from KES 1.89 trillion in 2013 to KES 8.56 trillion in 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the economic situation. Approximately 1.72 million workers lost their jobs between April and June 2020. Another 740,000 Kenyans lost their jobs in 2021.

This was a perfect moment for the UhuRuto administration to turn to the IMF and the World Bank to resuscitate the economy. Obviously, the Bretton Woods institutions never lend money without conditions. Kenya has since remained hooked to the IMF, with the latter prescribing unrealistic and theoretical economic policies to boost the economy post-COVID and under the Ruto administration.

Leaders first embark on the route to failure by deliberately not structuring a competent team to deliver their vision. A basic rule in organisational transformation is crafting a highly competent team. Getting the right people for the right job simplifies issues, whether in a bureaucratic setup or lean teams. Ruto has failed on this. Recall his first Cabinet; hard to point out any man or woman with an unmatched work ethic and elite professionalism in it. His second Cabinet is still subpar. People in pursuit of power and success often refer to the Machiavellian power book, but one thing they rarely pay attention to or ignore is the centrality of a competent team. According to Machiavelli, a leader’s intelligence is estimated by the people he surrounds himself with. Therefore, we can use this rulebook to judge and rank Ruto’s merit as a leader.

Succeeding as a leader is relatively easy if you listen to people. Ruto excels at this during elections. He listened to his presidential campaign think-tank when running for office in 2022. He equally listened to his allies and the on-ground voices when campaigning. It is baffling when he fails to pay attention to what people have said in the course of his presidency. Perhaps he believes having won the presidency at the first attempt makes him a genius. Wrong! He is not. He only capitalised on Raila Odinga’s disorganisation and complacency. Ruto has a bloated team of advisers who are perfect courtiers and typical jesters. Just a bunch of hangers-on.

On a few occasions, Kenya Kwanza-affiliated parliamentarians warned Ruto of growing hostility against his leadership due to the high cost of living. Such warnings dominated a Kenya Kwanza parliamentary group meeting in November 2023. The MPs informed him of the public’s displeasure with the withdrawal of fuel subsidies, and retrogressive taxation, among other unwelcome socioeconomic policies. Similar warnings were repeated at another meeting in February this year. Ruto chose to dismiss them.

Public heckling against Ruto and other Kenya Kwanza leaders gained momentum at the end of 2023 and the better part of this year before the pro-good governance mass protests. Ruto appeared surprised by the demonstrations, which, if he was keen enough and not blinded by hubris, would have prevented them. And even in the aftermath of the protests, he embraced time-wasting ventures instead of attempting to turn around his failures.

The public’s rejection of the IMF-initiated, controversial, punitive, and unpopular 2024 Finance Bill was a vote of no confidence against the Kenya Kwanza administration. His coalition partner and Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi is on record having stated that the bill’s withdrawal would be a vote of no confidence against the government.

I am yet to see a government that works so hard to become unpopular. Kenya Kwanza offers a good template for this. The scheme to impeach Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua is another clear vote of no confidence against Ruto’s presidency. The public participation exercises showed disaffection against the most incompetent government in Kenya since independence…no, since the colonial era. The writing is on the wall; Ruto will be a one-term president.

So, what awaits a post-Ruto Kenya? This may sound premature than the process leading to this eventuality. The unity of purpose of like-minded forces is imperative. The majority is clearly anti-Ruto, and this should now transition from mobilisation to organisation. Mass and voluntary civic education should be prioritised by like-minded entities. Ideologically disciplined parties and coalitions should be established. These need to reflect a break from Kenya’s unprogressive political party culture, where parties are personality-based and devoid of institutionalism. Public scrutiny and pressure should be sustained against the political establishment, including the Kenya Kwanza leadership. Any proposed laws or amendments or policies must be subject to proper public participation. We are past the years of Odinga, Kalonzo, and the long-time political establishment. We need a new crop of devoted, fresh-thinking political leaders to take Kenya to the next level.

A post-Ruto Kenya should be a society that absolutely adheres to the Constitution. Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity must be enforced. Fighting against and stamping out corruption has to be the main objective of the government and the public in a post-Ruto Kenya. It must be a republic where there are no shady commercial deals and all agreements involving development projects must be disclosed to the public. Details of the public debt and all procured loans must be publicised in a post-Ruto Kenya. Independence of the arms of government must be respected in a post-Ruto Kenya. A post-Ruto Kenya should pursue economic independence and stop the parasitic relationship with the IMF and other creditors. Public education and healthcare must be free in a post-Ruto Kenya. The youth must be at the centre of decision-making in a post-Ruto Kenya. The political leadership must work for the people in a post-Ruto Kenya.

Sitati Wasilwa writes and speaks on geopolitics and governance.

