Tag: history

Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius, and Power Politics 

On January 24, 2026, I appeared on Egypt’s leading regional television network, Al-Qahera News. The discussion focused on the sovereignty of Mauritius. This is in light of US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks accusing the UK of planning to give away the Diego Garcia Island, alongside other islands in the Chagos Archipelago, to Mauritius. 

Trump perceives the UK’s intention to surrender the islands as great stupidity, noting that China and Russia will take advantage of it and enhance their influence. 

President Trump’s view of the UK’s handover of the archipelago to Mauritius as a case of great stupidity is a classic Trumpian tantrum, but it also reflects great power rivalry, colonial legacy, neocolonial footprints, and the relativism of international law. 

Trump’s remarks on Diego Garcia and Chagos contradict his earlier position. In 2025, he praised the deal signed between the UK and Mauritius over the planned handover of Chagos and a 99-year lease of Diego Garcia as a momentous achievement. Power politics necessitate recalibrating commitments and flipping positions for self-interest. 

Trump’s sidestepping of the 2019 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), highlighting the urgent return of Chagos to Mauritius, is intentional but woeful. He was in his first term as president. But that’s the bullish nature of great powers, which constantly undermine the sanctity of global institutions. Such is the Thucydidean power doctrine: “The strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.”

The Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, are central to America’s geostrategic interests in and across the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a military base established by the UK and the US in 1971 at the height of the Cold War.  The US military used it in 1991 and 2003 during the military interventions in Iraq. These are not the only instances; the Diego Garcia base is used by US forces on reconnaissance missions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 

Trump’s paranoia about China and Russia seeking to fill the void in Chagos could be valid from Washington’s point of view. The Donroe Doctrine exemplifies Trump’s reimagined unipolarity of a highly globally powerful America, rivalled by none and feared by all. This is delusional, of course. It sticks out as any other power ambition, but it’s less likely to trigger nightmares in Beijing and sleepless nights in Moscow. China and Russia, in all fairness, learn a great deal from history, especially China. The Chinese are a step ahead or at par with the US on many aspects, bar military might and technology. 

The Indian Ocean is just one of the key maritime and geographically strategic zones for major powers to enhance their security and economic interests. In addition, consider the fact that Diego Garcia is America’s only permanent military base in the Indian Ocean. 

Eastern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are accessible via the Indian Ocean, more so, through Diego Garcia. From Diego Garcia, the US can flex its might and check its interests via other strategic maritime areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean, such as the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the South China Sea. 

Key Indian Ocean sea lanes are the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global oil trade and 20% of global trade of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s busiest maritime chokepoint, accounting for around 23.7% of global oil trade and 35-40% of global LNG trade. The Bab-al Mandeb Strait accounts for at least 8% of the global oil trade. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean accounts for approximately 40% of global maritime trade. 

With or without Trump, America will still want free and secure passage through these key chokepoints; hence the essence of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean. Hostile sentiments against Trump arise from his abrasive, often less statesmanly approach to guarding US geostrategic interests. 

Washington cannot underestimate China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, justifying Trump’s ‘great stupidity’ remark against the UK. China has operational control of the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota. It also has a significant presence at the port of Djibouti. 

Diego Garcia enables US naval deployments that allow forward presence near Chinese maritime supply lines, rapid deployment to potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific, and reassurances of allies (Australia, Japan, and India). 

China doesn’t have an official or direct presence in the Chagos Archipelago. Trump’s fear emanates from strengthening economic relations between China and Mauritius. This is in view of the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in October 2019 and entered into force in January 2021. 

What’s more, Beijing supports Mauritius over its long-standing claim for sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. While China has yet to reveal its plans for Chagos, hawkish Western perspectives point to the possibility of Beijing establishing a commercial and military presence on some of the islands of the archipelago. 

Trump’s comment on the UK’s surrender of Diego Garcia is a bluff at best. The 99-year lease not only ensures America’s strong geostrategic positioning but also enhances its counterterrorism and regional security interests. Diego Garcia supports intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the region. Consider piracy threats off the Somali coast and armed groups (Al-Shabaab and the Houthis). 

Central to the Chagos question is whether the UK government will hand over the islands in line with the ICJ’s ruling or not. The UK conservative politicians share the Trumpian view of China increasing its influence around the Chagos Archipelago and the Indian Ocean. 

The UK may eventually hand over the archipelago to Mauritius, but multiple political and legal obstacles exist. America’s resistance and political opposition in the UK are likely to prolong the May 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty that cedes the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Political and legal challenges by Chagossians may also delay the handover. 

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

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Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: East Africa, Ocean Access, and the Limits of Military Federation

These notes reflect my analytical views following a television interview with Al-Qahera News, a leading Egyptian regional media house, on regional politics, security, and geopolitical risk on November 29, 2025. The link for the conversation can be accessed here. This followed Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni’s controversial statement on possible conflicts in the future in relation to Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean, and the need for the EAC bloc to establish a military federation.

Big Picture

The debate around Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean and calls for an East African military federation is being overstated and, in some cases, misinterpreted. While President Museveni frames the issue in terms of future conflict prevention and regional self-reliance, the structural realities of East African integration make interstate conflict over ocean access unlikely. Uganda’s strategic interests are already embedded within existing EAC economic and political frameworks, and the leap from cooperation to a full military federation remains politically unrealistic. The underlying issue is less about imminent conflict and more about how East Africa positions itself collectively amid growing external geopolitical competition.

Key Points:

  • Conflict narratives are exaggerated: Claims that Uganda could face future conflict over Indian Ocean access are overstated and often incorrectly likened to the Ethiopia–Eritrea case. The historical, legal, and institutional contexts are fundamentally different.
  • Uganda’s access is structurally secured: Uganda’s present and future access to the Indian Ocean is anchored in deepening partnerships with Kenya and Tanzania, reinforced by regional infrastructure projects (roads, railways, pipelines) and EAC frameworks such as the customs union and common market.
  • Military federation vs political reality: While rhetorically appealing, a military federation is improbable without a political federation. The EAC has not yet fully implemented the monetary union, making progression to political—and by extension military—federation premature.
  • Sovereignty remains the core obstacle: A political federation would require a common constitution and a significant surrender of sovereignty, a step no EAC member state is currently willing to take.
  • Federation is not the same as alliance: Museveni’s proposal implies a military federation with a single defence doctrine. This differs sharply from a military alliance (e.g. NATO), where collective defence does not require surrendering national sovereignty.
  • The strategic subtext is regional autonomy: Museveni’s references to Libya point to a broader concern: the need for regional mechanisms to protect East Africa’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests amid ongoing conflicts, natural resource competition, and intensifying involvement by external powers (USA, China, EU, India, Turkey, Gulf states).

The more relevant question is not whether East Africa needs a military federation, but how existing regional frameworks can be leveraged to safeguard shared strategic interests in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

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Conflicts, Coups & Disputed Elections: Africa in 2026

Here are the key issues that will define Africa’s geopolitical landscape in 2026:

The AFC/M23 rebellion in the DRC: The conflict in the eastern Congo has persisted for decades, much like a lingering bad smell. US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed role of world peacemaker is not a magic wand to end the rebellion by the AFC/M23 group. Deep mistrust and suspicions driven by paranoia and geostrategic interests could scuttle the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. The President Felix Tshisekedi-led administration is unlikely to welcome unhinged diplomatic negotiations with Paul Kagame’s Rwanda. Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila, is expected to influence the course of Congolese politics as well as the rebellion.

War in Sudan: This is another opportunity for President Trump to fetishise his peacemaker role. The US presented a humanitarian ceasefire proposal to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in November 2025. The RSF agreed to it, while the SAF dismissed it, noting its bias and demanding the RSF’s withdrawal from occupied territories. Prospects are high for the war to continue into its fourth year by April 15. Power sharing and disarmament would be central to a mutually approved ceasefire and post-war governance. Other wild guesses would be the RSF’s push for the autonomy of the areas it controls, particularly the expansive Darfur region.

