On May 14 and 15, 2026, I joined Nigerian broadcaster Voice of the People TV for two interviews discussing major geopolitical, diplomatic, and economic developments across Africa.
The discussions covered regional diplomacy, trade integration, Nile politics, security dynamics, and Africa’s evolving place within an increasingly competitive global order.
Watch one of the interviews here: Voice of the People TV live interview
On May 12, 2026, I joined Alghad TV, a major regional Egyptian news broadcaster, to discuss the Africa–France Summit in Nairobi and the broader recalibration of external influence in Africa amid intensifying geopolitical competition.
The discussion focused on France’s evolving Africa strategy, shifting geopolitical alignments, and Africa’s growing strategic weight within a more multipolar global order.
Watch the full interview here: Alghad TV interview on Africa–France Summit
On May 11, 2026, I joined Al-Qahera News to discuss the Africa–France Summit in Nairobi and the ongoing recalibration of France’s political, economic, and security engagement across Africa.
The conversation examined shifting Africa–France relations, growing geopolitical competition on the continent, and Africa’s increasing strategic relevance within a multipolar global order.
Watch the full interview here: Al-Qahera News interview on Africa–France Summit
On May 1, 2026, I spoke with Mikael Darbinian of The Security Observer on the evolving political and security crisis in Mali.
The discussion focused on the trajectory of instability, armed group dynamics, and the broader implications for state authority and regional security across the Sahel. I argued that the conflict is increasingly characterized by structural governance stress and persistent security fragmentation rather than isolated insurgent incidents.
Watch the full interview here: Interview with The Security Observer on Mali’s Security Crisis
In April 2026, I spoke with Uganda’s The Independent Magazine on the structural challenges facing East Africa’s ports and their place within global maritime trade.
In the interview, I argued that geography remains a major constraint on East Africa’s long-term competitiveness as a global transshipment hub. While ports such as Port of Mombasa remain economically indispensable to the region, they are structurally disadvantaged by their distance from the world’s major maritime arteries compared to hubs like Tanger Med. I also noted that while policy reforms can improve efficiency, they cannot fundamentally override geographic realities shaping global shipping and trade flows.
Read the full article here: East Africa’s Ports Are Busy but Stuck on the Wrong Side of Global Trade
Recently spoke with the leading Dutch media outlet, NRC, on the potential economic fallout of the Iran crisis for African economies.
In the interview, I argued that the effects would extend beyond oil prices alone — affecting shipping routes, inflation, food and fertilizer costs, currency stability, and broader supply chains across the continent.
The discussion also touched on Africa’s continued exposure to external geopolitical shocks and the strategic importance of Gulf trade routes.
You can read the full piece here: NRC article.
On March 17, the Confederation of African Football (CAF) declared Morocco the winners of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). It controversially overturned Senegal’s victory secured against Morocco in Rabat on January 18.
The decision by the CAF Appeal Board is ridiculous and raises suspicions of possible bribery. The statement by the CAF President Patrice Motsepe on January 19 defending the decision was weak, horrendous, and incoherent. His face illustrated an obvious lack of confidence in the contents of his brief, unceremonious speech.
Typically, football results are pegged on the final decision by the referee on the pitch. The Appeal Board cites Senegal’s abandoning of the match just before stoppage time for 15 minutes after the referee controversially awarded Morocco a penalty. There were also unsporting dramatic episodes during the match, with Moroccan players petulantly running after the glove towel of Senegal’s goalkeeper. CAF ultimately imposed hefty fines on each team weeks ago.
These incidents highlight the problem of football and sports in general in Africa: weak institutions. This reflects the African governance challenge, where meritocracy, integrity, and hard work are frowned upon by those in power.
Think of the appeal decision and the entire match-related processes as similar to electoral processes in Africa, and consider that most African countries abhor foolproof systems. First, the activities on the pitch were influenced by the emotions of the Moroccan fans and, by extension, the Moroccan football authorities. Childish, bizarre behaviour by Moroccan players and unorthodox decisions by the referee. Morocco behaved like the typical African heads of state and governments and their sycophants who are sore losers and always seek to influence the election results.
