Conflicts, Coups & Disputed Elections: Africa in 2026

Here are the key issues that will define Africa’s geopolitical landscape in 2026:

The AFC/M23 rebellion in the DRC: The conflict in the eastern Congo has persisted for decades, much like a lingering bad smell. US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed role of world peacemaker is not a magic wand to end the rebellion by the AFC/M23 group. Deep mistrust and suspicions driven by paranoia and geostrategic interests could scuttle the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. The President Felix Tshisekedi-led administration is unlikely to welcome unhinged diplomatic negotiations with Paul Kagame’s Rwanda. Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila, is expected to influence the course of Congolese politics as well as the rebellion.

War in Sudan: This is another opportunity for President Trump to fetishise his peacemaker role. The US presented a humanitarian ceasefire proposal to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in November 2025. The RSF agreed to it, while the SAF dismissed it, noting its bias and demanding the RSF’s withdrawal from occupied territories. Prospects are high for the war to continue into its fourth year by April 15. Power sharing and disarmament would be central to a mutually approved ceasefire and post-war governance. Other wild guesses would be the RSF’s push for the autonomy of the areas it controls, particularly the expansive Darfur region.

First post-independence general elections in South Sudan: Voting is scheduled for December 22, 2026. The elections were initially planned for December 2024 as per the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). Postponement of the elections beyond this year is possible. President Salva Kiir is attempting to manage his succession, but at the same time, he seems unwilling to hand over power. Kiir intends to cut off the estranged Vice President Riek Machar from any power networks that he could leverage. Clashes involving forces and militia groups allied to Kiir and Machar are highly likely to continue. A civil war cannot be ruled out.

Elections and terrorism in Somalia: Somalia’s stability and instability will have wider effects in the Horn of Africa and northwards in the Red Sea sphere. Elections are anticipated in the first half of 2026. Full universal suffrage is unlikely. Partial direct voting is expected due to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group controlling some parts of the country. Institutional weaknesses and logistical constraints will hinder large-scale direct polling. The legitimacy of the elections will largely depend on the support or lack thereof from Jubbaland and Puntland. Counterterrorism operations against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia Province will persist. The US is expected to continue participating in these operations. But this will be alongside opportunistic attacks by these militant groups that utilise guerrilla tactics. Al-Shabaab’s collaboration of convenience with the Houthis will be one to watch out for in 2026. Key to Somalia’s stability is the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Its mandate was extended by a year until December 31, 2026. AUSSOM is unlikely to achieve its goals primarily due to limited finances. Funding constraints are likely to persist, with the US unwilling to reverse its opposition to financing peacekeeping missions. Trump’s recent executive order pulling the US out of 66 international organisations heightens financial constraints for AUSSOM.

Somaliland’s sovereignty and regional geostrategic interests: Israel’s official recognition of Somaliland’s independence on December 26, 2025, set the pace for intense diplomatic and geopolitical swings. Israel’s geostrategic interests in Somaliland focus on checking and countering the Iranian-backed Houthis’ influence, which is critical in securing the Red Sea shipping lanes. Furthermore, Israel seeks to strengthen its geopolitical and security cooperation with the UAE to enhance its interests in the Horn of Africa. The UAE operates Somaliland’s strategic port of Berbera. Lobbying by US groups, including pro-Israel ones, could intensify this year to push for Washington’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Trump’s administration is unpredictable, and a sudden change in its position on Somaliland is possible.

Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts and Red Sea access ambitions: The Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions will remain hotspots in the foreseeable future. The June 1, 2026, elections could exacerbate these conflicts. In Tigray, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal forces seems to be declining. The pro-government Tigray Peace Front (TPF), which split from the TPLF, would most likely engage militarily against the TPLF. Essentially, the federal government would fight a proxy war via the TPF. Ethiopia is unlikely to change its position to access the Red Sea via the port of Assab in Eritrea. However, this may remain rhetorical, implying that a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is less likely. Regional and international deterrence is a primary factor limiting the possibility of an all-out war. Second, it would be a strange gambit for Ethiopia to wage war against Eritrea, given the ongoing hostilities in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray.

Insurgencies and instability in the Sahel/West Africa: Little collective effort is expected from countries in this region to combat insurgent groups. Neither the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nor the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has demonstrated political and military willingness to effectively address insecurity and instability. Terrorist groups, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State, seek to expand their operational reach in the region. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to remain terrorism epicentres. Regime changes via coups cannot be ruled out in these countries as a result of insecurity. Nigeria’s recent welcoming of the US support to fight terrorist and bandit groups is one to watch out for this year. But it would likely be another prolonged, less successful external counterinsurgency supported by Washington.

Youth protests, coups, and controversial elections: Unprecedented youth-led protests occurred in Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar in the past two years. Similar protests also took place in Nigeria in 2024 and in Togo in 2025. Limited economic opportunities, a relatively highly exposed younger generation, and the ability to quickly organise via social media could trigger more protests in Africa. African governments less likely to promote accountability and the creation of economic opportunities are priming the instability pump. African politicians seem to ignore these risks. Eleven successful coups and at least 10 failed/thwarted coup attempts occurred in Africa in the last six years. Poor political accountability, disputed elections, and insecurity are likely to lead to additional coup attempts in 2026.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Raila Odinga: A Remembrance

My earliest memories of the enigmatic Raila Odinga were in the late 1990s, when I was in my formative schooling years. This was shortly after the 1997 election, which Daniel Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party allegedly won.

Moi rigged votes in his favour, and 1997 was an opportunity for him to demonstrate his mastery of the cutbacks on electoral systems. These nascent memories are courtesy of my father, who religiously purchased copies of the three major newspapers then – the Daily Nation, the Standard, and the People’s Daily.

Around that time, my curiosity was also elevated by access to copies of contemporary political publications, such as the Society Magazine and the Weekly Review. My dad had copies of these publications, some dating to the early 1990s when multiparty politics was reintroduced. I cannot clearly recall some key political events that followed shortly after the elections. This includes the 1998 cooperation between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP), then led by Raila Odinga.

By 2001, I had a keen interest in political events. I recollect the June 2001 appointment of Raila Odinga and other NDP MPs to the Cabinet by Moi. The newspapers and radio stations extensively broadcast Raila’s appointment as energy minister. Others who joined the Cabinet were Adhu Awiti (planning minister), Orwa Ojode (education assistant minister), and Peter Odoyo (foreign affairs assistant minister).

Months later, in March 2002, one of the most consequential political events occurred: the KANU-NDP merger. I was in boarding school at that time, but managed to get access to newspapers. A month or so later, when schools closed for the April holiday, I went through newspapers page by page at home to keep up with the merger. Luckily, the media was still covering the significance of the event. It was unclear at that time if Moi would leave the presidency or extend his term despite his insistence on retiring by sticking to the two-term presidential term limit. A formidable, broad-based opposition movement was uncertain then.

Moi’s endorsement of Uhuru Kenyatta seven months later, on October 14, 2002, shifted the momentum and paved the way for the eventual formation of a united opposition coalition against Moi and KANU. Since then, Raila remained a highly influential political player, a colossus of sorts, until his death.

Following the death of the legendary Franco Luambo Makiadi on October 12, 1989, Sam Mangwana described him as “a man who comes once in 100 years.” Mangwana inherently referred to Franco’s combination of musical brilliance, leadership, innovation, and lyrical power that was so rare in a career that spanned four decades. Franco also commanded a religious following, and his music is immortal.

Parallels can be drawn between Raila Odinga and Luambo Makiadi. First, their souls departed in October. Three days before Odinga’s death, I had passionately celebrated Luambo’s 36th death anniversary. Probably great men, revolutionaries, die in October. Thomas Sankara and Samora Machel died on October 15, 1987, and October 19, 1986, respectively. Second, the two lives of these legends offer lessons in longevity. They mastered the art of reinventing themselves amid fierce competition and changing times.

Third, they commanded a cult-like following in life and in death. There are charismatic people all over, but very few are uniquely charming. Fourth, Luambo and Odinga were pragmatists and built their admirable careers by building alliances. They worked with their rivals, a typically Machiavellian power strategy.

