Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius, and Power Politics 

On January 24, 2026, I appeared on Egypt’s leading regional television network, Al-Qahera News. The discussion focused on the sovereignty of Mauritius. This is in light of US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks accusing the UK of planning to give away the Diego Garcia Island, alongside other islands in the Chagos Archipelago, to Mauritius. 

Trump perceives the UK’s intention to surrender the islands as great stupidity, noting that China and Russia will take advantage of it and enhance their influence. 

President Trump’s view of the UK’s handover of the archipelago to Mauritius as a case of great stupidity is a classic Trumpian tantrum, but it also reflects great power rivalry, colonial legacy, neocolonial footprints, and the relativism of international law. 

Trump’s remarks on Diego Garcia and Chagos contradict his earlier position. In 2025, he praised the deal signed between the UK and Mauritius over the planned handover of Chagos and a 99-year lease of Diego Garcia as a momentous achievement. Power politics necessitate recalibrating commitments and flipping positions for self-interest. 

Trump’s sidestepping of the 2019 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), highlighting the urgent return of Chagos to Mauritius, is intentional but woeful. He was in his first term as president. But that’s the bullish nature of great powers, which constantly undermine the sanctity of global institutions. Such is the Thucydidean power doctrine: “The strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.”

The Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, are central to America’s geostrategic interests in and across the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a military base established by the UK and the US in 1971 at the height of the Cold War.  The US military used it in 1991 and 2003 during the military interventions in Iraq. These are not the only instances; the Diego Garcia base is used by US forces on reconnaissance missions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 

Trump’s paranoia about China and Russia seeking to fill the void in Chagos could be valid from Washington’s point of view. The Donroe Doctrine exemplifies Trump’s reimagined unipolarity of a highly globally powerful America, rivalled by none and feared by all. This is delusional, of course. It sticks out as any other power ambition, but it’s less likely to trigger nightmares in Beijing and sleepless nights in Moscow. China and Russia, in all fairness, learn a great deal from history, especially China. The Chinese are a step ahead or at par with the US on many aspects, bar military might and technology. 

The Indian Ocean is just one of the key maritime and geographically strategic zones for major powers to enhance their security and economic interests. In addition, consider the fact that Diego Garcia is America’s only permanent military base in the Indian Ocean. 

Eastern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are accessible via the Indian Ocean, more so, through Diego Garcia. From Diego Garcia, the US can flex its might and check its interests via other strategic maritime areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean, such as the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the South China Sea. 

Key Indian Ocean sea lanes are the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global oil trade and 20% of global trade of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s busiest maritime chokepoint, accounting for around 23.7% of global oil trade and 35-40% of global LNG trade. The Bab-al Mandeb Strait accounts for at least 8% of the global oil trade. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean accounts for approximately 40% of global maritime trade. 

With or without Trump, America will still want free and secure passage through these key chokepoints; hence the essence of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean. Hostile sentiments against Trump arise from his abrasive, often less statesmanly approach to guarding US geostrategic interests. 

Washington cannot underestimate China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, justifying Trump’s ‘great stupidity’ remark against the UK. China has operational control of the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota. It also has a significant presence at the port of Djibouti. 

Diego Garcia enables US naval deployments that allow forward presence near Chinese maritime supply lines, rapid deployment to potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific, and reassurances of allies (Australia, Japan, and India). 

China doesn’t have an official or direct presence in the Chagos Archipelago. Trump’s fear emanates from strengthening economic relations between China and Mauritius. This is in view of the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in October 2019 and entered into force in January 2021. 

What’s more, Beijing supports Mauritius over its long-standing claim for sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. While China has yet to reveal its plans for Chagos, hawkish Western perspectives point to the possibility of Beijing establishing a commercial and military presence on some of the islands of the archipelago. 

Trump’s comment on the UK’s surrender of Diego Garcia is a bluff at best. The 99-year lease not only ensures America’s strong geostrategic positioning but also enhances its counterterrorism and regional security interests. Diego Garcia supports intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the region. Consider piracy threats off the Somali coast and armed groups (Al-Shabaab and the Houthis). 

Central to the Chagos question is whether the UK government will hand over the islands in line with the ICJ’s ruling or not. The UK conservative politicians share the Trumpian view of China increasing its influence around the Chagos Archipelago and the Indian Ocean. 

The UK may eventually hand over the archipelago to Mauritius, but multiple political and legal obstacles exist. America’s resistance and political opposition in the UK are likely to prolong the May 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty that cedes the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Political and legal challenges by Chagossians may also delay the handover. 

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

South Sudan’s Perilous Path

On January 19, 2026, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Wisley Welebe Samson ordered forces to move to Juba from all directions. The advance aims at removing what Welebe describes as the “anti-peace regime.” Welebe called on disgruntled members of the South Sudanese People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) to defect. He further ordered civilians to evacuate military targets. Consequently, President Salva Kiir dismissed four Cabinet ministers, a governor, a deputy governor, and a senior intelligence officer.

Recent Clashes

The SPLA-IO’s call for its forces to advance to Juba is primarily an outcome of the persisting divisions in the fragile coalition government. It is also linked to the recent fighting between the opposition troops and government forces (SSPDF). On January 2, the Kit-Gang faction of the SPLA-IO took control of Uror County in Jonglei State, following clashes with the SSPDF. Reports indicate around 70 people died and thousands were displaced. President Kiir carried out a mini-reshuffle of the Cabinet on January 7, replacing opposition-aligned ministers with loyalists.

Heavy fighting occurred between the two groups in the northern part of Jonglei State from January 12 to 15. On January 16, the SPLA-IO announced the capture of the strategic town of Pajut in Duk County, approximately 300 km north of Juba. The seizure of Pajut enhances prospects of the SPLA-IO’s attack and capture of Bor. The SPLA-IO also issued a 72-hour ultimatum to aid workers and civilians in Duk, Bor, and Poktap to evacuate places near military installations. The group further demanded the unconditional release of the estranged First Vice President Riek Machar and leader of the SPLM-IO and others within two weeks.

Additional clashes occurred on January 17 and 18 in Pigi County in Jonglei State, prompting the government to deploy more troops to purposely defend Bor. Clashes persisted in Panyume in Central Equatoria State on January 19 and 20 following an offensive launched by the SPLA-IO.

The United Nations describes the clashes as the most intense since 2017. Clashes involving the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, and other armed groups, peaked in 2017, following the 2016 collapse of the transitional government.

