When Institutions Fail, Football Falls

On March 17, the Confederation of African Football (CAF) declared Morocco the winners of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). It controversially overturned Senegal’s victory secured against Morocco in Rabat on January 18. 

The decision by the CAF Appeal Board is ridiculous and raises suspicions of possible bribery. The statement by the CAF President Patrice Motsepe on January 19 defending the decision was weak, horrendous, and incoherent. His face illustrated an obvious lack of confidence in the contents of his brief, unceremonious speech. 

Typically, football results are pegged on the final decision by the referee on the pitch. The Appeal Board cites Senegal’s abandoning of the match just before stoppage time for 15 minutes after the referee controversially awarded Morocco a penalty. There were also unsporting dramatic episodes during the match, with Moroccan players petulantly running after the glove towel of Senegal’s goalkeeper. CAF ultimately imposed hefty fines on each team weeks ago. 

These incidents highlight the problem of football and sports in general in Africa: weak institutions. This reflects the African governance challenge, where meritocracy, integrity, and hard work are frowned upon by those in power. 

Think of the appeal decision and the entire match-related processes as similar to electoral processes in Africa, and consider that most African countries abhor foolproof systems. First, the activities on the pitch were influenced by the emotions of the Moroccan fans and, by extension, the Moroccan football authorities. Childish, bizarre behaviour by Moroccan players and unorthodox decisions by the referee. Morocco behaved like the typical African heads of state and governments and their sycophants who are sore losers and always seek to influence the election results.

Second, the CAF Appeal Board mirrors the electoral appellate bodies in Africa, which go by different names and levels depending on a country’s constitution. These could be electoral commissions, supreme courts, courts of appeal, high courts, or supreme councils. The name does not matter. These entities in Africa have normalised making rulings that resonate with those in power. The circumstances under which the Appeal Board ruled in favour of Morocco fell short of the prescribed CAF statutes threshold. But this did not matter. 

Back home in Kenya, I stopped going to the stadium to watch football matches whose results are predetermined. Match officials, players, officials from the Football Kenya Federation (FKF), and opportunistic individuals collude to fix matches. Match-fixing is not a reserve of African football. It occurs in other parts of the world, but there is a serious lack of effort to eliminate this vice in Africa. 

There is a former Kenyan goalkeeper who is currently facing prosecution over match-fixing suspicion. Before he was finally caught speaking to a match-fixer in a viral video, I was not convinced with his posture between the sticks and his dramatised jumps and failed saves letting in cheap goals which a well-stitched scarecrow would save! 

It is agonising paying for match tickets and watching compromised games. The standards of the Kenya Premier League have fallen so badly because of the lack of belief in the sanctity of institutions. 

Currently, there are concerns about the lack of readiness by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, especially Kenya, to host the joint AFCON tournament in 2027. Recently, the Sports Principal Secretary Elijah Mwangi cautioned that Kenya risks losing the opportunity to host the tournament if it fails to pay the KES 3.9 billion hosting fee. Tanzania and Uganda have paid it. 

There are also concerns about delayed repairs at the Kasarani International Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium. Apparently, the Kasarani Stadium contractor is owed KES 3.7 billion and has reduced the workforce, with the completion deadline in six months. At Nyayo, the contractor is owed KES 2.6 billion and has vacated the site.

But there are spirited defences by the Ruto-led regime and its acolytes to carelessly marvel at the so-called infrastructural beauty that the Raila Odinga International Stadium (formerly Talanta Stadium) is. Last month, the Auditor General revealed that KES 11 billion for the stadium’s construction cannot be accounted for. The stadium’s initial value was KES 44.5 billion, but its expenses have exceeded that by the amount questioned by the Auditor General. Also, bear in mind that Kenyan taxpayers are expected to pay over KES 100 billion in interest for 15 years for the stadium. 

CAF and most African football bodies are despicable institutions. And one wonders why European football is way more popular than local football. Why support that which is doomed and purposely designed to fail? The starry-eyed and inconsequential ‘pan-Africanists’ may find my stance uncomfortable and Eurocentric. No apologies, anyway. 

The debate on the limited support for African football and massive fanaticism for European football should not be reduced to colonialist and anti-colonialist perspectives. Human beings respond to incentives and disincentives. And such responses are strong in this era of a highly globalised world. 

Two interesting football-related books lie pretty in my library: How Soccer Explains the World by Franklin Foer and Soccernomics by Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski. Kuper writes interesting football articles for the Financial Times.  

Chapter 7 of Foer’s book is titled “How Soccer Explains the New Oligarchs.” Before it, Chapter 5 is “How Soccer Explains the Survival of Top Hats.” While these two chapters are limited in examples and references to African football, their explanations resonate with African football.

In Chapter 5, Foer narrates the failure of foreign investment to turn around the big Brazilian clubs of Corinthians and Flamengo in the 1990s due to systemic corruption. The great Pelé then was the president of the Brazilian football federation. He proposed and enacted progressive measures requiring football clubs to operate as transparent capitalist ventures. However, these measures were sneered at by the heads of the football clubs. Foreign investment found its way out of Brazil. 

Foer goes ahead to offer a damning explanation of Pele’s boundaries to no longer forgive his corrupt allies in the country’s football system. He states: “It’s not far from the sociologist Edward Banfield’s famous 1958 study of corruption, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Banfield explained that it’s the most familial-based societies, where the sense of obligation is strongest, that breed the worst nepotism and cronyism.” This highlights the failures of the African football institutions. 

In Chapter 7, Foer gives hilarious accounts about the fancy, monied owners of Italian football clubs. This trend is replicated in other parts of the world, including Africa. The point of departure between Africa and the rest of the world is that in the former, most of the owners disregard the relevance of strong football institutions. There is a former squeaky-voiced and disgraced head of FKF who personifies this unholy institutional wickedness. 

