Category: Geopolitics

Armed Conflict in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on the Edge

The junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are struggling to contain armed groups. When pressed for answers on their failures, they usually allude to foreign actors, among other reasons. Captain Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, General Assimi Goita of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani rose to power through coups, promising to effectively address insecurity.

In a recent interview, Traore, in his defence, claimed to have found approximately 100,000 AK-47 bullets in the country’s stocks when he took over three years ago. Whether this is figurative or not, Traore failed to restore security and order within three months of taking over.

Multiple factors are responsible for the prolongation of insecurity and political instability in the three Sahelian countries. The general incompetence of the military-led governments is a key factor. These regimes seem largely concerned about power consolidation rather than addressing pertinent issues affecting the people. This is done through propaganda campaigns that often chide the West, banning and suspending political parties and civil society groups, and extending transitional terms.

The anti-West sentiments, mostly against France, of these regimes are quite interesting. Historically, France is responsible for enabling extractive politico-economic and social institutions in the broader Francophone Africa. France is also responsible for the failures of Operation Barkhane and other related security missions in the Sahel. But these issues do not absolve the military regimes from worsening insecurity and instability.

UN peacekeepers and French forces withdrew from Mali. French troops also pulled out of Burkina Faso. Similar exits by the French, American, and German forces also occurred in Niger. The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger turned to Russia for security and defense support. So far, no tangible results can be linked to the Russian mercenaries in these countries.

These regimes, in a way, underestimated the intelligence gathering and sharing by foreign troops. They also overestimated the capabilities of their own security forces and those of the Russian mercenaries in combating armed groups.

Effective regional security solutions are yet to be decisively implemented. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after exiting from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a paper tiger. The AES is not fundamentally different from ECOWAS in that it fails to match aspirations with decisive actions.

Armed groups in the region have demonstrated improved operational capabilities. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) occasionally use drones in their attacks. Drone attacks by armed groups have substantially increased in the region, especially in Mali, in the last two years.

In addition, armed groups in the Sahel are getting more access to rifles and ammunition. While illicit trafficking channels in West Africa and North Africa were the primary ways of acquiring weapons, increasing attacks against military installations are enabling easy access. Seizures and looting of these facilities facilitate the supply of weapons.

Insecurity and instability will persist in the Sahel region, given the incapabilities of the security apparatus of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat armed groups. Of course, the three states are good at propaganda to sanitize their incompetence while pointing fingers at domestic, regional, and extra-continental imaginary enemies. Propaganda is a delusionary reprieve for these military regimes. However, this is not a magic bullet by any means to resolve the governance crises in these countries.

Traore, Goita, and Tchiani are on borrowed time. Their regimes, besides the perfection of propaganda, are likely to face a backlash from the public due to worsening insecurity. While elections of civilian-led governments may not be necessary conditions for robust economic growth, the delayed return to constitutional order creates the ideal conditions for an increase in anti-junta sentiments. These sentiments are germs for intensified attacks by armed groups or coup attempts.

Consider Mali. JNIM has imposed an economic blockade since early September 2025. The blockade, featuring attacks against fuel tankers, was in place at the time of writing this article. While some tankers have successfully been escorted by security forces to Bamako and other parts, growing frustrations among the public are possible. Unrest cannot be ruled out under these circumstances.

A significant number of people are in awe of Traore and generally the junta in these three countries for supposedly giving neocolonialism and Western influence a back foot. I find this impractical, unreasonable, and infantile. If they indeed cherish neocolonialism, then they should absolutely pursue total independence. This is unrealistic in a highly globalized world. What’s more, claiming Western influence to be neocolonialism while at the same time strengthening relations with Russia is shifting goalposts. Is it that Russia does not seek to influence these governments by pursuing its geostrategic interests?