Key Points

The main issues characterising South Sudan’s political environment are as follows:

  • The transitional framework has stalled: Repeated delays to elections and reforms reflect a shared elite preference for postponement over risk-taking, rather than an inability to move forward.
  • Violence functions as political signalling: Localised clashes serve to recalibrate power balances, test red lines, and assert relevance within the governing arrangement, rather than to trigger nationwide conflict.
  • Security forces remain factionalised: The absence of credible security sector reform continues to anchor political competition in armed leverage rather than institutions.
  • Succession concerns are shaping behaviour: Uncertainty over future leadership is encouraging pre-emptive positioning by key actors, increasing the likelihood of calibrated instability.
  • International leverage is diminishing: Diplomatic engagement persists, but enforcement mechanisms are weak and external attention is increasingly divided.

Outlook

A managed stalemate is the most likely scenario in the near term. As such, the state is expected to retain formal authority with uneven governance, a fragmented security architecture, and contested political legitimacy. Tolerance of instability and elites leveraging it for influence are anticipated. Further slippage of the transitional timelines and occasional outbreaks of violence are expected, particularly in the hotspots. A gradual erosion of tolerance and heightened tensions over suspicions linked to a mismanaged transition could trigger a full-blown conflict over time.

Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: East Africa, Ocean Access, and the Limits of Military Federation

These notes reflect my analytical views following a television interview with Al-Qahera News, a leading Egyptian regional media house, on regional politics, security, and geopolitical risk on November 29, 2025. The link for the conversation can be accessed here. This followed Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni’s controversial statement on possible conflicts in the future in relation to Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean, and the need for the EAC bloc to establish a military federation.

Big Picture

The debate around Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean and calls for an East African military federation is being overstated and, in some cases, misinterpreted. While President Museveni frames the issue in terms of future conflict prevention and regional self-reliance, the structural realities of East African integration make interstate conflict over ocean access unlikely. Uganda’s strategic interests are already embedded within existing EAC economic and political frameworks, and the leap from cooperation to a full military federation remains politically unrealistic. The underlying issue is less about imminent conflict and more about how East Africa positions itself collectively amid growing external geopolitical competition.

Key Points:

  • Conflict narratives are exaggerated: Claims that Uganda could face future conflict over Indian Ocean access are overstated and often incorrectly likened to the Ethiopia–Eritrea case. The historical, legal, and institutional contexts are fundamentally different.
  • Uganda’s access is structurally secured: Uganda’s present and future access to the Indian Ocean is anchored in deepening partnerships with Kenya and Tanzania, reinforced by regional infrastructure projects (roads, railways, pipelines) and EAC frameworks such as the customs union and common market.
  • Military federation vs political reality: While rhetorically appealing, a military federation is improbable without a political federation. The EAC has not yet fully implemented the monetary union, making progression to political—and by extension military—federation premature.
  • Sovereignty remains the core obstacle: A political federation would require a common constitution and a significant surrender of sovereignty, a step no EAC member state is currently willing to take.
  • Federation is not the same as alliance: Museveni’s proposal implies a military federation with a single defence doctrine. This differs sharply from a military alliance (e.g. NATO), where collective defence does not require surrendering national sovereignty.
  • The strategic subtext is regional autonomy: Museveni’s references to Libya point to a broader concern: the need for regional mechanisms to protect East Africa’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests amid ongoing conflicts, natural resource competition, and intensifying involvement by external powers (USA, China, EU, India, Turkey, Gulf states).

The more relevant question is not whether East Africa needs a military federation, but how existing regional frameworks can be leveraged to safeguard shared strategic interests in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

Khartoum Is Back – But Sudan’s War Is Far From Over

On January 11, Sudan’s Prime Minister Kamil Idris announced the government’s return to the capital, Khartoum. The government relocated from Khartoum to Port Sudan in April 2023 when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Politically, it helps. Symbolically, it matters. Strategically, however, it changes far less than many expect. Control of a capital city does not equal control of a state.

The illusion of victory?

Khartoum is Sudan’s administrative and diplomatic centre. Controlling it enables the SAF to reassert its international legitimacy and speak authoritatively as Sudan’s legitimate government.

Even so, wars do not end with symbolism. They end when coercive power is consolidated – and in Sudan, it is not.

The RSF is active and controls large swathes of territory. This is particularly in the Darfur region and parts of the Kordofan region. These are strategically defensible areas and not peripheral backwaters.

Territory matters more than capitals

Khartoum would almost certainly be a top strategic priority for the RSF. But the SAF’s control of the capital pushes the RSF to recalibrate its strategic priorities. As such, the RSF seeks to control territory that allows it to function independently of the central state.

Darfur is historically and strategically crucial for the RSF. Historically, the RSF has its origins in the Janjaweed elements in Darfur.

The RSF seeks leverage by controlling cross-border trade routes into Chad and Libya, overseeing gold mining areas, and establishing alliances with local militia groups. These assets give the RSF an incentive not to pursue or submit to a central authority.

RSF’s pursuit of autonomy

A ceasefire is unlikely under the current circumstances. While the RSF agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire proposal on November 6, 2025, the SAF demanded the paramilitary group’s withdrawal from all occupied civilian areas and territories. The SAF also demanded the disarmament and surrender of the RSF weapons.

These demands are unrealistic, given the RSF’s deeply entrenched structures in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. The SAF is expected to maintain its position on the conditions for a ceasefire.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is the RSF’s fight for survival in some regions with less interest in attaining victory over the SAF in the country. Survival necessitates the RSF’s push for an autonomous or semi-autonomous region, especially in Darfur. This allows the RSF to:

  • Preserve its military structure
  • Retain control over revenue-generating resources
  • Rebrand its cause as decentralisation or regional self-rule
  • Force negotiations on its own terms

High-Impact Fragmentation?

This is a likely outcome linked to the RSF’s fight for survival and the SAF’s hardline positions. The following geographical and administrative indicators would characterise high-impact fragmentation:

  • The SAF governs Khartoum and eastern Sudan, backed by international recognition.
  • The RSF dominates western and central regions, exercising parallel authority.
  • Low-intensity fighting, humanitarian crises, and political deadlock persist.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

Conflicts, Coups & Disputed Elections: Africa in 2026

Here are the key issues that will define Africa’s geopolitical landscape in 2026:

The AFC/M23 rebellion in the DRC: The conflict in the eastern Congo has persisted for decades, much like a lingering bad smell. US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed role of world peacemaker is not a magic wand to end the rebellion by the AFC/M23 group. Deep mistrust and suspicions driven by paranoia and geostrategic interests could scuttle the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. The President Felix Tshisekedi-led administration is unlikely to welcome unhinged diplomatic negotiations with Paul Kagame’s Rwanda. Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila, is expected to influence the course of Congolese politics as well as the rebellion.