Raila Odinga had power arrangements with Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Uhuru Kenyatta, and William Ruto. To many, these were personal and opportunistic. But they embodied the pragmatic sense of acquiring power. This is not an endorsement of the formation of the broad-based government. The Grand Master of Congolese rhumba and African music, Luambo Makiadi, forged alliances with one of his biggest rivals, Tabu Ley Rochereau. This union of legends produced one of the best music compositions.

My respect for Mwai Kibaki waned following the events of the controversial 2007 elections. While I was a high school student, I was politically conscious. I wondered why Kibaki would mastermind vote rigging when Odinga had won. It was confusing. A day or two before Chief Justice Evan Gicheru swore in Kibaki, I went to bed ecstatic, fantasizing about a Raila Odinga presidency.

The headline of the Saturday Standard the following day affirmed my conviction of Raila Odinga winning the presidential election. My father had sent me to purchase a copy of the dailies to keep track of the election developments. Odinga had polled 3.34 million votes against Kibaki’s 2.45 million. Later that evening, a tide swept, and votes apparently streamed in from the so-called Kibaki strongholds, including the infamous Tharaka Nithi.

Tensions were visibly high at the national tallying centre at the KICC. Odinga looked deeply frustrated with his lieutenants, James Orengo, William Ruto, et al., demanding fairness from the then chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu. Anyway, an Odinga presidency never materialised. I could not fathom why Odinga would let it go, having run one of the most remarkable and consequential political campaigns in Kenya’s political history.

In his autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, and multiple interviews, Odinga maintains that he chose to form the grand coalition government in 2008 for the sake of national unity. This was despite objections by hardliners in the ODM negotiating team at the Serena Hotel who wanted nothing less than Kibaki conceding or the formation of a transitional government leading to elections in a few months.

Odinga reiterated the need for national unity following his political reconciliation with Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2018 and William Ruto in 2024. I am convinced the 2008 Odinga was fundamentally different from the one in 2018 and 2024, and perhaps the 1998 one.

The 2008 Odinga was much more concerned about national unity, given the widespread post-election violence. But the Odinga of 1998, 2018, and 2024 was an opportunistic one who aimed at securing his political and economic interests. The 1998 KANU-NDP cooperation was a strategic maneuver by Odinga to position himself as a potential successor to Daniel Moi in 2002. Odinga played this card, having in mind a possible divided opposition and the fact that no high-ranking KANU leaders had experience in running in presidential elections.

It would be out of order to claim he pushed for his economic interests to secure the purchase of the Kisumu molasses factory in light of the political cooperation with KANU. A significant number of people claim that the land where the factory was located was illegally acquired by Spectre International, the Odinga family business. These allegations are traced to the 2003 Ndung’u Land Commission Report. According to the report, “direct allocation of alienated government land to the company (Spectre International) by the commissioner of lands was illegal.”

A few interesting facts! The Ndung’u Commission was established following a report by a task force Odinga formed in 2003, when he was the minister for roads, public works, and housing. The aim was to assess the status of government property and housing amid deeply entrenched corruption. Second, the government acquired the molasses factory land in 1982, but payments for the land were not made in full. Bidding for the factory gained momentum in the mid-1990s.

Foul play cannot be ruled out in the findings of the Ndung’u Report on Spectre’s illegal acquisition of the land. Lots of political witch-hunting was at play by mid-2003, a few months after the formation of the NARC administration. Two camps had emerged over the failure to implement the infamous power-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Kibaki-led National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Raila-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These were the principal units that formed NARC.

Were it not for a court order sought by Spectre International in January 2006, perhaps the company, Odinga, and others would have been prosecuted. Kibaki’s acolytes were not leaving anything to chance, especially after the embarrassing defeat in the August 2005 constitutional referendum. It was evident by then that Odinga would be a force to reckon with in the 2007 elections.

Political and economic interests motivated the extra-constitutional power arrangements of 2018 and 2024. The 2018 one could have targeted cutting off William Ruto from Kenyatta and weakening him in the run-up to the 2017 election. It never worked with Ruto playing victim. The 2024 arrangement occurred when Ruto was extremely desperate following a wave of youth-led protests. The fact that this power deal was followed by the impeachment of then Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua raises suspicions.

It is difficult to figure out the specific political goal Odinga was pursuing. Was he strategically positioning ODM to be a principal coalition partner with UDA in 2027? Or was he just playing the good guy card to cement his status as a statesman? On both occasions, the commercial interests of the Odinga family were on the table.

I embraced Odinga’s ideologies in the lead-up to the 2007 election, given the manner in which he packaged his campaign messaging. He built his manifesto on infrastructure as the key to transforming Kenya’s socioeconomic fortunes. Little credit is given to Raila Odinga for being the brainchild of some notable physical infrastructure projects. The Thika Superhighway, the LAPSETT corridor project, and multiple by-passes in Nairobi were conceptualised by Odinga. To me, he stands out as the most progressive roads minister in Kenya’s history.

At the onset of the NARC administration, Odinga, with gusto, oversaw the demolition of structures built on road reserves. He attempted to inject some sanity as Kenya was transitioning from an irredeemably corrupt Moi administration. The construction of the Raila Odinga Way, previously known as Mbagathi Way, highlights his legacy and embodies his high value for posterity. He was on record many times, noting that most of his decisions are based on posterity.

The Raila Odinga Way was initiated during his time as roads minister, and it was constructed from 2005 to 2007. It was a pilot project to assess the viability of concrete road technology in the country. The road is still in shape almost two decades later.

One has to admire Odinga for his resilience, willpower, and intellect. Few can survive eight years of detention, considering the physical and psychological torture victims are subjected to. It is even more agonizing to imagine Odinga’s mum and brother died and got buried while he was in detention. Odinga endured the loss of his four siblings and eldest son but chose to fight for a cause larger than his life. He lost the presidential election multiple times but stayed on course.

Odinga’s resilience resonates with Viktor Frankl’s thoughts in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning. This excerpt from the book’s preface highlights Frankl’s view on finding purpose in life even during moments of suffering:

“…The great task for any person is to find meaning in his or her life: in work (doing something significant), in love (caring for another person), and in courage in difficult times…Suffering in and of itself is meaningless; we give our suffering meaning by the way in which we respond to it…”

His autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, remains one of my favourite memoirs, especially in the Kenyan context. It is relatively rich in history. Most Kenyan autobiographies are quite shallow and read more like eulogies than texts meant to inspire thinking, belief, and action.

Raila also authored Quest for Nationhood – Roadmap to Our Future. As revealed by one of his sisters on the burial day, he was working on another book on Pan-Africanism. He had also instructed Anyang’ Nyong’o to work on a paper on nationhood and tribalism just before his demise.

I highly value people who have been in the limelight to pen down the intrigues of their lives, motivations, purpose, and achievements. In one of my blog posts, I stated the need for such figures to give us more books, but meaningful ones. I have read memoirs that left me cursing the authors for presenting underwhelming information despite having been in the corridors of power.

His father’s, Not Yet Uhuru, is also a remarkable autobiography. Raila Odinga stands out among the few Kenyan politicians who found meaning in writing books, again for posterity purposes. Apart from Anyang’ Nyong’o, it is difficult to easily identify politicians who are intellectually grounded. And I do not imply academic qualifications…We glorify the practice of acquiring academic certificates instead of valuing intellectualism. There is a high deficit of thinkers in Kenya.

It is a generational tragedy that politicians annoyingly talk of Kenya as the next Singapore, yet their woeful intellects tell of a limited understanding of the formidable thinker Lee Kuan Yew was. I am hopeless for a better Kenya.

Odinga was overall well-informed, not just about history, but about many issues. His parliamentary contributions and Cabinet briefings demonstrated a man who highly valued knowledge.

The most consequential deaths generally lead to destructive institutional episodes, largely due to internal contradictions. The ODM party will wane, and the political careers of Odinga’s hangers-on will die with his demise. Despite his intellect and strong belief in institutions, Odinga did not build ODM for posterity. He failed to overcome the Kenyan political party culture, where parties are built around personalities and not effective institutional elements.

