China’s White Paper on International Development Cooperation and its Implication for Africa

By Sitati Wasilwa

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China released a white paper, China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era, on January 10th, 2021. This white paper is a projection of China’s global geostrategic ambitions at a time when the world is battling the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects, and the dawning reality of a multi-polar world.

Context

China’s New Era started after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2012. The dawn of the New Era was significant to China’s global relations in two major ways. First, it represented a shift from Deng Xiaoping’s thought on foreign relations which guided China for several decades as the country experienced one of the world’s greatest economic miracles. Deng’s thought on China’s external engagement was based on the need to “hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”. Thus, the New Era signified China’s arrival on the global stage as a major power player, aggressive enough to influence the establishment of a new world order.

Second, the commencement of the New Era was marked by the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the primary foreign policy instrument. The introduction of the BRI was symbolic; drawing inspiration from the ancient Silk Road, a network of trade routes established about 2,000 years ago during the Han Dynasty and connected China to the Mediterranean region via Eurasia.

More importantly, the timing of the release of the white paper is strategic; it comes at a time when the world is battling the COVID-19 pandemic, a critical juncture set to reconfigure the global economic, political and social infrastructure. The pandemic has elevated China’s vantage position geopolitically: it was the first major economy to recover from the pandemic posting an economic growth rate of 4.9% as of October 2020; it is leading in the supply of the COVID-19 vaccine in the Global South; and it has continually voiced support for multilateralism especially for the World Health Organisation (WHO) after the Trump administration dismissed the essentialism of the institution.

In the book, When China Rules the World, Martin Jacques notes that the 2008 financial crisis marked the beginning of the Chinese World Order. Certainly, the COVID-19 pandemic is an inflection point of the Chinese World Order considering China’s role in vaccine diplomacy and faster economic recovery as earlier stated.

The establishment of the Chinese World Order is exemplified by China’s phenomenal economic rise and America’s decline. Metrics such as China’s impressive economic growth rates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) size, the share of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), share of world exports, the share of global trade, the share of global foreign aid, global cultural infrastructure, and growing military capabilities indicate the reality of the Chinese World Order.

China’s economic growth trajectory is one of the most impressive in history, and has uplifted hundreds of millions of Chinese households from poverty to prosperity and caused China’s reemergence as a formidable global power. In essence, this is a reaffirmation of the centrality of economic growth, first, as an economic indicator, and second, as a political instrument.

Between 2000 and 2018, China’s average economic growth rate was 9.65%, a relatively high growth rate compared to America’s 2.18% over the same period. Although some entities could argue out that the Chinese economy is still playing catch-up to the American one, it is definite that the high growth rates of the Chinese economy have led to massive GDP expansion over time, and convergence of the two is only a matter of time.

The COVID-19 pandemic will potentially accelerate the convergence of the two largest economies in the world considering China’s faster economic recovery than the U.S. from the effects of the virus. In fact, it is expected that China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy by 2028 primarily due to faster economic recovery from the pandemic.

China’s impressive economic performance since the institutionalization of economic reforms by Deng through to the anticipated faster economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic confers the centrality of economic growth as a political tool in the world. In essence, Michael Mandelbaum notes in the book, Mission Failure, that since the end of the Cold War, economic growth is the primary goal pursued by governments across the world. Mandelbaum’s view is corroborated by Lorenzo Fioramonti as stated in his book, Gross Domestic Problem: “In 1991, the GNP was superseded by GDP, which is still the most popular acronym by which national income is commonly known. From ‘national’ the gross product became ‘domestic’. Although this may look like an irrelevant shift that only insiders would care about, it indeed signalled an important political change”.

China had the highest share of the world’s exports at 10.77% as of 2018. Also, its military spending has increased over time, though still dwarfed by the USA’s. China’s military spending increased almost 23 times between 1989 and 2019, an indication of Beijing’s growth in terms of military capabilities. Historically, powerful states have powerful militaries, and the ancient Chinese state was a leader in military technology leading in the production and usage of gun powder and marine warfare.

The rise and rise of China and its strategic repositioning as contained in the white paper is premised on the South-South cooperation framework. Accordingly, “international development cooperation”, as detailed in the white paper, refers to China’s bilateral and multilateral efforts within the framework of South-South cooperation.

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, South-South cooperation refers to the technical cooperation among developing countries in the Global South. The South-South cooperation is historically and geostrategically significant.

The historical significance of the South-South cooperation is rooted in the Cold War politics whereby countries of the Global South sought to carve out their own economic and political order to avoid being entangled by the ideological differences between the USA and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the geostrategic significance of the South-South cooperation is based on the post-Cold War contribution of the Global South to global economic growth (more than half of the world’s growth in recent times) and development in terms of trade, FDI, labour among other metrics. As such, the historical and geostrategic significance of the South-South cooperation informs the centrality of Beijing’s white paper.

Development Cooperation

The white paper outlines China’s five approaches to development cooperation, but I consider three of them as the most significant and consequential: South-South cooperation as the focal point of China’s socio-political and economic leap; the BRI as the main instrument of promoting global social, political and economic prosperity; and facilitating the collective achievement of the UN Agenda 2030 goals on Sustainable Development among developing countries.

I have briefly explained the essentialism of the South-South cooperation in view of China’s global geostrategic ambitions, but I revisit some of the events that prompted the heavy focus towards the Global South. First, the Global South is not deeply entangled in the economic system of the West – although China and the USA are each other’s main trading partners – and events such as the Asian financial crisis, which barely affected China, and the 2008 financial crisis as well as the Great Recession which monstrously ravaged Western economies while China escaped with a few dents especially on its exports, inform Beijing’s near-obsession with the South-South cooperation.

Second, the rise of the USA-China trade war and the likelihood of it turning out to be a protracted economic battle between the world’s two largest economies in terms of GDP size firms up China’s focus on the South-South cooperation as an economically strategic front. Third, the Global South is massively endowed with resources – markets, labour, minerals, oil, and arable land – that are critical in China’s economic growth and development.

The BRI is Beijing’s geoeconomic and geopolitical masterstroke and perhaps the instrumentarian tool set to catapult China to global socio-political and economic dominance. Accordingly, the white paper enunciates the BRI as a platform meant to:

  • enhance policy coordination through the promotion of national and regional initiatives such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063, Asia’s Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, the European Union’s Europe-Asia connectivity strategy, Philippine’s Build, Build, Build programme, and Pakistan’s vision of a new Pakistan among others, and facilitate regional economic and trade integration;
  • strengthen infrastructure connectivity across countries by building railways, highways, bridges, seaports, airports and telecommunications cable networks;
  • promote unimpeded trade by improving the competitiveness of developing countries in the global supply chain (modernizing trade systems and improving trade infrastructure) and enhancing the integration of the economies of developing countries in the global multilateral trading system;
  • deepen financial integration by supporting the improvement of financial systems and building multilateral cooperation platforms for financing such as Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF); and
  • foster closer people-to-people ties by improving people’s lives (housing, water supply, health care, education, rural roads, and assistance to vulnerable groups) and promoting cultural exchanges and cooperation.

For a long time, the Beijing Consensus largely concentrated on promoting the economic interests of the Chinese state, and it still does. But with the advent of the BRI, the political and social imperatives of China’s external engagement are bound to occupy a central position of its global agenda. Enhancement of policy coordination fundamentally implies that Beijing seeks to influence the political processes and outcomes of countries that have signed up for the BRI.

Championing for closer people-to-people ties is China’s soft power approach aimed at improving the quality of social amenities and promoting cultural cooperation. In particular, the white paper highlights that “China has launched a project known as Access to Satellite TV for 10,000 African Villages aimed at providing digital TV connection for rural communities in more than 20 African countries, opening a new window for them to see the world”. But is the project intended to enable the rural communities to see the world or to discover what China is all about?

Moreover, in the white paper, China prides itself in helping other developing countries to achieve the Agenda 2030 goals on Sustainable Development in eight areas which include poverty reduction, food security, health care, quality education, gender equality, infrastructure, sustainable and innovation-driven economic growth, and eco-environmental protection. The devil is in the details; by communicating in the white paper about its assistance to other developing countries to achieve the Agenda 2030 goals, China portrays itself as a champion of global and/or institutional multilateralism aiming to fill the void left by the U.S. especially during the Donald Trump administration.

The white paper highlights three practical measures for development cooperation: China’s fulfilment of its duties as a major country and providing global development with public goods; increasing aid to developing countries within the BRI framework; and proposing cooperation schemes with developing countries through regional cooperation mechanisms. For each practical measure, there are key events that illustrate Beijing’s geostrategic ambitions in the New Era.

For instance, in fulfilment of China’s mandate as a major country providing global development with public goods, the white paper points out the centrality of the UN’s 70th anniversary in September 2015 which ushered in the Agenda 2030 and the virtual 73rd World Health Assembly on May 18, 2020, of which Beijing used the latter to promote its pandemic diplomacy and faith in multilateralism after the USA discredited the event.

Bn increasing aid to other developing countries within the BRI framework, the white paper highlights two events: the First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2019 which repositioned the BRI not only as an economic instrument but also as a welfare-enhancing platform.

There are a host of events illustrating the cooperation schemes between China and other developing countries, but the three which define the course of the Sino-African relations in China’s New Era are the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Johannesburg Summit in December 2015; the FOCAC Beijing Summit held in September 2018; and the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against Covid-19 in June 2020.

Essentially, the major cross-cutting issues in the white paper include the BRI, multilateralism, foreign aid, and the COVID-19 pandemic diplomacy. The final section of the paper on future prospects for China’s international development cooperation reiterates the primacy of the aforementioned issues. As such, China’s future concerning international development cooperation is hinged on it being part of the global community championing health for all by supporting developing countries in the fight against COVID-19, helping developing countries to improve their public health systems, and supporting the WHO and other international organisations in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.

Second, the future of China’s international development cooperation is premised on promoting the implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 by supporting international organisations and cooperation mechanisms, eliminating poverty, and promoting South-South Cooperation among others. Third, the future of China’s international development cooperation also rests on improving the capacity for cooperation by reinforcing planning and strengthening the institutional framework, improving project management and exploring new approaches to aid, and enhancing supervision and evaluation to improve project efficacy.

So, how does the white paper on international development cooperation synchronize with China’s second Africa policy paper?

The Bottom Line: Development Cooperation and its Implication for Africa

For the sake of understanding the possible course of Sino-African relations in the wake of the white paper on international development cooperation, it is critical to revisit China’s second Africa policy paper that was released in December 2015 during the FOCAC Johannesburg Summit. At the outset, China’s second Africa policy paper is expected to play second fiddle to the white paper on international development cooperation though there are striking similarities in terms of areas of political, social and economic cooperation, perhaps except for the COVID-19 pandemic.