War in Sudan: This is another opportunity for President Trump to fetishise his peacemaker role. The US presented a humanitarian ceasefire proposal to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in November 2025. The RSF agreed to it, while the SAF dismissed it, noting its bias and demanding the RSF’s withdrawal from occupied territories. Prospects are high for the war to continue into its fourth year by April 15. Power sharing and disarmament would be central to a mutually approved ceasefire and post-war governance. Other wild guesses would be the RSF’s push for the autonomy of the areas it controls, particularly the expansive Darfur region.

First post-independence general elections in South Sudan: Voting is scheduled for December 22, 2026. The elections were initially planned for December 2024 as per the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). Postponement of the elections beyond this year is possible. President Salva Kiir is attempting to manage his succession, but at the same time, he seems unwilling to hand over power. Kiir intends to cut off the estranged Vice President Riek Machar from any power networks that he could leverage. Clashes involving forces and militia groups allied to Kiir and Machar are highly likely to continue. A civil war cannot be ruled out.

Elections and terrorism in Somalia: Somalia’s stability and instability will have wider effects in the Horn of Africa and northwards in the Red Sea sphere. Elections are anticipated in the first half of 2026. Full universal suffrage is unlikely. Partial direct voting is expected due to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group controlling some parts of the country. Institutional weaknesses and logistical constraints will hinder large-scale direct polling. The legitimacy of the elections will largely depend on the support or lack thereof from Jubbaland and Puntland. Counterterrorism operations against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia Province will persist. The US is expected to continue participating in these operations. But this will be alongside opportunistic attacks by these militant groups that utilise guerrilla tactics. Al-Shabaab’s collaboration of convenience with the Houthis will be one to watch out for in 2026. Key to Somalia’s stability is the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Its mandate was extended by a year until December 31, 2026. AUSSOM is unlikely to achieve its goals primarily due to limited finances. Funding constraints are likely to persist, with the US unwilling to reverse its opposition to financing peacekeeping missions. Trump’s recent executive order pulling the US out of 66 international organisations heightens financial constraints for AUSSOM.

Somaliland’s sovereignty and regional geostrategic interests: Israel’s official recognition of Somaliland’s independence on December 26, 2025, set the pace for intense diplomatic and geopolitical swings. Israel’s geostrategic interests in Somaliland focus on checking and countering the Iranian-backed Houthis’ influence, which is critical in securing the Red Sea shipping lanes. Furthermore, Israel seeks to strengthen its geopolitical and security cooperation with the UAE to enhance its interests in the Horn of Africa. The UAE operates Somaliland’s strategic port of Berbera. Lobbying by US groups, including pro-Israel ones, could intensify this year to push for Washington’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Trump’s administration is unpredictable, and a sudden change in its position on Somaliland is possible.

Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts and Red Sea access ambitions: The Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions will remain hotspots in the foreseeable future. The June 1, 2026, elections could exacerbate these conflicts. In Tigray, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal forces seems to be declining. The pro-government Tigray Peace Front (TPF), which split from the TPLF, would most likely engage militarily against the TPLF. Essentially, the federal government would fight a proxy war via the TPF. Ethiopia is unlikely to change its position to access the Red Sea via the port of Assab in Eritrea. However, this may remain rhetorical, implying that a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is less likely. Regional and international deterrence is a primary factor limiting the possibility of an all-out war. Second, it would be a strange gambit for Ethiopia to wage war against Eritrea, given the ongoing hostilities in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray.

Insurgencies and instability in the Sahel/West Africa: Little collective effort is expected from countries in this region to combat insurgent groups. Neither the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nor the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has demonstrated political and military willingness to effectively address insecurity and instability. Terrorist groups, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State, seek to expand their operational reach in the region. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to remain terrorism epicentres. Regime changes via coups cannot be ruled out in these countries as a result of insecurity. Nigeria’s recent welcoming of the US support to fight terrorist and bandit groups is one to watch out for this year. But it would likely be another prolonged, less successful external counterinsurgency supported by Washington.

Youth protests, coups, and controversial elections: Unprecedented youth-led protests occurred in Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar in the past two years. Similar protests also took place in Nigeria in 2024 and in Togo in 2025. Limited economic opportunities, a relatively highly exposed younger generation, and the ability to quickly organise via social media could trigger more protests in Africa. African governments less likely to promote accountability and the creation of economic opportunities are priming the instability pump. African politicians seem to ignore these risks. Eleven successful coups and at least 10 failed/thwarted coup attempts occurred in Africa in the last six years. Poor political accountability, disputed elections, and insecurity are likely to lead to additional coup attempts in 2026.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

Raila Odinga: A Remembrance

My earliest memories of the enigmatic Raila Odinga were in the late 1990s, when I was in my formative schooling years. This was shortly after the 1997 election, which Daniel Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party allegedly won.

Moi rigged votes in his favour, and 1997 was an opportunity for him to demonstrate his mastery of the cutbacks on electoral systems. These nascent memories are courtesy of my father, who religiously purchased copies of the three major newspapers then – the Daily Nation, the Standard, and the People’s Daily.

Around that time, my curiosity was also elevated by access to copies of contemporary political publications, such as the Society Magazine and the Weekly Review. My dad had copies of these publications, some dating to the early 1990s when multiparty politics was reintroduced. I cannot clearly recall some key political events that followed shortly after the elections. This includes the 1998 cooperation between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP), then led by Raila Odinga.

By 2001, I had a keen interest in political events. I recollect the June 2001 appointment of Raila Odinga and other NDP MPs to the Cabinet by Moi. The newspapers and radio stations extensively broadcast Raila’s appointment as energy minister. Others who joined the Cabinet were Adhu Awiti (planning minister), Orwa Ojode (education assistant minister), and Peter Odoyo (foreign affairs assistant minister).

Months later, in March 2002, one of the most consequential political events occurred: the KANU-NDP merger. I was in boarding school at that time, but managed to get access to newspapers. A month or so later, when schools closed for the April holiday, I went through newspapers page by page at home to keep up with the merger. Luckily, the media was still covering the significance of the event. It was unclear at that time if Moi would leave the presidency or extend his term despite his insistence on retiring by sticking to the two-term presidential term limit. A formidable, broad-based opposition movement was uncertain then.