Soccernomics presents riveting insights and conclusions about football in the developing world, including Africa. Kuper and Szymanski argue that wealth and well-being are significant indicators of a country’s sporting success. Of course, there are outliers to every statistical analysis. In Africa, football authorities view the game more as a pastime adventure than a commercial opportunity. It could be because of African economic conditions, but this is not an excuse for the oligarchs in charge of football to enrich themselves. The authors make a harsh conclusion: “People all over the world might want to play sports, but to make that possible requires money and organization that poor countries don’t have.”  Organisation refers to credible, competent institutions.

There is another bold observation by Kuper and Szymanski: “To win at sports, you need to find, develop, and nurture talent. Doing that requires money, know-how, and some kind of administrative infrastructure. Few African countries have enough of any.”  This is factually correct! This is not confined to football. Many sporting disciplines in most African countries are enduring these challenges.

Sports are geopolitically vital events. These are soft power projection avenues. African countries are generally laid-back geopolitically, often waiting for the rest of the world to set the pace. Probably it makes sense not to have high expectations with African countries still struggling with the basics of good governance. 

I will spare my energy and time to fervently watch and cheer non-African sports, for to passionately dedicate effort towards African sports is among the 1,000 ways to die. I repeat: I am no pan-African whatsoever!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on geopolitical and governance issues.

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Iran War: A Podcast with KOT FM/Mizani254

Recently, I conversed with Eli Likuyani of Mizani254/KOT FM on the US-Israel-Iran war. The discussion is available on YouTube here.

Many are getting it wrong or are confused about the main objectives of the US-Israel war against Iran. This is due to narrative control by the administrations of US President Donald Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu.

Trump, Netanyahu, and their henchmen insist on neutralising Iran’s nuclear programme and capabilities. They also claim to seek to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities. And of course, they are targeting a regime change in Iran.

The biggest goal for the US and Israel in Iran is regime change. The other two objectives are secondary. Netanyahu has historically had a notorious obsession with dislodging Iran’s complex political and military leadership and imposing a puppet regime. Some of his illusory statements can be traced to media interviews in the 1980s and 1990s, way before he became prime minister.

In recent years, Netanyahu’s grand propaganda poses and statements involved presenting incorrect maps showing Iran’s nuclear development sites.

Netanyahu’s obsession is anchored on his grand vision of a ‘Greater Israel’ near its borders and an Israel that is the most dominant and powerful state in the Middle East. The imperialist vision of a ‘Greater Israel’ underscores the wars in Palestine and Lebanon as well as the continued occupation of parts of these countries and Syria by Israeli forces. The recent Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hezbollah wars aimed to weaken these two formations and consequently scale down Iran’s geopolitical dominance in the region.

For many years, Netanyahu attempted to hoodwink US presidents into starting a war against Iran. Previous US presidents avoided entrapment by Bibi until Trump’s second term. The 12-day war in June 2025 and the ongoing conflict illustrate Bibi’s success in fooling Trump, and much credit goes to the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington.

This war was unjustified. A day before the attacks on February 28, Oman-mediated talks on Iran’s nuclear programme registered decent progress. It not only plays to the dangerous power illusions of Bibi and Trump but also to their fanatical religious fundamentalism.

The White House has published photos and videos of Trump humbling himself before church ministers in intercessory sessions. The US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently said that “crazy regimes like Iran, hell-bent on prophetic Islamic delusions, cannot have nuclear weapons.” Netanyahu, in an attempt to drive up Jewish support for the war, recently noted that: “Remember what Amalek did to you. We remember and we act”, to win the Israeli public’s support for the war.

Earlier this month, some U.S. military commanders told US forces that the war against Iran is biblical. The commanders consider it God’s divine plan to trigger Armageddon (the prophesied final battle in the Book of Revelation) and usher in the return of Jesus Christ.

This is a conflict rooted in multiplexities, and the religious angle highlights the classical clash of civilisations. This is rooted in propaganda, cultural imperialism, and civilisational arrogance. It’s a recurring pattern in wars waged by the US post-World War II. But regime change is the absolute goal.

Duration of the War

It’s difficult to predict when wars will end—the certainty of when they will end is not a coin flip. We can only rely on specific trends and indicators to think of the likely trajectory of a war. It is much easier to predict when war is likely to start than when it will end.

A key indicator signaling the possible commencement of war is the unusual military buildup, particularly near the primary front lines. This sounds like an obvious fact, but many commentators and analysts miss it by making assumptions. Nonetheless, war is inherently not entirely scientific, despite advances in disciplines such as game theory. Even seasoned analysts miss these indicators.

Before the Russia-Ukraine war broke out four years ago, there was an intense military buildup in the border areas. Many were accustomed to similar buildups, which occurred frequently, but few anticipated a full-scale war.

Weeks before the February 28 US-Israeli attacks on Iran, the US intensified the deployment of its military assets in the region. Many missed it, perhaps because Oman-mediated talks were progressing well.

There is a high possibility that Ethiopia and Eritrea will go to war. This is in light of the intense military buildup in border areas. Heavy deployments occurred prior to the 2020-2022 Tigray War. Again, few anticipated a breakout of war. It was largely assumed that the heavy deployments were deterrence mechanisms to increase the stakes for power negotiations.

A massive economic slump caused by the current conflict is probably the key issue that could occasion a shorter war. An economic crisis aggravated by widespread disruptions to the supplies of oil, gas, and other commodities would hit the world harder.

White House estimates that the war will last four to six weeks or into mid-2026. Other reports in Washington suggest that the Trump regime is prepared for military operations against Iran until September this year. On March 8, the Iranian military said it is prepared to fight an intense war for at least six months. While these are statements to depict a show of might, they signal the willingness of the adversaries to engage in a protracted conflict.