Russian mercenaries have proven ineffective in helping these military-led governments to contain insecurity. In fact, Western troops and UN peacekeepers in the region appear to have been more competent than the mercenaries. One could argue that the mercenaries are fewer than the Western troops and peacekeepers. Well, fair enough. But this does not excuse the failure of the mercenaries. It is a matter of time before these mercenaries fully withdraw from the region, like they did in Mozambique a few years ago.

The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas expect to remain in power until at least 2030, based on the collectively calculated extensions over the past year. Coups are ugly, and they fight back. Traore, Goita, and Tchiani rose to power via coups, justifying the takeovers due to worsening insecurity. These conditions persist, and additional coup attempts are anticipated. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a history of coups, and a farcical recurrence of these events in the future is possible. Remarkable political leaders who rose to power via coups, for instance, Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara, were victims of the fight back.

Newer armed groups are likely to be formed in the region, while the existing ones could become bolder with enhanced operational capabilities. These groups are also likely to strengthen alliances.

External and regional military interventions cannot be ruled out in the future, but these are highly unlikely at the moment. The positions of the three military regimes against UN forces and other European troops, including the French, limit the likelihood of a UN peacekeeping force. What’s more, the recent decisions by the UN to reduce peacekeepers by 25% globally and cut the peacekeeping budget by 15% technically rule out a global peacekeeping mission in the region.

This also means that security and stabilisation initiatives by the African Union (AU) are in jeopardy. Such initiatives historically rely on UN funding. This raises questions regarding the AU’s effectiveness, given its Agenda 2063, which ambitiously aimed at silencing guns – to end wars and civil conflicts – on the continent by 2020.

UN peacekeeping missions are criticized for their passive responses to violent conflicts in Africa. They are present in the DRC, South Sudan, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, and the Abyei region. While these missions have multiple shortcomings, their effectiveness cannot be overruled. Perhaps the funding cuts and force reduction could impact security and stability in Africa. I’ll discuss this in my next article after reflecting on the Malawi presidential election. But the fragility of the Sahel states and these UN decisions could be marked by a significant increase in the flow of arms and movement of armed groups on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His opinions are independent of his institutional affiliations.

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East Congo’s Relentless War Machine, Fading Peace

On the weekend of September 19 to September 21, intense clashes occurred between the Congolese forces and the M23 rebels. Fighting took place in Masisi (North Kivu), Walikale (North Kivu), and Kalehe (South Kivu). This marks the most substantial escalation in the last five or six months.

The escalation is not a surprise, given the occasional flare-ups involving the rebels and the pro-government Wazalendo militia group. Indicators of an impending escalation were visible. The missing of the August 8th and 18th deadlines for commencing direct negotiations and signing a peace agreement. These deadlines were prescribed by the Declaration of Principles signed by the Congolese government and M23 in Doha, Qatar, on July 19, 2025.

The key provisions of the Declaration of Principles include an immediate and permanent ceasefire, restoration of state authority in areas under M23, the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and the alignment of the principles with the June 27 Washington agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The rebels maintain a presence in multiple territories, including some that were seized in recent weeks.

There are no effective incentives for M23 to halt fighting and conquests. In the past, especially following the Second Congo War, rebel groups sought inclusion in the government. This seems not to be the case with the M23. The M23 recently unveiled 7,000 newly trained fighters. The rebel group stated that 12,000 recruits are currently in training. This indicates its readiness for a protracted conflict. It also hints at the rebel group enhancing its force and order capabilities to effectively oversee local administrative systems in conquered territories.

M23’s motive to keep fighting and control several areas in Kivu is linked to the region’s mineral wealth. Masisi’s mineral deposits include coltan, gold, tourmaline, and diamonds. The Rubaya mine in Masisi is the largest producer of coltan in the DRC. It supplies approximately half of the DRC’s total coltan output and 15% of the global coltan supply. Rubaya’s coltan is processed into tantalum that is used in electronic devices, including laptops and mobile phones.