Moi’s endorsement of Uhuru Kenyatta seven months later, on October 14, 2002, shifted the momentum and paved the way for the eventual formation of a united opposition coalition against Moi and KANU. Since then, Raila remained a highly influential political player, a colossus of sorts, until his death.

Following the death of the legendary Franco Luambo Makiadi on October 12, 1989, Sam Mangwana described him as “a man who comes once in 100 years.” Mangwana inherently referred to Franco’s combination of musical brilliance, leadership, innovation, and lyrical power that was so rare in a career that spanned four decades. Franco also commanded a religious following, and his music is immortal.

Parallels can be drawn between Raila Odinga and Luambo Makiadi. First, their souls departed in October. Three days before Odinga’s death, I had passionately celebrated Luambo’s 36th death anniversary. Probably great men, revolutionaries, die in October. Thomas Sankara and Samora Machel died on October 15, 1987, and October 19, 1986, respectively. Second, the two lives of these legends offer lessons in longevity. They mastered the art of reinventing themselves amid fierce competition and changing times.

Third, they commanded a cult-like following in life and in death. There are charismatic people all over, but very few are uniquely charming. Fourth, Luambo and Odinga were pragmatists and built their admirable careers by building alliances. They worked with their rivals, a typically Machiavellian power strategy.

Raila Odinga had power arrangements with Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Uhuru Kenyatta, and William Ruto. To many, these were personal and opportunistic. But they embodied the pragmatic sense of acquiring power. This is not an endorsement of the formation of the broad-based government. The Grand Master of Congolese rhumba and African music, Luambo Makiadi, forged alliances with one of his biggest rivals, Tabu Ley Rochereau. This union of legends produced one of the best music compositions.

My respect for Mwai Kibaki waned following the events of the controversial 2007 elections. While I was a high school student, I was politically conscious. I wondered why Kibaki would mastermind vote rigging when Odinga had won. It was confusing. A day or two before Chief Justice Evan Gicheru swore in Kibaki, I went to bed ecstatic, fantasizing about a Raila Odinga presidency.

The headline of the Saturday Standard the following day affirmed my conviction of Raila Odinga winning the presidential election. My father had sent me to purchase a copy of the dailies to keep track of the election developments. Odinga had polled 3.34 million votes against Kibaki’s 2.45 million. Later that evening, a tide swept, and votes apparently streamed in from the so-called Kibaki strongholds, including the infamous Tharaka Nithi.

Tensions were visibly high at the national tallying centre at the KICC. Odinga looked deeply frustrated with his lieutenants, James Orengo, William Ruto, et al., demanding fairness from the then chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu. Anyway, an Odinga presidency never materialised. I could not fathom why Odinga would let it go, having run one of the most remarkable and consequential political campaigns in Kenya’s political history.

In his autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, and multiple interviews, Odinga maintains that he chose to form the grand coalition government in 2008 for the sake of national unity. This was despite objections by hardliners in the ODM negotiating team at the Serena Hotel who wanted nothing less than Kibaki conceding or the formation of a transitional government leading to elections in a few months.

Odinga reiterated the need for national unity following his political reconciliation with Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2018 and William Ruto in 2024. I am convinced the 2008 Odinga was fundamentally different from the one in 2018 and 2024, and perhaps the 1998 one.

The 2008 Odinga was much more concerned about national unity, given the widespread post-election violence. But the Odinga of 1998, 2018, and 2024 was an opportunistic one who aimed at securing his political and economic interests. The 1998 KANU-NDP cooperation was a strategic maneuver by Odinga to position himself as a potential successor to Daniel Moi in 2002. Odinga played this card, having in mind a possible divided opposition and the fact that no high-ranking KANU leaders had experience in running in presidential elections.

It would be out of order to claim he pushed for his economic interests to secure the purchase of the Kisumu molasses factory in light of the political cooperation with KANU. A significant number of people claim that the land where the factory was located was illegally acquired by Spectre International, the Odinga family business. These allegations are traced to the 2003 Ndung’u Land Commission Report. According to the report, “direct allocation of alienated government land to the company (Spectre International) by the commissioner of lands was illegal.”

A few interesting facts! The Ndung’u Commission was established following a report by a task force Odinga formed in 2003, when he was the minister for roads, public works, and housing. The aim was to assess the status of government property and housing amid deeply entrenched corruption. Second, the government acquired the molasses factory land in 1982, but payments for the land were not made in full. Bidding for the factory gained momentum in the mid-1990s.

Foul play cannot be ruled out in the findings of the Ndung’u Report on Spectre’s illegal acquisition of the land. Lots of political witch-hunting was at play by mid-2003, a few months after the formation of the NARC administration. Two camps had emerged over the failure to implement the infamous power-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Kibaki-led National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Raila-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These were the principal units that formed NARC.

Were it not for a court order sought by Spectre International in January 2006, perhaps the company, Odinga, and others would have been prosecuted. Kibaki’s acolytes were not leaving anything to chance, especially after the embarrassing defeat in the August 2005 constitutional referendum. It was evident by then that Odinga would be a force to reckon with in the 2007 elections.

Political and economic interests motivated the extra-constitutional power arrangements of 2018 and 2024. The 2018 one could have targeted cutting off William Ruto from Kenyatta and weakening him in the run-up to the 2017 election. It never worked with Ruto playing victim. The 2024 arrangement occurred when Ruto was extremely desperate following a wave of youth-led protests. The fact that this power deal was followed by the impeachment of then Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua raises suspicions.

It is difficult to figure out the specific political goal Odinga was pursuing. Was he strategically positioning ODM to be a principal coalition partner with UDA in 2027? Or was he just playing the good guy card to cement his status as a statesman? On both occasions, the commercial interests of the Odinga family were on the table.

I embraced Odinga’s ideologies in the lead-up to the 2007 election, given the manner in which he packaged his campaign messaging. He built his manifesto on infrastructure as the key to transforming Kenya’s socioeconomic fortunes. Little credit is given to Raila Odinga for being the brainchild of some notable physical infrastructure projects. The Thika Superhighway, the LAPSETT corridor project, and multiple by-passes in Nairobi were conceptualised by Odinga. To me, he stands out as the most progressive roads minister in Kenya’s history.