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Arc of Authoritarianism Strengthening in East Africa

The debate on the centrality of democracy in promoting socioeconomic development is a chicken-and-egg conundrum. Most countries pursued development without embracing democratic institutions. Some of these countries later turned to establishing and strengthening their democratic institutions primarily after making significant development strides. Ha-Joon Chang meticulously demonstrates the nexus between democracy and economic development in his book, Kicking Away the Ladder.

Chang certifies two inescapable truths. First, the so-called developed countries were not democratic while developing. Second, the narrative of democracy as a pre-condition for economic development has been propagated by Western countries and multilateral institutions. It is a narrative that fits the frame of their global geostrategic interests.

I have made it a habit in my policy and political discourses to be guided by the prevailing context. Democracy is not key to economic development. However, this does not imply that authoritarianism is the absolute pathway to realising development. There is always the temptation to justify this by immortalising benevolent dictatorship. But it is unfair to validate benevolent dictatorship if at all a country has collectively approved Western-styled democratic institutions and practices. Obviously, this leads to another critical debate on whether Western democracy suits Africa and other non-Western countries.

We are currently accustomed to the absoluteness and cleavages of Western democracy. I mean, we may not have a better alternative at the moment. Though countries such as Botswana have proven that what could be thought of as Western democracy may as well have been practiced in African societies in the pre-colonial era. Botswana’s kgotla system demonstrably justifies this.

All East African countries have democratic or quasi-democratic institutions. The setup of these institutions is heavily Westernised. However, the democratic space in the region has been shrinking in recent years, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. No surprises for Uganda and Rwanda as authoritarian tendencies remain as firm as they have always been under the long-term presidencies of Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, respectively. There is not so much to anticipate in terms of democratic growth and development in these two countries.

Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu has proven to be a good student of his predecessor John Magufuli. President Suluhu has increasingly become authoritarian over the last year. Her agenda of Reconciliation, Resilience, Reform, and Rebuild (4Rs) is pretty much a package of hot air. Police brutality is a norm under her administration. Harassment and arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and other political dissidents are rife under her watch. Political-related abductions are part of her administration’s modus operandi.

President Suluhu has subtly proven to be incompetent and intolerant in the game of power just like Magufuli. Both seem to have a very wrong perspective of attempting to achieve development by oppressing their opponents. But these gimmicks are strategically aimed at consolidating power. In Suluhu’s case, she has illustrated her erratic power management skills by swiftly appointing and quickly dismissing high profile personalities.

In July 2024, she hastily revoked the appointment of senior executives in state corporations in the communications sector. In the same month, she fired two ministers; January Makamba (Foreign Minister) and Nape Nnauye (Information and ICT). Makamba served as Foreign Minister for 11 months and was Suluhu’s third appointee in the ministry since taking over from Magufuli. And there have been rafts of Cabinet reshuffles in her three-year rule. The Tanzania Intelligence and Security Services (TISS) has had three Director Generals since January 2023; quite an erratic turnover.

Kenya is an obvious basket case of fast-receding democratic gains in two years under the Kenya Kwanza coalition. The nightmarish memories of KANU and Daniel Arap Moi’s incompetent and authoritarian rule are back. Excessive use of police force, extrajudicial killings, abductions, torture, detention without trial, and fabricated charges are currently common. It takes a leader’s megalomaniac obsession to employ such inhumane tactics against the backdrop of persisting calls for better governance.

The highly publicized yet hollow Kenya Kwanza coalition manifesto – The Plan – has proven to be what the progressives initially thought of it. A flowery piece of excessively cheap jewelry. And this is an outcome of leadership without a philosophy. It is impossible to economically transform a country by retorting unphilosophical slogans coined around hustlers and wheelbarrows.

The fight against corruption is a lost cause under the Kenya Kwanza regime. The hastened withdrawal of high-profile corruption cases and closure of files by the Director of Public Prosecutions in the last two years affirms this. Consider the wealth accumulation of Kenya Kwanza-affiliated politicians and cronies. The recent vetting of Cabinet Secretary nominees is a microcosm of questionable wealth accumulation under this administration.

The Suluhu and Ruto administrations have never resisted the temptations of accusing external forces when questioned about their anti-democratic poses. Recently, President Suluhu criticised Western nations for calling her out on muzzling political dissidents. This does not mean that the West is spotless with regard to supporting authoritarian regimes. In Kenya, the West has been cagey in its condemnation of the brutality meted out to innocent young people in the wake of the pro-reform protests.

President Ruto and his team have illustrated they are typically out of touch with reality, shifting blame on the imagined sponsors of the youth-led protests. The Ford Foundation, Russia, Rigathi Gachagua, and Uhuru Kenyatta were blamed. So far, no evidence links any of these entities to the demonstrations. The creation of imagined enemies is an outcome of political leaderships that detest accountability.