There are five pillars of China’s second Africa policy paper, but the third pillar on promoting the all-round development of China-Africa cooperation is the most significant. The third pillar seeks to:

  • enhance mutual political trust by intensifying high-level exchanges, boosting experience sharing in governance, improving intergovernmental consultation and cooperation mechanisms, and promoting exchanges in various sectors including those between legislative bodies, consultative bodies, political parties, the military and local governments
  • deepen cooperation in international affairs
  • deepen economic and trade cooperation by boosting Africa’s industrialization, boosting Africa’s agricultural modernization, participating in Africa’s infrastructure development across the board, strengthening China-Africa financial cooperation, promoting the facilitation of China-Africa trade and investment, bolstering resource and energy cooperation, and expanding cooperation on the marine economy
  • strengthen development cooperation between China and Africa by increasing development assistance to Africa, supporting Africa in strengthening its public health system and capacity building, expanding cooperation in education and human resources development, eradicating poverty, cooperating and sharing knowledge on science and technology, and cooperating on climate change and environmental protection
  • deepen and expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges by expanding exchanges and cooperation in culture and sports, expanding tourism cooperation, broadening cooperation on press, radio, film and television, encouraging exchanges between academia and think tanks, and enhancing people-to-people exchanges
  • promote peace and security in Africa by supporting Africa in realizing peace and security, deepening military cooperation, and supporting Africa in confronting non-traditional security threats
  • strengthen exchanges and cooperation in consular, immigration, judicial and police areas

China’s white paper on international development cooperation will affect Africa in various ways. First, Africa is expected to play a primary role in China’s COVID-19 pandemic and/or vaccine diplomacy. In due course, Africa may benefit in terms of production and supply of the COVID-19 vaccine, but could also be entangled in vaccine diplomacy if the vaccine has strings attached to it – there is no free lunch. Second, Africa will receive more and more Chinese aid and this may go towards bolstering infrastructural development but may also mean the loss of economic independence for African countries.

Third, the cultural exchanges could be skewed towards promoting the Chinese culture and less of the African culture and this, in the long-run, will establish Africa as a market and consumer of the Chinese culture. Fourth, Africa may join hands with China to support global and regional multilateralism. Fifth, the China-Africa trade is expected to play out in favour of China with Africa set to retain its position as an exporter of raw materials. Sixth, an increase in China’s military presence across Africa is anticipated given the growing interests and influence of the Chinese state.

The COVID-19 is a critical juncture in global geopolitics and geoeconomics, and certainly, China is using it to reposition itself as evidenced by the white paper. But where is Africa? Is it wandering? Is it lost? Is it sleeping? Is it basking? Is it playing to Beijing’s strategy? Is it setting the agenda? Sorry, it is China’s moment.

The writer is a political economist and research consultant on geopolitics/geoeconomics, governance and public policy. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa Podcast: Sitati Wasilwa

This article was first published by The African Executive Magazine.

What Trump’s fall, Biden’s Presidency mean for Africa

By Sitati Wasilwa

The November 2020 US presidential election was a unique moment in the global post-Cold War epoch; it came at a time when the world battled the COVID-19 pandemic and also ushered in the post-Trumpism era.

The pandemic and Trumpism threatened globalisation. Shrouded in the foggy sentimental expression of “Make America Great Again”, Trumpism sought to cut back on the gains made through globalisation as evidenced by the US-China trade war, America’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, and pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and World Health Organisation (WHO) among other policy faux pas.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in late 2019, forecasted a loss of about $700 billion for the global economy by the end of 2020 as a result of the trade war. The situation may have worsened with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Accordingly, a report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – “Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trade and Development: Transitioning to a New Normal” – the global economy was bound to contract by 4.3% in 2020 with 130 million people pushed into extreme poverty due to the pandemic.

A few months after the outbreak of Coronavirus, global supply chains were massively disrupted prompting debate about the future of globalisation. For some, such large-scale disruption was bound to trigger relocation of enterprises back to their home countries. For others, globalisation was still the fulcrum for global economic recovery post-COVID-19. In fact, in an article I wrote in April 2020, I noted that globalisation will still be fashioned by state and non-state actors as key in the recovery of the global economy.

Fast forward, the victory of Joe Biden and Trump’s exit have several geopolitical implications for Africa in terms of security, trade, foreign aid, vaccine diplomacy, and others. But the concern is whether African states are formulating the necessary strategies and policies to address the complexities presented by this critical juncture.

Growth of Global Multilateralism: A More Globally Integrated But Less Economically Powerful Africa

So far, there has been a global approach towards addressing the pandemic and its effects especially in terms of vaccine development and financial support for the needy economies. This, coupled with the election of Joe Biden, will accelerate global multilateralism.

More importantly, Biden’s administration is expected to openly support global trade unlike Trump’s which was hell-bent on making America great by fashioning autarky.

In essence, Biden’s administration will renege on Trump’s policies meant to scuttle global multilateralism. This will enhance Africa’s global integration.

The Trump administration’s policy for Africa promoted bilateral engagements between Washington and African states. The US-Kenya free trade agreement (FTA) is an example of the carrot-and-stick method meant to scuttle Africa’s plans to implement the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA). The FTA was to serve as a model for America’s bilateral dealings with other African countries.

Under Joe Biden, it is highly unlikely that Washington will continue with the bilateral policy approach in Africa due to two major reasons. First, Biden’s administration will be obsessed with countering China’s growing influence in Africa with Beijing having expressed support for the AfCFTA. As such, Washington may consider backing up the AfCFTA and other collective initiatives. Second, it will be more convenient for Biden’s administration to holistically support Africa’s recovery post-COVID-19 rather than adopt piecemeal bilateral engagements.

The growth of global multilateralism under Biden’s administration means that Africa will be more integrated globally, but this will not necessarily translate to improved economic fortunes on a grand scale. Fundamentally, global trade is about national interests; more of knavish and less of knightly behaviours and notions.

Historically, trade interests advanced by Washington work more in favour of Americans than Africans. Biden’s administration will be no different in enhancing these ‘Bad Samaritan’ policies – to borrow Ha-Joon Chang’s description of the flawed, biased economic policies that work in favour of developed economies and disadvantage developing ones.

Make Foreign Aid Great Again: More and More Aid for Africa

Trump’s administration slashed foreign aid and this affected various social and economic initiatives in Africa.  Nonetheless, Trump’s “New Africa Strategy” appeared to be an “America First” politically correct document, kind of nebulous in some foreign policy issues, while clear-cut on some.

For instance, while Trump’s administration endeavored to facilitate stability of African economies through foreign aid assistance, its insistence on the efficient and effective use of U.S taxpayer dollars for aid, withdrawing support for “unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions”, and targeting “U.S. funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives” set the tone for scaling down one of Washington’s age-old foreign policy instruments in Africa.

Of course foreign aid, in a blanket sense, has undermined Africa’s socio-economic and political development. The U.S., for instance, has a tainted history of supporting vicious, inhuman, and fantastically corrupt politicians and governments in Africa for geostrategic reasons. As such, foreign aid is a carrot that Washington has dangled in Africa for decades, and even Trump’s politically correct strategy for Africa is not fundamentally different in any way.

Fast forward, Biden’s administration is highly likely to reverse Trump’s approach to the issuance of foreign aid for African countries. In essence, a strong case for Biden’s administration to increase foreign aid for Africa is premised on the need for strong global economic recovery given the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and attempts to rival China’s growing influence on the continent.

Additionally, Biden’s administration may direct more foreign aid towards the growth and development of Africa’s democratic space, but this could be effectively slowed down by America’s recent struggle with democracy, heightened and almost ruptured by Trumpism.

Primarily, the next four years in Africa will be a period of making foreign aid great again. How African national governments, and extensively the AU, are prepared to handle the nefarious effects, or otherwise positive, of an increase in aid is a different discussion, but one that points out to the lack of strategies to address the changing times.

Geopolitics and Geostrategic Interests: The Race for Africa is Still On

Apart from the common foreign policy issues such as military engagement, counter-terrorism activities, and trade, the footprints of Biden’s administration in Africa will also be defined by the COVID-19 diplomacy and geopolitics of 5G technology.

Nothing much is expected to change given Washington’s military engagement with African states except for the Biden administration to cut back on Trump’s plan to withdraw support for the costly U.N. peacekeeping missions.

But a hostile domestic environment in the U.S. characterized by a contracting economy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic could be a game-changer concerning Washington’s military priorities in Africa. However, the history of America’s foreign policy is as instructive as ever before with the reality that the military-industrial complex fuels the U.S. economy. As such, the military-industrial complex is expected to be a crucial growth frontier given the recovery of America’s economy, and existing military markets in Africa especially in strategic regions such the Horn of Africa, the Niger Delta and West Africa, the Congo, and North Africa will lay a case for an aggressive strategy by the Biden administration.

The COVID-19 diplomacy will shape Biden’s policy for Africa in terms of foreign aid assistance as earlier explained, and more categorically, the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. In mid-2020, Donald Trump vowed to cut relations and eventually have the U.S. withdraw her membership from the WHO, a move which would have weakened the global health body considering that America is its biggest funder. The repercussions in terms of vaccine accessibility would have been profound especially in Africa.

Biden’s administration is expected to scale back on America’s withdrawal from WHO as a sign of offering leadership in global health, thereby countering China’s support for the Organisation voiced during the China-Africa Extraordinary Summit.

How Biden’s administration will measure up to Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy in Africa will determine its resilience in enhancing cooperation. China declared her support for African countries to access the vaccine during the Extraordinary Summit convened in May 2020 and reiterated the same in October 2020 when fifty-one African diplomats visited Sinopharm – a leading manufacturer of the COVID-19 vaccine.

Under Biden, Washington may look to enhance its vaccine diplomacy in Africa by shoring up support for WHO; by increasing its funding and budgetary allocation to the COVAX facility.

Geopolitics of 5G technology will be a top priority for Biden’s administration, and Africa will be a key front. As it stands, it is a tall order for the U.S. to convince African governments to shun the China-based Huawei, and it is highly doubtful if Biden’s administration will win this war. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) notes that hampering China’s 5G ambitions in Africa is limited because the Chinese government provides funding to Huawei’s data operations across Africa, in addition to the company building most of the data networks across the continent. In effect, the U.S. must be ready to bear the financial implications demanded by African governments in exchange for abandoning Beijing’s 5G ambitions.

During the China-Africa Extraordinary Summit, China outlined her areas of cooperation, and as stated by President Xi Jinping: “China will explore broader cooperation with Africa in such new business forms as digital economy, smart city, clean energy, and 5G to boost Africa’s development and revitalization”. Notably, Beijing has a head start in the 5G race in Africa, and the reaction of the Biden administration will be interesting to watch.

All eyes are on the actions of Biden’s administration in Africa, and one thing is for sure; Washington will be more visible in Africa than it was during Trump’s presidency. But, how are African governments preparing to engage Washington especially in an era defined by post-Trumpism, COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy, and 5G geopolitics? 

The writer is a political economist. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa Podcast: Sitati Wasilwa

My 2020 Reading List

My 2020 reading list comprises of sixteen books which are insightful and pretty remarkable, and they include:

“How Life Imitates Chess: Making the Right Moves from the Board to the Boardroom” by Garry Kasparov.