At the onset of the NARC administration, Odinga, with gusto, oversaw the demolition of structures built on road reserves. He attempted to inject some sanity as Kenya was transitioning from an irredeemably corrupt Moi administration. The construction of the Raila Odinga Way, previously known as Mbagathi Way, highlights his legacy and embodies his high value for posterity. He was on record many times, noting that most of his decisions are based on posterity.

The Raila Odinga Way was initiated during his time as roads minister, and it was constructed from 2005 to 2007. It was a pilot project to assess the viability of concrete road technology in the country. The road is still in shape almost two decades later.

One has to admire Odinga for his resilience, willpower, and intellect. Few can survive eight years of detention, considering the physical and psychological torture victims are subjected to. It is even more agonizing to imagine Odinga’s mum and brother died and got buried while he was in detention. Odinga endured the loss of his four siblings and eldest son but chose to fight for a cause larger than his life. He lost the presidential election multiple times but stayed on course.

Odinga’s resilience resonates with Viktor Frankl’s thoughts in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning. This excerpt from the book’s preface highlights Frankl’s view on finding purpose in life even during moments of suffering:

“…The great task for any person is to find meaning in his or her life: in work (doing something significant), in love (caring for another person), and in courage in difficult times…Suffering in and of itself is meaningless; we give our suffering meaning by the way in which we respond to it…”

His autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, remains one of my favourite memoirs, especially in the Kenyan context. It is relatively rich in history. Most Kenyan autobiographies are quite shallow and read more like eulogies than texts meant to inspire thinking, belief, and action.

Raila also authored Quest for Nationhood – Roadmap to Our Future. As revealed by one of his sisters on the burial day, he was working on another book on Pan-Africanism. He had also instructed Anyang’ Nyong’o to work on a paper on nationhood and tribalism just before his demise.

I highly value people who have been in the limelight to pen down the intrigues of their lives, motivations, purpose, and achievements. In one of my blog posts, I stated the need for such figures to give us more books, but meaningful ones. I have read memoirs that left me cursing the authors for presenting underwhelming information despite having been in the corridors of power.

His father’s, Not Yet Uhuru, is also a remarkable autobiography. Raila Odinga stands out among the few Kenyan politicians who found meaning in writing books, again for posterity purposes. Apart from Anyang’ Nyong’o, it is difficult to easily identify politicians who are intellectually grounded. And I do not imply academic qualifications…We glorify the practice of acquiring academic certificates instead of valuing intellectualism. There is a high deficit of thinkers in Kenya.

It is a generational tragedy that politicians annoyingly talk of Kenya as the next Singapore, yet their woeful intellects tell of a limited understanding of the formidable thinker Lee Kuan Yew was. I am hopeless for a better Kenya.

Odinga was overall well-informed, not just about history, but about many issues. His parliamentary contributions and Cabinet briefings demonstrated a man who highly valued knowledge.

The most consequential deaths generally lead to destructive institutional episodes, largely due to internal contradictions. The ODM party will wane, and the political careers of Odinga’s hangers-on will die with his demise. Despite his intellect and strong belief in institutions, Odinga did not build ODM for posterity. He failed to overcome the Kenyan political party culture, where parties are built around personalities and not effective institutional elements.

I cannot blame him for this. This is a culture primarily associated with the political parties that emerged with the reintroduction of multiparty politics. However, this goes further back to the colonial era. Perhaps KANU, after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, escaped this. His successor, Moi, was deeply entrenched in the system, and an inherent succession plan was already in place before his death.

FORD-Kenya weakened significantly with Oginga Odinga’s death in 1994. Tragedy struck the party the second time within a decade in August 2003 with the death of Vice President Kijana Wamalwa. The party sank deeper. Currently, its leaders are proud to have it as the most popular party among the Bukusu people in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia counties.

KANU lost its allure with Daniel Moi’s exit from the presidency. Moi personalized KANU after Jomo’s death. One of the primary causes was the 1982 coup attempt that prompted him to consolidate power and resulted in the legal ban of other parties.

Multiple factions within ODM will eventually split and weaken it. Part of the leadership led by the Secretary General, Edwin Sifuna, opposes the broad-based government and vouches for the party to field a presidential candidate in 2027. Others strongly support the broad-based government and vow to support Ruto’s reelection.

Appointing Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, as the acting party leader may have been motivated by paranoia and interests. Large political parties in Kenya are extensively family enterprises. This, plus other factors, will hasten the party’s weakening.

ODM has been on a gradual downward trajectory in the past decade. This is supported by its performance in the 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, apart from presidential polls. Its agreement with UDA/KKA to form the broad-based government impacted it significantly. Weeks ago, its SG Sifuna raised concerns about the fading desire by aspirants to run for elections on ODM.

Oburu lacks the national appeal that Raila enjoyed. I am careful not to refer to Oburu as weak – and I do not mean physically – but he does not inspire confidence. There are leaders whose supporters can go to war for. At least not Oburu.

Raila’s eldest brother is safeguarding the interests of ODM ‘conservatives.’ Linked to this are Ruto’s interests and machinations to win ODM’s support for his unassured reelection. Ruto might have influenced the selection of Oburu as the acting party leader. Ruto’s political career could be a victim of Raila’s death. A fractured ODM and a united opposition spell doom for him.

I have keenly listened to Oburu’s speeches after assuming the party leader’s role of ODM. Fundamentally, it’s double-speak. His speeches carry a reconciliatory tone. But the power arrangement between ODM and UDA/KKA is intact. Oburu was a staunch supporter of this extra-constitutional arrangement when Raila was alive. (I will dedicate the next few weeks to digging deeper and understanding Oburu’s worldview and leadership. But the November 2nd, 2025, Sunday Nation’s Weekly Review was a good starting point. His autobiography is on my bucket list).

In September 2024, Raila Odinga, with the NEC’s endorsement, settled on Anyang’ Nyong’o as the party’s acting leader. This was at the onset of Odinga’s campaigns for the chairperson’s position of the African Union Commission (AUC).

Nyong’o is a near ideological twin to Raila and would make a better party leader than Oburu ideologically. But the two gentlemen are aging. They may resonate with the generational shift in Kenyan politics. Even so, Oburu should facilitate a transition to relatively youthful leadership for posterity.

For ODM to remain relevant and possibly become vibrant, it must embrace youthful leadership. It should brand itself as the political party of the present and the future. The present and the future of Kenya oscillate on political and economic solutions that address the plight of the youth.