Consolidation of political power can occur without endangering the fundamental rights and freedoms of opponents. This requires the mastery of the emotional and intellectual pathways of the game of power. Anything short of this denotes incompetence.

Democracy is certainly not a prerequisite for economic development. But it shields the people from the ill motives of demagogues and megalomaniacs. A Changian view may detest democracy as a vanguard for solid development. However, authoritarianism sets ideal conditions for extractive economic and political institutions. As solidly demonstrated by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in the book, Why Nations Fail, extractive institutions beget poor economic development. No coincidence that poverty rates in East Africa are barely decreasing almost six decades after independence.

Sitati Wasilwa writes and speaks on geopolitics and governance.  

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Netanyahu’s Israel Out to Profit from Wars and Instability in the Middle East

In April 1986, then US President Ronald Reagan labelled Muammar Gaddafi as the mad dog of the Middle East. This was in the aftermath of a bombing in Berlin that killed two US military officers, with Gaddafi’s residence targeted a few days later, resulting in the death of her adopted daughter. Libyan nationals were believed to have masterminded the attack that targeted a discotheque. Reagan, in his typical American Exceptionalism war-mongering paranoia, claimed Gaddafi intended to create a global Muslim fundamentalist revolution.

Anyway, while the context of the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East then is somewhat different from the current one, there is a constant. Israel continues to dictate what is right and wrong in the region. Its conflicts with Palestine and Lebanon linger. Obviously, the regional and global powers, including Israel’s closest ally, the US, have never been genuine in pursuing peace. Perhaps Reagan would go ahead and praise Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the military offensives in Palestine and Lebanon with some soothing melodies. After all, Israel is graciously protecting itself and the interests as well as values of its allies. Such a fabricated pun; polished, packaged, and sold. Well, Netanyahu aptly fits Reagan’s words of the mad dog of the Middle East. I mean, Netanyahu fantasizes about Israel’s expansionist agenda in the region; a rugged, amorphous revolution of sorts.

Israel’s extension of its military operations northwards into Lebanon demonstrates Netanyahu’s pursuit of his fantasies. And this is the problem of giving power to obsessive and arrogant egomaniacs. While wars are as old as humanity, it is illogical to kill innocent civilians in the name of targeting Hezbollah and Hamas militants. Of course, pro-Israel chaps will come out arms up chanting Israel’s right to self-defence in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attacks. Well, fair enough. But where are the limits of Israel’s aggression in the region? Most people – obviously the pro-Israel camps – conveniently forget that the events of October 7 did not occur in a vacuum.

In 2023, before October 7, the Israeli military had killed 205 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, while the Israeli settlers killed nine. On July 3, Israel conducted a 48-hour military operation targeting the Jenin refugee camp with drones and fighter jets. Earlier on June 19, the Israeli military targeted the occupied West Bank with airstrikes for the first time since the early 2000s. Based on these facts, Netanyahu’s Israel was simply obsessed with provoking retaliatory attacks and a war.

But why is Netanyahu pre-occupied with the petulant fantasies of triggering wars in the region? The primary aim of a colonial, apartheid state is to use violence to further its expansionist agenda. The devil certainly lies in the details! In 2023, the total number of settlement plans and tenders initiated by Israel in the occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank was higher than in 2022; in fact, the highest ever since 2012. The total number of Israeli settlement advancements increased by 180% in 2023 in a span of five years.

Israel had illegally seized 23.7 km2 of Palestinian land from January to July this year surpassing the total land size grabbed by Israel in the last 20 years collectively. As such, 2024 is historically significant in the course of the Israel-Palestine conflict as it represents the year with the highest ever illegal land grabs by Israel. I am almost certain Netanyahu’s Israel may attempt to re-occupy parts of southern Lebanon like it did from 1985 until 2000. The recent Israeli evacuation orders directed at Lebanese nationals in southern Lebanon strongly signal such a possibility.

Wars serve as golden distractions in the game of power. This is why generational economic heists, racketeering, pilferage, looting, and such always occur during wars. Think of any ongoing or past wars – Sudan, the DRC, Russia-Ukraine, Libya, Iraq, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and others – and you’ll clearly visualise the battle for resources. Thus, Netanyahu has never been interested in a ceasefire with Hamas. This instinctually and logically informs you that he is obsessed with his expansionist motives to completely dash any hopes of a sovereign Palestinian state.