This is an intriguing text on the striking similarities between life and chess. One striking lesson from the book:

Aggressiveness is as much of an asset in politics, business, and other walks of life as it is in chess.

Garry Kasparov

“The Company of the Future: Meeting the Management Challenges of the Communications Revolution” by Frances Cairncross.

Amid the ever-changing technological landscape, organisations are bound to either respond effectively to the disruption, or risk decaying and collapsing. Cairncross offers ten rules for survival: manage knowledge; make decisions; focus on customers; manage talent; manage collaboration; build the right structure; manage communications; set standards; foster openness; and develop leadership.

“Global Discontents: Conversations on the Rising Threats to Democracy” by Noam Chomsky with David Barsamian.

This is an unhinged conversation on the triumph of global anarchy manifested through imperialism, interventions, colonial legacy, nefarious private capital and corporatism. It is an elaborate discussion on global geopolitics – a candid view of the activities of the “masters of the universe.”

“A Leap Into the Future: A Vision for Kenya’s Socio-Political and Economic Transformation” by Anyang’ Nyong’o.

Undoubtedly, this book is an illuminating account and blueprint for transforming Kenya’s political economy. Such transformation, according to Nyong’o, rests on the quality of political leadership, and he illustrates this by stating that:

What Lee Kwan Yew meant to convey to us was that leadership matters in development, particularly leaders with clear ideas and vision about the future of their nation, those who can fix their eyes on some distant star that guides their action towards clear developmental goals…

Anyang’ Nyong’o

“Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life” by Robert Reich.

I can’t think of any other book that outlines the history of the rise of neoliberalism in America and across the world quite magnificently like Reich’s “Supercapitalism”. To him, the rise, and rise of corporate power poses a danger to democracy. There’s no doubt that political campaigns across the world have been taken over by wealthy merchants with citizens banished to the fringes of the socio-political systems.

“The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make A Big Difference” by Malcolm Gladwell.

To illustrate how little things can make a big difference, Gladwell explores the nature of epidemics by looking at what he primes as the three agents of change – the Law of the Few; the Stickiness Factor; and the Power of Context.

According to Gladwell, the tipping point (or change) is realized when: a handful of rarely gifted people are heavily involved (the Law of the Few); a contagious message is made memorable and irresistible (the Stickiness Factor); and the right environment or situation for change is created (the Power of Context).

“The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World” by Jonathan Powell.

Niccolo Machiavelli is a classic instructor of the game of power. “The New Machiavelli” is a candid illustration of Machiavelli’s lessons about power. It is an essential text on the intricacies and intrigues of political power. Brilliant!

“Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy in Kenya: Choices to Be Made” by Anyang’ Nyong’o.

Nyong’o admonishes the presidential system in Kenya and fervently advocates for institutionalization of the parliamentary system of democracy. He offers ten reasons, among them: a troubled post-independence history as a result of the presidential system; presidential politics hardly builds political parties; better nurturing of national development policies; effective administration of devolution; and better inclusivity of disenfranchised groups among others.

“Tom Mboya” The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget” by David Goldsworthy.

This is one of the most definitive political biographies, particularly about Kenya’s most brilliant politician. It is an engrossing documentation of a man who certainly came before his time, and did all he can to acquire power – such a strong-willed character.

“The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for A Human Future at the New Frontier of Power” by Shoshana Zuboff.

According to Shoshana Zuboff, surveillance capitalism refers to “A new economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales.”

We love technology, but hardly think of the dangers that it poses to humanity. This book is one of the finest texts on the intricacies of the political economy of capitalism in the face of rapid technological development.

“Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything” by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner.

Freakish. Comical. Hilarious.

“Think Like A Freak” by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner

A sequel to “Freakonomics”, and definitely a breath-taking and intriguing text!

“On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons From the Twentieth Century” by Timothy Snyder.

This is a refreshing account on confronting political tyranny and enhancing societal progress. Simple, yet relevant.

“Mastery” by Robert Greene

The rigor and almost-philosophical intensity with which Greene writes the book is engrossing. The book is a dynamo – deeply reflective, thoroughly informative, and richly instructive.

“My Life in Red and White” by Arsene Wenger.

The French economist and football coach/manager offers insights on what it takes to be at the top for long – a great deal of obsession, strong sense of conviction, discipline, being demanding, setting high standards, and physical fitness. I wrote a review of the book (click here to read) and outlined some of the most crucial lessons offered by the former Arsenal F.C manager including:

…The common denominator for any success is a combination of attitude, talent and external luck. People at the top are also capable of objectively analysing their own performance and are hard on themselves. A good balance between intelligence and constant motivation and a good dose of humility…

Arsene Wenger

“Managing With Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations” by Jeffrey Pfeffer.

This is one of the most intimate books I have read on leadership and management. All crucial lessons on Politics and Power 101 are captured in the text. Pfeffer’s in-depth writing about the centrality of power in organizations is bewitching!

Happy New Year 2021.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist and contributing writer of The African Executive Magazine.

A Look at Arsene Wenger’s Autobiography, “My Life in Red and White”

“Life is a journey punctuated with afflictions that help us progress with our fears, our inner moods and emotions.” By Arsene Wenger.

Arsene Wenger’s autobiography, “My Life in Red and White,” is a grand summary of the life of a revolutionary and icon who dared to dream about conquering the world of football. Despite not having an illustrious and flowery career as a professional footballer, Wenger made his mark as a thoroughbred football manager, and currently serves as Head of Global Football Development at FIFA.

I love reading books about sports, particularly on managers and coaches, which are always enriching in terms of what it takes to create a winning team and institutionalising a performance culture. Although we have different interests and passions, I strongly believe that individuals who are not ardent fans of team sport tend to miss out on something really interesting. Still, a good number of the fanatics and fervent supporters never take keen interest on the intricacies of power, management and leadership in sports.

In short, team sport offers interesting and intriguing insights on leadership and management that current and future organizational leaders and managers will find helpful.

“My Life in Red and White” personifies Wenger’s character: a resolute, highly ambitious personality with a great eye for detail, an embodiment of strong conviction, and an uncompromising believer in philosophy.

Wenger’s book is as thoughtful and expressive as other autobiographies of great leaders in sports such as Sir Alex Ferguson’s. But I really hope that Wenger plans to write a more engrossing text specifically on leadership and management just like “Leading” – authored by Alex Ferguson with Michael Moritz. His current trade at FIFA will be a rich experience to read about, and such a book will uncannily stretch, though subtly, rivalry between two great men who shaped English and global football in general.

The University of Strasbourg trained economist writes at length about the centrality of a performance culture in a team, and extensively, in an organisation. Wenger notes:

“It is also important to instil a performance culture. By this, I mean a culture that requires the leader and the players to ask themselves the fundamental questions that I have already mentioned:

How can I get better?

Have I achieved my full potential?

What can I do to get there?”

Wenger comes across as a professional who recognises the intimate value of details, and in effect, detail matters:

“Everything mattered, including and especially the state of the grass! The groundsmen at Monaco must have popped up champagne when I left.”

For Arsenal’s former manager, the buck stops with the leader if he or she expects to implement his or her vision and values. A leader should be demanding and ruthlessly efficient at times. He notes:

“…And I managed to win players over by being committed, by being demanding, even severe, too, sometimes. I waged a bit of a war on the rebels. I wanted involvement from everybody that was equal to mine and up to the standards of the game.”

“…I was very demanding in training. I was very vocal. I’m sure some of them will remember my shouting and our arguments. I had no tolerance for poor passing or lack of willpower…”

“…I was also in great physical shape: I worked hard, I led from the front, and that had an impact on the players…”

Wenger extensively writes about the power of conviction in achieving goals and dreams, and attaches great value on a high sense of self-belief and hard work to attain the set objectives:

“…That has always been a lesson for me: setting the highest ambition and believing in it, sowing the seeds one year and harvesting two years later.”

“At the start of the 2003-04 season, I repeated to the players what I had declared earlier: they could win the title without losing. I believed in it, and it was our goal.”

The iconic Frenchman, an iconoclast of his own standing, reveals that decision making is an enduring attribute in leadership and management. He acknowledges making unpopular decisions, but nonetheless, in management, decisions count, whether good or bad – popular or unpopular.

Additionally, Wenger highlights the importance of questioning oneself, not as an expression of self-doubt, but as a fundamental approach towards having honest self-assessment. He notes:

“…Even today, I still have this need to question myself in order to progress…”

Furthermore, Wenger places premium on competence as a tidbit of organisational success, a key factor that is nowadays taken for granted. He emphasizes on the importance of a leader surrounding himself or herself with competent, brilliant and honest individuals.

Nevertheless, Arsene Wenger’s autobiography demonstrates his streak of obsessiveness with football, a fiery passion that definitely propelled him to the apogee of the world’s most popular sport. And certainly:

“Football determined the pace of my whole life. At night, when I got home after a long day at the club, I’d watch more matches that would throw me back into the work I was planning to do the following day with the team – how I was going to settle certain problems, how I was going to keep making progress. When I went to bed, I would be thinking over my day, and the next: the players, the matches and the training sessions populated my nights.”

Wenger’s tenacity is revealed in his religious adherence to a life-long routine characterised by iron discipline. He writes:

“…I get up at 5.30 a.m., do my exercises, train, eat and drink the way my former players did…”

“Today I still have the discipline I acquired over all those years. As I often say, freedom is the discipline you impose on yourself. I start my day with an hour and a half in the gym, without exception, even Saturday and Sunday. When I get the chance, I’m always ready to do another hour of cardio. This iron discipline, I have to acknowledge, helps me maintain my energy levels and stay in shape, because I’m still travelling a lot and I have other activities besides my role with FIFA.”  

And his thoughts on what it takes to be successful:

“…The common denominator for any success is a combination of attitude, talent and external luck. People at the top are also capable of objectively analysing their own performance and are hard on themselves. A good balance between intelligence and constant motivation and a good dose of humility…”

I recommend Wenger’s autobiography for football lovers and individuals interested in leadership and management. His life is a true manifestation of what it means to trust the process while putting in the hours and iron discipline. It’s a nice read.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist with great interest in leadership and management.

Snapshots from History: Re-imagining Jubilee’s Plan to Have Four Deputy Party Leaders

By Sitati Wasilwa

Word has it that the Jubilee Party plans to have four deputy party leaders, a move interpreted as an attempt to politically annihilate the Party’s current second in command and Kenya’s Deputy President, William Ruto.

This plan is similar to past instances where ambitious Vice Presidents had their ambitions vanquished. Among all the former Vice Presidents, the drama and humiliation that Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Kinuthia Muthengi Saitoti endured, in the wake of succession politics, certainly stand out. Mwai Kibaki’s experience comes close but Jaramogi’s and Saitoti’s involved watering down their positions as KANU’s second in command which suitably parallels the scheme to neutralize Ruto’s position in the Jubilee Party.

In this edition of Snapshots from History, I draw reference from books I consider authoritative.