I cannot blame him for this. This is a culture primarily associated with the political parties that emerged with the reintroduction of multiparty politics. However, this goes further back to the colonial era. Perhaps KANU, after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, escaped this. His successor, Moi, was deeply entrenched in the system, and an inherent succession plan was already in place before his death.

FORD-Kenya weakened significantly with Oginga Odinga’s death in 1994. Tragedy struck the party the second time within a decade in August 2003 with the death of Vice President Kijana Wamalwa. The party sank deeper. Currently, its leaders are proud to have it as the most popular party among the Bukusu people in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia counties.

KANU lost its allure with Daniel Moi’s exit from the presidency. Moi personalized KANU after Jomo’s death. One of the primary causes was the 1982 coup attempt that prompted him to consolidate power and resulted in the legal ban of other parties.

Multiple factions within ODM will eventually split and weaken it. Part of the leadership led by the Secretary General, Edwin Sifuna, opposes the broad-based government and vouches for the party to field a presidential candidate in 2027. Others strongly support the broad-based government and vow to support Ruto’s reelection.

Appointing Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, as the acting party leader may have been motivated by paranoia and interests. Large political parties in Kenya are extensively family enterprises. This, plus other factors, will hasten the party’s weakening.

ODM has been on a gradual downward trajectory in the past decade. This is supported by its performance in the 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, apart from presidential polls. Its agreement with UDA/KKA to form the broad-based government impacted it significantly. Weeks ago, its SG Sifuna raised concerns about the fading desire by aspirants to run for elections on ODM.

Oburu lacks the national appeal that Raila enjoyed. I am careful not to refer to Oburu as weak – and I do not mean physically – but he does not inspire confidence. There are leaders whose supporters can go to war for. At least not Oburu.

Raila’s eldest brother is safeguarding the interests of ODM ‘conservatives.’ Linked to this are Ruto’s interests and machinations to win ODM’s support for his unassured reelection. Ruto might have influenced the selection of Oburu as the acting party leader. Ruto’s political career could be a victim of Raila’s death. A fractured ODM and a united opposition spell doom for him.

I have keenly listened to Oburu’s speeches after assuming the party leader’s role of ODM. Fundamentally, it’s double-speak. His speeches carry a reconciliatory tone. But the power arrangement between ODM and UDA/KKA is intact. Oburu was a staunch supporter of this extra-constitutional arrangement when Raila was alive. (I will dedicate the next few weeks to digging deeper and understanding Oburu’s worldview and leadership. But the November 2nd, 2025, Sunday Nation’s Weekly Review was a good starting point. His autobiography is on my bucket list).

In September 2024, Raila Odinga, with the NEC’s endorsement, settled on Anyang’ Nyong’o as the party’s acting leader. This was at the onset of Odinga’s campaigns for the chairperson’s position of the African Union Commission (AUC).

Nyong’o is a near ideological twin to Raila and would make a better party leader than Oburu ideologically. But the two gentlemen are aging. They may resonate with the generational shift in Kenyan politics. Even so, Oburu should facilitate a transition to relatively youthful leadership for posterity.

For ODM to remain relevant and possibly become vibrant, it must embrace youthful leadership. It should brand itself as the political party of the present and the future. The present and the future of Kenya oscillate on political and economic solutions that address the plight of the youth.

The three ODM deputy party leaders are not visionaries. The immediate former two deputy party leaders who were appointed as Cabinet Secretaries in the broad-based government are not good enough to lead ODM. Ideally, an ODM of the future should be built around Sifuna’s talents. He stands out as a visionary and the most qualified to lead the party.

I will forever miss Raila Odinga. His legacy for pro-democratic reforms is solid. His intellect is admirable. His decision-making for posterity is cherished. It is unbelievable that he died. Looks like a dream!

May his soul rest in eternal peace!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst and strategist. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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Africa Elections Brief: Violence Erupts in Cameroon as Biya Declared Winner

The Constitutional Council declared 92-year-old President Paul Biya the winner with 53.66% of the vote. Opposition leader Issa Tchiroma emerged second with 35.2% of the vote on October 27. Protests broke out on the weekend of October 25 and 26 due to vote rigging claims. At least four people died in Douala. Tchiroma has called for nationwide protests. Tchiroma declared victory a few days ago.

Biya’s faculties are probably not sharp enough to effectively govern the country, given his age. The most likely outlook at the moment is the persistence of violence across the country. Political unrest could intensify, given the high-stakes polls. In the 2018 presidential election, results by the Constitutional Council indicated Biya’s victory with 71.28% of the vote. His closest challenger, Maurice Kamto, polled 14.23%.

Cameroonians are generally disillusioned with Biya’s ability to govern, primarily due to his age. The country stares at a crisis in the short and long term. Biya is likely to play his familiar card of using security forces to violently suppress protests. This worked in the past. His acolytes and family could be in charge of key institutions, such as the military and intelligence. But sustained pressure by protesters creates conducive conditions for a military takeover, repeat elections, or the formation of a broader coalition government of national unity.

A few days ago, reports indicated that Biya had offered Tchiroma the prime minister position. The opposition leader rejected it. Recent geopolitical events in Africa and around the world could keep protesters on the streets longer. Cameroon’s political stability faces an imminent risk from the socioeconomic frustrations of the youth. The Gen Z protests in Madagascar, Morocco, Kenya, Nepal, and Bangladesh could inspire youthful Cameroonians to continue demonstrating.

Biya is unlikely to address the plight of Cameroonians even if he were to remain in power for the next 50 years. If he manages to suppress protests, his old age is likely to intensify succession battles in the long term. A Robert Mugabe scenario is highly likely.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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DRC: Ex-President Kabila Sets Sights on a Comeback amid M23 Entanglement

On September 30, a military court in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sentenced former President Joseph Kabila Kabange to death in absentia. Kabila was convicted of multiple crimes, including insurrection, torture, sexual assault, murder, crimes against humanity, and treason.

In July 2025, Kabila went on trial in absentia for supporting the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. This must have precipitated the death sentence, with Kabila’s successor, Felix Tshisekedi, unable to contain the M23 offensive in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.

On October 15, Kabila and other political leaders opposing Tshisekedi met in Nairobi and launched the Sauvons le Congo (Save the Congo) movement. They said the movement will reach out to all the Congolese people opposed to the dictatorship. In addition, they stated that the formation seeks to “end the tyranny, restore state authority, reestablish democracy, and promote national reconciliation.”

Why is Kabila so invested in Congolese national politics?

Politics, whether at the local or global level, is dictated by interests. And Congo is not uniquely different from this maxim. Kabila’s interests and calculated return are motivated by Tshisekedi’s betrayal. Kabila’s exit from the presidency in 2019 and his subsequent succession by Tshisekedi were met with controversy.

Tshisekedi was third in the presidential election behind Emmanuel Shadary and Martin Fayulu, who won. Kabila maneuvered the systems and influenced the declaration of Tshisekedi as president. Kabila and his acolytes settled on Tshisekedi because he was a weak politician. Tshisekedi had a limited understanding of critical governance and military institutions.

Apart from his weak leadership, Tshisekedi had insufficient key internal and external power networks. These were fault lines that Kabila sought to capitalize on following an agreement with Tshisekedi. According to the agreement, Tshisekedi was to serve as president for one term and give way to the return of Kabila.

Sometimes, the average and below-average minds can be good at heeding Machiavelli’s advice of discarding allies who help them to secure power. Power consolidation demands ruthlessness, given that survival is the priority. Machiavelli emphasizes pragmatism over loyalty, implying that rulers can discard allies and break promises because sentiment is a luxury a ruler cannot afford in the power struggle.

Rulers perceived as weak are not necessarily foolish and can be very ruthless in consolidating power. In the early years of his presidency, Kenya’s second president, Daniel Moi, was considered weak. But he became ruthless after the failed 1982 coup attempt and remained in power until 2002.

Tshisekedi has targeted Kabila’s point men in the military and key political institutions in the last six years. The recent trial and sentencing of Kabila indicate Tshisekedi’s pursuit of former allies of convenience.

What are Kabila’s pathways to power?