The three ODM deputy party leaders are not visionaries. The immediate former two deputy party leaders who were appointed as Cabinet Secretaries in the broad-based government are not good enough to lead ODM. Ideally, an ODM of the future should be built around Sifuna’s talents. He stands out as a visionary and the most qualified to lead the party.

I will forever miss Raila Odinga. His legacy for pro-democratic reforms is solid. His intellect is admirable. His decision-making for posterity is cherished. It is unbelievable that he died. Looks like a dream!

May his soul rest in eternal peace!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst and strategist. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

Africa Elections Brief: Violence Erupts in Cameroon as Biya Declared Winner

The Constitutional Council declared 92-year-old President Paul Biya the winner with 53.66% of the vote. Opposition leader Issa Tchiroma emerged second with 35.2% of the vote on October 27. Protests broke out on the weekend of October 25 and 26 due to vote rigging claims. At least four people died in Douala. Tchiroma has called for nationwide protests. Tchiroma declared victory a few days ago.

Biya’s faculties are probably not sharp enough to effectively govern the country, given his age. The most likely outlook at the moment is the persistence of violence across the country. Political unrest could intensify, given the high-stakes polls. In the 2018 presidential election, results by the Constitutional Council indicated Biya’s victory with 71.28% of the vote. His closest challenger, Maurice Kamto, polled 14.23%.

Cameroonians are generally disillusioned with Biya’s ability to govern, primarily due to his age. The country stares at a crisis in the short and long term. Biya is likely to play his familiar card of using security forces to violently suppress protests. This worked in the past. His acolytes and family could be in charge of key institutions, such as the military and intelligence. But sustained pressure by protesters creates conducive conditions for a military takeover, repeat elections, or the formation of a broader coalition government of national unity.

A few days ago, reports indicated that Biya had offered Tchiroma the prime minister position. The opposition leader rejected it. Recent geopolitical events in Africa and around the world could keep protesters on the streets longer. Cameroon’s political stability faces an imminent risk from the socioeconomic frustrations of the youth. The Gen Z protests in Madagascar, Morocco, Kenya, Nepal, and Bangladesh could inspire youthful Cameroonians to continue demonstrating.

Biya is unlikely to address the plight of Cameroonians even if he were to remain in power for the next 50 years. If he manages to suppress protests, his old age is likely to intensify succession battles in the long term. A Robert Mugabe scenario is highly likely.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

DRC: Ex-President Kabila Sets Sights on a Comeback amid M23 Entanglement

On September 30, a military court in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sentenced former President Joseph Kabila Kabange to death in absentia. Kabila was convicted of multiple crimes, including insurrection, torture, sexual assault, murder, crimes against humanity, and treason.

In July 2025, Kabila went on trial in absentia for supporting the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. This must have precipitated the death sentence, with Kabila’s successor, Felix Tshisekedi, unable to contain the M23 offensive in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.

On October 15, Kabila and other political leaders opposing Tshisekedi met in Nairobi and launched the Sauvons le Congo (Save the Congo) movement. They said the movement will reach out to all the Congolese people opposed to the dictatorship. In addition, they stated that the formation seeks to “end the tyranny, restore state authority, reestablish democracy, and promote national reconciliation.”

Why is Kabila so invested in Congolese national politics?

Politics, whether at the local or global level, is dictated by interests. And Congo is not uniquely different from this maxim. Kabila’s interests and calculated return are motivated by Tshisekedi’s betrayal. Kabila’s exit from the presidency in 2019 and his subsequent succession by Tshisekedi were met with controversy.

Tshisekedi was third in the presidential election behind Emmanuel Shadary and Martin Fayulu, who won. Kabila maneuvered the systems and influenced the declaration of Tshisekedi as president. Kabila and his acolytes settled on Tshisekedi because he was a weak politician. Tshisekedi had a limited understanding of critical governance and military institutions.

Apart from his weak leadership, Tshisekedi had insufficient key internal and external power networks. These were fault lines that Kabila sought to capitalize on following an agreement with Tshisekedi. According to the agreement, Tshisekedi was to serve as president for one term and give way to the return of Kabila.

Sometimes, the average and below-average minds can be good at heeding Machiavelli’s advice of discarding allies who help them to secure power. Power consolidation demands ruthlessness, given that survival is the priority. Machiavelli emphasizes pragmatism over loyalty, implying that rulers can discard allies and break promises because sentiment is a luxury a ruler cannot afford in the power struggle.

Rulers perceived as weak are not necessarily foolish and can be very ruthless in consolidating power. In the early years of his presidency, Kenya’s second president, Daniel Moi, was considered weak. But he became ruthless after the failed 1982 coup attempt and remained in power until 2002.

Tshisekedi has targeted Kabila’s point men in the military and key political institutions in the last six years. The recent trial and sentencing of Kabila indicate Tshisekedi’s pursuit of former allies of convenience.

What are Kabila’s pathways to power?

Kabila will find it difficult to become president constitutionally. The death penalty and the possibility of other charges technically lock him out. General elections are scheduled for December 16, 2028. As such, Kabila may front a proxy candidate if all the legal loopholes remain sealed. It is too soon to predict the 2028 polls. However, vote rigging by Tshisekedi is possible. What’s more, Tshisekedi’s reelection depends on how he handles the M23 conflict.

The most likely pathway for Kabila to obtain presidential powers is through supporting armed groups, such as M23, against government forces. This cannot be ruled out. He may emulate his father’s ascendancy to the presidency through armed struggle that started and spawned in the volatile east before the long march to Kinshasa that culminated in the fall of the once indefatigable Mobutu Sese Seko.

Kabila enjoys extensive networks in the region and has good relations with battle-hardened politicians, i.e., Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. Museveni and Kagame were instrumental in the takeover of the government by Laurent Kabila (Kabange Kabila’s father) in May 1997.

This year, Kabange Kabila met with Museveni in Kampala, Uganda, in March 2025. Later in April, he was seen in Kigali, Rwanda, though it is unclear if he met Kagame. These are strategic relationships that Tshisekedi does not enjoy in the region. Broadly, Tshisekedi’s weak capabilities to cultivate and nurture strategic relationships are also evident in his poor handling of collective peace and security decisions made by regional blocs, which the DRC is a member; the EAC and SADC.

Outlook

War in the east of the Congo, especially in the Kivu region, is likely to persist in the long term. Kabila’s interests in national politics complicate the country’s political and security situation. The M23’s operations indicate a resolute force that will continue to present governance challenges for the Tshisekedi administration.