Jaramogi’s Day of Reckoning at Limuru

What was the origin of Jaramogi’s woes in KANU just shortly after Kenya gained her independence? As written by David Goldsworthy in the book, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget:

“The general story has been told many times. In essence, the factional dividing line within the party became much more sharply drawn. On one side Mboya was allied with the inner Kikuyu group – Njonjo, Mungai, Koinange, Gichuru, Kiano – and certain others, notably McKenzie and Moi. Against them Odinga was allied with the ex-detainees Kaggia and Oneko and various other leaders, including Tom Okelo-Odongo and J. D. Kali. Certain other leading actors, for example Murumbi and Ngei, occupied somewhat ambivalent positions, but were generally regarded as linked by old loyalties to the latter group. Both the main contestants, Mboya and Odinga, lobbied hard for support in the parliamentary party, so that in due course almost every Member came to be aligned with one or the other. So, by extension, did their local branch parties.” (Goldsworthy, page 232).

What were the sources of the conflict that divided KANU into two factions?

“The sources of conflict were manifold. Clashes of temperament, of generation, of regional and ethnic interest, and of ambition (especially long-run ambition for presidential succession) all played a part. But what should be stressed is that conflict stemmed too from a genuine clash of policy ideas over a whole range of issues, foremost among which were the issues of land distribution and land use, development planning, and Kenya’s relationships with the great powers. On these pervasive issues the factions took consistently antagonistic political positions…” (Goldsworthy, page 232).

In the lead up to the infamous Limuru Conference of 12-13 March, 1966, there are crucial dates which the fate of Jaramogi and his lieutenants was sealed.

15 February 1966:

“On 15 February he (Mboya) moved a parliamentary motion which expressed confidence in the President and the government, condemned dissident groups in KANU, and demanded that those who did not support the government should declare themselves. Odinga fell into the trap. Complaining that he had not been consulted about the motion, which as (unofficial) leader of government business he should have been, he stormed out of the House. The motion was passed in Odinga’s absence, but not until more than seven angry hours of debate had elapsed and the two sides had laid bare their personal and policy disagreements as never before.” (Goldsworthy, page 242).

27 February, 1966:

“On 27 February Mboya made the bombshell announcement that a full party delegates’ conference – the first since 1960 – would be held at Limuru on the weekend of 12-13 March. The announcement was certainly unconstitutional. Mboya had neither consulted the national executive, nor given three weeks’ notice, nor issued an agenda and statement of accounts, all of which were required by the KANU constitution. An outraged Odinga mustered his forces in protest.” (Goldsworthy, page 242).

8 March, 1966:

“On 8 March forty-nine MPs and senators petitioned Kenyatta to postpone the conference. But on the next day ninety-nine MPs and senators counter-petitioned. Kenyatta decreed that the whole KANU Parliamentary group should meet to settle the issue democratically. Having duly endorsed Mboya’s initiative, this meeting was presented with a second Mboya bombshell: a proposed new party constitution drafted by himself. Among other things, it was proposed that the responsibility of the secretary-general should be expanded from covering ‘all Union correspondence’ to ‘all Union affairs’; and, most importantly, that the post of deputy party president (Odinga’s post) should be replaced by eight provincial vice-presidencies…” (Goldsworthy, page 242).

The outcome of the Limuru Conference:

“…Provincial caucuses met to select their new vice-presidents. For Nyanza Province a disgusted Odinga did not even stand, thereby allowing Lawrence Sagini to walk in unopposed. Elsewhere such conservatives as Moi (Rift Valley), Ngala (Coast), Nyagah (Eastern), and Kibaki (Nairobi) were elected with little hindrance. Only in Central Province did things come temporarily unstuck. Kaggia was chosen, and it needed considerable overnight manipulation of delegations and their credentials to disqualify him and install Gichuru in his place.” (Goldsworthy, page 242).

Saitoti’s Baptism with Fire At Kasarani

George Saitoti’s date with the powers that be was in March 2002, thirty-six years after Jaramogi’s encounter with mafia-styled party politics. Both incidences took place in the month of March.

For a better understanding of Saitoti’s humiliation, I draw reference from Moody Awori’s book, Riding on a Tiger, and Charles Hornsby’s, Kenya: A History Since Independence.

Saitoti’s vanquished ambitions came soon after the 1997 general elections when KANU had a narrow parliamentary majority and Moi embarked on a mission to source for strategic political partners as Hornsby explains.

“Meanwhile, Moi sought alliances outside KANU to sustain his narrow parliamentary majority. There were rumours that Moi had offered Kibaki the vice presidency if he would bring the DP back into KANU, but he had refused. The opposition leaders from western Kenya – Kijana Wamalwa and Odinga – proved more flexible. As his father had done in 1993–4, Raila Odinga soon made a (cynical) deal with his greatest foe. By February 1998, the ‘cooperation’ between NDP and KANU and between the Luo and Kalenjin was sealed. This alliance was to last for four years, during which the NDP supported KANU’s thin majority in Parliament in return for Luo access to the ‘fruits of Uhuru’ (including investments in the cotton industry and the Kisumu molasses plant) and progress on constitutional reform. As a ‘sweetener’, Moi dangled a few parastatal posts before the Luo, and appointed Luo Philemon Abong’o as commissioner of police, and Sandhurst and US-educated Lieutenant General Daniel Opande as vice-chief of the General Staff. The NDP alliance was essential to secure KANU’s control of Parliament and of the constitutional review process. In October 1998, for example, the NDP voted with the government to defeat a motion of no confidence from James Orengo. Odinga was simultaneously positioning himself for a second shot at the presidency. By mid-1998, there was even talk of a coalition government.” (Hornsby, page 621).

In 2001, the KANU-NDP Alliance was formalized, a move that isolated an already disgruntled Saitoti as noted by Hornsby:

“The alliance between the NDP and KANU deepened. A key indicator of Raila’s progress into the heart of KANU was his role in the constitutional review process, where he was now Moi’s most loyal ally. In June 2001, Odinga finally received a reward for his cooperation, when Moi formed Kenya’s first coalition government since 1963. He appointed Raila as minister for energy, his colleague Adhu Awiti became planning minister and two more NDP MPs became assistant ministers. Most NDP MPs crossed over to the government bench, and moves began to formalise their partnership into a merger. Raila looked to have done a deal that would leave him well placed to succeed Moi, and Nyanza celebrated in response. However, there was strong opposition inside KANU from the Kamotho–Saitoti axis, concerned about their future. They resisted Moi’s ‘western alliance’ throughout 2001, arguing that KANU’s constitution did not permit a merger, and had to be overridden by Moi. The parties eventually held a joint Delegates’ Conference on 24 August 2001 at Kasarani Sports Stadium, an event that became known as ‘Kasarani I…” (Hornsby, pages 662-663).

18 March 2002, NDP and KANU merged and Saitoti’s political fate was sealed. Moody Awori notes:

“When the National Delegates Conference met in March 2002 at Kasarani, President Moi addressed the delegates and spoke about how KADU had dissolved itself at independence and joined KANU. He then announced a merger between KANU and NDP and the NDP flag was lowered amidst cheers from the 6,000 delegates. He further announced that it had been decided that in the new KANU, the position of National Vice Chairman had been abolished and four Vice Chairmen’s positions created.” (Awori, page 210).

Consequentially, Saitoti lost his position as the National Vice Chairman and was replaced by four Vice Chairmen as documented by Awori:

“Others elected unanimously included Vice Chairmen Kalonzo Musyoka, Noah Katana Ngala, Musalia Mudavadi and Uhuru Kenyatta.” (Awori, page 210).

Saitoti’s reaction and Moi’s response:

According to Hornsby;

“To his horror, Saitoti found that his name had been removed from the list of vice-chairmen he had seen the night before. Saitoti had been Moi’s vice president for as long as Moi had been Kenyatta’s, but despite the recent undermining of his position by State House, Saitoti could not believe that he could be dumped so humiliatingly. He was wrong, and cameras captured the angry debate between Saitoti and Moi, during which Moi ordered him to kimya (shut up). With voting by ‘acclamation’, Saitoti could do nothing…” (Hornby, page 671).

According to Awori;

“As usual, in what was then a habit in KANU, Saitoti was thoroughly humiliated. President Moi told him that KANU had “its owners”. It was then that Saitoti made his famous statement to the effect that: “There come (sic) a time when a country is more important than an individual”. From that moment, things would not be the same for KANU stalwarts.” (Awori, page 210).

Further;

“…The KANU establishment was not yet through with Saitoti. As Vice President, he was a frequent visitor to State House. One day after such a visit, he emerged after meeting the President only to find his official vehicles and security detail had been withdrawn.” (Awori, page 211).

Conclusion

Jubilee Party’s alleged maneuvering to create four Deputy Party Leaders positions in a bid to politically vanquish William Ruto’s presidential ambitions mirrors the 1966 and 2002 humiliation of Jaramogi and Saitoti respectively. In the next edition, I explore possible scenarios regarding William Ruto’s 2022 presidential ambitions with respect to the 1966 and 2002 happenstances.

Sources

Awori, Moody (2017). “Riding on a Tiger: An Autobiography.” Nairobi: Moran (E. A) Publishers Limited.

Goldworthy, David (1982). “Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget.” Nairobi: Kenway Publications.

Hornby, Charles (2012). “Kenya: A History Since Independence.” London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co, Ltd.

The writer is a political economist.

September 11 (9/11): Anarchy, Imperialism & War

By Sitati Wasilwa

The 2001 September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the USA, is highly recorded but the 1973 September 11 attack and overthrow of the legitimate government of Chile is less known to most people. This is largely due to narrative control propagated by the so-called liberal media which sieves the kind of information fed to the public.

In this piece, I highlight some of the commentary and analysis by some authoritative sources on what we need to know in reference to the two September 11 attacks.

September 11, 1973 Attack: Imperialism & Tyranny by Any Means Necessary

To explain the basis and tyranny of the 9/11 attack of 1973, I draw reference to Noam Chomsky’s book, Who Rules the World?

“As we all should know, this is not a thought experiment. It happened. I am, of course, referring to what in Latin America is often called “the first 9/11”: September 11, 1973, when the United States succeeded in its intensive efforts to overthrow the democratic government of Salvador Allende in Chile via the military coup that placed General Augusto Pinochet’s ghastly regime in office. The dictatorship then installed the Chicago Boys – economists trained at the University of Chicago – to reshape Chile’s economy. Consider the economic destruction and the torture and kidnappings, and multiply the numbers killed by twenty five to yield per-capita equivalents, and you will see just how much more devastating the first 9/11 was.”