The initiators of wars usually desire to have brief, intense military operations. But there are hardly any phenomena that are overtaken by the law of unintended consequences, perhaps except for wars. The failure to achieve the primary objectives usually prolongs wars. US-led military interventions post-World War II initially started with the promises of brief operations to protect civilians, destroy the capabilities of the perceived terrorists, or destroy the weapon-making sites and arms industrial complexes. But somehow, these evolved into regime change ambitions.

Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas, Gaddafi’s Libya, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan, the US and Israel, this time, are facing an adversary that is fairly well-armed and has prepared for such a confrontation for a long time.

The US and Israel are likely to make the mistake that Russia made against Ukraine. Russia was more powerful than Ukraine at the onset of the war in terms of military technology and the overall power of the armed forces. Nothing has changed in the course of the war four years later. But Russia is yet to kick out President Zelenskyy from power, thanks largely to arms supplies from Ukraine’s Western allies.

Russia’s President Putin assumed that Ukraine’s inferior military and weapons would guarantee Moscow a quick victory. Trump and Netanyahu are assuming that pounding Iran heavily and decimating its political, military, and religious leaders would guarantee victory.

Ukraine got arms supplies from its allies that pushed back Russia and led to a war of attrition. What stops Iran from sourcing supplies and technology from the so-called Axis of Aggressors – China, Russia, and North Korea?

The US and Israel are fighting amidst concerns of inadequate arms supplies to sustain the war for weeks or months. US stockpiles are particularly stretched due to supplies to Ukraine and Israel over the past two and a half years.

Regime change further protracts conflicts and makes them messier. This was the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Similar observations can be made in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war. And a similar fate is highly likely in Iran if the US and Israel contemptuously insist on toppling the current government.

Regime Change Prospects

The Iranian government faces significant opposition domestically. This cannot be dismissed. Yet it is ignorant to assume that the government has no support among a substantial number of Iranians.

At the height of the recent mass anti-government protests in Iran, Donald Trump pledged to send assistance to the protesters and urged them to push on until the leadership resigns. This is the classical Washington playbook: capitalise on domestic and regional crises to fuel regime change.

Supporting the Kurdish fighters to be part of a ground invasion force to fight the Iranian government may not yield the desired outcome of regime change. The Kurds make up around 10% of the Iranian population, and having them as US-Israeli proxies may only serve to fuel nationalistic sentiments and strengthen support for the Iranian government.

Geography will play a crucial role in the battleground dynamics of the war in the event of a ground offensive by the US and Israel. Western Iran is highly mountainous, and the mastery of this terrain could be an advantage to Iranian forces. Iran could well be another mission failure for the US and Israel.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on geopolitical and governance issues.

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Willy Ngoma is Dead But M23 is not Weakened

The spokesperson of the M23 rebel group, Willy Ngoma, was killed in a Congolese military attack near Rubaya in Masisi territory in North Kivu Province yesterday. Drones targeted M23 leaders, and reports suggest that others could be severely injured or dead, including the group’s military chief, Sultani Makenga. 

These are significant personnel losses for M23. Would this shift the conflict in favour of the Congolese military and government? 

The President Felix Tshisekedi administration seems to be intensifying its offensive to recapture the highly lucrative Rubaya mines from the M23 rebels. A week ago, reports indicated that the Congolese government had offered the Rubaya mines to the US as part of the minerals-for-security framework signed in Washington on December 4, 2025. 

Rubaya makes up about 15% of the global coltan supply. A December 2024 report by UN experts indicates that coltan mining and trade generate approximately USD 800,000 per month for the M23. These figures illustrate the strategic significance of the Rubaya mines.

Congolese forces reserve the right to use any means, including force, to reclaim the territory occupied by the rebels. However, force may not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes. The Congolese military mirrors President Tshisekedi’s impatience. His impatience led to a wider rebel conflict in the Kivu region.

In 2023, Tshisekedi demanded the exit of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). The EACRF was succeeding in pacifying the war. Tshisekedi was unimpressed with the EACRF’s non-offensive mandate. He pushed for the deployment of the SAMIDRC (the Southern African Development Community peacekeeping mission) with an offensive mandate. The SAMIDRC suffered substantial losses and could not effectively combat the M23 rebels. 

He also demanded the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces in 2023. The exit was paused in mid-2024 following an increase in violence in North Kivu. 

Tshisekedi has failed to reform and transform the Congolese military into a formidably disciplined force. His administration heavily relies on militia groups, foreign mercenaries, and ad hoc alliances with regional forces and rebel groups. 

What’s more, Tshisekedi has performed poorly diplomatically. His relations with the EAC and SADC states indicate his desire for quick, one-sided outcomes unaccompanied by concessions. The DRC is entitled to reclaim its sovereignty, but Tshisekedi should not ignore historical facts perpetuating the conflict that would be critical in prioritising diplomatic solutions to end fighting. 

M23 enjoys the support of Kagame’s Rwanda. Kagame is highly experienced in conflicts in the region, an advantage that Tshisekedi does not have the benefit of. M23 is relatively disciplined and organised. 

It would be reckless to pronounce M23’s weakening in the aftermath of Ngoma’s death and the attack on the group’s senior leaders. The dead and injured leaders will be replaced. This is a worst-case scenario that the group and its financiers anticipated. 

Ngoma’s death could be a critical juncture in the conflict. The M23 could launch retaliatory attacks against Congolese government interests. Overall, these developments threaten ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire and long-term peace and stability. The M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Rubaya and other occupied areas in the Kivu region.

The US is unlikely to offer direct military assistance to the DRC to counter Rwanda at this time and in the future. Kagame has been a close ally of the US for decades. The US considers him a reliable and effective partner, particularly due to Rwanda’s peacekeeping role in the region. It would be a strategic faux pas for Washington to abandon Kagame for Tshisekedi. 