Prolongation of the Israel-Hamas war and possible escalation of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah aim at generating obscene profits for the Israeli military-industrial complex. Defence companies form the basis of the military-industrial complex and a war economy is the lifeblood of these firms. In March this year, the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems disclosed an increase in its revenue in the fourth quarter from USD 1.5 billion to USD 1.6 billion on a year-on-year basis thanks to the offensive in the Gaza Strip. Elbit projected to hire an additional 2,000 workers this year compared to 1,000 in 2023. Furthermore, Elbit predicted an increase in sales to the Israeli government in the course of 2024 beyond its USD 1.2 billion usual annual sales. This is against the backdrop of the Israeli government approving a budget anticipated to increase defence spending by USD 5.5 billion annually. Elbit is a microcosm of the profits to be reaped by other defence companies due to the wars.

The prospects of peace are currently narrow in the region. Netanyahu understands he will be ejected out of office if the wars end, especially the Israel-Hamas war. Israel’s allies led by the US cannot force Netanyahu to halt the wars. The US may never want the wars to end for obvious geostrategic reasons. The UN and other multilateral institutions are toothless to push for any meaningful end of the conflicts. But certainly, a wider conflict is in the offing across the region though the firepower of Hezbollah’s allies cannot match that of Israel and its allies. In Clausewitzian sense, war is a continuation of politics by other means. In Machiavelli’s world, there are no morals in politics. However, morality should be enforced when wars degenerate into genocidal ventures. Another Gaza should not be allowed in Lebanon.

Sitati Wasilwa writes and speaks about geopolitical and governance-related issues.

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Kenya’s ‘Gen Z’ Movement is Not Yet Done!

Politics largely gravitates around interests. The history of politics is replete with references to why enmity in politics is illusionary. Kenya is a perfect case study of politics lacking morality, conscience, dignity, and high standards. No wonder Kenya is struggling with the same issues it was battling at independence; disease, poverty, and ignorance. Who is to blame? First, the political leadership has proven to be greedy putting first self-interests at the expense of the common good. Kenya is one of the countries where politics is an avenue to riches. Second, a citizenry is often threatened by fear-mongering and primitive tribal-based politics.

Anyway, here we are. A cornered president forced to embrace his one-time ally and leader during the formative years of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party. But why did President William Ruto work with former Prime Minister Raila Odinga in the aftermath of pro-governance protests? Ruto was desperate, so desperate to cling to power. Wasn’t it intriguing to see the globe-trotting president grounded within the Kenyan borders? So far, Ruto has only made one foreign trip in the last two months! 

It is contentious who approached the other between Ruto and Odinga. I guess Ruto made the first move. An important fact to note is that Odinga’s usurping of the youth-led revolutionary moment to consolidate his riches and those of his henchmen was not a surprise. Odinga had earlier cut a deal with Ruto to contest for the chairperson’s position of the African Union Commission (AUC). The award of key ministries to ODM leaders justifies that Odinga may have demanded these after being approached by Ruto to help him consolidate his power. 

Odinga’s Pro-Democracy Credentials and Back-end Deals with Presidents

Odinga’s political union with Ruto has watered down his pro-democracy credentials. These are the sunset years and Odinga understands that he stands no chance of ever being Kenya’s president. He is after cementing the legacy of his four-decade political career by attempting to clinch the coveted AUC chairperson’s post. Odinga has in the past forged political unions with presidents, but the recent one with Ruto is simply deceitful and disgusting. On the streets, on social media…”Odinga took advantage of the blood shed by the youth.” Elitist, progressive-minded, and youthful Odinga’s supporters have certainly withdrawn their support for the veteran politician. 

How does Odinga benefit from these political unions, unholy alliances for that matter, with presidents? Politics is dictated by interests, and as stated for centuries, there are no permanent friends and enemies in politics. Kenyans easily forget that Odinga is a billionaire and one of the wealthiest people in Kenya. We never really care that much to question Odinga’s acquisition of wealth. He is a hard worker, but his political stature and networks earned him these riches. It is documented in several sources that Odinga benefited from the union with Daniel Moi after the 1997 elections by acquiring the controversial molasses plant in Kisumu. Odinga, however, denies this in his autobiography, The Flame of Freedom. 

Let’s crack this further. Moi appointed Odinga as Minister for Energy post-1997 elections. Guess who has interests and investments in the gas industry? Odinga’s East Africa Spectre, a leading manufacturer of liquified petroleum gas cylinders, serves domestic and international markets. The son of Kenya’s first vice president Oginga Odinga insists in his autobiography that his union with Moi was a political strategy to make a second stab at the presidency in 2002. 

Most people claim the formation of the Grand Coalition Government after the 2007/2008 post-election violence was Odinga’s political union with Mwai Kibaki. I strongly differ. Kibaki rigged the 2007 elections which Odinga won. I will excuse Odinga as this was a forced political marriage with Kibaki. This is one of my justifications why Kibaki’s presidency is overrated. 