Historical Significance of the 1973 9/11

First, USA’s violent overthrow of a democratically elected and popular Chilean government happened at the height of the Cold War. By overthrowing the socialist government led by President Salvador Allende, the notorious USA government believed it was a primary way of expanding its capitalistic ideals across Latin America, a region which America has ravaged for decades under the dictates of the Monroe Doctrine. One of the leading economists invited by the murderer Augusto Pinochet was Milton Friedman, an intellectual who proved instrumental in the Chicago Boys programme. His meet-up with Pinochet is described by Robert Reich in the book, Supercapitalism:

“In March 1975, economist Milton Friedman accepted an invitation to Chile to meet with Augusto Pinochet, who some eighteen months before had toppled the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. Friedman was criticized in the American press for making the trip, but there is no reason to suppose he approved of Pinochet. Friedman went to Chile to urge Pinochet’s Junta to adopt free-market capitalism – to trim the business regulations and welfare state that had grown under Chile’s many years of democratic government and to open itself to trade and investment with the rest of the world. In a series of lectures he delivered in Chile, Friedman reiterated his long-held belief that free markets were a necessary precondition to political freedom and sustainable democracy. Pinochet took Friedman’s free market advice, but Pinochet’s brutal dictatorship lasted another fifteen years. The men died within weeks of each other in late 2006.”

I am not sure if Reich’s excerpt of Friedman’s belief and ideology makes sense because taken with a pinch of salt, it best qualifies as an expert’s tyranny! Why did he work with a tyrant if he believed that democracy was the way to go? Your guess is as good as mine. For further reading, check: here, here, here and here.

Second, the 1973 9/11 attack took place when the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism was tanking and an alternative was needed (Please note that African countries endured economic, social and political ruin during the Westernized ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’ as a result of colonialism). The answer, to some, was neoliberalism which has turned out to be cataclysmic in view of social and economic inclusivity. Was the attack an experiment on neoliberalism? I think so.

Third, the 1973 9/11 attack, as a neoliberalism experiment, was extended or experimented in other countries around the world as a model for advancing America’s imperialism. Such economic ‘shock therapy’ experiments were administered in the form of the infamous structural adjustment policies whose records across Africa and Latin America are astonishingly ridiculous. Further reading: here, here and here.

A Quick Through

Two articles can offer some quick insight of the 1973 9/11. One is titled, “1973 Chile coup: The first 9/11 attack allegedly backed by the USA” by Republic World, and the other is titled, “The Coup in Chile” by Jacobin.

September 11, 2001 Attack: A Clash of Civilizations, Imperialism & Mission Failure

The 2001 9/11 attack has its roots in the Cold War era during the Soviet War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. The Mujahedeen rebels who fought against the Soviet Union were supported by the American and Saudi Arabian governments in terms of supply of weapons and cash among other effects. Through this, Osama Bin Laden found his way into Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia. The end of the Soviet War saw withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops from Afghanistan and meant that the Mujahedeen fighters no longer had guaranteed sources of income.

As a consequence, most of them resorted to creation of territorial units (informal governments) and levied taxes on the Afghanistani people. A few notable leaders of the Mujahedeens aimed to restore sharia law and order in Afghanistan on the account that some of the territorial units were meting violence and harsh rules on civilians. But the shrewd leaders of the Taliban were soon overpowered by radicals mainly from Pakistan who infiltrated the movement and purposed to spread their ideology around the world.

An intriguing account of the Taliban and Afghanistani society is documented by James Fergusson in his book, Taliban: The Unknown Enemy. It’s a definitive account of a clash of civilizations. Tim Weiner also wrote an article titled, History to Trump: CIA was aiding Afghan rebels before the Soviets invaded in ’79”, published by the Washington Post which presents a fair view of this clash of civilizations.

Historical Significance of the 2001 9/11

First, it was the genesis of the War on Terror era which USA fashions as a mechanism to stamp out terrorism. As stated, bombing of the World Trade Center and the War on Terror have roots in the Cold War as illustrated by an excerpt from Tim Weiner’s article.

“I traveled through Afghanistan again in 1994. Jihadis from all over the world were gathering there. The first World Trade Center bombing was on their minds. The talk was that they’d knocked off one superpower — the Soviets — and they could knock off the next. America was nowhere to be seen. Not a penny of its aid was to be had.”

Second, it laid the basis for America’s enhanced interventions across the Middle East, first in Iraq before wrecking the civilizations of the Libyan and Syrian people through the much-famed ‘Arab Spring.’ Basically, America’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has largely been driven by nonsensical interventions which Michael Mandelbaum notes in his book, Mission Failure, as failed missions.

Third, the War on Terror has sucked African countries into the failed missions with notable social, economic and political costs. Kenya’s invasion of Somalia to fight the Al-Shabab has been a costly proxy war. Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Uganda among other countries have faced several terrorist attacks. This has necessitated increase in public spending on security while also prompting America to strengthen its military activities through increased financing and establishment of military bases across the world including in Africa.

Fourth, the supposed War on Terror has aided Russia’s resurgence with the Russian state now actively participating in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts.

Fifth, the War on Terror has also significantly pushed the Chinese to largely invest in their military and as a positive externality, somewhat offered an incentive for China to set up military bases in strategic regions of the world.

Conclusion

Both 9/11 instances exemplify anarchy, imperialism and war and offer crucial lessons why foreign interventions will always fail. This failure is based on the clash of civilizations in view of conflicting cultures and societal orientations.

The writer is a political economist. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa Podcast: Sitati Wasilwa

Tom Mboya: The Undeservedly Forgotten Figure

By Sitati Wasilwa

In the last chapter of the book, “Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget,” David Goldsworthy describes the late Tom Mboya as “a leader of intellectual brilliance, vast practical competence, fine judgement, great drive, courage, and dedication.”

Mboya’s exceptional brilliance and talents and intellectual acumen were demonstrated through his organizational skills in the labour movement, administration of political entities, and establishment of effective networks locally, continentally and globally. Further, his oratorical prowess and writings illustrate that indeed he was a man ahead of his time.

Anyang’ Nyong’o’s recollection of his visit to Singapore in 1995 to attend the Africa-Singapore Encounter forum graced by the late Lee Kwan Yew illuminates Mboya’s eminence.

Professor Nyong’o writes in his book, “A Leap into the Future: A Vision for Kenya’s Socio-political and Economic Transformation,” that upon asking Lee Kwan Yew why Singapore had leapfrogged Kenya and Uganda yet they had almost the same GDP per capita in 1969, Lee particularly answered him that: “While we chose to go forward in Singapore, you in Kenya assassinated Tom Mboya.”

The assassination that took place on July 5th, 1969 fundamentally altered Kenya’s political, social and economic spheres. An assassination attempt on Mboya was first made on December 1967 with several bullets fired at his unoccupied vehicle by his official guard.

Politically, Mboya’s death united the Luo tribe (though Mboya originally was an Abasuba) and widened the schism between larger sections of the community and the Agikuyu following Oginga Odinga’s humiliation during the infamous Limuru Conference in March 1966.

Jaramogi’s neutralization in the KANU party preceded the formation of the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) that was later banned on October 30th, 1969. To the Luo, Jomo Kenyatta and the Agikuyu were the real enemies with the 1969 assassination marking the end of the long political rivalry between Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya.

Economically, Mboya’s assassination had significant effects on Kenya’s political economy. Fundamentally, it crippled the objectives of Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, “African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya,” largely propagated by Mboya then serving as Minister for Economic Planning and Development.

Although the aforementioned policy document was drafted by Professor Edgar Edwards, an American economist, David Goldsworthy notes that its main features embodied Mboya’s thinking and hence Mboyaism: political democracy; mutual social responsibility; various forms of ownership; a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interest of society and its members; diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic power; and progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income.

The essentialism of Mboyaism was reversed and drowned by the retrogressive Ndegwa Commission Report of 1972 which recommended civil servants to engage in private business as a measure to sustain the bloated civil service. This escalated corruption in government institutions which had begun in earnest following Kenya’s attainment of political independence. Mboya, it is said, was against the plundering of resources by most of the top most officials in the Kenyatta administration.

Socially, Mboya’s murder reminded Kenyans about the centrality of the tribe in their social relations. Appointments in the civil service, the nature of political formations and the general day to day interactions among members of different tribes never fall short of a defined ethnic orientation.

Reasons Why Mboya Should be Remembered

No doubt that Mboya’s razor-sharp intellect is one to be admired or envied. His rare intellectual ability is exemplified in the books, pamphlets, articles, essays, speeches, manifestos, policy papers and conference papers that he wrote. Certainly, he belongs to the unique generation of African political leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon and a few others who put their thoughts and ideas in writing.

Some of his notable works include “Freedom and After” (autobiography), “The Kenya Question: An African Answer,” “Conflict and Nationhood: The Essentials of Freedom in Africa,” and “The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and Writings” (synthesized in 1970). The particulars of tens of his articles are documented in Goldsworthy’s book.

To be an effective writer, one has to be a voracious reader and such was Mboya’s nature. Reading builds competence in the long-term and leaders ought to be religiously committed to lifelong reading and writing. This is a quality that most political leaders lack in Kenya and beyond.

Additionally, Mboya was a firm believer in mutual social responsibility, a tenet espoused in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965. The centrality of this principle, as documented in the policy, entailed building a country where citizens value a sense of service and are not driven by a greedy desire for personal gain. This reflected in Mboya’s relatively modest life and his discomfort with plundering of public resources by high ranking officials in the Jomo Kenyatta administration. Notably, he financed the purchase of land and construction of his first house along Convent Drive in Lavington through loans despite the glaring opportunities to profit from vices.

Further, Mboya’s dedication to build the labour movement was premised on his quest for a fair and just society. His leadership through the Kenya Local Government Workers’ Union (KLGWU), Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU), Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL), and as Minister for Labour following his appointment on April 9th, 1962 fundamentally transformed the working conditions of workers. His stint in the Ministry of Labour resulted in the drafting of the country’s first ever Industrial Relations Charter, a milestone for Kenyan workers and governance of labour relations.

The famous student airlifts to America was Mboya’s hallmark in regards to enhancing social, economic and political emancipation of Africans. Even though his personal interests pushed him to organize for the student airlifts, it cannot be gainsaid that a significant number of Kenyans benefited from the scholarships directly and indirectly.

Following the May 1963 elections that ushered self-governance rule by Africans, Mboya was appointed as Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and among his responsibilities included negotiating for the formation of the East African federation. Goldsworthy notes that reasons for Mboya’s argument for establishment of the East African federation included: creation of a common market; enhancing defence of the member states; need to save resources; desire for unity and the need for East Africa to make an impact on global affairs; and the need to pursue Pan Africanism and the Addis spirit that established the then Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Mboya’s grand vision for an East African federation remains a pipe dream. First, it was jeopardized by lack of effective political will among the political leadership of Uganda and Kenya in 1960s. Later on, the political instability in Uganda and ideological differences between Kenya and Tanzania in 1970s and 80s further deferred the dream of the East African federation.

Among the aims and objectives of the East African Community (EAC) include establishment of a Customs Union (has been in place since 2005); creation of a Common Market (was to be effected in 2010); establishment of a Monetary Union (was to be in place from 2012); and creation of a Political Federation (by 2015). Mboya’s quest for a federation in the region still lingers on in his death.