Currently, the prospects for a permanent ceasefire agreement are low. Parties to the conflict have missed key deadlines. The October 14 agreement between the M23 rebels and the DRC government to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism is not sufficient to fast-track a ceasefire at this time. Clashes are anticipated to continue in the Kivu region.

The failure to have a ceasefire in the short to medium term could potentially lead to the spread of the conflict to other territories. It is possible that the M23 will keep fantasizing about a grand march to Kinshasa and the eventual usurpation of power.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

Armed Conflict in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on the Edge

The junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are struggling to contain armed groups. When pressed for answers on their failures, they usually allude to foreign actors, among other reasons. Captain Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, General Assimi Goita of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani rose to power through coups, promising to effectively address insecurity.

In a recent interview, Traore, in his defence, claimed to have found approximately 100,000 AK-47 bullets in the country’s stocks when he took over three years ago. Whether this is figurative or not, Traore failed to restore security and order within three months of taking over.

Multiple factors are responsible for the prolongation of insecurity and political instability in the three Sahelian countries. The general incompetence of the military-led governments is a key factor. These regimes seem largely concerned about power consolidation rather than addressing pertinent issues affecting the people. This is done through propaganda campaigns that often chide the West, banning and suspending political parties and civil society groups, and extending transitional terms.

The anti-West sentiments, mostly against France, of these regimes are quite interesting. Historically, France is responsible for enabling extractive politico-economic and social institutions in the broader Francophone Africa. France is also responsible for the failures of Operation Barkhane and other related security missions in the Sahel. But these issues do not absolve the military regimes from worsening insecurity and instability.

UN peacekeepers and French forces withdrew from Mali. French troops also pulled out of Burkina Faso. Similar exits by the French, American, and German forces also occurred in Niger. The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger turned to Russia for security and defense support. So far, no tangible results can be linked to the Russian mercenaries in these countries.

These regimes, in a way, underestimated the intelligence gathering and sharing by foreign troops. They also overestimated the capabilities of their own security forces and those of the Russian mercenaries in combating armed groups.

Effective regional security solutions are yet to be decisively implemented. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after exiting from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a paper tiger. The AES is not fundamentally different from ECOWAS in that it fails to match aspirations with decisive actions.

Armed groups in the region have demonstrated improved operational capabilities. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) occasionally use drones in their attacks. Drone attacks by armed groups have substantially increased in the region, especially in Mali, in the last two years.

In addition, armed groups in the Sahel are getting more access to rifles and ammunition. While illicit trafficking channels in West Africa and North Africa were the primary ways of acquiring weapons, increasing attacks against military installations are enabling easy access. Seizures and looting of these facilities facilitate the supply of weapons.

Insecurity and instability will persist in the Sahel region, given the incapabilities of the security apparatus of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat armed groups. Of course, the three states are good at propaganda to sanitize their incompetence while pointing fingers at domestic, regional, and extra-continental imaginary enemies. Propaganda is a delusionary reprieve for these military regimes. However, this is not a magic bullet by any means to resolve the governance crises in these countries.

Traore, Goita, and Tchiani are on borrowed time. Their regimes, besides the perfection of propaganda, are likely to face a backlash from the public due to worsening insecurity. While elections of civilian-led governments may not be necessary conditions for robust economic growth, the delayed return to constitutional order creates the ideal conditions for an increase in anti-junta sentiments. These sentiments are germs for intensified attacks by armed groups or coup attempts.

Consider Mali. JNIM has imposed an economic blockade since early September 2025. The blockade, featuring attacks against fuel tankers, was in place at the time of writing this article. While some tankers have successfully been escorted by security forces to Bamako and other parts, growing frustrations among the public are possible. Unrest cannot be ruled out under these circumstances.

A significant number of people are in awe of Traore and generally the junta in these three countries for supposedly giving neocolonialism and Western influence a back foot. I find this impractical, unreasonable, and infantile. If they indeed cherish neocolonialism, then they should absolutely pursue total independence. This is unrealistic in a highly globalized world. What’s more, claiming Western influence to be neocolonialism while at the same time strengthening relations with Russia is shifting goalposts. Is it that Russia does not seek to influence these governments by pursuing its geostrategic interests?

Russian mercenaries have proven ineffective in helping these military-led governments to contain insecurity. In fact, Western troops and UN peacekeepers in the region appear to have been more competent than the mercenaries. One could argue that the mercenaries are fewer than the Western troops and peacekeepers. Well, fair enough. But this does not excuse the failure of the mercenaries. It is a matter of time before these mercenaries fully withdraw from the region, like they did in Mozambique a few years ago.

The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas expect to remain in power until at least 2030, based on the collectively calculated extensions over the past year. Coups are ugly, and they fight back. Traore, Goita, and Tchiani rose to power via coups, justifying the takeovers due to worsening insecurity. These conditions persist, and additional coup attempts are anticipated. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a history of coups, and a farcical recurrence of these events in the future is possible. Remarkable political leaders who rose to power via coups, for instance, Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara, were victims of the fight back.

Newer armed groups are likely to be formed in the region, while the existing ones could become bolder with enhanced operational capabilities. These groups are also likely to strengthen alliances.

External and regional military interventions cannot be ruled out in the future, but these are highly unlikely at the moment. The positions of the three military regimes against UN forces and other European troops, including the French, limit the likelihood of a UN peacekeeping force. What’s more, the recent decisions by the UN to reduce peacekeepers by 25% globally and cut the peacekeeping budget by 15% technically rule out a global peacekeeping mission in the region.

This also means that security and stabilisation initiatives by the African Union (AU) are in jeopardy. Such initiatives historically rely on UN funding. This raises questions regarding the AU’s effectiveness, given its Agenda 2063, which ambitiously aimed at silencing guns – to end wars and civil conflicts – on the continent by 2020.

UN peacekeeping missions are criticized for their passive responses to violent conflicts in Africa. They are present in the DRC, South Sudan, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, and the Abyei region. While these missions have multiple shortcomings, their effectiveness cannot be overruled. Perhaps the funding cuts and force reduction could impact security and stability in Africa. I’ll discuss this in my next article after reflecting on the Malawi presidential election. But the fragility of the Sahel states and these UN decisions could be marked by a significant increase in the flow of arms and movement of armed groups on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His opinions are independent of his institutional affiliations.

East Congo’s Relentless War Machine, Fading Peace

On the weekend of September 19 to September 21, intense clashes occurred between the Congolese forces and the M23 rebels. Fighting took place in Masisi (North Kivu), Walikale (North Kivu), and Kalehe (South Kivu). This marks the most substantial escalation in the last five or six months.