Trump’s administration intends to get the Congo’s critical minerals to rival China. But Donald Trump’s foreign policy ambitions and geostrategic interests are infatuations at best with regard to the Congo. The security situation in Kivu is too complex for the US. Kagame is aware that any military assistance for the DRC by the US could create momentum for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels. 

Tshisekedi fantasises about making riches out of the deal with the US, but he’s rushed to believe he’ll retake Rubaya or end the war by simply taking out a few M23 leaders. The war will persist. 

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about geopolitics and governance issues. 

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Four Years of the Russia-Ukraine War: Africa Can’t Escape

The fourth anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war comes at a time when there is not so much to indicate an imminent ceasefire and a peace deal. Russia is hellbent on its stance to take over Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow is also unlikely to change its demand on Ukraine, maintaining neutrality over its relations with its allies, especially the European Union. 

Ukraine, whilst generally outmatched by Russia throughout the conflict, has mounted significant defences and offensives. These have prevented some of Russia’s main objectives, especially regime change. A peace deal is likely to favour Russia, given US President Donald Trump’s much more favourable view of President Vladimir Putin. The war of attrition is expected to persist given the current circumstances.

Far from the frontlines, Africa cannot escape the impact of the war. The spillovers of the conflict are not as intense as they were four years ago. However, the war of attrition implies that African countries will continue to get sucked into the conflict in various ways. 

Russia signed multiple defence, security, and economic agreements with several African countries in the course of the war. The Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are notable examples. The Russia-Ukraine war coincided with coups and anti-French/Western sentiments in these countries. 

Little success has been registered through these cooperations. The deployments of Russian mercenaries in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have barely been revolutionary in combating armed groups. The exit of the French and other Western actors seems not to have fully restored the sovereignty of these Sahelian states. 

Moscow recalled a host of its mercenaries multiple times from these countries and redeployed them on the frontlines in Ukraine and Russia in the course of the war. 

We are yet to see another attempt by Ukraine to support armed groups against Russian mercenaries that are backing the military-led governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since July 2024. In July 2024, the Azawad rebels in northern Mali ambushed a convoy of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries. Ukraine claimed it supported the rebels to carry out the attack. 

Ukraine is less likely to replicate such alliances of convenience and, in these Sahel countries, to target Russian interests. Russia, thanks largely to propaganda, is viewed as a messianic partner within these states and in several African countries. It is considered a better alternative to the West, although fundamentally, the interests of the West and Russia are driven by extractive motives. The West’s assistance to Ukraine reinforces the positive perception of Russia. 

As the war of attrition persists and the conflict enters its fifth year, the recruitment of foreigners to fight in the war could intensify. Recently, there has been an uproar over Russia’s recruitment of Africans. 

In November 2025, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said 1,400 people from 36 African countries were fighting for Russia, with a substantial number held as prisoners of war by Ukraine. Around 200 Kenyans had travelled to fight for Ukraine, according to the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs in November last year. 

A recent report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) indicates that approximately 1,000 Kenyans have been enticed to fight for Russia. Employment agencies are recruiting financially desperate civilians and former police and military officers. 

Russia has denied facilitating the recruitment of Kenyans and Africans. But of course, you do not expect Moscow to admit its role in enlisting and deploying foreigners on the frontlines. Kenyan authorities are unlikely to prosecute the proprietors of these agencies. There are numerous cases implicating employment agencies for rogue recruitment practices. However, prosecutions are delayed and abandoned, as the owners are close to the powers that be. This is anticipated for the proprietors of the agencies recruiting fighters for Russia.

Financial desperation and limited meaningful employment opportunities in Kenya and other African countries will incentivise more Africans to look forward to fighting for Russia. Very few would resist offers of monthly salaries of KES 350,000, bonuses of KES 900,000 to 1.2 million, and Russian citizenship. 

Historically, major wars in the world have involved foreign fighters. This was the case during the World Wars and other armed conflicts post-World War II. Thousands of Africans were recruited and deployed on the frontlines in Africa, Asia, and Europe. So, the recruitment of Kenyans and other Africans is not a new phenomenon. 

Kenya’s Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi is scheduled to visit Russia in March to negotiate the release and repatriation of Kenyans stuck in the war. This is positive. But the fact that Kenyans are recruited scandalously highlights the incompetence of the Kenya Kwanza coalition-led government. Where was the intelligence agency when the recruitment commenced? Certainly, cronies tied to the ruling coalition are making millions out of the venture. It is a Russian roulette for these African fighters!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on politics, geopolitics, and other governance-related issues. 

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ODM’s Rift: Raila’s Legacy Up for Auction 

The death of Raila Odinga’s father, Oginga Odinga, in January 1994 cast a dark shadow on the future of the FORD-Kenya party. The party disintegrated due to irreconcilable differences on who would succeed Oginga Odinga. Raila Odinga led a faction that demanded elections to settle the succession issue, while Kijana Wamalwa led the camp that believed he was Oginga’s natural successor. Wamalwa was the party’s first vice chairperson. Raila was the deputy director of elections.

Raila seemed not convinced of Wamalwa’s leadership. It could be that Wamalwa circumstantially found himself in FORD-Kenya after losing favour in the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Wamalwa was largely perceived as not radical enough and could easily be compromised by KANU. 

FORD-Kenya substantially weakened following the exit of Raila and his allies to the National Development Party (NDP). Wamalwa attempted to strengthen the party, but it faltered into a regional party in parts of Western Kenya. Wamalwa’s death plunged the party into an endemic, generational leadership crisis. It is unlikely that the lion party will restore its dominance.

The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party is at a crossroads following Raila’s demise. History is bound to repeat itself. Like his father, Raila’s posthumous legacy will be defined by a disintegrated party. This is a fundamental weakness affecting political parties in Kenya when their dominant leader dies, retires, or party-hops. Kenyan political parties are institutionally weak. 