Second, the CAF Appeal Board mirrors the electoral appellate bodies in Africa, which go by different names and levels depending on a country’s constitution. These could be electoral commissions, supreme courts, courts of appeal, high courts, or supreme councils. The name does not matter. These entities in Africa have normalised making rulings that resonate with those in power. The circumstances under which the Appeal Board ruled in favour of Morocco fell short of the prescribed CAF statutes threshold. But this did not matter.
Back home in Kenya, I stopped going to the stadium to watch football matches whose results are predetermined. Match officials, players, officials from the Football Kenya Federation (FKF), and opportunistic individuals collude to fix matches. Match-fixing is not a reserve of African football. It occurs in other parts of the world, but there is a serious lack of effort to eliminate this vice in Africa.
There is a former Kenyan goalkeeper who is currently facing prosecution over match-fixing suspicion. Before he was finally caught speaking to a match-fixer in a viral video, I was not convinced with his posture between the sticks and his dramatised jumps and failed saves letting in cheap goals which a well-stitched scarecrow would save!
It is agonising paying for match tickets and watching compromised games. The standards of the Kenya Premier League have fallen so badly because of the lack of belief in the sanctity of institutions.
Currently, there are concerns about the lack of readiness by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, especially Kenya, to host the joint AFCON tournament in 2027. Recently, the Sports Principal Secretary Elijah Mwangi cautioned that Kenya risks losing the opportunity to host the tournament if it fails to pay the KES 3.9 billion hosting fee. Tanzania and Uganda have paid it.
There are also concerns about delayed repairs at the Kasarani International Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium. Apparently, the Kasarani Stadium contractor is owed KES 3.7 billion and has reduced the workforce, with the completion deadline in six months. At Nyayo, the contractor is owed KES 2.6 billion and has vacated the site.
But there are spirited defences by the Ruto-led regime and its acolytes to carelessly marvel at the so-called infrastructural beauty that the Raila Odinga International Stadium (formerly Talanta Stadium) is. Last month, the Auditor General revealed that KES 11 billion for the stadium’s construction cannot be accounted for. The stadium’s initial value was KES 44.5 billion, but its expenses have exceeded that by the amount questioned by the Auditor General. Also, bear in mind that Kenyan taxpayers are expected to pay over KES 100 billion in interest for 15 years for the stadium.
CAF and most African football bodies are despicable institutions. And one wonders why European football is way more popular than local football. Why support that which is doomed and purposely designed to fail? The starry-eyed and inconsequential ‘pan-Africanists’ may find my stance uncomfortable and Eurocentric. No apologies, anyway.
The debate on the limited support for African football and massive fanaticism for European football should not be reduced to colonialist and anti-colonialist perspectives. Human beings respond to incentives and disincentives. And such responses are strong in this era of a highly globalised world.
Two interesting football-related books lie pretty in my library: How Soccer Explains the World by Franklin Foer and Soccernomics by Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski. Kuper writes interesting football articles for the Financial Times.
Chapter 7 of Foer’s book is titled “How Soccer Explains the New Oligarchs.” Before it, Chapter 5 is “How Soccer Explains the Survival of Top Hats.” While these two chapters are limited in examples and references to African football, their explanations resonate with African football.
In Chapter 5, Foer narrates the failure of foreign investment to turn around the big Brazilian clubs of Corinthians and Flamengo in the 1990s due to systemic corruption. The great Pelé then was the president of the Brazilian football federation. He proposed and enacted progressive measures requiring football clubs to operate as transparent capitalist ventures. However, these measures were sneered at by the heads of the football clubs. Foreign investment found its way out of Brazil.
Foer goes ahead to offer a damning explanation of Pele’s boundaries to no longer forgive his corrupt allies in the country’s football system. He states: “It’s not far from the sociologist Edward Banfield’s famous 1958 study of corruption, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Banfield explained that it’s the most familial-based societies, where the sense of obligation is strongest, that breed the worst nepotism and cronyism.” This highlights the failures of the African football institutions.