His Pan-Africanist ambitions seeking for the social, economic and political emancipation of Africans cannot be forgotten. Local and foreign influences have thwarted the realization of a united Africa but the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) offers a ray of hope. But the conceptualization and expected operationalization of AfCFTA could be overtaken by parochial interests and neofeudalism just as it was the case during Mboya’s time.

Forgetting Mboya?

I still regard Tom Mboya as the best president Kenya never had. His unmatched intellect, effective organizational skills and global networks brewed enmity towards him that culminated in his assassination.

Jomo Kenyatta’s first heart attack in July 1966 set in motion succession politics with Mboya identified as the main enemy by the Kenyatta camp. This divided KANU into two factions, one pro-Mboya and the other pro-Kenyatta. At the height of the Emergency period in the better part of 1950s, Mboya had clear intentions to become Kenya’s Prime Minister or President and was not keen enough to support the idea of a Jomo Kenyatta presidency or premiership. This prompted accusations against Mboya about his plans to assassinate Jomo Kenyatta even during the latter’s fledgling presidency.

Kenya’s first president suffered a mild stroke in May 1968 at a time when Charles Njonjo and Daniel Moi – then Attorney General and Vice President respectively – were working so hard to amend the Constitution with the primary aim of scuttling a possible Mboya presidency.

Constitutional amendments of 1964 led by Njonjo and Mboya regarding the president’s succession in the event of his/her death required Parliament to elect a successor for the remainder of the term. But this was superimposed on June 25th, 1968 by an amendment allowing the vice president to take over for a maximum period of ninety days in case of the president’s death.

A year later, Mboya was murdered and the Kenyatta and Moi regimes worked so hard for over three decades to ensure his legacy was forgotten. The Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta administrations are no way better though Kibaki’s erected a statue in Nairobi’s CBD in his honour.

In attempting to exterminate his legacy, for instance, are there any key landmarks in Kenya named in his honor except for the Tom Mboya Labour College (now Tom Mboya University College), the famous Tom Mboya Street, Tom Mboya Hall along Jogoo Road, and a few schools here and there? Secondly, the documented history about Mboya particularly in primary and secondary schools ought to be rightly framed.

And let’s not forget that the initial attempt to forget him came immediately after his assassination as written by Goldsworthy that:

“…shortly after Mboya’s death a great volume of his papers were taken from their place of storage in his office, and have not been seen since. They could only have been removed on government order. Almost certainly they included two particularly vital documents which the family has been unable to find. One was the manuscript of an almost completed book; portions of this had been shown to Mboya’s intimates on several occasions in his last months. The other was Mboya’s will.”

I choose to forever remember the flamboyant Tom Mboya.

The writer is a political economist and consultant on governance, geopolitics and public policy. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa; Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa; LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa.

How Not to Run a Country: Of the Dangerous Confidence of Demagogues

History is replete with examples of political leaders who are narcissistic, incompetent and have a penchant for demagoguery. Although such characters tend to be charismatic, they often create misery by suppressing fundamental rights and freedoms or barely achieve anything substantial while in office apart from occasional bluffing.

Such individuals include Pombe Magufuli, Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Jair Bolsonaro and Narendra Modi among others. And the list is not just limited to politicians since we encounter such personalities in our daily lives.

But what makes such individuals appealing? Organizational psychologist, Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic notes that most incompetent people get to the top due to three reasons. Firstly, they are rewarded for their confidence with majority of the people confusing confidence for competence. Secondly, the love for charismatic individuals who tend to be entertaining or simply charming. Thirdly, the inability to resist the grandiose nature of narcissists fond of chest-thumping or regarding themselves as immortals and know-it-alls.

Tanzania’s president, Pombe Magufuli, has never been short of drama when making decisions. He began his tenure with so much gusto and was applauded in the manner which he dealt with the supposedly corrupt or lazy government bureaucrats and employees.

But his tenure is rife with cases of impunity, manifested through gagging of dissenting voices and making irrational decisions such as denying teenage mothers the opportunity to complete their education, a ruling which he recently reversed. His narcissism is also evident in the way he fires government employees without consideration for detailed information.

Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro and Boris Johnson behave more or less the same like the tin-pot despot from Tanzania. This trio of demagogues has clashed with senior officials in their administrations who’ve had to resign and some fired.

Even though politics demands that you dismiss courtiers who publicly defy a leader’s directions or collective agreements, the case is different with revered narcissists. They are usually dismissive of contributions from other team members and firmly but stupidly believe in the validity of their thoughts and decisions which often results in a chaotic work environment or country as well as failure to achieve the desired goals.

These demagogues fall short of traits such as competence, emotional intelligence, and the ability to have perspective which enable one to be a great leader as noted by Jonathan Powell in his book, “The New Machiavelli.”

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the demagogues’ incompetence, lack of emotional intelligence and inability to have perspective while addressing the ongoing crisis.

Several heads of states and governments have failed to effectively address the pandemic but some like Magufuli, Trump, Bolsonaro, Modi and extensively Boris have been ridiculous in their approach and pronouncements.

Populist rhetoric by Trump, Magufuli and Bolsonaro are hinged on the need to seek for popularity as their countries prepare for elections. Tanzania is set to have a general election in October 2020 while the United States of America will have a presidential election in November this year. Brazil will hold its elections in 2022. For this bunch of demagogues, averting economic crises will secure them another term in office.

But what comes first, economic recovery or protective measures to slowdown the virus? While economic recovery is necessary, protective measures are more than necessary. Although lockdowns are economically destructive and not sustainable for poor economies like Tanzania’s, protective measures must be observed to contain the spread of COVID-19. However, Magufuli believes that the economy comes first and offers some valid justifications though other piety reasons, for instance, the eventual decline and cessation of church offerings demean his intellect.

Magufuli’s pious nature makes him believe that COVID-19 can be cured by prayers! To have a scientist and head of state making such dangerous statements reeks of incompetence and ignorance. That Tanzanian churches have to remain open in the wake of Coronavirus is simply Magufuli’s strategy to win support from a society obsessed with religion. But such is the language used by demagogues.

Trump has remained defiant on the need to open up the American economy, worst hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in the world. So far, more than 40 million Americans have filed for unemployment in the world’s most unequal and unsafest country. The pandemic has exposed America’s realities of mega inequality and the lie that is ‘American Exceptionalism.’

Recently, Trump ordered state governors to open places of worship amid opposition from some religious leaders who content that it is not the right decision. But Trump is obsessed with being reelected risking lives of ordinary Americans by encouraging them to stage protests against restrictions imposed by governors while he enjoys the benefits of belonging to the oligarchy. This is the epitome of class warfare.

Ignoring advice from experts and firing them is a script in the demagogues’ playbook. Richard Bright was fired by Trump after rejecting most of the unscientific claims made by his administration regarding Coronavirus. Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of America’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, has clashed severally with Trump over issues such as the origin of Coronavirus, opening up of schools, and generally relaxing the safety measures put in place.

The clownish antics of Jair Bolsonaro cast him as a personality obsessed with power and not the welfare of the people. His presidency has poorly responded to the pandemic in terms of mitigating the economic and social crises occasioned by the COVID-19 scourge.

Bolsonaro has actively participated in the anti-lockdown protests demanding state governments to get rid of physical distancing and lockdown measures citing the threats of unemployment, hunger and misery. Under the leadership of Boris Johnson, the response to the pandemic has been less effective.

So, what is the best way to run a country? Heads of states and governments should learn to listen to professional advice and develop perspective on critical policy issues. Obsession with profits seems to drive political leaders but we need to come to terms with the reality that the economy is about people. We tend to disentangle people from the functioning of an economy. Ideally, economic policies need to fashion people over profits.

Voters also need to set the bar high enough and allow for the election of competent people. But the reality is that most voters – members of the general public – have poor judgment to differentiate between confident and competent individuals, and have a high affinity towards supporting charismatic but narcissistic politicians who are often demagogues.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist and consultant on governance, geopolitics and public policy, and a youth leader at YMCA Kenya. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa. Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa. LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa.

My 2020 Reads So Far…

In this article, I reflect on the books that I have read in 2020 or currently reading. I strongly believe that reading is the most fundamental way we can conceptualize new ideas or simply become better thinkers. So far, I have only read seven books which are very few, but I have always believed that quality matters and not quantity.

We need to read better instead of reading more but I am certain I could be on my tenth read if not for other work and personal commitments.

So which books have I read or currently reading? What are the definitive lessons I have learnt? And what are some of the compelling insights, arguments or opinions that they bear? I have excerpted most of the insights, arguments and opinions for purposes of originality.

“How Life Imitates Chess: Making the Right Moves from the Board to the Boardroomby Garry Kasparov

I picked Garry Kasparov’s text since I needed to start the year on a high note; to reflect on personal and professional goals and ambitions. Kasparov is a Russian chess grand-master and regarded as the greatest chess player of all time. Additionally, he is a writer and political activist in Russia.

I love reading books authored by former players or coaches since sports offers insightful lessons on organization of teams, formulation of strategies, execution of plans, and significance of discipline and personality in winning. I also enjoy playing chess and related the game’s concepts to Kasparov’s thoughts.

What are some of the insights or lessons from Kasparov’s book?

“Aggressiveness is as much of an asset in politics, business, and other walks of life as it is in chess.”

“Every leader in every field, every successful company or individual, got to the top by working harder and focusing better than someone else.”

“Every step, every reaction, every decision you make, must be done with a clear objective.”

“Self-awareness is essential to being able to combine your knowledge, experience and talent to reach your peak performance.”

“If critics and competitors can’t match your results, they will often denigrate the way you achieve them.”

“As a politician I know that there is always a time and place for diplomacy, but I also know that you win more often when you negotiate from a position of strength. And sometimes that means playing the aggressor.”

It’s an insightful read especially for individuals who know how to play chess.

“The Company of the Future: Meeting the management challenges of the communications revolution” by Frances Cairncross.

Frances Cairncross is a British economist, journalist and academic. She previously headed Exeter College, University of Oxford, and was an economic columnist for 13 years at The Guardian and spent 20 years as a senior editor at The Economist magazine.

This book is a definitive guide to some of the fundamental management practices in a world that is rapidly changing as a result of technological development. Cairncross offers insights on how organizations can weather the storms of communication technology.

Cairncross outlines the “Ten Rules for Survival” in an era where disruptions occasioned by technology are rife.

  1. Manage knowledge

“A company is the sum of what its people understand and know how to do well.”

“Getting intelligent people to share what is in their heads is vital, and takes more than mere money or clever software.”

“Ideas must flow sideways through a company and from the bottom up – not merely top down.

2. Make decisions

“Good judgment will remain a key skill. Managers constantly blitzed with new information require strong nerves if they are to build in the data that matters and set aside the rest.”

“Managers must accept that it is sometimes better to be roughly right than exactly wrong.”

“…a decision must be not just financially right, but ethically defensible too.”

3. Focus on customers

“Customers matter – but some matter more than others.”

4. Manage talent

“Like its customers, some of a company’s people matter more than others. That does not apply only to people at the top: Managing talent is also about capturing ideas from middle managers and those further down the line.”