The March 2018 ‘handshake’ between Odinga and President Uhuru Kenyatta was a strategic blunder for Odinga’s presidential ambitions. First, some of his supporters believed he had betrayed them as several protesters lost their lives in anti-government demonstrations. Second, Odinga embraced Uhuru, a president who seemed not to care about consolidating his power. Anyway, Ruto’s presidency is an outcome of Odinga’s political short-sightedness. 

There are a few critical questions at this point. Has Odinga ever intended to win the presidential elections? Has he been running for the elections not to win but to protect his interests? Is Odinga’s pro-democracy legacy overrated? While Odinga’s pragmatic approach to winning power is somehow understandable, his taking advantage of the death of youth due to the use of excessive force by an incompetent regime dilutes his pro-democracy credentials. 

Ruto’s Project-Launching Spree: ‘Gen Z’ Are Winners

One of Ruto’s economic advisors who swims in bourgeoisie intellectualism and lives in an ivory tower recently claimed that ‘Gen Z’ challenged Ruto to a political contest. David Ndii, probably the most arrogant human south of the Sahara, claimed Ruto has pulled the rug under the Kenyan youth and is on the ground consolidating his support. The Ruto hater turned romanticist of the amorphous, caricatured bottom-up economic model in his usual dismissive tone chided the ‘Gen Z’ for being busy trolling the incompetent administration on social media instead of focusing on 2027. Well, Ndii intentionally forgets his role as troller-in-chief having dismissed the mobilisation on social media prior to the commencement of the protests on June 18 and even more notably on June 25. In June, Ndii sensationally labeled the youth on social media calling for reforms as ‘digital wankers’ who are cowardly to take to the streets. 

Anyway, he is a typical example of a court jester who entertains the king despite an impending political disaster. The fact that President Ruto has traversed villages launching menial projects demonstrates the power of the people. It is funny that Ruto is consolidating his power – anyway, politics is about optics and PR – but of course by mobilising artificial crowds. Optics, PR, and propaganda are effective when running election campaigns; running a government and improving the lives of the people demands competence and meritocracy. On this, Ruto has failed. 

In 2021, I purchased and read a book – Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders? The author deconstructs mediocre leaders and sub-par leadership. For instance, the author points out that we have great tolerance for people who are not as talented as they think. He goes on to state: “What it takes to get the job is not just different from, but also sometimes the reverse of, what it takes to do the job.” These are the sub-par metrics demonstrated by Ruto’s leadership. Ruto seems not to believe that Kenyans can protest against his leadership and demand his resignation. He overrates his importance. He demeans the intelligence of Kenyans. 

The project-launching spree will do little to change the course of a popular movement. A movement that is only concerned with high-quality governance and not the creation of wabenzis – mannerless, greedy, grandiose, arrogant politicians competing on who vomits quicker and heavily on Kenyans’ heads. Do not confuse a strategic retreat with a loss or surrender. The launching of dead and menial projects is akin to running on quicksand. And even before the project-launching rendezvous, the unarmed, peaceful ‘Gen Zs’ won, given the cowardly use of excessive force by the security apparatus against them. 

Aluta Continua! Of, For, and By the People

Earlier, I noted that President Ruto overrates or overestimates his capabilities, competence, and popularity – perhaps not as talented as he thinks. The popular, youth-led movement has not been politically nutmegged by the unholy political alliance of Willian Ruto and Raila Odinga. Here are the reasons why the ‘Gen Z’ movement is not yet done.

Economically, Kenya is far from creating decent, meaningful jobs. The Kenyan economy is mounted on weak fundamentals. Our economy can only continue creating conditions for informal, unsustainable jobs meaning that unemployment, underemployment, and poverty will thrive. These are issues that need concrete, long-term plans, and of course, killing corruption. Where do you expect these hungry, unemployed mobs to go? Exported to work as casuals in the Middle East? Drive boda bodas? Be mama mbogas? Reincarnate themselves as fool-proof hustlers? A hungry man is an angry man. 

A huge debt burden, if still poorly managed, will keep the flames of the revolution lit. Major weaknesses that Ruto’s advisors are not burning the midnight oil to sweet-talk him to get over it is his know-it-all attitude, detest for history, and probably his pococurante nature of not reading widely and deeply. Tax hikes will never propel developing, third-world economies to prosperity. A poorly managed, ballooned public debt is a harbinger for additional tax hikes commandeered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Ruto-led administration. But we need to be honest; tax increases are not the only ways to manage public debt. Ruto should ruthlessly kill corruption and renegotiate a significant number of existing debts. Otherwise, further tax hikes mean more poverty and you can guess the consequences. 