Kabila will find it difficult to become president constitutionally. The death penalty and the possibility of other charges technically lock him out. General elections are scheduled for December 16, 2028. As such, Kabila may front a proxy candidate if all the legal loopholes remain sealed. It is too soon to predict the 2028 polls. However, vote rigging by Tshisekedi is possible. What’s more, Tshisekedi’s reelection depends on how he handles the M23 conflict.

The most likely pathway for Kabila to obtain presidential powers is through supporting armed groups, such as M23, against government forces. This cannot be ruled out. He may emulate his father’s ascendancy to the presidency through armed struggle that started and spawned in the volatile east before the long march to Kinshasa that culminated in the fall of the once indefatigable Mobutu Sese Seko.

Kabila enjoys extensive networks in the region and has good relations with battle-hardened politicians, i.e., Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. Museveni and Kagame were instrumental in the takeover of the government by Laurent Kabila (Kabange Kabila’s father) in May 1997.

This year, Kabange Kabila met with Museveni in Kampala, Uganda, in March 2025. Later in April, he was seen in Kigali, Rwanda, though it is unclear if he met Kagame. These are strategic relationships that Tshisekedi does not enjoy in the region. Broadly, Tshisekedi’s weak capabilities to cultivate and nurture strategic relationships are also evident in his poor handling of collective peace and security decisions made by regional blocs, which the DRC is a member; the EAC and SADC.

Outlook

War in the east of the Congo, especially in the Kivu region, is likely to persist in the long term. Kabila’s interests in national politics complicate the country’s political and security situation. The M23’s operations indicate a resolute force that will continue to present governance challenges for the Tshisekedi administration.

Currently, the prospects for a permanent ceasefire agreement are low. Parties to the conflict have missed key deadlines. The October 14 agreement between the M23 rebels and the DRC government to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism is not sufficient to fast-track a ceasefire at this time. Clashes are anticipated to continue in the Kivu region.

The failure to have a ceasefire in the short to medium term could potentially lead to the spread of the conflict to other territories. It is possible that the M23 will keep fantasizing about a grand march to Kinshasa and the eventual usurpation of power.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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Armed Conflict in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on the Edge

The junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are struggling to contain armed groups. When pressed for answers on their failures, they usually allude to foreign actors, among other reasons. Captain Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, General Assimi Goita of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani rose to power through coups, promising to effectively address insecurity.

In a recent interview, Traore, in his defence, claimed to have found approximately 100,000 AK-47 bullets in the country’s stocks when he took over three years ago. Whether this is figurative or not, Traore failed to restore security and order within three months of taking over.

Multiple factors are responsible for the prolongation of insecurity and political instability in the three Sahelian countries. The general incompetence of the military-led governments is a key factor. These regimes seem largely concerned about power consolidation rather than addressing pertinent issues affecting the people. This is done through propaganda campaigns that often chide the West, banning and suspending political parties and civil society groups, and extending transitional terms.

The anti-West sentiments, mostly against France, of these regimes are quite interesting. Historically, France is responsible for enabling extractive politico-economic and social institutions in the broader Francophone Africa. France is also responsible for the failures of Operation Barkhane and other related security missions in the Sahel. But these issues do not absolve the military regimes from worsening insecurity and instability.

UN peacekeepers and French forces withdrew from Mali. French troops also pulled out of Burkina Faso. Similar exits by the French, American, and German forces also occurred in Niger. The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger turned to Russia for security and defense support. So far, no tangible results can be linked to the Russian mercenaries in these countries.

These regimes, in a way, underestimated the intelligence gathering and sharing by foreign troops. They also overestimated the capabilities of their own security forces and those of the Russian mercenaries in combating armed groups.

Effective regional security solutions are yet to be decisively implemented. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after exiting from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a paper tiger. The AES is not fundamentally different from ECOWAS in that it fails to match aspirations with decisive actions.

Armed groups in the region have demonstrated improved operational capabilities. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) occasionally use drones in their attacks. Drone attacks by armed groups have substantially increased in the region, especially in Mali, in the last two years.

In addition, armed groups in the Sahel are getting more access to rifles and ammunition. While illicit trafficking channels in West Africa and North Africa were the primary ways of acquiring weapons, increasing attacks against military installations are enabling easy access. Seizures and looting of these facilities facilitate the supply of weapons.

Insecurity and instability will persist in the Sahel region, given the incapabilities of the security apparatus of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat armed groups. Of course, the three states are good at propaganda to sanitize their incompetence while pointing fingers at domestic, regional, and extra-continental imaginary enemies. Propaganda is a delusionary reprieve for these military regimes. However, this is not a magic bullet by any means to resolve the governance crises in these countries.

Traore, Goita, and Tchiani are on borrowed time. Their regimes, besides the perfection of propaganda, are likely to face a backlash from the public due to worsening insecurity. While elections of civilian-led governments may not be necessary conditions for robust economic growth, the delayed return to constitutional order creates the ideal conditions for an increase in anti-junta sentiments. These sentiments are germs for intensified attacks by armed groups or coup attempts.

Consider Mali. JNIM has imposed an economic blockade since early September 2025. The blockade, featuring attacks against fuel tankers, was in place at the time of writing this article. While some tankers have successfully been escorted by security forces to Bamako and other parts, growing frustrations among the public are possible. Unrest cannot be ruled out under these circumstances.

A significant number of people are in awe of Traore and generally the junta in these three countries for supposedly giving neocolonialism and Western influence a back foot. I find this impractical, unreasonable, and infantile. If they indeed cherish neocolonialism, then they should absolutely pursue total independence. This is unrealistic in a highly globalized world. What’s more, claiming Western influence to be neocolonialism while at the same time strengthening relations with Russia is shifting goalposts. Is it that Russia does not seek to influence these governments by pursuing its geostrategic interests?

Russian mercenaries have proven ineffective in helping these military-led governments to contain insecurity. In fact, Western troops and UN peacekeepers in the region appear to have been more competent than the mercenaries. One could argue that the mercenaries are fewer than the Western troops and peacekeepers. Well, fair enough. But this does not excuse the failure of the mercenaries. It is a matter of time before these mercenaries fully withdraw from the region, like they did in Mozambique a few years ago.

The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas expect to remain in power until at least 2030, based on the collectively calculated extensions over the past year. Coups are ugly, and they fight back. Traore, Goita, and Tchiani rose to power via coups, justifying the takeovers due to worsening insecurity. These conditions persist, and additional coup attempts are anticipated. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a history of coups, and a farcical recurrence of these events in the future is possible. Remarkable political leaders who rose to power via coups, for instance, Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara, were victims of the fight back.

Newer armed groups are likely to be formed in the region, while the existing ones could become bolder with enhanced operational capabilities. These groups are also likely to strengthen alliances.

External and regional military interventions cannot be ruled out in the future, but these are highly unlikely at the moment. The positions of the three military regimes against UN forces and other European troops, including the French, limit the likelihood of a UN peacekeeping force. What’s more, the recent decisions by the UN to reduce peacekeepers by 25% globally and cut the peacekeeping budget by 15% technically rule out a global peacekeeping mission in the region.

This also means that security and stabilisation initiatives by the African Union (AU) are in jeopardy. Such initiatives historically rely on UN funding. This raises questions regarding the AU’s effectiveness, given its Agenda 2063, which ambitiously aimed at silencing guns – to end wars and civil conflicts – on the continent by 2020.

UN peacekeeping missions are criticized for their passive responses to violent conflicts in Africa. They are present in the DRC, South Sudan, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, and the Abyei region. While these missions have multiple shortcomings, their effectiveness cannot be overruled. Perhaps the funding cuts and force reduction could impact security and stability in Africa. I’ll discuss this in my next article after reflecting on the Malawi presidential election. But the fragility of the Sahel states and these UN decisions could be marked by a significant increase in the flow of arms and movement of armed groups on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His opinions are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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East Congo’s Relentless War Machine, Fading Peace

On the weekend of September 19 to September 21, intense clashes occurred between the Congolese forces and the M23 rebels. Fighting took place in Masisi (North Kivu), Walikale (North Kivu), and Kalehe (South Kivu). This marks the most substantial escalation in the last five or six months.