5. Manage collaboration

“Teams may be separated by time zone or by geographic distance and increasingly will work for different employers. Effective collaboration between teams and between companies calls for similar qualities: trust and shared understanding, rather than the top-down, command-and-control approach of hierarchical structures.”

6. Build the right structure

“As costs of handling information in a company decline, so new opportunities open for redefining corporate shape. In general, companies will be less hierarchical, more modular, with more ways to arrange and rearrange structure.”

7. Manage communications

“Given the pace of change, bosses need more than ever to be able to communicate persuasively through many channels, with their staff and the outside world. They must also listen: The most valuable communications will frequently be bottom-up, and the folk nearest to the customer and the product now have new tools for explaining what they see.”

8. Set standards

“Ironically, Internet technologies, tools of freedom and decentralization, call for discipline, protocols, and standard processes.”

9. Foster openness

“Once standards have been set, then openness and freedom should reign. Discipline and openness are two sides of the same coin: Centralization of standards makes possible decentralization of decision making.”

10. Develop leadership

“Without the right organizational structure, culture, and staff, a company will not fully benefit from even the most sophisticated technology.”

“At some points in a company’s life, it will need a hero-leader who can rally staff to push through the trauma of disruptive change. At other times, the right style will be the manager-as-coach, a selfless talent scout who specializes in assembling and motivating great teams.”

“Always, the people at the top will set the tone in a firm. Their skills will determine whether it is a good company to work in and do business with.”

This is an effective read for organizational leaders and managers.

“Global Discontents: Conversations on the Rising Threats to Democracy” by Noam Chomsky with David Barsamian.

Noam Chomsky is one of the world’s most formidable intellectuals. He is a linguist, philosopher, historian and political activist. David Barsamian is a radio broadcaster and writer.

This book is a collection of conversations between Chomsky and Barsamian and reflects on the continuous rise of imperialism and decline of democracy across the world.

What are some of the insights?

“The technology is available. You can use it for making money, and you can use it for controlling people’s attitudes and beliefs, directing them toward what you want them to do. So they do.”

“In Iraq, it was clear that the United States was basically defeated. Its war aims were unrealizable, and the Bush administration was starting to pull out. In Afghanistan, Obama actually expanded the war in the hope of achieving some kind of victory. It didn’t happen.”

“Why is the state executive granted the authority to capriciously decide you’re a terrorist? Why does the state have the right to say that Nelson Mandela is a terrorist, which they insisted on until just a couple of years ago? Why do they have the right to say, as Ronald Reagan did in 1982, that Saddam Hussein isn’t a terrorist, just because the U.S. government wanted to give him aid?”

“The basic principle was enunciated by the president of the Continental Congress, John Jay, later the first chief justice of the (U.S) Supreme Court. He said, “Those who own the country ought to govern it.” Or as (James) Madison put it, power has to be in the hands of the wealth of the nation, the more responsible set of men who sympathize with property owners and understand that you have “to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.” The rest of the population has to be tamed to make sure they can’t do very much.”

“The three countries that are most supportive of Israel are the United States, Australia, and Canada – all settler-colonial societies that virtually exterminated their indigenous populations. What Israel is doing (in Palestine) seems quite consistent with their own national images.”

“And Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were supporters of apartheid right to the end. In fact, Reagan was supporting terrorist groups in Angola – UNITA was essentially a terrorist gang…”

“…the ANC, the African National Congress, was condemned by the United States in 1988 – almost at the end of apartheid – as one of the “more notorious” terrorist groups in the world. That was shortly before Mandela was released. In fact, Mandela himself stayed on the terrorist list until 2008. It took special legislation in Congress to get him off it.”

“Imperialism basically means domination of others, and it takes many different forms. It can take the form of overt rule over the natives. It can take the form of settler colonialism, the worst kind, where you drive out the natives and replace them. There are other forms, too, such as economic domination. Take the so-called free-trade agreements, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership. These have nothing much to do with trade, despite the name; they are largely investor-rights agreements. They give multinational corporations and investors substantial control over the resources, policies, and actions of other countries.”

This is a book worth reading especially if one seeks to gain an understanding of how the world operates.

“A Leap Into the Future: A Vision for Kenya’s Socio-political and Economic Transformation” by Anyang’ Nyong’o.

The good old professor and a renowned political scientist in Africa and currently serves as the second Governor of Kisumu County. He played an instrumental role in Kenya’s second liberation and formation of the NARC coalition that drove KANU out of power.

This book is a collection of his essays, articles and presentations. It is rich in Kenya’s political and economic history and economic recovery post-KANU regime. What are some of the insights?

“Lee Kwan Yew, then a senior cabinet minister in Singapore, after his retirement from being Premier and founding father of the nation, had just given us a lecture on “What Singapore Can Learn from Africa and What Africa Can Learn from Singapore.” At question time I asked him whether he could explain to us why Singapore was able to take off and become a modern developed nation from the late sixties while we, who were at that time at the same level with them, retrogressed. Then came the old man’s wisdom in reply to my question: “While we in Singapore decided to march forward together as a nation, you in Kenya decided to assassinate Tom Mboya.” What Lee Kwan Yew meant to convey to us was that leadership matters in development, particularly leaders with clear ideas and vision about the future of their nation, those who can fix their eyes on some distant star that guides their action towards clear developmental goals.”

“Creating wealth for the few without creating employment for the masses would not lead to a full recovery process for purposes of kick-starting sustainable growth. Such jobless growth models are many in developing economies, and Kenya would not be the first to try economic recovery through the easy way of a growing GDP without the requisite creation of jobs. Tough political choices needed to be made to meet the objectives of the recovery strategy, i.e. wealth as well as employment creation.”

“Empowerment does not simply mean being appointed to a position – although representation is a major aspect of the empowerment process: it essentially means making people have their destiny in their own hands as much as possible.”

“Thus, the Ndegwa Commission of 1972 that allowed Kenyan civil servants to engage in business provided a big loophole for corruption in Kenya. It was indeed after the Ndegwa Commission Report that corruption in public offices started to escalate.”

“Let it not be said that corruption is a uniquely African disease, now would it be correct to assert that it is an affliction of post-independence Africa. The white settlers in colonial Kenya made their fortunes through corruption. Without cheating in collusion with colonial officials, stealing from the coffers of the colony, appropriating land for which they paid next to nothing, sucking of the blood of poor peasants for labour not paid for and literally getting public transport for free for their farm products, the Blundells and Delameres of colonial Kenya would not have built their fortunes and “moved to better things” when the nationalists finally took over political power.”

“Thus, when KPU cited corruption as one of the ways by which KANU misruled Kenya, Kenyatta chided Kaggia in that famous speech at a rally in Nairobi in 1966 where he accused him of having failed to build a house for himself while he, Kenyatta, had put up a mansion in rural Gatundu. For Kenyatta, it was not corruption that was the issue, it was the inability of some “leaders” to make use of “opportunities” open to them within the state to improve themselves. In this public and dramatised setting, a tradition was set from the highest level of political authority that made public officials enjoy impunity against the law should they be accused of corruption.”

“Malaysian leaders told me that when they visited Kenya in the mid-1970s, they were similarly struck by the progress Kenya had made since independence compared to where they were at the time!…But what had struck the Malaysians most was that at the time, Nairobi (and Kenya) had better infrastructure than Malaysia, and it was also better managed…Kuala Lumpur was nothing like this. So Malaysian leaders decided they would make their capital as good as – or better than – Nairobi. They requested the Kenya Government to allow Malaysian planners and civil servants to take courses at the Kenya Institute of Administration, then Kenya’s premier public service training institution, and the Kenya Government obliged.”

Nyong’o’s book contains credible insights and hence worth reading.

“Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life” by Robert Reich.

Robert Reich is an American economist, professor, author and political commentator. He served as Secretary of Labor between 1993 and 1997 and as member of President Barack Obama’s economic transition advisory board.

Although this book mostly gives an account of the American economy and polity, it resonates with the global realities of the political economy of capitalism. What are some of the insights?

“Some observers rightly point out that these gains (from capitalism) have been accompanied by widening inequalities of income and wealth. The gains have also accompanied other problems such as heightened job insecurity, and environmental hazards such as global warming. Strictly speaking, though, these are not failings of capitalism. Capitalism’s role is to enlarge the economic pie. How the slices are divided and whether they are applied to private goods like personal computers or public goods like clean air is up to society to decide. This is the role we assign to democracy.”

“Between 1945 and 1970, real incomes tripled around the world and world trade quadrupled. Not coincidentally, America’s foreign policy created new opportunities for America’s largest corporations – then larger, richer, and more technologically advanced than anywhere else in the world – to expand their markets abroad. With the dollar as the currency on which the world’s fixed-exchange system was based, America’s bankers and large corporations could extend the reach of American capitalism at minimal risk. Under a World Bank controlled by Americans, development assistance could be focused around the globe precisely where large American corporations saw greatest opportunity.”

“The effect was not uniformly benign. With uncanny precision, the Central Intelligence Agency uncovered communist plots just where America’s largest corporations wanted to ensure stable supplies of natural resources. When in 1953 an anti-colonial Iranian nationalist movement led by Mohammed Mossadegh challenged the power of the shah and seized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the CIA secretly channeled millions of dollars to Iranian army officers dedicated to returning the shah to power. Once that objective was met, American oil companies were granted generous access to Iranian oil. The next year, Guatemala’s democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, initiated land reforms that, along the way, confiscated the United Fruit Company’s plantations. The CIA then bankrolled right-wing revolutionaries who, helped by CIA pilots and aircraft supplied by Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, spared United Fruit an otherwise dismal fate. Also in 1954, the United States became quietly involved in Indochina, another area rich in natural resources. In Latin America, Vietnam, and the Middle East, America’s foreign policy sowed the seeds of profound problems for the future.”

This is certainly a good read for understanding the global political economy system of capitalism.

“The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference” by Malcolm Gladwell.

Malcolm Gladwell is a Canadian journalist, author and public speaker. Gladwell’s book is interesting on the account that it explores three fundamental ways of understanding social epidemics but still applicable in other facets of life; the law of the few, stickiness factor, and the power of context.

The law of the few refers to very few individuals who spread epidemics or can be able to orchestrate change. Gladwell categorizes such individuals into connectors, mavens, and salespeople.

Connectors are individuals who seem to know very many people and help to spread epidemics or change.

Mavens are individuals who seem to know everything and they read more and often use the information they possess to help others. Mavens are usually passionate about new ideas and concepts and this creates a contagious effect among other individuals.

Salespeople are individuals with great interpersonal skills and effectively use their body language to enhance change or social epidemics.

The stickiness factor refers to a unique quality of a product or event that easily sticks in people’s minds and lasts for a considerably longer period of time.

The power of context refers to the environment within which an event takes place or a product coexists.

“The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World” by Jonathan Powell.