First post-independence general elections in South Sudan: Voting is scheduled for December 22, 2026. The elections were initially planned for December 2024 as per the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). Postponement of the elections beyond this year is possible. President Salva Kiir is attempting to manage his succession, but at the same time, he seems unwilling to hand over power. Kiir intends to cut off the estranged Vice President Riek Machar from any power networks that he could leverage. Clashes involving forces and militia groups allied to Kiir and Machar are highly likely to continue. A civil war cannot be ruled out.

Elections and terrorism in Somalia: Somalia’s stability and instability will have wider effects in the Horn of Africa and northwards in the Red Sea sphere. Elections are anticipated in the first half of 2026. Full universal suffrage is unlikely. Partial direct voting is expected due to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group controlling some parts of the country. Institutional weaknesses and logistical constraints will hinder large-scale direct polling. The legitimacy of the elections will largely depend on the support or lack thereof from Jubbaland and Puntland. Counterterrorism operations against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia Province will persist. The US is expected to continue participating in these operations. But this will be alongside opportunistic attacks by these militant groups that utilise guerrilla tactics. Al-Shabaab’s collaboration of convenience with the Houthis will be one to watch out for in 2026. Key to Somalia’s stability is the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Its mandate was extended by a year until December 31, 2026. AUSSOM is unlikely to achieve its goals primarily due to limited finances. Funding constraints are likely to persist, with the US unwilling to reverse its opposition to financing peacekeeping missions. Trump’s recent executive order pulling the US out of 66 international organisations heightens financial constraints for AUSSOM.

Somaliland’s sovereignty and regional geostrategic interests: Israel’s official recognition of Somaliland’s independence on December 26, 2025, set the pace for intense diplomatic and geopolitical swings. Israel’s geostrategic interests in Somaliland focus on checking and countering the Iranian-backed Houthis’ influence, which is critical in securing the Red Sea shipping lanes. Furthermore, Israel seeks to strengthen its geopolitical and security cooperation with the UAE to enhance its interests in the Horn of Africa. The UAE operates Somaliland’s strategic port of Berbera. Lobbying by US groups, including pro-Israel ones, could intensify this year to push for Washington’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Trump’s administration is unpredictable, and a sudden change in its position on Somaliland is possible.

Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts and Red Sea access ambitions: The Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions will remain hotspots in the foreseeable future. The June 1, 2026, elections could exacerbate these conflicts. In Tigray, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal forces seems to be declining. The pro-government Tigray Peace Front (TPF), which split from the TPLF, would most likely engage militarily against the TPLF. Essentially, the federal government would fight a proxy war via the TPF. Ethiopia is unlikely to change its position to access the Red Sea via the port of Assab in Eritrea. However, this may remain rhetorical, implying that a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is less likely. Regional and international deterrence is a primary factor limiting the possibility of an all-out war. Second, it would be a strange gambit for Ethiopia to wage war against Eritrea, given the ongoing hostilities in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray.

Insurgencies and instability in the Sahel/West Africa: Little collective effort is expected from countries in this region to combat insurgent groups. Neither the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nor the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has demonstrated political and military willingness to effectively address insecurity and instability. Terrorist groups, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State, seek to expand their operational reach in the region. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to remain terrorism epicentres. Regime changes via coups cannot be ruled out in these countries as a result of insecurity. Nigeria’s recent welcoming of the US support to fight terrorist and bandit groups is one to watch out for this year. But it would likely be another prolonged, less successful external counterinsurgency supported by Washington.

Youth protests, coups, and controversial elections: Unprecedented youth-led protests occurred in Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar in the past two years. Similar protests also took place in Nigeria in 2024 and in Togo in 2025. Limited economic opportunities, a relatively highly exposed younger generation, and the ability to quickly organise via social media could trigger more protests in Africa. African governments less likely to promote accountability and the creation of economic opportunities are priming the instability pump. African politicians seem to ignore these risks. Eleven successful coups and at least 10 failed/thwarted coup attempts occurred in Africa in the last six years. Poor political accountability, disputed elections, and insecurity are likely to lead to additional coup attempts in 2026.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Raila Odinga: A Remembrance

My earliest memories of the enigmatic Raila Odinga were in the late 1990s, when I was in my formative schooling years. This was shortly after the 1997 election, which Daniel Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party allegedly won.

Moi rigged votes in his favour, and 1997 was an opportunity for him to demonstrate his mastery of the cutbacks on electoral systems. These nascent memories are courtesy of my father, who religiously purchased copies of the three major newspapers then – the Daily Nation, the Standard, and the People’s Daily.

Around that time, my curiosity was also elevated by access to copies of contemporary political publications, such as the Society Magazine and the Weekly Review. My dad had copies of these publications, some dating to the early 1990s when multiparty politics was reintroduced. I cannot clearly recall some key political events that followed shortly after the elections. This includes the 1998 cooperation between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP), then led by Raila Odinga.

By 2001, I had a keen interest in political events. I recollect the June 2001 appointment of Raila Odinga and other NDP MPs to the Cabinet by Moi. The newspapers and radio stations extensively broadcast Raila’s appointment as energy minister. Others who joined the Cabinet were Adhu Awiti (planning minister), Orwa Ojode (education assistant minister), and Peter Odoyo (foreign affairs assistant minister).

Months later, in March 2002, one of the most consequential political events occurred: the KANU-NDP merger. I was in boarding school at that time, but managed to get access to newspapers. A month or so later, when schools closed for the April holiday, I went through newspapers page by page at home to keep up with the merger. Luckily, the media was still covering the significance of the event. It was unclear at that time if Moi would leave the presidency or extend his term despite his insistence on retiring by sticking to the two-term presidential term limit. A formidable, broad-based opposition movement was uncertain then.

Moi’s endorsement of Uhuru Kenyatta seven months later, on October 14, 2002, shifted the momentum and paved the way for the eventual formation of a united opposition coalition against Moi and KANU. Since then, Raila remained a highly influential political player, a colossus of sorts, until his death.

Following the death of the legendary Franco Luambo Makiadi on October 12, 1989, Sam Mangwana described him as “a man who comes once in 100 years.” Mangwana inherently referred to Franco’s combination of musical brilliance, leadership, innovation, and lyrical power that was so rare in a career that spanned four decades. Franco also commanded a religious following, and his music is immortal.

Parallels can be drawn between Raila Odinga and Luambo Makiadi. First, their souls departed in October. Three days before Odinga’s death, I had passionately celebrated Luambo’s 36th death anniversary. Probably great men, revolutionaries, die in October. Thomas Sankara and Samora Machel died on October 15, 1987, and October 19, 1986, respectively. Second, the two lives of these legends offer lessons in longevity. They mastered the art of reinventing themselves amid fierce competition and changing times.

Third, they commanded a cult-like following in life and in death. There are charismatic people all over, but very few are uniquely charming. Fourth, Luambo and Odinga were pragmatists and built their admirable careers by building alliances. They worked with their rivals, a typically Machiavellian power strategy.

Raila Odinga had power arrangements with Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Uhuru Kenyatta, and William Ruto. To many, these were personal and opportunistic. But they embodied the pragmatic sense of acquiring power. This is not an endorsement of the formation of the broad-based government. The Grand Master of Congolese rhumba and African music, Luambo Makiadi, forged alliances with one of his biggest rivals, Tabu Ley Rochereau. This union of legends produced one of the best music compositions.

My respect for Mwai Kibaki waned following the events of the controversial 2007 elections. While I was a high school student, I was politically conscious. I wondered why Kibaki would mastermind vote rigging when Odinga had won. It was confusing. A day or two before Chief Justice Evan Gicheru swore in Kibaki, I went to bed ecstatic, fantasizing about a Raila Odinga presidency.