The escalation is not a surprise, given the occasional flare-ups involving the rebels and the pro-government Wazalendo militia group. Indicators of an impending escalation were visible. The missing of the August 8th and 18th deadlines for commencing direct negotiations and signing a peace agreement. These deadlines were prescribed by the Declaration of Principles signed by the Congolese government and M23 in Doha, Qatar, on July 19, 2025.

The key provisions of the Declaration of Principles include an immediate and permanent ceasefire, restoration of state authority in areas under M23, the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and the alignment of the principles with the June 27 Washington agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The rebels maintain a presence in multiple territories, including some that were seized in recent weeks.

There are no effective incentives for M23 to halt fighting and conquests. In the past, especially following the Second Congo War, rebel groups sought inclusion in the government. This seems not to be the case with the M23. The M23 recently unveiled 7,000 newly trained fighters. The rebel group stated that 12,000 recruits are currently in training. This indicates its readiness for a protracted conflict. It also hints at the rebel group enhancing its force and order capabilities to effectively oversee local administrative systems in conquered territories.

M23’s motive to keep fighting and control several areas in Kivu is linked to the region’s mineral wealth. Masisi’s mineral deposits include coltan, gold, tourmaline, and diamonds. The Rubaya mine in Masisi is the largest producer of coltan in the DRC. It supplies approximately half of the DRC’s total coltan output and 15% of the global coltan supply. Rubaya’s coltan is processed into tantalum that is used in electronic devices, including laptops and mobile phones.

Of course, there are sociocultural and political factors perpetuating the conflict in the east of the Congo. While these factors that are tied to ethnic groups are still significant in the conflict, they are superseded by geoeconomic interests. Following the M23’s takeover of Goma, North Kivu’s capital, I argued that the conflict had evolved from one driven by ethno-political interests to one fueled by geoeconomic interests.  

The conflict in the east not only highlights the DRC’s central role in the global mineral supply chains but also demonstrates the country’s long, troubled history of natural resource curses. An excerpt from David Van Reybrouck’s book, “Congo: The Epic History of A People,” aptly summarizes the DRC’s tribulations despite its rich natural resource endowment:

“There is no other country in the world as fortunate as Congo in terms of its natural wealth. During the last century and a half, whenever acute demand has risen on the international market for a given raw material – ivory in the Victorian era; rubber after the invention of the inflatable tire; copper during the full-out industrial and military expansion; uranium during the Cold War; alternative electrical energy during the oil crisis of the 1970s; coltan in the age of portable telephonics – Congo has turned out to contain huge supplies of the coveted commodity. It has easily been able to meet demand. The economic history of Congo is one of improbably lucky breaks. But also of improbably great misery. As a rule, not a drop of the fabulous profits trickled down to the larger part of the population.“

M23’s significant force capabilities is an impetus for the group to push to establish and retain local administrative systems in the occupied territories. Kinshasa’s incentive is national stability that has been elusive for decades. Achieving this under President Felix Tshisekedi seems illusory in light of his administration’s ineffective handling of the M23 conflict.

Tshisekedi’s administration mismanaged the entire deployment of regional troops from the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He demanded the exit of the EAC Regional Force for not engaging the M23 and other armed groups in direct combat. This is despite the regional force’s mandate to supervise the withdrawal of armed groups from captured territories.

The formal exit of the EAC force and the subsequent deployment of the SADC troops in December 2023 did not remedy the situation. And this is the problem with Tshisekedi’s fascination with moments of delusional reprieve.  The SADC forces failed to restore stability in the east. The M23 rebels seized Sake, Goma, and Bukavu a year later, in January 2025.

Multiple factors contributed to the failure of the SADC force, which was intended to engage in direct combat with the rebels alongside Congolese troops. The highly limited capabilities of the Congolese forces and the geographical unfamiliarity of the combat zones to the SADC troops stand out.

Tshisekedi turned to the Trump administration for a minerals-for-security support deal signed by the DRC and Rwanda in Washington on June 27, 2025. Its failure was almost certain. On September 22, 2025, President Tshisekedi acknowledged the failure of the deal to end the fighting. He also reiterated that the agreement does not pave the way for auctioning the DRC’s minerals to the US. In mid-September, DRC and Rwanda agreed to start implementing the security measures of the agreement from October 1. This includes the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and disarming and eliminating the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

The FDLR aims to overthrow the Kagame-led Tutsi majority government in Rwanda. It is active in eastern DRC and is largely made up of the Hutu. The DRC supports the FDLR; the FDLR is to the DRC as the M23 is to Rwanda. It is unlikely that FDLR’s disarmament and elimination will succeed, especially if Rwanda maintains its troops in the DRC and the M23 does not give up its controlled territories. Kinshasa is bound to feel insecure if FDLR is wound up.

The EAC and SADC forces are out, and the US-brokered minerals-for-security deal is unlikely to materialize. This is an ugly juncture for Tshisekedi. His administration is better off sticking with the UN peacekeepers at the moment. While they have primarily been ineffective in containing armed groups in the east over the last 25 years, their presence could help share intelligence with the low-morale Congolese forces.

Tshisekedi’s administration pushed for the exit of the peacekeepers but requested the renewal of the mission’s mandate in December 2024. The departure of UN peacekeepers alongside French forces from Mali without replacement by highly capable security forces has significantly contributed to the escalation of armed conflict. This is probably a key lesson for Tshisekedi.

Some complex possibilities await the Tshisekedi administration. It may consider engaging in a war of attrition against the rebels. But this would require boosting the morale of a poorly paid and equipped military. It is unlikely that the Congolese government will substantially increase the payments for the troops and purchase adequate military equipment in the short term. This means a continued reliance on militia groups whose fighters would be much happier to pocket some francs than eke out a living as overworked miners or desperate small-scale traders. At least looting is guaranteed for militia fighters as a means of survival.  

A war of attrition or not (if maneuver warfare is preferred), the recruitment of more foreign mercenaries to fight alongside the Congolese forces and militia fighters is highly likely. Eastern European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and some African countries are potential sources of mercenaries. Rwandan forces and dozens of armed groups could fight alongside the M23 if Kinshasa opts for a scorched-earth policy. But this would elevate the DRC’s political instability, recalling that conflicts in the east previously led to transitional governments.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst.

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Calls for National Dialogue Opportunistic and Baseless

Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga often struggles to read the room. On July 7, 2025, his lethargic speech, commemorating the 35th anniversary of Saba Saba Day, affirms this. Two or three aspects of the speech intrigued me.

First, Odinga’s call for a national dialogue, which he referred to as an inclusive intergenerational national conclave. Second, a national referendum to vote on the outcomes of the dialogue. Third, a demand for police reforms and an end to police brutality.

Odinga is deluded and demonstrates his religious obsession through such dialogues, which he has historically capitalized on to gain government power.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that led to the formation of the incompetent broad-based government stipulates a 10-point agenda to improve Kenya’s governance. This agenda is an outcome of a dialogue that involved long-time politicians. It was an outcome of President William Ruto’s political desperation and Odinga’s opportunistic nature in the aftermath of the June 25, 2024, mass protests.

Kenya would not be on a race to the bottomless pit had the Ruto administration implemented its promises after the 2022 elections and 2024 protests. Ruto attempted to dialogue with the people, a rare show of humility from him. But to him, these were brilliant moments to hoodwink the public. After all, his promises to address high taxation, an odious public debt, cut wastage of public resources, and completely reshuffle the presidential appointees, among others, have never been implemented. Would you want to dialogue with people who feel shortchanged and lied to?

Odinga should instead lead his party, ODM, to resign from the mongrel broad-based government. It is easier for him to also consider calling Ruto and insisting on the implementation of the 10-point agenda.

The former prime minister has perfected Law 25 of the 48 Laws of Power by recreating himself each time his relevance appears to hit a dead end. While he has mastered the Machiavellian script of pursuing power, I am afraid his moves on the national political chessboard may not be effective this time.

Anything great or mighty, including powerful personalities and institutions that are sometimes perceived as immortal, has its end. Greatness is a factor of time, and time changes, and people move on.  History is replete with such examples.