This is my current read and I’m aiming to finish it in the course of the month of May. I have cleared chapter one and two and found it a very interesting book which the author contextualizes Niccolo Machiavelli’s texts, The Prince and The Discourses with his own experiences while serving as Chief of Staff to former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Here are some of the insights.

“In The Discourses, Machiavelli repeats the old saw that ‘he (Prince) is of a different opinion in the market place from which he is in the Palace.’ He explains that, once a man has risen to the highest office, when he gets there he looks ‘at things more clearly and so has come to recognise the source of the disorders, the dangers which they entail, and the difficulty of putting matters right.”

“Machiavelli advises that a new leader ‘must keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn’…But leaders also need to have a plan if they want to change things rather than being hijacked by events or by the agendas of others.”

“Over time opposition will build up and it is harder to be radical. A leader should spend his political capital early rather than hoarding it.”

“In the words of Isaiah Berlin, Machiavelli’s advice was: ‘if your action must be drastic, do it in one fell swoop, not in agonising stages.’

“According to the Machiavelli scholar John Plamenatz, Machiavelli ‘valued above all the two qualities which enabled a man to assert himself, courage and intelligence’, and these are the two qualities at the heart of leadership in any field. What Machiavelli meant by courage is self-evident, but by intelligence he did not mean intellect but rather judgement or instinct – what we would now call emotional intelligence. This is the mysterious ingredient that allows great leaders to have sense of where Fortune will lead and how best to take advantage of it.”

“Unlike wisdom, for example, which cab be acquired with experience, these qualities of courage and intelligence cannot be learned. A leader has to be born with them.”

“Machiavelli believed that, in addition to the ability to make difficult decisions, successful princes need to be born with good political instincts.”

“These innate qualities of courage and political instinct, while essential, are not enough by themselves to make a great leader. Leaders also need to acquire five other skills: competence, the ability to communicate, charisma, perspective and charm.”

Powell’s book would require one to read The Prince in order to clearly understand its content.

“A room without books is like a body without a soul.” – Cicero

“Books are the quietest and most constant of friends; they are the most accessible and wisest of counselors, and the most patient of teachers.” – Charles W. Eliot

Sitati Wasilwa is a consultant on governance, geopolitics and public policy. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa

Analysis of the Jubilee-KANU Post-Election Coalition Agreement

The Jubilee-KANU post-election coalition agreement should be interpreted as Uhuru Kenyatta’s uncanny political ‘theory’ in determining who succeeds him in 2022. However, this political deal does not qualify Uhuru Kenyatta as a political maverick but as a circumstantial political nanny attempting to replay Daniel Moi’s political script then christened as Project Uhuru.

Background to the Post-Election Deal

After Uhuru Kenyatta lost the 1997 parliamentary elections to Moses Muhia, the late Daniel Moi appointed him to chair the Kenya Tourism Board in 1999. Later in 2001, Uhuru Kenyatta was nominated as a Member of Parliament after the late Mark Too stepped down, and was appointed as Minister for Local Government.

In March 2002, he was elected as one of the four Vice Chairpersons of KANU in a scheme hatched by the late Daniel arap Moi to have Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU’s flag bearer in the 2002 elections. In 2007, Uhuru’s KANU did not field a presidential candidate but instead supported the reelection of Mwai Kibaki, a position which was also taken by Daniel Moi.

Although KANU was part of the Amani Coalition with the United Democratic Front (UDF) and New FORD-Kenya in the lead up to the 2013 elections, it jumped ship after the polls and signed a post-election deal with the Jubilee Coalition. In the 2017 elections, KANU supported the reelection of Uhuru Kenyatta.

The March 2018 handshake between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga served as the tipping point for the former to fix his Deputy, William Ruto, and lay out plans to elevate the political status of Baringo Senator, Gideon Moi. Of course the handshake is bound to shape Kenya’s political trajectory en route to the 2022 polls.

Undoubtedly, the handshake rattled William Ruto’s camp with the anti-handshake brigade opposed to calls for a pre-2022 constitutional referendum whose primary objective is the expansion of the Executive.

A common feature of post-handshake Kenya were the serial visits to the late Daniel Moi’s residence by Uhuru Kenyatta, Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, Mama Ngina Kenyatta among others. We need to recall that William Ruto was barred by Gideon Moi from visiting Kenya’s second president at his Kabarak home. The mini-handshakes with the late Daniel Moi could have been about securing the political future of Gideon Moi, who is either an underrated or weak politician.

A few weeks ago, the owners of the Jubilee Party made their intentions known by making changes to the Party’s National Management Committee, a move that elicited a lot of emotions and stirred debate about the future of the Party, and William Ruto in particular.

Regrouping of the Kenyatta’s, Moi’s and Odinga’s is a historical show of might out to eclipse William Ruto’s political stardom.

Kenya’s political history is rife with incidences of post-election deals some of which were ground-breaking and some of which were colourless.

Post-Election Pacts in Kenya

Kenya’s first post-election deal in modern history can be traced to the triumph of KANU in the May 1963 elections whereby KADU’s luminaries disbanded the party and merged with KANU. As a result, a number of KADU officials were appointed as Cabinet ministers. Elevation of former KADU officials in the KANU government intensified hostility between the Jomo Kenyatta camp and the so-called communist brigade led by Oginga Odinga. The rivalry resulted in the formation of Kenya People’s Union (KPU) led by Oginga Odinga.

During KANU’s meeting at the infamous Limuru Conference, the Vice President’s position in KANU was expanded to eight positions to politically fix Oginga Odinga with Tom Mboya acting as Jomo Kenyatta’s Mr. Fix It.

The November 1979 elections did not witness crafting of post-election deals per se, but the events following the election shaped Kenya’s and KANU’s political trajectories. Daniel Moi felt time was ripe to create his own legion of courtiers in order to move away from the political shadow of Jomo Kenyatta. This led to the appointment of several politicians to the Cabinet including Nicholas Biwott, Jonathan arap Ng’eno, Henry Kosgey, Moses Mudavadi, and Joseph Kamotho, with others such as Simeon Nyachae and Joseph Leting securing key appointments in government.

After the 1992 elections, a post-election pact between KANU and FORD-Kenya was in the offing up until the death of Oginga Odinga. The deal seemed to have been midwifed by Kamlesh Pattni having sensed that FORD-Kenya was broke with the latter’s leadership having failed to secure funds from the then feared USA Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, to file petitions against the Democratic Party (DP) and FORD-Asili.

Pattni’s donation came in handy and was an inflection point of Oginga Odinga to reunite with Daniel Moi but the former’s death shifted focus to FORD-Kenya’s chaotic succession.

Following the 1997 general elections, both FORD-Kenya under the leadership of Kijana Wamalwa and NDP then led by Raila Odinga jostled to court Moi’s attention. Raila’s NDP successfully crafted a post-election cooperation deal with KANU that saw the latter receive support in Parliament among other institutions within the government establishment. The post-election cooperation agreement between KANU and NDP laid the foundation of the merger that took place in March 2002. This was also the tipping point of KANU’s defeat in the 2002 elections following Moi’s selection of Uhuru Kenyatta as the party’s presidential candidate.

The defeat of Mwai Kibaki’s Banana faction during the 2005 constitutional referendum paved way for the formation of a Government of National Unity that saw the appointment of some KANU and FORD-People MPs to the Cabinet. This somehow laid the foundation for KANU to support Kibaki’s reelection and Kibaki’s adoption of the Party of National Unity (PNU) as his reelection outfit.

The contentious 2007 general elections led to the formation of the Grand Coalition government with the parties represented in Parliament having their members in the Executive except for Cryrus Jirongo’s then political outfit, KADDU.

After the 2013 elections, KANU and UDF separately signed post-election deals with the Jubilee Coalition with members from the two parties rewarded with government appointments though these pacts were politically mild.

Following the highly charged 2017 elections, Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta signed a post-election deal in March 2018 popularly known as the handshake. The handshake has already proven to be a political game-changer in the country; ODM no longer plays its role as the largest opposition party, the Jubilee Party is split, William Ruto appears to be isolated and generally new alliances are shaping up.

The KANU-Jubilee Party post-election deal comes at a time when the country’s political trajectory is gearing for Uhuru Kenyatta’s succession.

But what are the scenarios and perhaps the eventualities of the post-election deal between Jubilee Party and KANU?

Possible Scenarios and Eventualities

The eventual death of the Jubilee Party is in the offing. The handshake divided the ruling party and the post-election pact complicates William Ruto’s position in the Party. Ruto now needs to identify his political party or risk further isolation. As such, we are bound to witness Ruto and his allies finding a new political home.

Additionally, with Kenyatta set to retire, politicians in his camp could regroup under KANU or a Mt. Kenya-based political party in 2022 in the event that Ruto successfully gets hold of a weakened Jubilee Party. Jubilee Party could end up being an outfit with support among pockets of the Kalenjin nation.

Formation of a broader coalition comprising of KANU, Jubilee, ODM, Wiper, FORD-Kenya, and ANC could happen. Such a coalition could have Raila Odinga as the flag bearer and Gideon Moi as the running mate. Leaders of the other political parties could assume positions in an expanded Executive. We can now connect the dots on who is supporting and not supporting the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) which aims to create more positions within the Executive.

But why Gideon Moi as the possible running mate and not the other experienced politicians? He is the prince and a blue-eyed boy who can easily finance a presidential campaign but would need a higher power in Odinga to set pace for his national political career. Why Raila Odinga as the flag bearer? James Orengo has hinted of a possible alliance between Raila’s and Uhuru’s forces. By Raila Odinga taking charge of BBI rallies and hosting delegations at his Capitol Hill offices are subtle indicators of him being the flag bearer of a super-coalition.

Raila Odinga could also be betrayed in the context of the post-election pact between Jubilee Party and KANU. Kenya’s political history is not short of political betrayals and Odinga’s betrayal by Kenyatta will certainly add flavour to this political pot.

Uhuru Kenyatta might advocate for ‘Project Gideon Moi’ since 2022 is the only viable year that the young Moi has to be thrust into the national political scene. Sometime back, Uhuru Kenyatta publicly stated that the choice of his preferred successor will be a shock to many. Maybe Gideon Moi will be the man.

Betrayal of Raila Odinga could occasion formation of an alliance between him and the now isolated William Ruto. But with Odinga and Ruto on one side, will KANU’s alliance with the other parties triumph? Possibly yes especially if the Luhya bloc largely sticks with Musalia Mudavadi and Moses Wetang’ula who could lend support to Gideon Moi, and also if the formation gets the support of majority of members of the Mt. Kenya bloc. If this scenario plays out, then it will be the most interesting political battle to watch.

The rise of Gideon Moi would eventually divide the unity portrayed by the Kalenjin bloc during elections; voting in a defined pattern. This could also be a strategy to further decapitate Ruto’s kingship status of the Kalenjin community.

All in all, the political jostling and repositioning will take place as we head towards 2022 but let’s not forget the role of the deep state in determining the country’s political fate. The deep state calls the shots on who becomes the Commander-In-Chief. Interesting political times lie ahead.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist and consultant on public policy, governance and geopolitics.

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