Related to the above, Ruto should mercilessly cut unnecessary spending. He has poorly performed on this. It seems the floodgates to quick riches and opulence were opened to his cronies as soon as he put down the sword and the constitution. One of Ruto’s pathways to failure is his preference for political expediency at the expense of competence and good results. I wonder about the extent of political debts he owes given his excessively large team of advisors and numerous hangers-on. Their time to eat perhaps! A consequence of untamed spending coupled with a huge debt burden is a higher incidence of poverty, and you expect the ‘Gen Zs’ to surrender…It is naive to think as such. 

Perhaps the final reason; the ‘Gen Zs’ are not cowardly, or they are rather more exposed and woke than their parents. And why do we have to be threatened when we express our dissatisfaction with poor governance? A culture we need to kill in Kenya and Africa is obeying those in power. Such a cowardly, embarrassing piece of advice. Aren’t we taxpayers? Why would a politician think the people are right and matter a great deal during elections, and the same people are perceived as enemies when demanding better leadership? Aluta continua…

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is an analyst of geopolitics and governance. His interests include armed conflict, foreign policy, power politics, political economy, leadership, and strategy.

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Kenyan Youth are Protesting Punitive Taxation. How Did We Get Here?

June 18 and 20 will be historically remembered as days when the Kenyan youth dared to rise against an administration perceived as economically oppressive. The protests have been structurally different from previous anti-government demonstrations, except for the use of excessive force by police officers. Never mind that the Kenyan police have a poor human rights history. This is an institution in dire need of reforms, given its systemic decay and corruption stretching over 60 years!

So far, no political party or notable political figure has been involved in organising or leading the protests. For long, Kenya has been accustomed to Raila Odinga leading similar protests. The personality of the protesters is also a stark contrast from the hired ruffians we are used to in previous anti-government protests. The organisation and mobilisation have been a break from the past. Social media platforms, especially X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok, have been instrumental in mobilising.

What’s the issue?

At the centre of the protests are controversial tax proposals. A significant number of Kenyan youth and Kenyans in general perceive the Finance Bill 2024 as economically oppressive. On June 18, shortly after the protests broke out, the ruling coalition announced that unpopular tax proposals had been dropped. These are 16% VAT on bread, VAT on financial services and forex transactions, 2.5% motor vehicle tax, excise duty on vegetable oil, and VAT on sugar transportation. The proposed eco levy on locally manufactured sanitary towels, diapers, motorcycles, tyres, computers, and phones was also dropped. No income tax will be levied on the Social Health Insurance and the Housing Tax.

The Kenya Kwanza administration believed that getting rid of the aforementioned taxes after public pressure would dissipate sentiments against the 2024 Finance Bill. Kenyans protesting against the controversial Bill are demanding its total rejection and do not want any amendments. This indicates other underlying grievances that the ruling coalition has chosen to ignore. And this is the problem when you have a president who believes he is larger than life, brilliant, and swims in illusions of grandeur.

Underlying grievances

The William Ruto-led administration has been less effective in addressing the rising cost of living. Ruto took office when the economy was at a crossroads with high public debt and slow economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. His administration opted to ravenously increase taxes as a means to raise revenue to settle part of the public debt. This never sat well with a good number of Kenyans who are battling poverty and reduced household budgets. Since September 2022, conversations in the streets, villages, and thoroughfares of major urban centres have centred around nicknaming President Ruto as Zacchaeus the Tax Collector.

There is seething anger, especially among schooled Kenyans, about the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the country’s economic management. The Ruto-led administration’s foreign policy leans heavily towards the West. The IMF is on record directing the Ruto administration to fast-track taxation measures to increase revenue. There is a big disconnect between the IMF’s demands and the on-ground reality. Making a decent living as a Kenyan is currently difficult.

This is not the first time that the IMF has played an active role in Kenya’s economic management by pushing for structural adjustment policies (SAPs) as a means of economic recovery. In the 1990s, the IMF pushed for similar SAPs that led to cuts in spending on healthcare, education, and physical infrastructure. These unrealistic policies also led to an increase in unemployment,, with a significant number of Kenyans retrenched from the public sector. The second-hand industry well-known locally as mitumba flourished courtesy of the SAPs. The policies simply killed the textile industry. The Ruto administration has bent backward the arc of history. Presently, there are constraints in financing public education, public healthcare, and other critical sectors.

Some of the legislators and ministers in the current government are not shy of displaying opulent lifestyles. Convincingly, these are proceeds from looted public resources. The youthful protesters are disgusted with this shameless exhibition of wealth by politicians whose salaries do not match their expensive watches, belts, clothes, cars, and houses, among other material stuff.