Most of these mighty entities usually collapse because of internal contradictions, greed, arrogance, overestimation of their outdated strategies/tactics, and not heeding the evolving demands of time. The architects of the broad-based government are facing a generation of young Kenyans who are relatively well-exposed, educated, and courageous. They are also facing a public that is delusional and hopeless of vague promises.

National dialogues have barely benefited the people in Kenya, given the multiple times we’ve had them. Interestingly enough, the first point of the 10-point agenda is the full implementation of the NADCO report. NADCO is an abbreviation for National Dialogue Committee, a team that comprised members of the ruling coalition and the opposition to address political and economic governance.

NADCO came a few years after another amorphous national dialogue initiative: the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI). While the courts quashed the BBI-driven attempts for a referendum, Odinga largely achieved his aim of enjoying political power without responsibility.

From a political strategy view, the BBI was Uhuru Kenyatta’s stroke to exercise his powers by limiting sabotage by his then-deputy, Ruto. But it was a miscalculation by Odinga. Ruto successfully linked Odinga with the failures of an administration he was the second in command. And Odinga’s lazy and disorganised presidential election campaigns did not remedy the situation.

Our Constitution is an outcome of a political dialogue held after Mwai Kibaki rigged the votes in the 2007 elections. This is perhaps one of the diligent results from numerous dialogues in the last six decades. But if we consider the bigger picture, the people, especially victims of the post-election violence, rarely benefited from the dialogue.

The political class deliberately objected to the implementation of the report by the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). With hindsight, it was far-fetched to entrust a compromised and non-progressive political class to implement the TJRC’s recommendations.

The TJRC submitted its report to Uhuru Kenyatta in May 2013. Uhuru and Ruto were then facing charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, these are politicians whose political and biological roots are entangled in historical injustices committed by the Jomo Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki regimes. This indicates why it is hard to expect tangible progress from establishment politicians.

A good example of another dialogue is the Ndung’u Land Commission in 2003. Unfortunately, but not shockingly, its report has never been implemented. Again, expect nothing from a political class that is a purveyor of corruption.

National dialogues are meaningless. These are resource-wasting ventures by the establishment. Why should we have a national dialogue when we have an administration that is tone-deaf, arrogant, and casts itself as an enemy of the people? Dialogue with an administration obsessed with killing, maiming, and abducting people without shame? Dialogue with an administration that is incompetent and good at nothing?

Constitutionalism and meritocracy are the primary pillars to transform Kenya. If the current and future administrations stick to the Constitution, corruption, unwarranted high public debt, high taxation, unaffordable education, poor housing, and high-cost healthcare will be eradicated. Our Constitution is the answer to all our governance challenges and not caricatured dialogues.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, speaks and writes on political and economic governance. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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June 25: Reflections on an Unfinished People’s Revolution

June 25, 2024, shaped Kenya’s present and future. I refer to it as Kenya’s great political reset. The aftermath of the events of this date portrays a political class that is not ready for change. The top brass of the Kenya Kwanza administration remains defiantly arrogant, corrupt, dismissive, but still cannot implement measures to improve the lives of Kenyans.

This bunch of gluttonous politicians and wheeler-dealers fails to recognise its failures and acknowledge the need for a holistic, generational change. We certainly need to do better as a country, 62 years after independence.

But independence has all along been a charade. Apart from powerful neocolonial forces, the Kenyan political establishment cherishes colonial attitudes and institutions. Our political class is worse than the British colonialists. Sometimes I think of how the world could have been a terrible place had Kenyans colonised several territories. I mean, the Kenyan political establishment lacks the passion to put in place systems that work.

I do not mean to excuse European colonialism. It was unjustified. Since it happened, comparisons and contrasts can be drawn. In 2023, I read a controversial opinion article titled “What is Uganda’s Problem?” in the Daily Monitor newspaper. The writer, Timothy Kalyegira, argues that colonialists established functional institutions and had a good work ethic. He chides post-colonial governments in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania for not matching the colonialists’ work ethic and institutions.

Fundamentally, I agree with Kalyegira’s thoughts in the article. There is no justification for the existence of broken systems that deprive citizens high quality public goods and services.

One could argue that the post-colonial politicians in the region inherited extractive political and economic institutions. Sounds fine. But they loudly pontificate development blueprints and slogans, intentionally bypassing the urgency for institutional reforms.

The William Ruto administration, at some point, was obsessed with transforming Kenya into the Singapore of Africa. Never mind that this hallucinatory obsession is aimed at justifying the warped housing levy and affordable housing policy.

Economic history indicates that Kenya and Singapore were almost at par on several economic growth and development indicators in the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, Kenya’s GDP was USD 926.6 million, while Singapore’s was USD 917.2 million in 1963. Presently, Kenya and Singapore are worlds apart.

Where did we lose the plot? In some of my articles, I have referenced Professor Anyang’ Nyong’o’s book, “A Leap Into the Future,” detailing answers to this question. Nyong’o highlights an encounter with Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, in the 1990s. Kuan Yew referred to the assassination of Tom Mboya as having dragged Kenya backward when Singapore chose to go forward.

He may have symbolically brought up Mboya’s assassination. The bigger picture is the dismissal of the intentional nation-building and institutional development through meritocracy. Kenya’s political establishment passionately hates meritocracy.

While Kuan Yew’s Singapore identified Meritocracy, Pragmatism, and Honesty (MPH) as the pathway for socioeconomic development, Kenya’s political class religiously embraced corruption, lack of merit, and despised work ethic. Kenya appears to be worsening.

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) remains a moribund institution. Its notable achievements are name changes. The amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1997 paved the way for the establishment of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority. This was an outcome of key reforms undertaken by the Daniel Moi administration to restore foreign aid. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2003, and later the EACC in 2011.

No substantial prosecutions of high-profile politicians and wheeler-dealers have occurred in the last 30 years. Corruption is rampant under the current administration, and this was one of the key issues raised by Kenyans in 2024 during the demonstrations. Nothing has changed, no lessons learnt.

The Kenya Kwanza regime believes you can overtax a country to prosperity. We have the habit of blaming the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for imposing policies that lead to inequality. Historically, there is solid evidence linking the neoliberal Washington Consensus policies to unequal development in Africa.

But our governments ought to be blamed more. Kenya lacks leaders, visionaries, and thinkers at the centre of power. Meaningful economic development cannot be achieved without dedicated intellectualism in the Executive and Legislature.

Kenya is a victim of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) championed by the Bretton Woods institutions. The victimhood dates back to the 1990s. The education and health sectors were severely affected by SAPs. We find ourselves in similar situations where massive spending cuts threaten access to affordable education and healthcare. Any country with visionary leaders would not be experiencing this.

The future of Kenya is gloomy. We are back in the times when education, especially higher education, was a privilege of those who could afford to pay fees. Fundraisers for hospital bills have increased, while the regime insists that the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) is working efficiently. We must not forget KES 104 billion was spent on the transition from the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) to SHIF.

Overtaxation cannot lead to socioeconomic prosperity. Let’s forget about socioeconomic prosperity for now; you cannot overtax economic agents strained by a high cost of living and unemployment. The June 25, 2024, protests were a platform for the citizens to remind the incompetent Kenya Kwanza regime about the folliness of overtaxation.

We are constantly reminded by the establishment that we must pay taxes to achieve economic independence. They also tell us that we are not overtaxed, unlike other countries. This dangerous thinking always draws comparisons between Kenya and developed economies and not other peer countries. Kenyans may not have a problem with high taxes, provided that these efforts are reciprocated with the provision of affordable and high quality public goods and services.

Vision 2030, like many other wonderfully drafted socioeconomic Sessional Papers, will never be attained in totality. This blueprint envisioned the manufacturing sector as a key driver for transforming Kenya into a globally competitive, middle-income economy. It targeted the manufacturing sector to contribute 20% to the economy’s GDP and create one million jobs yearly. This remains a pipe dream.

Policymakers have shown little concern that high taxes and an unpredictable tax regime are strangling the manufacturing sector. Yet, they go around the country on the rooftops of top-of-the-range cars like snake oil merchants, showing little concern for the stagnated growth of the sector.