KANU weakened with Daniel Moi’s retirement as president. Its fortunes diminished further when its chairperson, Uhuru Kenyatta, decamped to The National Alliance (TNA) prior to the 2013 elections. The Democratic Party (DP) and the Party of National Unity (PNU) were rendered hopeless with Kibaki’s party hopping, retirement, and mugwumpiness. 

Chilling Crossroads 

After Raila’s death, I wrote an article reflecting on his legacy. I argued that Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, is unsuitable to lead ODM mainly due to two reasons. First, he is compromised by President Ruto’s desperate 2027 reelection ambitions. Second, he doesn’t represent the ODM of the future and is unlikely to strongly champion a futuristic pathway for the party’s long-term dominance.

In 1966, Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga declared former Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba a national hero. Five years earlier, in January 1961, Mobutu, along with Moise Tshombe, the Belgian state, and the US, coordinated the murder of Lumumba. Mobutu sought to consolidate power by posthumously rehabilitating Lumumba and neutralising his influence by declaring him a national hero. 

When Raila died, Ruto declared a state burial for him and also awarded him the CGH honour posthumously. Recently, he appointed Raila’s wife, Ida, Kenya’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). This mirrors Mobutu’s posthumous rehabilitation and neutralisation playbook. Such is the game of power. 

The most intriguing neutralisation of Raila’s support base was the hurried declaration of Oburu as ODM’s party leader, and embarrassingly so, before Raila was buried. As I wrote, Ruto’s invincible hand in Raila’s succession is visible. 

When a predator is hunting, it conveniently and cleverly picks out the weakerprey in a group. Some of ODM’s national leaders, such as Gladys Wanga, Abdulswamad Nassir, Simba Arati, John Mbadi, Hassan Joho, Opiyo Wandayi, and Junet Mohammed, among others, were picked out by Ruto. They were influenced to push for Oburu’s immediate takeover of the party when Raila died.

ODM’s rift mirrors the discord in the FORD movement in the early 1990s. Daniel Moi and KANU singled out the Kenneth Matiba faction and covertly financed it, leading to FORD’s disintegration. Ruto is manipulating ODM. A weak and divided ODM may enable Ruto’s party, the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), and its affiliates to make inroads into some of ODM’s strongholds. Ruto’s fear is a united ODM, which could easily field a presidential candidate independently or jointly with other opposition parties. 

Oburu is not a man of his own as far as ODM’s leadership is concerned. He is a lame duck, weak, easily compromised, and lacks the wherewithal to be a grand strategist. You may not expect so much from a grand old man who audaciously expressed his surprise upon his appointment as ODM’s acting party leader when Raila died. Oburu cannot run for president. His old age, lack of independent-mindedness, and almost non-existent charisma complicate his potential candidature. And these attributes were considered by Ruto when he covertly pushed for Oburu’s leadership of the party. Oburu is not a threat to Ruto’s ambitions, unlike if the party settled for more youthful and ambitious leaders to head it. 

Following the ouster of Edwin Sifuna as ODM’s Secretary General, 10-year-old tweets of the late controversial businessman Jacob Juma resurfaced. His opinions about Oburu may appear condescending, but it seems Juma knew a bit more about some of his political associates. Juma considered Oburu a liability to Raila’s presidential ambitions. And Juma could have been right.

Pragmatism is a key to winning and consolidating political power by forming alliances with adversaries. However, pragmatism loses its effectiveness when such alliances are established devoid of strategic thinking. The political alliance (handshake) between Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2018 was one of the former’s biggest political blunders, courtesy of Oburu. 

Uhuru was in dire need of political survival due to sustained opposition to his administration’s policies by Raila’s coalition. Raila needed political capital for the 2022 elections. Uhuru benefited more than Raila. And it was Oburu who was approached by Uhuru’s emissaries to convince Raila to create an amorphous political alliance. 

Oburu’s public speeches are structurally managed by external forces to endorse Ruto’s reelection. This is a lack of ambition, given ODM’s stature. Oburu has repeatedly said the party will neither field a presidential candidate nor contest for the deputy president role. This may have made Raila squirm and turn in his grave. 

ODM’s disintegration is also an outcome of Raila’s poor succession planning. One of Raila’s weaknesses was surrounding himself with opportunistic and vulturine allies, and failing to learn from history. Raila was a victim of the illusion of immortality. Whilst he was a champion of strong institutions of governance in Kenya, he failed to establish robust party structures that would outlive him.

The appointment of Arati, Nassir, and Vihiga’s Senator Godfrey Osotsi as deputy party leaders, and Wanga as chairperson, following the formation of the mongrel broad-based government, strengthened my conviction that Raila wasn’t willing to work with the competent. Raila had a notorious tolerance for working with people who were less competent in winning power. This partly explains his presidential election losses in 2013, 2017, and 2022. 

Before his death, ODM’s pro-Ruto faction schemed to remove Edwin Sifuna as the party’s Secretary General. These maneuvers intensified after Raila died. ODM’s pro-Ruto faction, while recklessly demanding Sifuna’s resignation, fails to appreciate the party’s history of high-profile decamps that significantly affected its performance in elections. ODM is a great example of hopelessly relying on nostalgia as a strategy. Retreating to a familiar yet serially failed strategy is grand incompetence. 

William Ruto abandoned ODM in favour of the United Republican Party (URP) following a breakdown in relations with the Odinga camp during the grand coalition government. Musalia Mudavadi also quit ODM for the United Democratic Front (UDF). These were two significant losses for ODM, with Mudavadi and Ruto then serving as the first and second ODM deputy party leaders. Raila and his henchmen were upbeat about winning the 2013 election, belittling the impact of the departures of Ruto and Mudavadi. 

History is uncannily repeating itself. Some repeats could be rebirth moments. Others could be ruthless, oblivion-sending spells. Some may turn out as mere perpetuation of the status quo. As far as ODM’s ideals and Raila’s legacy are concerned, post-Raila events could be oblivion-sending spells, particularly for the party itself. Dismissing Sifuna as the party’s Secretary General is a strategic mistake for ODM.