The headline of the Saturday Standard the following day affirmed my conviction of Raila Odinga winning the presidential election. My father had sent me to purchase a copy of the dailies to keep track of the election developments. Odinga had polled 3.34 million votes against Kibaki’s 2.45 million. Later that evening, a tide swept, and votes apparently streamed in from the so-called Kibaki strongholds, including the infamous Tharaka Nithi.

Tensions were visibly high at the national tallying centre at the KICC. Odinga looked deeply frustrated with his lieutenants, James Orengo, William Ruto, et al., demanding fairness from the then chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu. Anyway, an Odinga presidency never materialised. I could not fathom why Odinga would let it go, having run one of the most remarkable and consequential political campaigns in Kenya’s political history.

In his autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, and multiple interviews, Odinga maintains that he chose to form the grand coalition government in 2008 for the sake of national unity. This was despite objections by hardliners in the ODM negotiating team at the Serena Hotel who wanted nothing less than Kibaki conceding or the formation of a transitional government leading to elections in a few months.

Odinga reiterated the need for national unity following his political reconciliation with Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2018 and William Ruto in 2024. I am convinced the 2008 Odinga was fundamentally different from the one in 2018 and 2024, and perhaps the 1998 one.

The 2008 Odinga was much more concerned about national unity, given the widespread post-election violence. But the Odinga of 1998, 2018, and 2024 was an opportunistic one who aimed at securing his political and economic interests. The 1998 KANU-NDP cooperation was a strategic maneuver by Odinga to position himself as a potential successor to Daniel Moi in 2002. Odinga played this card, having in mind a possible divided opposition and the fact that no high-ranking KANU leaders had experience in running in presidential elections.

It would be out of order to claim he pushed for his economic interests to secure the purchase of the Kisumu molasses factory in light of the political cooperation with KANU. A significant number of people claim that the land where the factory was located was illegally acquired by Spectre International, the Odinga family business. These allegations are traced to the 2003 Ndung’u Land Commission Report. According to the report, “direct allocation of alienated government land to the company (Spectre International) by the commissioner of lands was illegal.”

A few interesting facts! The Ndung’u Commission was established following a report by a task force Odinga formed in 2003, when he was the minister for roads, public works, and housing. The aim was to assess the status of government property and housing amid deeply entrenched corruption. Second, the government acquired the molasses factory land in 1982, but payments for the land were not made in full. Bidding for the factory gained momentum in the mid-1990s.

Foul play cannot be ruled out in the findings of the Ndung’u Report on Spectre’s illegal acquisition of the land. Lots of political witch-hunting was at play by mid-2003, a few months after the formation of the NARC administration. Two camps had emerged over the failure to implement the infamous power-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Kibaki-led National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Raila-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These were the principal units that formed NARC.

Were it not for a court order sought by Spectre International in January 2006, perhaps the company, Odinga, and others would have been prosecuted. Kibaki’s acolytes were not leaving anything to chance, especially after the embarrassing defeat in the August 2005 constitutional referendum. It was evident by then that Odinga would be a force to reckon with in the 2007 elections.

Political and economic interests motivated the extra-constitutional power arrangements of 2018 and 2024. The 2018 one could have targeted cutting off William Ruto from Kenyatta and weakening him in the run-up to the 2017 election. It never worked with Ruto playing victim. The 2024 arrangement occurred when Ruto was extremely desperate following a wave of youth-led protests. The fact that this power deal was followed by the impeachment of then Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua raises suspicions.

It is difficult to figure out the specific political goal Odinga was pursuing. Was he strategically positioning ODM to be a principal coalition partner with UDA in 2027? Or was he just playing the good guy card to cement his status as a statesman? On both occasions, the commercial interests of the Odinga family were on the table.

I embraced Odinga’s ideologies in the lead-up to the 2007 election, given the manner in which he packaged his campaign messaging. He built his manifesto on infrastructure as the key to transforming Kenya’s socioeconomic fortunes. Little credit is given to Raila Odinga for being the brainchild of some notable physical infrastructure projects. The Thika Superhighway, the LAPSETT corridor project, and multiple by-passes in Nairobi were conceptualised by Odinga. To me, he stands out as the most progressive roads minister in Kenya’s history.

At the onset of the NARC administration, Odinga, with gusto, oversaw the demolition of structures built on road reserves. He attempted to inject some sanity as Kenya was transitioning from an irredeemably corrupt Moi administration. The construction of the Raila Odinga Way, previously known as Mbagathi Way, highlights his legacy and embodies his high value for posterity. He was on record many times, noting that most of his decisions are based on posterity.

The Raila Odinga Way was initiated during his time as roads minister, and it was constructed from 2005 to 2007. It was a pilot project to assess the viability of concrete road technology in the country. The road is still in shape almost two decades later.

One has to admire Odinga for his resilience, willpower, and intellect. Few can survive eight years of detention, considering the physical and psychological torture victims are subjected to. It is even more agonizing to imagine Odinga’s mum and brother died and got buried while he was in detention. Odinga endured the loss of his four siblings and eldest son but chose to fight for a cause larger than his life. He lost the presidential election multiple times but stayed on course.

Odinga’s resilience resonates with Viktor Frankl’s thoughts in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning. This excerpt from the book’s preface highlights Frankl’s view on finding purpose in life even during moments of suffering:

“…The great task for any person is to find meaning in his or her life: in work (doing something significant), in love (caring for another person), and in courage in difficult times…Suffering in and of itself is meaningless; we give our suffering meaning by the way in which we respond to it…”

His autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, remains one of my favourite memoirs, especially in the Kenyan context. It is relatively rich in history. Most Kenyan autobiographies are quite shallow and read more like eulogies than texts meant to inspire thinking, belief, and action.

Raila also authored Quest for Nationhood – Roadmap to Our Future. As revealed by one of his sisters on the burial day, he was working on another book on Pan-Africanism. He had also instructed Anyang’ Nyong’o to work on a paper on nationhood and tribalism just before his demise.

I highly value people who have been in the limelight to pen down the intrigues of their lives, motivations, purpose, and achievements. In one of my blog posts, I stated the need for such figures to give us more books, but meaningful ones. I have read memoirs that left me cursing the authors for presenting underwhelming information despite having been in the corridors of power.

His father’s, Not Yet Uhuru, is also a remarkable autobiography. Raila Odinga stands out among the few Kenyan politicians who found meaning in writing books, again for posterity purposes. Apart from Anyang’ Nyong’o, it is difficult to easily identify politicians who are intellectually grounded. And I do not imply academic qualifications…We glorify the practice of acquiring academic certificates instead of valuing intellectualism. There is a high deficit of thinkers in Kenya.

It is a generational tragedy that politicians annoyingly talk of Kenya as the next Singapore, yet their woeful intellects tell of a limited understanding of the formidable thinker Lee Kuan Yew was. I am hopeless for a better Kenya.

Odinga was overall well-informed, not just about history, but about many issues. His parliamentary contributions and Cabinet briefings demonstrated a man who highly valued knowledge.

The most consequential deaths generally lead to destructive institutional episodes, largely due to internal contradictions. The ODM party will wane, and the political careers of Odinga’s hangers-on will die with his demise. Despite his intellect and strong belief in institutions, Odinga did not build ODM for posterity. He failed to overcome the Kenyan political party culture, where parties are built around personalities and not effective institutional elements.

I cannot blame him for this. This is a culture primarily associated with the political parties that emerged with the reintroduction of multiparty politics. However, this goes further back to the colonial era. Perhaps KANU, after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, escaped this. His successor, Moi, was deeply entrenched in the system, and an inherent succession plan was already in place before his death.