Let’s get it right; you cannot cheat yourself into robust socioeconomic development. Failing to formulate relevant policies to spur the manufacturing sector means we will barely create meaningful and sustainable jobs in Kenya. This also applies to other African countries.

Nearly all developed and fast-developing economies established robust manufacturing sectors. Ours has hardly contributed more than 10% to the GDP in the last 10 years. The frustrations of Kenyans, particularly the youth, arise from unemployment and underemployment. Yet, the regime’s honchos overburden these vulnerable humans with taxes without creating sustainable jobs.

It is laughable that the Ruto administration talks big about exporting labour as a job creation mechanism. This is hogwash. In addition, we have seen this regime countless times purporting to facilitate the creation of jobs through the digital economy. Not sure why this barely comes up nowadays.

This rogue regime does not understand the dignity of decent jobs. It has no comprehension of the dangers of idle, educated youth. Again, you cannot cheat your way into development. There are no miracles and shortcuts to attaining meaningful socioeconomic development.

What is the essence of this irredeemable obsession with increasing taxes yearly? Conventional economic thinking indicates that a country struggling with a huge public debt considers the following economic policies: spending cuts, tax increases, structural reforms, investing in infrastructure, and debt restructuring and forgiveness.

In the aftermath of the June 25, 2024, youth-led protests, the Ruto administration committed to auditing the public debt. Nothing tangible has been heard or seen since. Borrowing is on an upward trajectory. Tax increases are prevalent. The political class ensured that such increases are masked in a jargon-heavy and technical 2025/26 Budget Policy Statement (BPS) and 2025 Finance Bill.

Spending cuts are skewed. In the 2025/26 BPS, the security budget was increased by 17%, while the education budget was reduced by 18%. State House and state lodges are under constant construction and renovation. How urgent are these works? It is a problem to have a regime allocating over KES 11 billion for renovating and constructing buildings that do not add value to Kenyans. These are conduits for siphoning public resources. The Executive and Parliament waste so much money traveling within and out of the country to attend useless events.

The increase in the security budget is not surprising. This regime is paranoid and hellbent on creating a totalitarian state. The paranoia emanated from last year’s protests. The regime’s leadership never believed organic protests could break out. State-sanctioned abductions, enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and threats are outcomes of a cowardly political leadership not ready to embrace accountability.

Kenya’s political establishment has another bad obsession: the need to control social media. On one hand, the political class dismisses social media government criticism. On the other hand, it craves controlling social media to limit free speech. Part of the increase in the security budget is the allocation of KES 150 million to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) to purchase a system to track social media. This worries me a lot. It means more abductions, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings. But the more these issues persist, the more defiant the people become.

Ruto and his cabal are poor students of history. And the president is on record dismissing history. They should take time and study regime changes caused by popular uprisings. Burkina Faso in 2014, Sudan in 2019, Egypt in 2011, and Czechoslovakia in 1989, among others.

Commonsensically, you’d expect the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to consider such basic epochs. But the NIS is highly politicised under the Kenya Kwanza regime. The previous director generals of the NIS were more professional and polished. At the moment, this institution is a circus. This is the first time its director general has appeared in public forums multiple times, not to contribute anything meaningful to enhance nation-building, but to threaten the regime’s dissidents and call for the regulation of social media.

June 25, 2024, was a major political reset in Kenya’s history. It forced an unpopular president to reach out to a once-popular opposition leader and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga for political survival. This formally resulted in the formation of the so-called broad-based government.

William Ruto and his people do not get it; incorporating Odinga in the government is not equal to addressing the concerns of Kenyans. This mongrel government is a similar government formation Ruto vehemently criticised between 2018 and 2022, when Odinga and then-President Uhuru Kenyatta reached an MoU to form an inclusive government.

Such government arrangements are unconstitutional. With last year’s great political reset, we have demystified the cult of Odinga. The people no longer need him to call for protests. And he disgraced his pro-democracy credentials when he opted to support a rogue, incompetent regime. The majority of young people of my generation and the generations that come after will remember Odinga as a scheming, calculative opportunist, and not a champion for democracy.

Will the victims and their families get justice from the state following the attack on citizens on and after June 25, 2024? This is unlikely. But the arc of justice is long and swings slowly. However long it takes, justice will be served once this regime is voted out of power.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, speaks and writes on politics, governance, political economy, public policy, geopolitics, and armed conflict. Contact sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Russia’s Wagner Exits Mali: The Bigger Picture

On June 6, the Russian Wagner private military company (PMC) announced its withdrawal from Mali. Wagner deployed its mercenaries in Mali around three and a half years ago to support the military-led government in counter-terrorism operations.

Wagner declared its mission in Mali as successful, noting its support in training Malian security forces and directly combating armed groups. But this is superficial, considering that Russian mercenaries will remain in Mali under the command of the Africa Corps PMC.

The Africa Corps is a rebranding of Wagner following the failed rebellion and death of the latter’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023. Structurally, Wagner and the Africa Corps differ in terms of their hierarchy. Functionally and operationally, the two PMCs are the same.

Wagner relied heavily on its civilian leaders. The Africa Corps is controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry. This highlights a key structural change by the Kremlin, with President Vladimir Putin seeking to prevent scenarios where state-contracted PMCs rebel against the regime.

Essentially, the Kremlin would have mercenaries deployed in Mali but under a fundamentally different command structure. This is also expected in five other African countries where the paramilitary officers are stationed.

Moscow’s continued deployment of mercenaries in Africa, now under higher state influence, demonstrates its overall foreign policy on the continent. Africa is too important to be neglected by Russia. It remains a strategic pawn in the global geostrategic power play. Russian PMCs are active in countries where Moscow has economic interests.

In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian mercenaries are deployed to safeguard Moscow’s interests in the mining and oil sectors. The mercenaries also offer guarding services to high-ranking politicians and government officials. I wrote about these countries and Wagner’s deployment and rebranding some time back.

At this juncture, it is important to reflect on Wagner’s touted success in Mali. At best, its mission in Mali was chequered. The threat of armed conflict persists in Mali. In fact, it has worsened in the course of Wagner’s deployment mission.

Data from the Global Terrorism Index indicates a steady increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in Mali since 2017. The data is even more intriguing if you consider the 2021-2025 period, 2021 being the year of Wagner’s deployment.

Wagner may have substantially supported the Malian security forces in counterinsurgency operations. But it collectively failed to effectively contain armed groups in the country. Multiple factors could be responsible for this.

First, the number of Wagner mercenaries deployed in Mali was/is too small to facilitate any meaningful combat against relatively well-equipped and highly mobile armed groups. The situation could perhaps be different if there were no war between Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of mercenaries, including those from Wagner, are on the frontlines.

Second, Wagner mercenaries highly rely on the intelligence shared by the Malian authorities. Before their withdrawals, Malian forces heavily depended on French troops and UN peacekeepers for intelligence. The exit of the French forces and the peacekeepers may have significantly affected intelligence gathering and sharing.

Third, Wagner mercenaries’ deployment is limited to strategic locations of interest. This, in addition to their small contingents, implies that they cannot sufficiently carry out security operations across the country.

Furthermore, Wagner may not be using highly advanced military equipment, munitions, and technology in its operations in Mali. This mirrors the overall defence and offense paradigm in the country. Despite Bamako and Moscow increasing their defence and military cooperation in the last four years, a significant amount of Russian arms/equipment supplied to Mali is of the Soviet era. And these are also limited if you consider the vastness of the Malian territory.

Additionally, some local communities are embedded in the ambitions of the armed groups and do not voluntarily share intelligence with the Russian mercenaries and Malian forces. This is particularly common in northern Mali, where the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebel group is active.

The FLA draws its support largely from the Tuareg ethnic group, and the quest for the creation of an autonomous Azawad state has persisted for over 60 years. Apart from the FLA, terrorist groups such as JNIM are gaining support among some local communities due to the attacks against civilians by Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries.

Can Russia and Its PMCs Improve Security in the Sahel?