The escalation is not a surprise, given the occasional flare-ups involving the rebels and the pro-government Wazalendo militia group. Indicators of an impending escalation were visible. The missing of the August 8th and 18th deadlines for commencing direct negotiations and signing a peace agreement. These deadlines were prescribed by the Declaration of Principles signed by the Congolese government and M23 in Doha, Qatar, on July 19, 2025.

The key provisions of the Declaration of Principles include an immediate and permanent ceasefire, restoration of state authority in areas under M23, the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and the alignment of the principles with the June 27 Washington agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The rebels maintain a presence in multiple territories, including some that were seized in recent weeks.

There are no effective incentives for M23 to halt fighting and conquests. In the past, especially following the Second Congo War, rebel groups sought inclusion in the government. This seems not to be the case with the M23. The M23 recently unveiled 7,000 newly trained fighters. The rebel group stated that 12,000 recruits are currently in training. This indicates its readiness for a protracted conflict. It also hints at the rebel group enhancing its force and order capabilities to effectively oversee local administrative systems in conquered territories.

M23’s motive to keep fighting and control several areas in Kivu is linked to the region’s mineral wealth. Masisi’s mineral deposits include coltan, gold, tourmaline, and diamonds. The Rubaya mine in Masisi is the largest producer of coltan in the DRC. It supplies approximately half of the DRC’s total coltan output and 15% of the global coltan supply. Rubaya’s coltan is processed into tantalum that is used in electronic devices, including laptops and mobile phones.

Of course, there are sociocultural and political factors perpetuating the conflict in the east of the Congo. While these factors that are tied to ethnic groups are still significant in the conflict, they are superseded by geoeconomic interests. Following the M23’s takeover of Goma, North Kivu’s capital, I argued that the conflict had evolved from one driven by ethno-political interests to one fueled by geoeconomic interests.  

The conflict in the east not only highlights the DRC’s central role in the global mineral supply chains but also demonstrates the country’s long, troubled history of natural resource curses. An excerpt from David Van Reybrouck’s book, “Congo: The Epic History of A People,” aptly summarizes the DRC’s tribulations despite its rich natural resource endowment:

There is no other country in the world as fortunate as Congo in terms of its natural wealth. During the last century and a half, whenever acute demand has risen on the international market for a given raw material – ivory in the Victorian era; rubber after the invention of the inflatable tire; copper during the full-out industrial and military expansion; uranium during the Cold War; alternative electrical energy during the oil crisis of the 1970s; coltan in the age of portable telephonics – Congo has turned out to contain huge supplies of the coveted commodity. It has easily been able to meet demand. The economic history of Congo is one of improbably lucky breaks. But also of improbably great misery. As a rule, not a drop of the fabulous profits trickled down to the larger part of the population.

M23’s significant force capabilities is an impetus for the group to push to establish and retain local administrative systems in the occupied territories. Kinshasa’s incentive is national stability that has been elusive for decades. Achieving this under President Felix Tshisekedi seems illusory in light of his administration’s ineffective handling of the M23 conflict.

Tshisekedi’s administration mismanaged the entire deployment of regional troops from the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He demanded the exit of the EAC Regional Force for not engaging the M23 and other armed groups in direct combat. This is despite the regional force’s mandate to supervise the withdrawal of armed groups from captured territories.

The formal exit of the EAC force and the subsequent deployment of the SADC troops in December 2023 did not remedy the situation. And this is the problem with Tshisekedi’s fascination with moments of delusional reprieve.  The SADC forces failed to restore stability in the east. The M23 rebels seized Sake, Goma, and Bukavu a year later, in January 2025.

Multiple factors contributed to the failure of the SADC force, which was intended to engage in direct combat with the rebels alongside Congolese troops. The highly limited capabilities of the Congolese forces and the geographical unfamiliarity of the combat zones to the SADC troops stand out.

Tshisekedi turned to the Trump administration for a minerals-for-security support deal signed by the DRC and Rwanda in Washington on June 27, 2025. Its failure was almost certain. On September 22, 2025, President Tshisekedi acknowledged the failure of the deal to end the fighting. He also reiterated that the agreement does not pave the way for auctioning the DRC’s minerals to the US. In mid-September, DRC and Rwanda agreed to start implementing the security measures of the agreement from October 1. This includes the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and disarming and eliminating the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

The FDLR aims to overthrow the Kagame-led Tutsi majority government in Rwanda. It is active in eastern DRC and is largely made up of the Hutu. The DRC supports the FDLR; the FDLR is to the DRC as the M23 is to Rwanda. It is unlikely that FDLR’s disarmament and elimination will succeed, especially if Rwanda maintains its troops in the DRC and the M23 does not give up its controlled territories. Kinshasa is bound to feel insecure if FDLR is wound up.

The EAC and SADC forces are out, and the US-brokered minerals-for-security deal is unlikely to materialize. This is an ugly juncture for Tshisekedi. His administration is better off sticking with the UN peacekeepers at the moment. While they have primarily been ineffective in containing armed groups in the east over the last 25 years, their presence could help share intelligence with the low-morale Congolese forces.

Tshisekedi’s administration pushed for the exit of the peacekeepers but requested the renewal of the mission’s mandate in December 2024. The departure of UN peacekeepers alongside French forces from Mali without replacement by highly capable security forces has significantly contributed to the escalation of armed conflict. This is probably a key lesson for Tshisekedi.

Some complex possibilities await the Tshisekedi administration. It may consider engaging in a war of attrition against the rebels. But this would require boosting the morale of a poorly paid and equipped military. It is unlikely that the Congolese government will substantially increase the payments for the troops and purchase adequate military equipment in the short term. This means a continued reliance on militia groups whose fighters would be much happier to pocket some francs than eke out a living as overworked miners or desperate small-scale traders. At least looting is guaranteed for militia fighters as a means of survival.  

A war of attrition or not (if maneuver warfare is preferred), the recruitment of more foreign mercenaries to fight alongside the Congolese forces and militia fighters is highly likely. Eastern European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and some African countries are potential sources of mercenaries. Rwandan forces and dozens of armed groups could fight alongside the M23 if Kinshasa opts for a scorched-earth policy. But this would elevate the DRC’s political instability, recalling that conflicts in the east previously led to transitional governments.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst.

Website Powered by WordPress.com.

Up ↑

Design a site like this with WordPress.com
Get started