FORD-Kenya weakened significantly with Oginga Odinga’s death in 1994. Tragedy struck the party the second time within a decade in August 2003 with the death of Vice President Kijana Wamalwa. The party sank deeper. Currently, its leaders are proud to have it as the most popular party among the Bukusu people in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia counties.

KANU lost its allure with Daniel Moi’s exit from the presidency. Moi personalized KANU after Jomo’s death. One of the primary causes was the 1982 coup attempt that prompted him to consolidate power and resulted in the legal ban of other parties.

Multiple factions within ODM will eventually split and weaken it. Part of the leadership led by the Secretary General, Edwin Sifuna, opposes the broad-based government and vouches for the party to field a presidential candidate in 2027. Others strongly support the broad-based government and vow to support Ruto’s reelection.

Appointing Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, as the acting party leader may have been motivated by paranoia and interests. Large political parties in Kenya are extensively family enterprises. This, plus other factors, will hasten the party’s weakening.

ODM has been on a gradual downward trajectory in the past decade. This is supported by its performance in the 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, apart from presidential polls. Its agreement with UDA/KKA to form the broad-based government impacted it significantly. Weeks ago, its SG Sifuna raised concerns about the fading desire by aspirants to run for elections on ODM.

Oburu lacks the national appeal that Raila enjoyed. I am careful not to refer to Oburu as weak – and I do not mean physically – but he does not inspire confidence. There are leaders whose supporters can go to war for. At least not Oburu.

Raila’s eldest brother is safeguarding the interests of ODM ‘conservatives.’ Linked to this are Ruto’s interests and machinations to win ODM’s support for his unassured reelection. Ruto might have influenced the selection of Oburu as the acting party leader. Ruto’s political career could be a victim of Raila’s death. A fractured ODM and a united opposition spell doom for him.

I have keenly listened to Oburu’s speeches after assuming the party leader’s role of ODM. Fundamentally, it’s double-speak. His speeches carry a reconciliatory tone. But the power arrangement between ODM and UDA/KKA is intact. Oburu was a staunch supporter of this extra-constitutional arrangement when Raila was alive. (I will dedicate the next few weeks to digging deeper and understanding Oburu’s worldview and leadership. But the November 2nd, 2025, Sunday Nation’s Weekly Review was a good starting point. His autobiography is on my bucket list).

In September 2024, Raila Odinga, with the NEC’s endorsement, settled on Anyang’ Nyong’o as the party’s acting leader. This was at the onset of Odinga’s campaigns for the chairperson’s position of the African Union Commission (AUC).

Nyong’o is a near ideological twin to Raila and would make a better party leader than Oburu ideologically. But the two gentlemen are aging. They may resonate with the generational shift in Kenyan politics. Even so, Oburu should facilitate a transition to relatively youthful leadership for posterity.

For ODM to remain relevant and possibly become vibrant, it must embrace youthful leadership. It should brand itself as the political party of the present and the future. The present and the future of Kenya oscillate on political and economic solutions that address the plight of the youth.

The three ODM deputy party leaders are not visionaries. The immediate former two deputy party leaders who were appointed as Cabinet Secretaries in the broad-based government are not good enough to lead ODM. Ideally, an ODM of the future should be built around Sifuna’s talents. He stands out as a visionary and the most qualified to lead the party.

I will forever miss Raila Odinga. His legacy for pro-democratic reforms is solid. His intellect is admirable. His decision-making for posterity is cherished. It is unbelievable that he died. Looks like a dream!

May his soul rest in eternal peace!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst and strategist. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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Africa Elections Brief: Violence Erupts in Cameroon as Biya Declared Winner

The Constitutional Council declared 92-year-old President Paul Biya the winner with 53.66% of the vote. Opposition leader Issa Tchiroma emerged second with 35.2% of the vote on October 27. Protests broke out on the weekend of October 25 and 26 due to vote rigging claims. At least four people died in Douala. Tchiroma has called for nationwide protests. Tchiroma declared victory a few days ago.

Biya’s faculties are probably not sharp enough to effectively govern the country, given his age. The most likely outlook at the moment is the persistence of violence across the country. Political unrest could intensify, given the high-stakes polls. In the 2018 presidential election, results by the Constitutional Council indicated Biya’s victory with 71.28% of the vote. His closest challenger, Maurice Kamto, polled 14.23%.

Cameroonians are generally disillusioned with Biya’s ability to govern, primarily due to his age. The country stares at a crisis in the short and long term. Biya is likely to play his familiar card of using security forces to violently suppress protests. This worked in the past. His acolytes and family could be in charge of key institutions, such as the military and intelligence. But sustained pressure by protesters creates conducive conditions for a military takeover, repeat elections, or the formation of a broader coalition government of national unity.

A few days ago, reports indicated that Biya had offered Tchiroma the prime minister position. The opposition leader rejected it. Recent geopolitical events in Africa and around the world could keep protesters on the streets longer. Cameroon’s political stability faces an imminent risk from the socioeconomic frustrations of the youth. The Gen Z protests in Madagascar, Morocco, Kenya, Nepal, and Bangladesh could inspire youthful Cameroonians to continue demonstrating.

Biya is unlikely to address the plight of Cameroonians even if he were to remain in power for the next 50 years. If he manages to suppress protests, his old age is likely to intensify succession battles in the long term. A Robert Mugabe scenario is highly likely.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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Armed Conflict in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on the Edge

The junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are struggling to contain armed groups. When pressed for answers on their failures, they usually allude to foreign actors, among other reasons. Captain Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, General Assimi Goita of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani rose to power through coups, promising to effectively address insecurity.

In a recent interview, Traore, in his defence, claimed to have found approximately 100,000 AK-47 bullets in the country’s stocks when he took over three years ago. Whether this is figurative or not, Traore failed to restore security and order within three months of taking over.

Multiple factors are responsible for the prolongation of insecurity and political instability in the three Sahelian countries. The general incompetence of the military-led governments is a key factor. These regimes seem largely concerned about power consolidation rather than addressing pertinent issues affecting the people. This is done through propaganda campaigns that often chide the West, banning and suspending political parties and civil society groups, and extending transitional terms.

The anti-West sentiments, mostly against France, of these regimes are quite interesting. Historically, France is responsible for enabling extractive politico-economic and social institutions in the broader Francophone Africa. France is also responsible for the failures of Operation Barkhane and other related security missions in the Sahel. But these issues do not absolve the military regimes from worsening insecurity and instability.

UN peacekeepers and French forces withdrew from Mali. French troops also pulled out of Burkina Faso. Similar exits by the French, American, and German forces also occurred in Niger. The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger turned to Russia for security and defense support. So far, no tangible results can be linked to the Russian mercenaries in these countries.

These regimes, in a way, underestimated the intelligence gathering and sharing by foreign troops. They also overestimated the capabilities of their own security forces and those of the Russian mercenaries in combating armed groups.

Effective regional security solutions are yet to be decisively implemented. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after exiting from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a paper tiger. The AES is not fundamentally different from ECOWAS in that it fails to match aspirations with decisive actions.

Armed groups in the region have demonstrated improved operational capabilities. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) occasionally use drones in their attacks. Drone attacks by armed groups have substantially increased in the region, especially in Mali, in the last two years.

In addition, armed groups in the Sahel are getting more access to rifles and ammunition. While illicit trafficking channels in West Africa and North Africa were the primary ways of acquiring weapons, increasing attacks against military installations are enabling easy access. Seizures and looting of these facilities facilitate the supply of weapons.

Insecurity and instability will persist in the Sahel region, given the incapabilities of the security apparatus of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat armed groups. Of course, the three states are good at propaganda to sanitize their incompetence while pointing fingers at domestic, regional, and extra-continental imaginary enemies. Propaganda is a delusionary reprieve for these military regimes. However, this is not a magic bullet by any means to resolve the governance crises in these countries.