Raila had tremendous respect for Sifuna. He understood the party’s lack of talent in having a strong, intelligent, independent spokesperson like Sifuna. Even some of the party’s sycophants and long-standing stalwarts, such as John Mbadi, admit it. On February 11, Mbadi revealed that while they pushed for Wafula Buke to succeed Ababu Namwamba as the party’s Secretary General in 2015, Raila insisted on having Sifuna due to his strong personality. This stands out as one of Raila’s most remarkable personnel appointments. I am certain ODM would be weaker with Wafula Buke as the Secretary General. Revolutionaries are good foot soldiers, but are usually terrible at winning and retaining power. They tend to be delusional and idealistic. 

The loss of Raila and Sifuna has left ODM with talentless and short-sighted leadership. This will significantly accelerate the party’s unpopularity. Politics has no morals in Machiavelli’s view, and ODM has the right to dismiss Sifuna. However, competence is critical over emotionally-driven decision-making, and this is where ODM’s caricatured leadership gets it wrong. ODM’s leaders and supporters loyal to the Oburu faction erroneously believe that Raila’s massive support equates to the party’s popularity. They are overestimating themselves and ODM’s popularity. Raila was bigger than ODM. 

Sifuna’s interim successor illustrates the lack of serious talent in ODM, especially in the Oburu faction. Catherine Omanyo is incoherent, inept, and unambitious, traits that are adored by the party’s Oburu-allied leaders and supporters. Recall my earlier denunciation of Raila’s – and by extension – ODM’s fondness for weak leaders; Wanga, Arati, Nassir, Osotsi, and Oburu. Add Omanyo to this, and you have a team of audaciously incompetent and flamboyantly thoughtless party leadership. Disastrous. Oburu, perhaps, may have learnt this from Raila, or he advised Raila to constitute such a team of theatrical losers. It would be foolhardy to expect such weak leadership to strengthen ODM and position it to ambitiously contest the 2027 presidential election. 

ODM embarrassingly struggles to prove that nostalgia cannot be a strategy. Raila’s death was a big blow to the party’s fortunes. Oburu’s takeover is cataclysmic. And Sifuna’s ouster is preposterous. Raila’s death ought to have been a rejuvenation moment for ODM. But as earlier stated, ODM and Raila seem allergic to killer strategies that would strengthen the party. For Sifuna, this is a Damascus moment. He has high potential to be Kenya’s consequential politician for my generation. For ODM, it may find solace in KANU’s and FORD-Kenya’s fall from glory; this path is inevitable. For Raila, his legacy of a vibrant party is being annihilated by his blood brother, Oburu, but at least in his death. So unfortunate that he cannot witness ODM’s faltering fortunes. 

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about African geopolitical and governance-related issues. 

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Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius, and Power Politics 

On January 24, 2026, I appeared on Egypt’s leading regional television network, Al-Qahera News. The discussion focused on the sovereignty of Mauritius. This is in light of US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks accusing the UK of planning to give away the Diego Garcia Island, alongside other islands in the Chagos Archipelago, to Mauritius. 

Trump perceives the UK’s intention to surrender the islands as great stupidity, noting that China and Russia will take advantage of it and enhance their influence. 

President Trump’s view of the UK’s handover of the archipelago to Mauritius as a case of great stupidity is a classic Trumpian tantrum, but it also reflects great power rivalry, colonial legacy, neocolonial footprints, and the relativism of international law. 

Trump’s remarks on Diego Garcia and Chagos contradict his earlier position. In 2025, he praised the deal signed between the UK and Mauritius over the planned handover of Chagos and a 99-year lease of Diego Garcia as a momentous achievement. Power politics necessitate recalibrating commitments and flipping positions for self-interest. 

Trump’s sidestepping of the 2019 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), highlighting the urgent return of Chagos to Mauritius, is intentional but woeful. He was in his first term as president. But that’s the bullish nature of great powers, which constantly undermine the sanctity of global institutions. Such is the Thucydidean power doctrine: “The strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.”

The Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, are central to America’s geostrategic interests in and across the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a military base established by the UK and the US in 1971 at the height of the Cold War.  The US military used it in 1991 and 2003 during the military interventions in Iraq. These are not the only instances; the Diego Garcia base is used by US forces on reconnaissance missions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 

Trump’s paranoia about China and Russia seeking to fill the void in Chagos could be valid from Washington’s point of view. The Donroe Doctrine exemplifies Trump’s reimagined unipolarity of a highly globally powerful America, rivalled by none and feared by all. This is delusional, of course. It sticks out as any other power ambition, but it’s less likely to trigger nightmares in Beijing and sleepless nights in Moscow. China and Russia, in all fairness, learn a great deal from history, especially China. The Chinese are a step ahead or at par with the US on many aspects, bar military might and technology. 

The Indian Ocean is just one of the key maritime and geographically strategic zones for major powers to enhance their security and economic interests. In addition, consider the fact that Diego Garcia is America’s only permanent military base in the Indian Ocean. 

Eastern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are accessible via the Indian Ocean, more so, through Diego Garcia. From Diego Garcia, the US can flex its might and check its interests via other strategic maritime areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean, such as the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the South China Sea. 

Key Indian Ocean sea lanes are the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global oil trade and 20% of global trade of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s busiest maritime chokepoint, accounting for around 23.7% of global oil trade and 35-40% of global LNG trade. The Bab-al Mandeb Strait accounts for at least 8% of the global oil trade. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean accounts for approximately 40% of global maritime trade. 

With or without Trump, America will still want free and secure passage through these key chokepoints; hence the essence of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean. Hostile sentiments against Trump arise from his abrasive, often less statesmanly approach to guarding US geostrategic interests. 