In Chapter 7, Foer gives hilarious accounts about the fancy, monied owners of Italian football clubs. This trend is replicated in other parts of the world, including Africa. The point of departure between Africa and the rest of the world is that in the former, most of the owners disregard the relevance of strong football institutions. There is a former squeaky-voiced and disgraced head of FKF who personifies this unholy institutional wickedness.
Soccernomics presents riveting insights and conclusions about football in the developing world, including Africa. Kuper and Szymanski argue that wealth and well-being are significant indicators of a country’s sporting success. Of course, there are outliers to every statistical analysis. In Africa, football authorities view the game more as a pastime adventure than a commercial opportunity. It could be because of African economic conditions, but this is not an excuse for the oligarchs in charge of football to enrich themselves. The authors make a harsh conclusion: “People all over the world might want to play sports, but to make that possible requires money and organization that poor countries don’t have.” Organisation refers to credible, competent institutions.
There is another bold observation by Kuper and Szymanski: “To win at sports, you need to find, develop, and nurture talent. Doing that requires money, know-how, and some kind of administrative infrastructure. Few African countries have enough of any.” This is factually correct! This is not confined to football. Many sporting disciplines in most African countries are enduring these challenges.
Sports are geopolitically vital events. These are soft power projection avenues. African countries are generally laid-back geopolitically, often waiting for the rest of the world to set the pace. Probably it makes sense not to have high expectations with African countries still struggling with the basics of good governance.
I will spare my energy and time to fervently watch and cheer non-African sports, for to passionately dedicate effort towards African sports is among the 1,000 ways to die. I repeat: I am no pan-African whatsoever!
The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on geopolitical and governance issues.
Recently, I conversed with Eli Likuyani of Mizani254/KOT FM on the US-Israel-Iran war. The discussion is available on YouTube here.
Many are getting it wrong or are confused about the main objectives of the US-Israel war against Iran. This is due to narrative control by the administrations of US President Donald Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu.
Trump, Netanyahu, and their henchmen insist on neutralising Iran’s nuclear programme and capabilities. They also claim to seek to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities. And of course, they are targeting a regime change in Iran.
The biggest goal for the US and Israel in Iran is regime change. The other two objectives are secondary. Netanyahu has historically had a notorious obsession with dislodging Iran’s complex political and military leadership and imposing a puppet regime. Some of his illusory statements can be traced to media interviews in the 1980s and 1990s, way before he became prime minister.
In recent years, Netanyahu’s grand propaganda poses and statements involved presenting incorrect maps showing Iran’s nuclear development sites.
Netanyahu’s obsession is anchored on his grand vision of a ‘Greater Israel’ near its borders and an Israel that is the most dominant and powerful state in the Middle East. The imperialist vision of a ‘Greater Israel’ underscores the wars in Palestine and Lebanon as well as the continued occupation of parts of these countries and Syria by Israeli forces. The recent Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hezbollah wars aimed to weaken these two formations and consequently scale down Iran’s geopolitical dominance in the region.
For many years, Netanyahu attempted to hoodwink US presidents into starting a war against Iran. Previous US presidents avoided entrapment by Bibi until Trump’s second term. The 12-day war in June 2025 and the ongoing conflict illustrate Bibi’s success in fooling Trump, and much credit goes to the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington.
This war was unjustified. A day before the attacks on February 28, Oman-mediated talks on Iran’s nuclear programme registered decent progress. It not only plays to the dangerous power illusions of Bibi and Trump but also to their fanatical religious fundamentalism.
The White House has published photos and videos of Trump humbling himself before church ministers in intercessory sessions. The US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently said that “crazy regimes like Iran, hell-bent on prophetic Islamic delusions, cannot have nuclear weapons.” Netanyahu, in an attempt to drive up Jewish support for the war, recently noted that: “Remember what Amalek did to you. We remember and we act”, to win the Israeli public’s support for the war.
Earlier this month, some U.S. military commanders told US forces that the war against Iran is biblical. The commanders consider it God’s divine plan to trigger Armageddon (the prophesied final battle in the Book of Revelation) and usher in the return of Jesus Christ.