Traore, Goita, and Tchiani are on borrowed time. Their regimes, besides the perfection of propaganda, are likely to face a backlash from the public due to worsening insecurity. While elections of civilian-led governments may not be necessary conditions for robust economic growth, the delayed return to constitutional order creates the ideal conditions for an increase in anti-junta sentiments. These sentiments are germs for intensified attacks by armed groups or coup attempts.

Consider Mali. JNIM has imposed an economic blockade since early September 2025. The blockade, featuring attacks against fuel tankers, was in place at the time of writing this article. While some tankers have successfully been escorted by security forces to Bamako and other parts, growing frustrations among the public are possible. Unrest cannot be ruled out under these circumstances.

A significant number of people are in awe of Traore and generally the junta in these three countries for supposedly giving neocolonialism and Western influence a back foot. I find this impractical, unreasonable, and infantile. If they indeed cherish neocolonialism, then they should absolutely pursue total independence. This is unrealistic in a highly globalized world. What’s more, claiming Western influence to be neocolonialism while at the same time strengthening relations with Russia is shifting goalposts. Is it that Russia does not seek to influence these governments by pursuing its geostrategic interests?

Russian mercenaries have proven ineffective in helping these military-led governments to contain insecurity. In fact, Western troops and UN peacekeepers in the region appear to have been more competent than the mercenaries. One could argue that the mercenaries are fewer than the Western troops and peacekeepers. Well, fair enough. But this does not excuse the failure of the mercenaries. It is a matter of time before these mercenaries fully withdraw from the region, like they did in Mozambique a few years ago.

The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas expect to remain in power until at least 2030, based on the collectively calculated extensions over the past year. Coups are ugly, and they fight back. Traore, Goita, and Tchiani rose to power via coups, justifying the takeovers due to worsening insecurity. These conditions persist, and additional coup attempts are anticipated. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a history of coups, and a farcical recurrence of these events in the future is possible. Remarkable political leaders who rose to power via coups, for instance, Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara, were victims of the fight back.

Newer armed groups are likely to be formed in the region, while the existing ones could become bolder with enhanced operational capabilities. These groups are also likely to strengthen alliances.

External and regional military interventions cannot be ruled out in the future, but these are highly unlikely at the moment. The positions of the three military regimes against UN forces and other European troops, including the French, limit the likelihood of a UN peacekeeping force. What’s more, the recent decisions by the UN to reduce peacekeepers by 25% globally and cut the peacekeeping budget by 15% technically rule out a global peacekeeping mission in the region.

This also means that security and stabilisation initiatives by the African Union (AU) are in jeopardy. Such initiatives historically rely on UN funding. This raises questions regarding the AU’s effectiveness, given its Agenda 2063, which ambitiously aimed at silencing guns – to end wars and civil conflicts – on the continent by 2020.

UN peacekeeping missions are criticized for their passive responses to violent conflicts in Africa. They are present in the DRC, South Sudan, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, and the Abyei region. While these missions have multiple shortcomings, their effectiveness cannot be overruled. Perhaps the funding cuts and force reduction could impact security and stability in Africa. I’ll discuss this in my next article after reflecting on the Malawi presidential election. But the fragility of the Sahel states and these UN decisions could be marked by a significant increase in the flow of arms and movement of armed groups on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His opinions are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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Calls for National Dialogue Opportunistic and Baseless

Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga often struggles to read the room. On July 7, 2025, his lethargic speech, commemorating the 35th anniversary of Saba Saba Day, affirms this. Two or three aspects of the speech intrigued me.

First, Odinga’s call for a national dialogue, which he referred to as an inclusive intergenerational national conclave. Second, a national referendum to vote on the outcomes of the dialogue. Third, a demand for police reforms and an end to police brutality.

Odinga is deluded and demonstrates his religious obsession through such dialogues, which he has historically capitalized on to gain government power.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that led to the formation of the incompetent broad-based government stipulates a 10-point agenda to improve Kenya’s governance. This agenda is an outcome of a dialogue that involved long-time politicians. It was an outcome of President William Ruto’s political desperation and Odinga’s opportunistic nature in the aftermath of the June 25, 2024, mass protests.

Kenya would not be on a race to the bottomless pit had the Ruto administration implemented its promises after the 2022 elections and 2024 protests. Ruto attempted to dialogue with the people, a rare show of humility from him. But to him, these were brilliant moments to hoodwink the public. After all, his promises to address high taxation, an odious public debt, cut wastage of public resources, and completely reshuffle the presidential appointees, among others, have never been implemented. Would you want to dialogue with people who feel shortchanged and lied to?

Odinga should instead lead his party, ODM, to resign from the mongrel broad-based government. It is easier for him to also consider calling Ruto and insisting on the implementation of the 10-point agenda.

The former prime minister has perfected Law 25 of the 48 Laws of Power by recreating himself each time his relevance appears to hit a dead end. While he has mastered the Machiavellian script of pursuing power, I am afraid his moves on the national political chessboard may not be effective this time.

Anything great or mighty, including powerful personalities and institutions that are sometimes perceived as immortal, has its end. Greatness is a factor of time, and time changes, and people move on.  History is replete with such examples.

Most of these mighty entities usually collapse because of internal contradictions, greed, arrogance, overestimation of their outdated strategies/tactics, and not heeding the evolving demands of time. The architects of the broad-based government are facing a generation of young Kenyans who are relatively well-exposed, educated, and courageous. They are also facing a public that is delusional and hopeless of vague promises.

National dialogues have barely benefited the people in Kenya, given the multiple times we’ve had them. Interestingly enough, the first point of the 10-point agenda is the full implementation of the NADCO report. NADCO is an abbreviation for National Dialogue Committee, a team that comprised members of the ruling coalition and the opposition to address political and economic governance.

NADCO came a few years after another amorphous national dialogue initiative: the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI). While the courts quashed the BBI-driven attempts for a referendum, Odinga largely achieved his aim of enjoying political power without responsibility.

From a political strategy view, the BBI was Uhuru Kenyatta’s stroke to exercise his powers by limiting sabotage by his then-deputy, Ruto. But it was a miscalculation by Odinga. Ruto successfully linked Odinga with the failures of an administration he was the second in command. And Odinga’s lazy and disorganised presidential election campaigns did not remedy the situation.

Our Constitution is an outcome of a political dialogue held after Mwai Kibaki rigged the votes in the 2007 elections. This is perhaps one of the diligent results from numerous dialogues in the last six decades. But if we consider the bigger picture, the people, especially victims of the post-election violence, rarely benefited from the dialogue.

The political class deliberately objected to the implementation of the report by the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). With hindsight, it was far-fetched to entrust a compromised and non-progressive political class to implement the TJRC’s recommendations.

The TJRC submitted its report to Uhuru Kenyatta in May 2013. Uhuru and Ruto were then facing charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, these are politicians whose political and biological roots are entangled in historical injustices committed by the Jomo Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki regimes. This indicates why it is hard to expect tangible progress from establishment politicians.

A good example of another dialogue is the Ndung’u Land Commission in 2003. Unfortunately, but not shockingly, its report has never been implemented. Again, expect nothing from a political class that is a purveyor of corruption.

National dialogues are meaningless. These are resource-wasting ventures by the establishment. Why should we have a national dialogue when we have an administration that is tone-deaf, arrogant, and casts itself as an enemy of the people? Dialogue with an administration obsessed with killing, maiming, and abducting people without shame? Dialogue with an administration that is incompetent and good at nothing?