Arrogant political leadership

The Kenya Kwanza politicians, including the president, are arrogant and corrupted with power. Since taking over just over 20 months ago, Kenyans who question the ruling coalition for accountability are lectured on how President Ruto is brilliant enough to turn around the economy and offer decisive political leadership. He simply lacks the fundamentals to lead us towards prosperity of any kind. It is the Kenya Kwanza administration that has branded Kenya the “Singapore of Africa.” Clearly, the bottom-of-the-barrel stuff. Nothing done by this administration comes close to Singapore, a country whose GDP was almost at par with Kenya’s in the early 1960s.

Singapore’s governance is anchored on meritocracy, pragmatism, and honesty. The Ruto-led administration has demonstrated that any Tom, Dick, or Harry can be appointed to senior government positions without merit as long as they are sycophants. The Cabinet tells it all! The punitive taxes implemented and proposed indicate the lack of pragmatism to the on-ground reality. It is impractical to overtax people who are still battling the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and other systemic economic issues. Corruption defines the values or lack thereof of the Kenya Kwanza administration. This is far off from honesty.

Governing by lying is a leisurely walk on quicksand. You can win elections by lying but the same hardly works when running government. Most youthful Kenyans are simply fed up with regurgitated lies and endless promises. President Ruto has been heckled several times in public rallies over the last year. Embarrassingly, high-ranking Kenya Kwanza coalition politicians are arrogantly claiming that they are happy to have shifted the conversation from personality cults to economic issues. This is a howler.

History of resistance

Kenyans may not be the ideal individuals to publicly demonstrate against the government. However, Kenyans have historically resisted oppression and advocated for reforms. The fight for independence is a critical juncture that highlights the public’s pushback against oppression. Jomo Kenyatta may have been lucky to escape public outrage and fight for reforms even with the assassinations of the flamboyant Tom Mboya and the courageous J. M. Kariuki as well as the eminent Pio Gama Pinto. However, the less-spoken coup attempts of 1965 and 1971 highlight the dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Arap Moi, the passing cloud turned autocrat, endured a fair share of resistance in his 24-year presidency. First, the 1982 coup attempt which he was lucky to have his presidency saved. Second, the fight for the reintroduction of the multiparty political system in the early 1990s. Moi conceded to public pressure. Finally, Moi and his party KANU were sent packing in the December 2022 elections. It was always unimaginable that Moi and KANU would be dethroned from power. Voters massively voted for the opposition NARC coalition and its candidate Mwai Kibaki to teach Moi a lesson.

Kibaki squandered the best opportunity to change Kenya forever after two years in power. However, the 2005 constitutional referendum and the violent protests in the aftermath of the 2007 elections demonstrated the majority’s dissatisfaction with his leadership albeit robust economic growth. Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime oversaw punitive laws such as the amendment of the electoral laws. Uhuru was lucky to escape public resistance in his second term following the infamous March 18, 2018, handshake with Raila Odinga.

What does the future hold?

The protests are unlikely to stop. They will likely intensify as the Finance Bill 2024 awaits to go through the remaining legislative stages. The ruling coalition has the numbers to punitively pass the Bill. But these historical protests will change Kenya’s political history going forward.

President Ruto will be lucky to get reelected in 2027. Ruto won the presidential elections with a margin of around 200,000 votes in an election in which approximately eight million voters did not vote. The majority of those who did not vote were youthful voters. The youth are going to register and vote en masse come 2027. No way Ruto and his henchmen will survive the tsunami.

There is strength in numbers. I foresee a scenario where the youth will register their parties and field their candidates. Nothing definitely stops them. Around 80% of Kenya’s population is under 35 years. The median age of the Kenyan population is 19 years. I do not see any way out for the Ruto-led administration to change the economic fortunes of the youth in the remaining three years of his presidency. The chickens are fast coming home to roost. It is not yet uhuru for us!

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst. This article is a personal opinion and has no relation to his institutional affiliations.

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General F. O. Ogolla: A Farewell through the Lenses

Life is fickle! General Francis Omondi Ogolla seemed to have come to terms with human mortality. Last year at a church service, General Ogolla said, “In my military life, I have come to learn the reality of human mortality. I have appreciated that life is finite, humans are mortal, and life is short. One morning, you are with a healthy colleague. The next minute he is ashes and gone.” Sounds like a premonition!

April 18, 2024, will forever be etched in Kenya’s history. The death of the Chief of the Defence Forces (CDF) of the Republic of Kenya, General Francis Omondi Ogolla, the first for a sitting military chief in the country, is historical. General Ogolla’s appointment itself was historical; he was the first CDF from the Luo ethnic group. Then again, the Luos have endured painful moments in Kenya’s history with the controversial deaths of high-profile, promising, and ambitious figures. Tom Mboya and Robert Ouko are revered in death as they were in life.