Of course, there are sociocultural and political factors perpetuating the conflict in the east of the Congo. While these factors that are tied to ethnic groups are still significant in the conflict, they are superseded by geoeconomic interests. Following the M23’s takeover of Goma, North Kivu’s capital, I argued that the conflict had evolved from one driven by ethno-political interests to one fueled by geoeconomic interests.  

The conflict in the east not only highlights the DRC’s central role in the global mineral supply chains but also demonstrates the country’s long, troubled history of natural resource curses. An excerpt from David Van Reybrouck’s book, “Congo: The Epic History of A People,” aptly summarizes the DRC’s tribulations despite its rich natural resource endowment:

“There is no other country in the world as fortunate as Congo in terms of its natural wealth. During the last century and a half, whenever acute demand has risen on the international market for a given raw material – ivory in the Victorian era; rubber after the invention of the inflatable tire; copper during the full-out industrial and military expansion; uranium during the Cold War; alternative electrical energy during the oil crisis of the 1970s; coltan in the age of portable telephonics – Congo has turned out to contain huge supplies of the coveted commodity. It has easily been able to meet demand. The economic history of Congo is one of improbably lucky breaks. But also of improbably great misery. As a rule, not a drop of the fabulous profits trickled down to the larger part of the population.“

M23’s significant force capabilities is an impetus for the group to push to establish and retain local administrative systems in the occupied territories. Kinshasa’s incentive is national stability that has been elusive for decades. Achieving this under President Felix Tshisekedi seems illusory in light of his administration’s ineffective handling of the M23 conflict.

Tshisekedi’s administration mismanaged the entire deployment of regional troops from the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He demanded the exit of the EAC Regional Force for not engaging the M23 and other armed groups in direct combat. This is despite the regional force’s mandate to supervise the withdrawal of armed groups from captured territories.

The formal exit of the EAC force and the subsequent deployment of the SADC troops in December 2023 did not remedy the situation. And this is the problem with Tshisekedi’s fascination with moments of delusional reprieve.  The SADC forces failed to restore stability in the east. The M23 rebels seized Sake, Goma, and Bukavu a year later, in January 2025.

Multiple factors contributed to the failure of the SADC force, which was intended to engage in direct combat with the rebels alongside Congolese troops. The highly limited capabilities of the Congolese forces and the geographical unfamiliarity of the combat zones to the SADC troops stand out.

Tshisekedi turned to the Trump administration for a minerals-for-security support deal signed by the DRC and Rwanda in Washington on June 27, 2025. Its failure was almost certain. On September 22, 2025, President Tshisekedi acknowledged the failure of the deal to end the fighting. He also reiterated that the agreement does not pave the way for auctioning the DRC’s minerals to the US. In mid-September, DRC and Rwanda agreed to start implementing the security measures of the agreement from October 1. This includes the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and disarming and eliminating the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

The FDLR aims to overthrow the Kagame-led Tutsi majority government in Rwanda. It is active in eastern DRC and is largely made up of the Hutu. The DRC supports the FDLR; the FDLR is to the DRC as the M23 is to Rwanda. It is unlikely that FDLR’s disarmament and elimination will succeed, especially if Rwanda maintains its troops in the DRC and the M23 does not give up its controlled territories. Kinshasa is bound to feel insecure if FDLR is wound up.

The EAC and SADC forces are out, and the US-brokered minerals-for-security deal is unlikely to materialize. This is an ugly juncture for Tshisekedi. His administration is better off sticking with the UN peacekeepers at the moment. While they have primarily been ineffective in containing armed groups in the east over the last 25 years, their presence could help share intelligence with the low-morale Congolese forces.

Tshisekedi’s administration pushed for the exit of the peacekeepers but requested the renewal of the mission’s mandate in December 2024. The departure of UN peacekeepers alongside French forces from Mali without replacement by highly capable security forces has significantly contributed to the escalation of armed conflict. This is probably a key lesson for Tshisekedi.