Constitutionalism and meritocracy are the primary pillars to transform Kenya. If the current and future administrations stick to the Constitution, corruption, unwarranted high public debt, high taxation, unaffordable education, poor housing, and high-cost healthcare will be eradicated. Our Constitution is the answer to all our governance challenges and not caricatured dialogues.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, speaks and writes on political and economic governance. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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June 25: Reflections on an Unfinished People’s Revolution

June 25, 2024, shaped Kenya’s present and future. I refer to it as Kenya’s great political reset. The aftermath of the events of this date portrays a political class that is not ready for change. The top brass of the Kenya Kwanza administration remains defiantly arrogant, corrupt, dismissive, but still cannot implement measures to improve the lives of Kenyans.

This bunch of gluttonous politicians and wheeler-dealers fails to recognise its failures and acknowledge the need for a holistic, generational change. We certainly need to do better as a country, 62 years after independence.

But independence has all along been a charade. Apart from powerful neocolonial forces, the Kenyan political establishment cherishes colonial attitudes and institutions. Our political class is worse than the British colonialists. Sometimes I think of how the world could have been a terrible place had Kenyans colonised several territories. I mean, the Kenyan political establishment lacks the passion to put in place systems that work.

I do not mean to excuse European colonialism. It was unjustified. Since it happened, comparisons and contrasts can be drawn. In 2023, I read a controversial opinion article titled “What is Uganda’s Problem?” in the Daily Monitor newspaper. The writer, Timothy Kalyegira, argues that colonialists established functional institutions and had a good work ethic. He chides post-colonial governments in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania for not matching the colonialists’ work ethic and institutions.

Fundamentally, I agree with Kalyegira’s thoughts in the article. There is no justification for the existence of broken systems that deprive citizens high quality public goods and services.

One could argue that the post-colonial politicians in the region inherited extractive political and economic institutions. Sounds fine. But they loudly pontificate development blueprints and slogans, intentionally bypassing the urgency for institutional reforms.

The William Ruto administration, at some point, was obsessed with transforming Kenya into the Singapore of Africa. Never mind that this hallucinatory obsession is aimed at justifying the warped housing levy and affordable housing policy.

Economic history indicates that Kenya and Singapore were almost at par on several economic growth and development indicators in the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, Kenya’s GDP was USD 926.6 million, while Singapore’s was USD 917.2 million in 1963. Presently, Kenya and Singapore are worlds apart.

Where did we lose the plot? In some of my articles, I have referenced Professor Anyang’ Nyong’o’s book, “A Leap Into the Future,” detailing answers to this question. Nyong’o highlights an encounter with Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, in the 1990s. Kuan Yew referred to the assassination of Tom Mboya as having dragged Kenya backward when Singapore chose to go forward.

He may have symbolically brought up Mboya’s assassination. The bigger picture is the dismissal of the intentional nation-building and institutional development through meritocracy. Kenya’s political establishment passionately hates meritocracy.

While Kuan Yew’s Singapore identified Meritocracy, Pragmatism, and Honesty (MPH) as the pathway for socioeconomic development, Kenya’s political class religiously embraced corruption, lack of merit, and despised work ethic. Kenya appears to be worsening.

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) remains a moribund institution. Its notable achievements are name changes. The amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1997 paved the way for the establishment of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority. This was an outcome of key reforms undertaken by the Daniel Moi administration to restore foreign aid. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2003, and later the EACC in 2011.

No substantial prosecutions of high-profile politicians and wheeler-dealers have occurred in the last 30 years. Corruption is rampant under the current administration, and this was one of the key issues raised by Kenyans in 2024 during the demonstrations. Nothing has changed, no lessons learnt.

The Kenya Kwanza regime believes you can overtax a country to prosperity. We have the habit of blaming the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for imposing policies that lead to inequality. Historically, there is solid evidence linking the neoliberal Washington Consensus policies to unequal development in Africa.

But our governments ought to be blamed more. Kenya lacks leaders, visionaries, and thinkers at the centre of power. Meaningful economic development cannot be achieved without dedicated intellectualism in the Executive and Legislature.

Kenya is a victim of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) championed by the Bretton Woods institutions. The victimhood dates back to the 1990s. The education and health sectors were severely affected by SAPs. We find ourselves in similar situations where massive spending cuts threaten access to affordable education and healthcare. Any country with visionary leaders would not be experiencing this.

The future of Kenya is gloomy. We are back in the times when education, especially higher education, was a privilege of those who could afford to pay fees. Fundraisers for hospital bills have increased, while the regime insists that the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) is working efficiently. We must not forget KES 104 billion was spent on the transition from the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) to SHIF.

Overtaxation cannot lead to socioeconomic prosperity. Let’s forget about socioeconomic prosperity for now; you cannot overtax economic agents strained by a high cost of living and unemployment. The June 25, 2024, protests were a platform for the citizens to remind the incompetent Kenya Kwanza regime about the folliness of overtaxation.

We are constantly reminded by the establishment that we must pay taxes to achieve economic independence. They also tell us that we are not overtaxed, unlike other countries. This dangerous thinking always draws comparisons between Kenya and developed economies and not other peer countries. Kenyans may not have a problem with high taxes, provided that these efforts are reciprocated with the provision of affordable and high quality public goods and services.

Vision 2030, like many other wonderfully drafted socioeconomic Sessional Papers, will never be attained in totality. This blueprint envisioned the manufacturing sector as a key driver for transforming Kenya into a globally competitive, middle-income economy. It targeted the manufacturing sector to contribute 20% to the economy’s GDP and create one million jobs yearly. This remains a pipe dream.

Policymakers have shown little concern that high taxes and an unpredictable tax regime are strangling the manufacturing sector. Yet, they go around the country on the rooftops of top-of-the-range cars like snake oil merchants, showing little concern for the stagnated growth of the sector.

Let’s get it right; you cannot cheat yourself into robust socioeconomic development. Failing to formulate relevant policies to spur the manufacturing sector means we will barely create meaningful and sustainable jobs in Kenya. This also applies to other African countries.

Nearly all developed and fast-developing economies established robust manufacturing sectors. Ours has hardly contributed more than 10% to the GDP in the last 10 years. The frustrations of Kenyans, particularly the youth, arise from unemployment and underemployment. Yet, the regime’s honchos overburden these vulnerable humans with taxes without creating sustainable jobs.

It is laughable that the Ruto administration talks big about exporting labour as a job creation mechanism. This is hogwash. In addition, we have seen this regime countless times purporting to facilitate the creation of jobs through the digital economy. Not sure why this barely comes up nowadays.

This rogue regime does not understand the dignity of decent jobs. It has no comprehension of the dangers of idle, educated youth. Again, you cannot cheat your way into development. There are no miracles and shortcuts to attaining meaningful socioeconomic development.

What is the essence of this irredeemable obsession with increasing taxes yearly? Conventional economic thinking indicates that a country struggling with a huge public debt considers the following economic policies: spending cuts, tax increases, structural reforms, investing in infrastructure, and debt restructuring and forgiveness.

In the aftermath of the June 25, 2024, youth-led protests, the Ruto administration committed to auditing the public debt. Nothing tangible has been heard or seen since. Borrowing is on an upward trajectory. Tax increases are prevalent. The political class ensured that such increases are masked in a jargon-heavy and technical 2025/26 Budget Policy Statement (BPS) and 2025 Finance Bill.

Spending cuts are skewed. In the 2025/26 BPS, the security budget was increased by 17%, while the education budget was reduced by 18%. State House and state lodges are under constant construction and renovation. How urgent are these works? It is a problem to have a regime allocating over KES 11 billion for renovating and constructing buildings that do not add value to Kenyans. These are conduits for siphoning public resources. The Executive and Parliament waste so much money traveling within and out of the country to attend useless events.

The increase in the security budget is not surprising. This regime is paranoid and hellbent on creating a totalitarian state. The paranoia emanated from last year’s protests. The regime’s leadership never believed organic protests could break out. State-sanctioned abductions, enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and threats are outcomes of a cowardly political leadership not ready to embrace accountability.