Washington cannot underestimate China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, justifying Trump’s ‘great stupidity’ remark against the UK. China has operational control of the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota. It also has a significant presence at the port of Djibouti. 

Diego Garcia enables US naval deployments that allow forward presence near Chinese maritime supply lines, rapid deployment to potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific, and reassurances of allies (Australia, Japan, and India). 

China doesn’t have an official or direct presence in the Chagos Archipelago. Trump’s fear emanates from strengthening economic relations between China and Mauritius. This is in view of the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in October 2019 and entered into force in January 2021. 

What’s more, Beijing supports Mauritius over its long-standing claim for sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. While China has yet to reveal its plans for Chagos, hawkish Western perspectives point to the possibility of Beijing establishing a commercial and military presence on some of the islands of the archipelago. 

Trump’s comment on the UK’s surrender of Diego Garcia is a bluff at best. The 99-year lease not only ensures America’s strong geostrategic positioning but also enhances its counterterrorism and regional security interests. Diego Garcia supports intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the region. Consider piracy threats off the Somali coast and armed groups (Al-Shabaab and the Houthis). 

Central to the Chagos question is whether the UK government will hand over the islands in line with the ICJ’s ruling or not. The UK conservative politicians share the Trumpian view of China increasing its influence around the Chagos Archipelago and the Indian Ocean. 

The UK may eventually hand over the archipelago to Mauritius, but multiple political and legal obstacles exist. America’s resistance and political opposition in the UK are likely to prolong the May 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty that cedes the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Political and legal challenges by Chagossians may also delay the handover. 

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

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South Sudan’s Perilous Path

On January 19, 2026, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Wisley Welebe Samson ordered forces to move to Juba from all directions. The advance aims at removing what Welebe describes as the “anti-peace regime.” Welebe called on disgruntled members of the South Sudanese People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) to defect. He further ordered civilians to evacuate military targets. Consequently, President Salva Kiir dismissed four Cabinet ministers, a governor, a deputy governor, and a senior intelligence officer.

Recent Clashes

The SPLA-IO’s call for its forces to advance to Juba is primarily an outcome of the persisting divisions in the fragile coalition government. It is also linked to the recent fighting between the opposition troops and government forces (SSPDF). On January 2, the Kit-Gang faction of the SPLA-IO took control of Uror County in Jonglei State, following clashes with the SSPDF. Reports indicate around 70 people died and thousands were displaced. President Kiir carried out a mini-reshuffle of the Cabinet on January 7, replacing opposition-aligned ministers with loyalists.

Heavy fighting occurred between the two groups in the northern part of Jonglei State from January 12 to 15. On January 16, the SPLA-IO announced the capture of the strategic town of Pajut in Duk County, approximately 300 km north of Juba. The seizure of Pajut enhances prospects of the SPLA-IO’s attack and capture of Bor. The SPLA-IO also issued a 72-hour ultimatum to aid workers and civilians in Duk, Bor, and Poktap to evacuate places near military installations. The group further demanded the unconditional release of the estranged First Vice President Riek Machar and leader of the SPLM-IO and others within two weeks.

Additional clashes occurred on January 17 and 18 in Pigi County in Jonglei State, prompting the government to deploy more troops to purposely defend Bor. Clashes persisted in Panyume in Central Equatoria State on January 19 and 20 following an offensive launched by the SPLA-IO.

The United Nations describes the clashes as the most intense since 2017. Clashes involving the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, and other armed groups, peaked in 2017, following the 2016 collapse of the transitional government.

Key Points

The main issues characterising South Sudan’s political environment are as follows:

  • The transitional framework has stalled: Repeated delays to elections and reforms reflect a shared elite preference for postponement over risk-taking, rather than an inability to move forward.
  • Violence functions as political signalling: Localised clashes serve to recalibrate power balances, test red lines, and assert relevance within the governing arrangement, rather than to trigger nationwide conflict.
  • Security forces remain factionalised: The absence of credible security sector reform continues to anchor political competition in armed leverage rather than institutions.
  • Succession concerns are shaping behaviour: Uncertainty over future leadership is encouraging pre-emptive positioning by key actors, increasing the likelihood of calibrated instability.
  • International leverage is diminishing: Diplomatic engagement persists, but enforcement mechanisms are weak and external attention is increasingly divided.

Outlook

A managed stalemate is the most likely scenario in the near term. As such, the state is expected to retain formal authority with uneven governance, a fragmented security architecture, and contested political legitimacy. Tolerance of instability and elites leveraging it for influence are anticipated. Further slippage of the transitional timelines and occasional outbreaks of violence are expected, particularly in the hotspots. A gradual erosion of tolerance and heightened tensions over suspicions linked to a mismanaged transition could trigger a full-blown conflict over time.

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Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: Uganda at a Crossroads – Elections, Stability, and the Succession Question

On January 16, 2026, I appeared as a panelist in a discussion hosted by South Africa’s # TopOfTheMorningShow. The link for the discussion can be accessed here. Below are my views on the possible trajectory of Uganda’s political stability.

Big Picture

Uganda’s elections are no longer primarily about who governs today. They are a lens into the country’s future political stability and succession planning. With President Museveni ageing, the central challenge is how power will eventually change hands, rather than the mechanics of this election alone. The process of vote counting and result aggregation has historically been the most sensitive period, shaping public trust in the system. While the nation appears stable, this stability is largely security-driven and elite-managed, and its resilience will be tested when leadership eventually transitions. In this context, the elections reveal underlying pressures: a young, aspirational population, centralized governance, and a security sector that plays a decisive role in maintaining order.