This is a conflict rooted in multiplexities, and the religious angle highlights the classical clash of civilisations. This is rooted in propaganda, cultural imperialism, and civilisational arrogance. It’s a recurring pattern in wars waged by the US post-World War II. But regime change is the absolute goal.
Duration of the War
It’s difficult to predict when wars will end—the certainty of when they will end is not a coin flip. We can only rely on specific trends and indicators to think of the likely trajectory of a war. It is much easier to predict when war is likely to start than when it will end.
A key indicator signaling the possible commencement of war is the unusual military buildup, particularly near the primary front lines. This sounds like an obvious fact, but many commentators and analysts miss it by making assumptions. Nonetheless, war is inherently not entirely scientific, despite advances in disciplines such as game theory. Even seasoned analysts miss these indicators.
Before the Russia-Ukraine war broke out four years ago, there was an intense military buildup in the border areas. Many were accustomed to similar buildups, which occurred frequently, but few anticipated a full-scale war.
Weeks before the February 28 US-Israeli attacks on Iran, the US intensified the deployment of its military assets in the region. Many missed it, perhaps because Oman-mediated talks were progressing well.
There is a high possibility that Ethiopia and Eritrea will go to war. This is in light of the intense military buildup in border areas. Heavy deployments occurred prior to the 2020-2022 Tigray War. Again, few anticipated a breakout of war. It was largely assumed that the heavy deployments were deterrence mechanisms to increase the stakes for power negotiations.
A massive economic slump caused by the current conflict is probably the key issue that could occasion a shorter war. An economic crisis aggravated by widespread disruptions to the supplies of oil, gas, and other commodities would hit the world harder.
White House estimates that the war will last four to six weeks or into mid-2026. Other reports in Washington suggest that the Trump regime is prepared for military operations against Iran until September this year. On March 8, the Iranian military said it is prepared to fight an intense war for at least six months. While these are statements to depict a show of might, they signal the willingness of the adversaries to engage in a protracted conflict.
The initiators of wars usually desire to have brief, intense military operations. But there are hardly any phenomena that are overtaken by the law of unintended consequences, perhaps except for wars. The failure to achieve the primary objectives usually prolongs wars. US-led military interventions post-World War II initially started with the promises of brief operations to protect civilians, destroy the capabilities of the perceived terrorists, or destroy the weapon-making sites and arms industrial complexes. But somehow, these evolved into regime change ambitions.
Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas, Gaddafi’s Libya, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan, the US and Israel, this time, are facing an adversary that is fairly well-armed and has prepared for such a confrontation for a long time.
The US and Israel are likely to make the mistake that Russia made against Ukraine. Russia was more powerful than Ukraine at the onset of the war in terms of military technology and the overall power of the armed forces. Nothing has changed in the course of the war four years later. But Russia is yet to kick out President Zelenskyy from power, thanks largely to arms supplies from Ukraine’s Western allies.
Russia’s President Putin assumed that Ukraine’s inferior military and weapons would guarantee Moscow a quick victory. Trump and Netanyahu are assuming that pounding Iran heavily and decimating its political, military, and religious leaders would guarantee victory.
Ukraine got arms supplies from its allies that pushed back Russia and led to a war of attrition. What stops Iran from sourcing supplies and technology from the so-called Axis of Aggressors – China, Russia, and North Korea?
The US and Israel are fighting amidst concerns of inadequate arms supplies to sustain the war for weeks or months. US stockpiles are particularly stretched due to supplies to Ukraine and Israel over the past two and a half years.
Regime change further protracts conflicts and makes them messier. This was the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Similar observations can be made in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war. And a similar fate is highly likely in Iran if the US and Israel contemptuously insist on toppling the current government.
Regime Change Prospects
The Iranian government faces significant opposition domestically. This cannot be dismissed. Yet it is ignorant to assume that the government has no support among a substantial number of Iranians.
At the height of the recent mass anti-government protests in Iran, Donald Trump pledged to send assistance to the protesters and urged them to push on until the leadership resigns. This is the classical Washington playbook: capitalise on domestic and regional crises to fuel regime change.