Kenya’s political establishment has another bad obsession: the need to control social media. On one hand, the political class dismisses social media government criticism. On the other hand, it craves controlling social media to limit free speech. Part of the increase in the security budget is the allocation of KES 150 million to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) to purchase a system to track social media. This worries me a lot. It means more abductions, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings. But the more these issues persist, the more defiant the people become.

Ruto and his cabal are poor students of history. And the president is on record dismissing history. They should take time and study regime changes caused by popular uprisings. Burkina Faso in 2014, Sudan in 2019, Egypt in 2011, and Czechoslovakia in 1989, among others.

Commonsensically, you’d expect the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to consider such basic epochs. But the NIS is highly politicised under the Kenya Kwanza regime. The previous director generals of the NIS were more professional and polished. At the moment, this institution is a circus. This is the first time its director general has appeared in public forums multiple times, not to contribute anything meaningful to enhance nation-building, but to threaten the regime’s dissidents and call for the regulation of social media.

June 25, 2024, was a major political reset in Kenya’s history. It forced an unpopular president to reach out to a once-popular opposition leader and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga for political survival. This formally resulted in the formation of the so-called broad-based government.

William Ruto and his people do not get it; incorporating Odinga in the government is not equal to addressing the concerns of Kenyans. This mongrel government is a similar government formation Ruto vehemently criticised between 2018 and 2022, when Odinga and then-President Uhuru Kenyatta reached an MoU to form an inclusive government.

Such government arrangements are unconstitutional. With last year’s great political reset, we have demystified the cult of Odinga. The people no longer need him to call for protests. And he disgraced his pro-democracy credentials when he opted to support a rogue, incompetent regime. The majority of young people of my generation and the generations that come after will remember Odinga as a scheming, calculative opportunist, and not a champion for democracy.

Will the victims and their families get justice from the state following the attack on citizens on and after June 25, 2024? This is unlikely. But the arc of justice is long and swings slowly. However long it takes, justice will be served once this regime is voted out of power.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, speaks and writes on politics, governance, political economy, public policy, geopolitics, and armed conflict. Contact sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Russian Military Bases in Africa: The Bear’s Brisque Geostrategic Card

This is the last part of a four-article series on Russia’s geostrategic interests and presence in Africa. Parts one, two, and three can be accessed here, here, and here. Russia trails the US, China, the UK, and Turkiye in having established military bases in Africa. In 2020, reports suggested that Russia had finalised plans to build military bases in six African countries: Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Eritrea, Egypt, and the Central African Republic. Most of these countries share certain peculiarities. First, Russian PMCs have been present at different times in these countries, except in Egypt and Eritrea.

Second, these countries import Russian weapons, with Egypt as a major market for Russian arms on the continent. Third, these countries are endowed with natural resources: Sudan (gold), Mozambique (natural gas), Madagascar (chromite, uranium, among others), Egypt (gas), Eritrea (gold, oil, and gas), and the Central African Republic (gold).

Moreover, these countries are also geographically strategic. Sudan has a coastline along the Red Sea. Egypt overlooks the Mediterranean Sea. Eritrea is along the Red Sea. Madagascar and Mozambique offer access to the Indian Ocean. The Central African Republic is at the heart of Africa, guaranteeing strategic access to the DRC in the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the west, and Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo to the southwest. These countries are resource-rich, with some bordering the Atlantic Ocean.

Moscow has yet to establish a military base in Africa at the time of writing this article. The Sudanese military regime concluded a review of an agreement with Russia to put up a naval base in Suakin near Port Sudan along the Red Sea in February 2023. The ratification of the deal was subject to the establishment of a civilian-led government, including a legislative body. It is worth mentioning that initial agreements for a Russian naval base were mooted in 2017 when Omar el-Bashir was president and formalised in 2020.

Its establishment was derailed by Bashir’s ouster and later the war between the Sudanese army and the RSF. The agreement indicates Sudan’s provision of an area for the deployment of 300 Russian military personnel and four navy ships for around 25 years in exchange for weapons and military equipment. The agreement could be extended for another 10 years, subject to approval by both Khartoum and Moscow.

Russia cannot afford to refer to itself as a global power player without strategic military bases in key geographical locations. As such, Moscow is attempting to mirror the Soviet Union, which had naval bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have historically been strategic for major and rising power players in Africa and the Middle East. Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen, and Oman host military bases and other smaller facilities of foreign powers.

The US, China, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti. Saudi Arabia intends to establish a military base in Djibouti as it operates another one on the Socotra Island (Yemen). The UAE has bases on Socotra Island, Boosaaso in Somalia, and Assab in Eritrea near the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It intends to establish another military base in Berbera in Somaliland. Israel has a military base in Eritrea. The US and the UK operate military bases in Oman.

A naval base along the Red Sea would enable Russia to promote its regional and global interests. The region is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas, and key minerals such as gold. The Red Sea is also a geostrategic gateway for global trade, given the centrality of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

But is Russia in a position to develop its planned military bases in Africa? The building of these bases is subject to a myriad of factors in Africa as well as in Russia. In Sudan, for instance, the persistence of the civil war and the delayed formation of a new government could protract Russia’s hopes for fast-tracking the naval base, which is behind schedule. Russia’s intent to build a military base in the Central African Republic could be impacted by the interests of other major powers.

The government of the Central African Republic hired Bancroft, a US PMC. This denotes the possibility of US interests substantially increasing in the country, primarily to compete against Russia. The US is also good at sounding alarm bells to African countries associated with Russia. For instance, it previously warned Sudan of risking isolation from the international community were it to allow Russia to establish a military base along the Red Sea.

The major drawback to Russia’s ambition to establish military bases in Africa is the Russo-Ukrainian war. War is a costly affair, and certainly, Russia’s commitment to building these bases demands psychological and economic commitment. Economically, running a war economy may not give enough room for Russia to comfortably build and equip a military base in Africa.

Using existing military bases in the region could highlight why establishing them would be financially demanding for Moscow. For instance, the Chinese military base in Djibouti was constructed at USD 590 million over at least two years. The US military base in Djibouti attracts USD 63 million in rent annually, with Washington estimated to spend around USD 1.4 billion to upgrade it between 2014 and 2034.

As of September 2022, Russia incurred approximately USD 40 billion – around 84% of the 2021 national defence expenditure – due to the war. Other estimates highlight that Russia spends around 40% of the total government budget on war, with total military spending estimated at at least 10% of the GDP as of 2023.

These figures present an abstract picture of why Russia is unlikely to embark on the construction of military bases in Africa as long as the war against Ukraine persists. The bigger picture should be on the massive power of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) when the war ends. The MIC will have excess capacity and supply of weapons, and the exchequer will have a massive financial muscle. A significant number of sanctions imposed on Russia by the West are unlikely to be dropped after the war ends. Thus, the MIC could drive Russia’s economy post-war. This could lead to increased arms sales to Africa, and possibly, the fast-tracking of the construction of military bases in Africa for Russia to safeguard its economic interests on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Russia’s Growing Influence in Africa: A Security & Geostrategic Outlook

This is part one of a four to five-article series examining Russia’s influence in Africa from a security and geostrategic viewpoint. Moscow’s influence in Africa waned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s influence in Africa in the post-Cold War period is characterised by two almost distinct epochs. First, the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 1999, and second, the Crimea Annexation in 2014.

It is worth noting, though, that Moscow was a dominant power player in Africa in the Cold War era alongside the US. The recent increase in Russian influence in Africa is attributed to the Western-led sanctions following Russia’s incursion and takeover of Crimea. Russia’s imprints in Africa in the last 10 decades have largely involved working through the Private Military Companies (PMCs) such as Wagner. These mercenaries have been deployed in strategic countries where Russia also had or has interests in natural resources such as gold, gas, among others. But Russia’s engagement with African countries goes beyond the security issues and includes other mutual areas of cooperation.