The Sahel security environment is too complex for Russia and its PMCs to succeed. The Sahel military regimes pressured the French troops and UN peacekeepers to resign, but political instability and insecurity persist. The junta was perhaps excessively delusional to bank on Russia to replace the French and peacekeepers. They did this under the pretext of pursuing independence, intending to do away with neocolonialism.

I am not suggesting that the French soldiers and UN peacekeepers successfully contained armed groups in the Sahel. And of course, it is public knowledge that former French colonies are neo-colonially tied to Paris. But if the Sahel junta intended to avoid the neocolonial straps, then it would be more sensible for them to look inwards for domestic and regional solutions than to another foreign power.

Russia is misconstrued as friendlier than the West and perhaps less parasitic. This denotes naivety in power politics. Russia, like any other foreign power in Africa, is after its interests, usually at the expense of the client states. States cannot exist in isolation. Relations and coalitions are critical. Russia may not have colonised African countries, but this does not mean its power play in Africa is free of any power imbalance. Equality is utopian as far as state relations are concerned. Russia benefits more from its cooperation with African countries.

Credit should be given to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger for establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) regional bloc. I completely agree with the view of these states on the moribund nature of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc, which they exited. But the AES is unlikely to be a magic wand to address insecurity. AES states lack the financial muscle to sustain meaningful regionwide security operations.

In addition, these states have limited military capabilities, and at this point, they need additional support from ECOWAS or a regional force. Russia may not adequately finance the AES joint forces or supply them with enough equipment and munitions.

The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps is unlikely to change Russia’s security operations in the Sahel. The name has changed, the command structure altered a bit, but the substance is the same.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence has a more involved role in the operations of the Africa Corps compared to Wagner. Moscow is unlikely to deploy significant troop numbers in the Sahel despite this structural change. Any deployments of military officers are expected to be for training purposes.

As long as the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the Sahelian states should stop fantasizing about Russia deploying its military officers in the region. Russia cannot entangle itself in multiple conflicts at this point. This is the primary reason why Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria fell without any meaningful military support from the Russians.

It is safe to assume that Vladimir Putin is a good student of history. Apart from the Russia-Ukraine war, the West’s engagement in active combat in Africa without meaningful outcomes could restrain Russia’s deployment of military officers. The Kremlin would prefer deploying the mercenaries to avoid reputational damage. For instance, the Wagner mercenaries committed human rights abuses in Mali. Wagner takes the blame, and not necessarily the Russian government. Africa Corps would therefore be stationed at key sites and not actively pursuing armed groups countrywide.

Local sentiments could work against any hoped-for success of the Africa Corps mercenaries in Mali. The armed groups in Mali are unlikely to change their perception of the Russian mercenaries. The same applies to the local communities. The name change to Africa Corps is largely optical and not substantial enough to change local sentiments. Africa Corps mercenaries are expected to continue conducting joint operations with Malian forces. The existence of armed militants among the local communities makes the civilians vulnerable to extrajudicial killings. Such human rights abuses occur during security operations.

Stability is currently far-fetched in the Sahel region. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Wagner never succeeded in Mali, and neither will the Africa Corps. Restoring stability in the Sahel goes beyond the shouting of anti-neocolonial slogans. Governments and regional blocs should do things right and not sloganeering.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about governance, armed conflict, political risk, political economy, and foreign policy. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Russian Military Bases in Africa: The Bear’s Brisque Geostrategic Card

This is the last part of a four-article series on Russia’s geostrategic interests and presence in Africa. Parts one, two, and three can be accessed here, here, and here. Russia trails the US, China, the UK, and Turkiye in having established military bases in Africa. In 2020, reports suggested that Russia had finalised plans to build military bases in six African countries: Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Eritrea, Egypt, and the Central African Republic. Most of these countries share certain peculiarities. First, Russian PMCs have been present at different times in these countries, except in Egypt and Eritrea.

Second, these countries import Russian weapons, with Egypt as a major market for Russian arms on the continent. Third, these countries are endowed with natural resources: Sudan (gold), Mozambique (natural gas), Madagascar (chromite, uranium, among others), Egypt (gas), Eritrea (gold, oil, and gas), and the Central African Republic (gold).

Moreover, these countries are also geographically strategic. Sudan has a coastline along the Red Sea. Egypt overlooks the Mediterranean Sea. Eritrea is along the Red Sea. Madagascar and Mozambique offer access to the Indian Ocean. The Central African Republic is at the heart of Africa, guaranteeing strategic access to the DRC in the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the west, and Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo to the southwest. These countries are resource-rich, with some bordering the Atlantic Ocean.

Moscow has yet to establish a military base in Africa at the time of writing this article. The Sudanese military regime concluded a review of an agreement with Russia to put up a naval base in Suakin near Port Sudan along the Red Sea in February 2023. The ratification of the deal was subject to the establishment of a civilian-led government, including a legislative body. It is worth mentioning that initial agreements for a Russian naval base were mooted in 2017 when Omar el-Bashir was president and formalised in 2020.

Its establishment was derailed by Bashir’s ouster and later the war between the Sudanese army and the RSF. The agreement indicates Sudan’s provision of an area for the deployment of 300 Russian military personnel and four navy ships for around 25 years in exchange for weapons and military equipment. The agreement could be extended for another 10 years, subject to approval by both Khartoum and Moscow.

Russia cannot afford to refer to itself as a global power player without strategic military bases in key geographical locations. As such, Moscow is attempting to mirror the Soviet Union, which had naval bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have historically been strategic for major and rising power players in Africa and the Middle East. Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen, and Oman host military bases and other smaller facilities of foreign powers.

The US, China, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti. Saudi Arabia intends to establish a military base in Djibouti as it operates another one on the Socotra Island (Yemen). The UAE has bases on Socotra Island, Boosaaso in Somalia, and Assab in Eritrea near the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It intends to establish another military base in Berbera in Somaliland. Israel has a military base in Eritrea. The US and the UK operate military bases in Oman.

A naval base along the Red Sea would enable Russia to promote its regional and global interests. The region is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas, and key minerals such as gold. The Red Sea is also a geostrategic gateway for global trade, given the centrality of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

But is Russia in a position to develop its planned military bases in Africa? The building of these bases is subject to a myriad of factors in Africa as well as in Russia. In Sudan, for instance, the persistence of the civil war and the delayed formation of a new government could protract Russia’s hopes for fast-tracking the naval base, which is behind schedule. Russia’s intent to build a military base in the Central African Republic could be impacted by the interests of other major powers.

The government of the Central African Republic hired Bancroft, a US PMC. This denotes the possibility of US interests substantially increasing in the country, primarily to compete against Russia. The US is also good at sounding alarm bells to African countries associated with Russia. For instance, it previously warned Sudan of risking isolation from the international community were it to allow Russia to establish a military base along the Red Sea.

The major drawback to Russia’s ambition to establish military bases in Africa is the Russo-Ukrainian war. War is a costly affair, and certainly, Russia’s commitment to building these bases demands psychological and economic commitment. Economically, running a war economy may not give enough room for Russia to comfortably build and equip a military base in Africa.

Using existing military bases in the region could highlight why establishing them would be financially demanding for Moscow. For instance, the Chinese military base in Djibouti was constructed at USD 590 million over at least two years. The US military base in Djibouti attracts USD 63 million in rent annually, with Washington estimated to spend around USD 1.4 billion to upgrade it between 2014 and 2034.

As of September 2022, Russia incurred approximately USD 40 billion – around 84% of the 2021 national defence expenditure – due to the war. Other estimates highlight that Russia spends around 40% of the total government budget on war, with total military spending estimated at at least 10% of the GDP as of 2023.

These figures present an abstract picture of why Russia is unlikely to embark on the construction of military bases in Africa as long as the war against Ukraine persists. The bigger picture should be on the massive power of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) when the war ends. The MIC will have excess capacity and supply of weapons, and the exchequer will have a massive financial muscle. A significant number of sanctions imposed on Russia by the West are unlikely to be dropped after the war ends. Thus, the MIC could drive Russia’s economy post-war. This could lead to increased arms sales to Africa, and possibly, the fast-tracking of the construction of military bases in Africa for Russia to safeguard its economic interests on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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