Supporting the Kurdish fighters to be part of a ground invasion force to fight the Iranian government may not yield the desired outcome of regime change. The Kurds make up around 10% of the Iranian population, and having them as US-Israeli proxies may only serve to fuel nationalistic sentiments and strengthen support for the Iranian government.
Geography will play a crucial role in the battleground dynamics of the war in the event of a ground offensive by the US and Israel. Western Iran is highly mountainous, and the mastery of this terrain could be an advantage to Iranian forces. Iran could well be another mission failure for the US and Israel.
The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on geopolitical and governance issues.
The spokesperson of the M23 rebel group, Willy Ngoma, was killed in a Congolese military attack near Rubaya in Masisi territory in North Kivu Province yesterday. Drones targeted M23 leaders, and reports suggest that others could be severely injured or dead, including the group’s military chief, Sultani Makenga.
These are significant personnel losses for M23. Would this shift the conflict in favour of the Congolese military and government?
The President Felix Tshisekedi administration seems to be intensifying its offensive to recapture the highly lucrative Rubaya mines from the M23 rebels. A week ago, reports indicated that the Congolese government had offered the Rubaya mines to the US as part of the minerals-for-security framework signed in Washington on December 4, 2025.
Rubaya makes up about 15% of the global coltan supply. A December 2024 report by UN experts indicates that coltan mining and trade generate approximately USD 800,000 per month for the M23. These figures illustrate the strategic significance of the Rubaya mines.
Congolese forces reserve the right to use any means, including force, to reclaim the territory occupied by the rebels. However, force may not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes. The Congolese military mirrors President Tshisekedi’s impatience. His impatience led to a wider rebel conflict in the Kivu region.
In 2023, Tshisekedi demanded the exit of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). The EACRF was succeeding in pacifying the war. Tshisekedi was unimpressed with the EACRF’s non-offensive mandate. He pushed for the deployment of the SAMIDRC (the Southern African Development Community peacekeeping mission) with an offensive mandate. The SAMIDRC suffered substantial losses and could not effectively combat the M23 rebels.
He also demanded the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces in 2023. The exit was paused in mid-2024 following an increase in violence in North Kivu.
Tshisekedi has failed to reform and transform the Congolese military into a formidably disciplined force. His administration heavily relies on militia groups, foreign mercenaries, and ad hoc alliances with regional forces and rebel groups.
What’s more, Tshisekedi has performed poorly diplomatically. His relations with the EAC and SADC states indicate his desire for quick, one-sided outcomes unaccompanied by concessions. The DRC is entitled to reclaim its sovereignty, but Tshisekedi should not ignore historical facts perpetuating the conflict that would be critical in prioritising diplomatic solutions to end fighting.
M23 enjoys the support of Kagame’s Rwanda. Kagame is highly experienced in conflicts in the region, an advantage that Tshisekedi does not have the benefit of. M23 is relatively disciplined and organised.
It would be reckless to pronounce M23’s weakening in the aftermath of Ngoma’s death and the attack on the group’s senior leaders. The dead and injured leaders will be replaced. This is a worst-case scenario that the group and its financiers anticipated.
Ngoma’s death could be a critical juncture in the conflict. The M23 could launch retaliatory attacks against Congolese government interests. Overall, these developments threaten ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire and long-term peace and stability. The M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Rubaya and other occupied areas in the Kivu region.
The US is unlikely to offer direct military assistance to the DRC to counter Rwanda at this time and in the future. Kagame has been a close ally of the US for decades. The US considers him a reliable and effective partner, particularly due to Rwanda’s peacekeeping role in the region. It would be a strategic faux pas for Washington to abandon Kagame for Tshisekedi.
Trump’s administration intends to get the Congo’s critical minerals to rival China. But Donald Trump’s foreign policy ambitions and geostrategic interests are infatuations at best with regard to the Congo. The security situation in Kivu is too complex for the US. Kagame is aware that any military assistance for the DRC by the US could create momentum for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels.
Tshisekedi fantasises about making riches out of the deal with the US, but he’s rushed to believe he’ll retake Rubaya or end the war by simply taking out a few M23 leaders. The war will persist.