Historical Background of Moscow’s Influence in Africa

By accident or design, Moscow was excluded from having a share of Africa’s vast territory at the 1885 Berlin Congress. First, Russia did not have direct access to Africa, and this was geographically inconvenient to Moscow. Sailing around Asia, cutting through the Ottoman Empire, sailing through the Baltic Sea, and its frozen ports in the north created inconveniences.

Second, Russia was much more concerned about furthering its geostrategic interests in the neighbourhood; the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East. This explains Russia’s absent colonial legacy in Africa. Moscow’s interests in Africa were reignited by the commencement of the Cold War. Russia established alliances with several African countries as a geostrategic maneuver to counter the influence of the United States on the continent.

Moscow’s geostrategic currents in Africa at the height of the Cold War were characterised by the supply of arms as well as other soft power approaches such as education scholarships. African countries that benefited from the Soviet Union’s arms supply include Angola, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Morocco, Mozambique, and South Africa. Other countries, such as Guinea, exported their natural resources to the Soviet Union after signing military agreements with Moscow, as well as receiving Soviet aid. The People’s Friendship University was Moscow’s nerve centre in facilitating education scholarships to Africans.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dawn of unipolarity scaled down Moscow’s geostrategic power pursuits globally. A weakened Russia could not match the zeal of the Soviet Union due to domestic economic, political, and social pressures. Moscow’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Africa during the Cold War were facilitated by its diplomatic missions. The closure of nine embassies and three consulates in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union substantially dissipated Moscow’s influence in Africa.

The domestic challenges Russia experienced at that time demanded a reorientation of Moscow’s foreign policy with the President Boris Yeltsin’s administration heavily focused on resolving internal issues. The reduction of staff at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the termination of foreign aid, and closure of cultural institutions consequently impacted Russia’s influence in Africa.

Post-Cold War, two critical junctures define Russia’s reignited interest in Africa. First, the election of President Vladimir Putin in 1999, and second, the 2014 Crimea Annexation by Russia. The election of President Putin coincided with the growth and stability of the Russian economy after almost a decade of economic turbulence. Besides, Putin’s administration’s ambitions to restore Moscow’s lost glory in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union projected a state that sought to rediscover its global geostrategic footprints. Post-2000, Russia was involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa in the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan.

Moscow also enhanced its diplomatic engagements with African countries post-2000 as a strategy to project its geostrategic ambitions. President Putin visited South Africa in 2006, while President Dmitry Medvedev visited Angola, Egypt, Namibia, and Nigeria in 2009. The sanctions imposed by the West on Russia following the 2014 Crimea Annexation pushed Moscow to seek alternative economic partnerships. Russia’s increased influence in Africa and the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union were direct outcomes of this.

Russia’s post-2014 engagement with Africa is based on rivalry that defines global power politics. Moscow, like Beijing, rivals the US and other emerging powers in the reignited interest in Africa. African countries are obviously pawns in this great power rivalry game. Russia, on its part, charms African states with debt forgiveness and grain supply agreements.

The Kremlin also perceives Africa as a credible market for its arms, a significant portion of which were manufactured during the Soviet era. As such, it is not surprising that Russia accounted for 40% of Africa’s imports of major arms from 2018 to 2022, outstripping the US 16%, China 9.8%, and France 7.6%.

Russia signed 21 military agreements with African countries between 2015 and 2020, compared to four previously. The number increased to 43 as of February 2024. Some of the agreements have led to the deployment of Russian mercenaries in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan as later explored in this chapter. A hallmark of Russia’s growing military influence in Africa is the planned construction of a naval base in Sudan along the Red Sea territory.

The Russia-Africa Summits are strategically positioned to advance Moscow’s diplomatic, economic, and defence engagements in Africa. The first summit was held in 2019, and the second one in 2023. These summits mirror similar conferences initiated by China, the US, and Japan; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the United States-Africa Leaders’ Summit, and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development.

Contextualising Russia’s Mercenary Adventurism in Africa

Russia has attempted to perfect the use of PMCs in Africa rather than deploying its troops with the exception of its soldiers deployed under the UN missions on the continent. Yet, Russian troops deployed under these missions are fewer compared to the US and China. Additionally, the US and China have other troop deployments in strategic locations in Africa. While Russia is a bit distant from these powers in troop deployment, Moscow has nearly perfected the deployment of PMCs. Perhaps this highlights the benign distinctions of the foreign policies of Moscow and those of the US and China. It is important to note that Russia, contrary to what has been popularised in the public, is not the first country to fashion the use of PMCs as proxies for its interests in Africa.

A host of non-Russian PMCs have pitched camp in Africa. For instance, Blackwater, Triple Canopy, DynCorp, Academi, the Bancroft Development Group, and CACI are PMCs from the US. Chinese PMCs in Africa include HXZA, the China Overseas Group, the Frontier Services Group, and China Security and Protection Group. Xeless (Germany), Secopex (France), Omega Consulting Group (Ukraine), and the Aegis Defence Services (Britain) are other foreign PMCs in Africa.

As earlier indicated, Russia’s foreign policy for Africa is quite distinct in the use of the PMCs to drive Moscow’s interests. The statutory implication of this is the fact that the US and China largely use their militaries to project their foreign policies in Africa, unlike Russia, which outwardly projects its interests through the PMCs. However, this does not mean that the PMCs from the US or China have no link to state interests. For instance, the Chinese PMCs have scaled up their activities in Africa thanks to Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

DynCorp, prior to its acquisition by Amentum, supported the interests of the US in Niger. It was primarily involved in advising and training the Nigerien security forces and the government against the backdrop of securing contracts worth millions of dollars. Blackwater’s operations in Africa are hard to think about without linking them to Washington’s interests, given the company’s involvement in the DRC’s mining sector. Bancroft, known for bagging federal contracts in the US, at one time reached out to the government of the Central African Republic for security-related businesses.

An inescapable reality is premised on the growing popularity of PMCs in Africa, including non-Russian ones. This principally points to the strategic importance of Africa to foreign powers, with the renewed scramble for Africa having been organically reignited by China from 2000. Perhaps, we may see a shift in the approach by the US and China in projecting their interests in Africa by mirroring Russia’s heavy reliance on the PMCs in the coming years.

This projection is centred on the privatisation of the US federal programmes and activities, including homeland security. This is structurally linked to profiteering from disasters – otherwise known as disaster capitalism. The administrations of former Presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush extensively engaged PMCs such as Halliburton and Blackwater in the Balkans and Iraq.

The projected increased use of PMCs by China and the US in Africa, and obviously Russia, is linked to reputational and economic reasons. The use of the PMCs reduces or eliminates instances where these entities can be blamed in the event of human rights abuses and such. It would be damaging PR if the US or Russian, or Chinese military personnel deployed in Africa commit atrocities.

Furthermore, using the PMCs as proxies instead of deploying troops reduces the possibility of citizens of wherever African country they are deployed to demanding their exit, hence PR damage. The US troops were forced to exit Niger by September 15, 2024, following sustained pressure by the military junta and the Nigerien public. The use of PMCs also strategically prevents a public backlash, particularly if troop deployment is associated with failed military missions. Sentiments against failed military missions are usually laced with cost-benefit arguments.

As Washington and Beijing are playing catch-up to Moscow’s use of the PMCs in Africa, it is important to understand the extent of these Russian mercenaries in Africa. Russian PMCs were previously or are currently present in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan. Rumours of the presence of Russian mercenaries in the DRC surfaced in 2023. A common denominator of these countries is the presence of armed groups and persisting conflicts. As such, conflicts are potential markets for Russia and Russian PMCs. Part two focuses on the Wagner mercenary group in Africa, including its deployment and rebranding.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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