One could definitely argue that Mboya was not a Luo proper; originally, he was from the Abasuba ethnic group. Nonetheless, the Abasuba are culturally assimilated by the Luo. Anyway, Mboya, Ouko, and Ogolla could have been cut from different clothes, but these were polished and suave gentlemen. Mboya stands out as the most brilliant politician in Kenya’s history. He was outstanding given his achievements for the 39 years he lived. He is the type of human who perhaps appears once every 100 years. This is how legendary musician Sam Mangwana described his compatriot and king of Rhumba, the Congo Colossus, and Grand Master Franco Luambo Makiadi.

Ouko, an affable, charismatic, and charming personality just like Mboya, could possibly have emerged as a key player on the national political scene. Ogolla may have enjoyed the privilege of breathing his last while at the peak of his military career. Mboya and Ouko were hardly at the peak of their political careers when they were assassinated.

General Ogolla’s death has certainly evoked these memories. Wild speculations are rife on whether his death was pre-planned or otherwise. I am tempted to avoid this debate, but I will certainly join the bandwagon. The circumstances surrounding Ogolla’s death are suspicious. There are claims that the aircraft initially scheduled to ferry the General was suddenly swapped at the last minute to transport a senior government official. This is unprofessional, at least if the claims are true.

Kenya has a notoriety for hero-worshipping senior government officials and politicians. This is no surprise for a country where politicians and their wheeler dealers prefer opulent lifestyles over intentional, goal-oriented policymaking and competent public service.

On April 2, 2015, during the Garissa University terrorist attack, a police aircraft that was to transport commandos to battle terrorists was used to fly the family of a senior police officer from holiday. In January last year, a high-cost, custom-made operational helicopter previously used for surveillance was upgraded and handed over to Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua for official and unofficial use. Quite absurd! There could be other similar instances.

Nonetheless, there are harsh realities that the Kenyan government must confront during and after investigations surrounding the helicopter crash that led to the General’s demise. Five military aircraft crashes in the last 12 months is a worrying trend the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the government should address. This is a terrible record for a military that is highly respected regionally and globally for its professionalism. The Cabinet Secretary of Defence Aden Duale, escaped death by a whisker when a KDF military helicopter hit a tree and crashed while taking off in Turkana in July last year.

A comprehensive audit of the entire KDF aircraft unit for hardware and personnel should be carried out, and the results publicised. Similarly, the outcome of the investigations into the cause of the crash of the helicopter ferrying General Ogolla and other military officers should be made public. But the investigations could take a long time; rumours indicate probably between six and 12 months or more. Gone are the days of the government hiding behind the curtains and not publicly sharing so-called sensitive and confidential information. From a security standpoint, though, there are concerns about publicly availing such information. However, at least the Parliament should be briefed about these results.

General Ogolla had an amiable personality. He came across as having a cool, calm, and collected personality. His passion for physical fitness was easily seen. He was physically fit at 62 years old and consistently exercised in the morning at the Ulinzi Sports Complex. A KDF bulletin reiterates his philosophy on holistic health for military officers. Ogolla was outspoken about the role of physical fitness for military officers and its benefits in sustaining discipline and good, long-term health. As he remarked, “Fitness is important in any military in the world, and it keeps you stronger, healthier, and more versatile.”

Ogolla’s predecessor General Robert Kibochi, was also a fitness enthusiast. In an interview, Kibochi disclosed a plaque in his office that read, “I respect fit people.” These two were visibly fit and in good shape. A good number of their predecessors had unpleasant potbellies. Physical fitness is a hallmark of a disciplined soldier. This also applies to police officers. Comparatively, Kenyan military officers are in better shape than police officers. I naturally frown upon men and women in uniform who are physically unfit.

Leading by example is a trait that General Ogolla embraced. This is a critical lesson for those in leadership or aspiring to lead. I have interacted with, read about, and observed leaders. Unfortunately, a majority never leads from the front and is full of mediocrity, wimpishness, and incompetence. Ogolla died while literally leading from the front. His morning exercise routine occasionally alongside different military units reinforces Ogolla’s mantra to lead by example.

How best will Ogolla be remembered? For attempting to overturn the victory of William Ruto as president-elect in 2022, as he claimed? As the shortest serving military chief in Kenya’s history so far? As Kenya’s first CDF who died in office? As another high-profile personality whose death is likely to remain a mystery for ages? He was a remarkable husband and father, and a steadfast philanthropist in his community in Alego Usonga. I will remember him for the little things that made him outstanding.

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical analyst with an interest in political economy, foreign policy, political risk, and armed conflict. He is passionate about leadership, strategy, and military-related issues.

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