Key Points

  • Elections as Continuity Mechanisms: Uganda’s elections increasingly function to reaffirm continuity, with the credibility of results depending on transparent counting and aggregation rather than the polling day itself.
  • Stability vs. Resilience: The country remains stable, but this stability relies heavily on the ruling elite and security apparatus. The system is effective at containing dissent but less capable of absorbing political change.
  • The Succession Undercurrent: Museveni’s age makes succession the unspoken central issue. Elite cohesion within the ruling party and security sector is the primary stabilizing factor for Uganda’s political future.
  • Demographics and Accumulated Pressure: Uganda’s youthful population contrasts with its ageing leadership. Political pressure is accumulating, especially among urban youth, rather than being released through elections.
  • Security Sector Centrality: The security forces remain key to maintaining order during counting and announcements. Their actions will significantly shape the country’s stability during any leadership transition.
  • Regional and International Context: Uganda’s strategic role in regional security gives it protection from international pressure, which reinforces continuity and reduces incentives for deep electoral reform.

Uganda’s elections are no longer primarily about who wins power, but about how power will eventually change hands. Stability has been carefully managed, but succession remains unresolved. The real test for Uganda is not this election cycle, but whether the transition beyond President Museveni can be institutionalized rather than improvised.

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Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: East Africa, Ocean Access, and the Limits of Military Federation

These notes reflect my analytical views following a television interview with Al-Qahera News, a leading Egyptian regional media house, on regional politics, security, and geopolitical risk on November 29, 2025. The link for the conversation can be accessed here. This followed Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni’s controversial statement on possible conflicts in the future in relation to Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean, and the need for the EAC bloc to establish a military federation.

Big Picture

The debate around Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean and calls for an East African military federation is being overstated and, in some cases, misinterpreted. While President Museveni frames the issue in terms of future conflict prevention and regional self-reliance, the structural realities of East African integration make interstate conflict over ocean access unlikely. Uganda’s strategic interests are already embedded within existing EAC economic and political frameworks, and the leap from cooperation to a full military federation remains politically unrealistic. The underlying issue is less about imminent conflict and more about how East Africa positions itself collectively amid growing external geopolitical competition.

Key Points:

  • Conflict narratives are exaggerated: Claims that Uganda could face future conflict over Indian Ocean access are overstated and often incorrectly likened to the Ethiopia–Eritrea case. The historical, legal, and institutional contexts are fundamentally different.
  • Uganda’s access is structurally secured: Uganda’s present and future access to the Indian Ocean is anchored in deepening partnerships with Kenya and Tanzania, reinforced by regional infrastructure projects (roads, railways, pipelines) and EAC frameworks such as the customs union and common market.
  • Military federation vs political reality: While rhetorically appealing, a military federation is improbable without a political federation. The EAC has not yet fully implemented the monetary union, making progression to political—and by extension military—federation premature.
  • Sovereignty remains the core obstacle: A political federation would require a common constitution and a significant surrender of sovereignty, a step no EAC member state is currently willing to take.
  • Federation is not the same as alliance: Museveni’s proposal implies a military federation with a single defence doctrine. This differs sharply from a military alliance (e.g. NATO), where collective defence does not require surrendering national sovereignty.
  • The strategic subtext is regional autonomy: Museveni’s references to Libya point to a broader concern: the need for regional mechanisms to protect East Africa’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests amid ongoing conflicts, natural resource competition, and intensifying involvement by external powers (USA, China, EU, India, Turkey, Gulf states).

The more relevant question is not whether East Africa needs a military federation, but how existing regional frameworks can be leveraged to safeguard shared strategic interests in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

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Khartoum Is Back – But Sudan’s War Is Far From Over

On January 11, Sudan’s Prime Minister Kamil Idris announced the government’s return to the capital, Khartoum. The government relocated from Khartoum to Port Sudan in April 2023 when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Politically, it helps. Symbolically, it matters. Strategically, however, it changes far less than many expect. Control of a capital city does not equal control of a state.

The illusion of victory?

Khartoum is Sudan’s administrative and diplomatic centre. Controlling it enables the SAF to reassert its international legitimacy and speak authoritatively as Sudan’s legitimate government.

Even so, wars do not end with symbolism. They end when coercive power is consolidated – and in Sudan, it is not.

The RSF is active and controls large swathes of territory. This is particularly in the Darfur region and parts of the Kordofan region. These are strategically defensible areas and not peripheral backwaters.

Territory matters more than capitals

Khartoum would almost certainly be a top strategic priority for the RSF. But the SAF’s control of the capital pushes the RSF to recalibrate its strategic priorities. As such, the RSF seeks to control territory that allows it to function independently of the central state.

Darfur is historically and strategically crucial for the RSF. Historically, the RSF has its origins in the Janjaweed elements in Darfur.

The RSF seeks leverage by controlling cross-border trade routes into Chad and Libya, overseeing gold mining areas, and establishing alliances with local militia groups. These assets give the RSF an incentive not to pursue or submit to a central authority.

RSF’s pursuit of autonomy

A ceasefire is unlikely under the current circumstances. While the RSF agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire proposal on November 6, 2025, the SAF demanded the paramilitary group’s withdrawal from all occupied civilian areas and territories. The SAF also demanded the disarmament and surrender of the RSF weapons.

These demands are unrealistic, given the RSF’s deeply entrenched structures in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. The SAF is expected to maintain its position on the conditions for a ceasefire.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is the RSF’s fight for survival in some regions with less interest in attaining victory over the SAF in the country. Survival necessitates the RSF’s push for an autonomous or semi-autonomous region, especially in Darfur. This allows the RSF to:

  • Preserve its military structure
  • Retain control over revenue-generating resources
  • Rebrand its cause as decentralisation or regional self-rule
  • Force negotiations on its own terms

High-Impact Fragmentation?

This is a likely outcome linked to the RSF’s fight for survival and the SAF’s hardline positions. The following geographical and administrative indicators would characterise high-impact fragmentation:

  • The SAF governs Khartoum and eastern Sudan, backed by international recognition.
  • The RSF dominates western and central regions, exercising parallel authority.
  • Low-intensity fighting, humanitarian crises, and political deadlock persist.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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