The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about geopolitics and governance issues.
The fourth anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war comes at a time when there is not so much to indicate an imminent ceasefire and a peace deal. Russia is hellbent on its stance to take over Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow is also unlikely to change its demand on Ukraine, maintaining neutrality over its relations with its allies, especially the European Union.
Ukraine, whilst generally outmatched by Russia throughout the conflict, has mounted significant defences and offensives. These have prevented some of Russia’s main objectives, especially regime change. A peace deal is likely to favour Russia, given US President Donald Trump’s much more favourable view of President Vladimir Putin. The war of attrition is expected to persist given the current circumstances.
Far from the frontlines, Africa cannot escape the impact of the war. The spillovers of the conflict are not as intense as they were four years ago. However, the war of attrition implies that African countries will continue to get sucked into the conflict in various ways.
Russia signed multiple defence, security, and economic agreements with several African countries in the course of the war. The Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are notable examples. The Russia-Ukraine war coincided with coups and anti-French/Western sentiments in these countries.
Little success has been registered through these cooperations. The deployments of Russian mercenaries in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have barely been revolutionary in combating armed groups. The exit of the French and other Western actors seems not to have fully restored the sovereignty of these Sahelian states.
Moscow recalled a host of its mercenaries multiple times from these countries and redeployed them on the frontlines in Ukraine and Russia in the course of the war.
We are yet to see another attempt by Ukraine to support armed groups against Russian mercenaries that are backing the military-led governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since July 2024. In July 2024, the Azawad rebels in northern Mali ambushed a convoy of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries. Ukraine claimed it supported the rebels to carry out the attack.
Ukraine is less likely to replicate such alliances of convenience and, in these Sahel countries, to target Russian interests. Russia, thanks largely to propaganda, is viewed as a messianic partner within these states and in several African countries. It is considered a better alternative to the West, although fundamentally, the interests of the West and Russia are driven by extractive motives. The West’s assistance to Ukraine reinforces the positive perception of Russia.
As the war of attrition persists and the conflict enters its fifth year, the recruitment of foreigners to fight in the war could intensify. Recently, there has been an uproar over Russia’s recruitment of Africans.
In November 2025, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said 1,400 people from 36 African countries were fighting for Russia, with a substantial number held as prisoners of war by Ukraine. Around 200 Kenyans had travelled to fight for Ukraine, according to the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs in November last year.
A recent report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) indicates that approximately 1,000 Kenyans have been enticed to fight for Russia. Employment agencies are recruiting financially desperate civilians and former police and military officers.
Russia has denied facilitating the recruitment of Kenyans and Africans. But of course, you do not expect Moscow to admit its role in enlisting and deploying foreigners on the frontlines. Kenyan authorities are unlikely to prosecute the proprietors of these agencies. There are numerous cases implicating employment agencies for rogue recruitment practices. However, prosecutions are delayed and abandoned, as the owners are close to the powers that be. This is anticipated for the proprietors of the agencies recruiting fighters for Russia.
Financial desperation and limited meaningful employment opportunities in Kenya and other African countries will incentivise more Africans to look forward to fighting for Russia. Very few would resist offers of monthly salaries of KES 350,000, bonuses of KES 900,000 to 1.2 million, and Russian citizenship.
Historically, major wars in the world have involved foreign fighters. This was the case during the World Wars and other armed conflicts post-World War II. Thousands of Africans were recruited and deployed on the frontlines in Africa, Asia, and Europe. So, the recruitment of Kenyans and other Africans is not a new phenomenon.
Kenya’s Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi is scheduled to visit Russia in March to negotiate the release and repatriation of Kenyans stuck in the war. This is positive. But the fact that Kenyans are recruited scandalously highlights the incompetence of the Kenya Kwanza coalition-led government. Where was the intelligence agency when the recruitment commenced? Certainly, cronies tied to the ruling coalition are making millions out of the venture. It is a Russian roulette for these African fighters!
The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on politics, geopolitics, and other governance-related issues.
THE KAVIRONDO 