Some complex possibilities await the Tshisekedi administration. It may consider engaging in a war of attrition against the rebels. But this would require boosting the morale of a poorly paid and equipped military. It is unlikely that the Congolese government will substantially increase the payments for the troops and purchase adequate military equipment in the short term. This means a continued reliance on militia groups whose fighters would be much happier to pocket some francs than eke out a living as overworked miners or desperate small-scale traders. At least looting is guaranteed for militia fighters as a means of survival.  

A war of attrition or not (if maneuver warfare is preferred), the recruitment of more foreign mercenaries to fight alongside the Congolese forces and militia fighters is highly likely. Eastern European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and some African countries are potential sources of mercenaries. Rwandan forces and dozens of armed groups could fight alongside the M23 if Kinshasa opts for a scorched-earth policy. But this would elevate the DRC’s political instability, recalling that conflicts in the east previously led to transitional governments.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst.

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Russia’s Wagner Exits Mali: The Bigger Picture

On June 6, the Russian Wagner private military company (PMC) announced its withdrawal from Mali. Wagner deployed its mercenaries in Mali around three and a half years ago to support the military-led government in counter-terrorism operations.

Wagner declared its mission in Mali as successful, noting its support in training Malian security forces and directly combating armed groups. But this is superficial, considering that Russian mercenaries will remain in Mali under the command of the Africa Corps PMC.

The Africa Corps is a rebranding of Wagner following the failed rebellion and death of the latter’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023. Structurally, Wagner and the Africa Corps differ in terms of their hierarchy. Functionally and operationally, the two PMCs are the same.

Wagner relied heavily on its civilian leaders. The Africa Corps is controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry. This highlights a key structural change by the Kremlin, with President Vladimir Putin seeking to prevent scenarios where state-contracted PMCs rebel against the regime.

Essentially, the Kremlin would have mercenaries deployed in Mali but under a fundamentally different command structure. This is also expected in five other African countries where the paramilitary officers are stationed.

Moscow’s continued deployment of mercenaries in Africa, now under higher state influence, demonstrates its overall foreign policy on the continent. Africa is too important to be neglected by Russia. It remains a strategic pawn in the global geostrategic power play. Russian PMCs are active in countries where Moscow has economic interests.

In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian mercenaries are deployed to safeguard Moscow’s interests in the mining and oil sectors. The mercenaries also offer guarding services to high-ranking politicians and government officials. I wrote about these countries and Wagner’s deployment and rebranding some time back.

At this juncture, it is important to reflect on Wagner’s touted success in Mali. At best, its mission in Mali was chequered. The threat of armed conflict persists in Mali. In fact, it has worsened in the course of Wagner’s deployment mission.

Data from the Global Terrorism Index indicates a steady increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in Mali since 2017. The data is even more intriguing if you consider the 2021-2025 period, 2021 being the year of Wagner’s deployment.

Wagner may have substantially supported the Malian security forces in counterinsurgency operations. But it collectively failed to effectively contain armed groups in the country. Multiple factors could be responsible for this.

First, the number of Wagner mercenaries deployed in Mali was/is too small to facilitate any meaningful combat against relatively well-equipped and highly mobile armed groups. The situation could perhaps be different if there were no war between Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of mercenaries, including those from Wagner, are on the frontlines.

Second, Wagner mercenaries highly rely on the intelligence shared by the Malian authorities. Before their withdrawals, Malian forces heavily depended on French troops and UN peacekeepers for intelligence. The exit of the French forces and the peacekeepers may have significantly affected intelligence gathering and sharing.

Third, Wagner mercenaries’ deployment is limited to strategic locations of interest. This, in addition to their small contingents, implies that they cannot sufficiently carry out security operations across the country.

Furthermore, Wagner may not be using highly advanced military equipment, munitions, and technology in its operations in Mali. This mirrors the overall defence and offense paradigm in the country. Despite Bamako and Moscow increasing their defence and military cooperation in the last four years, a significant amount of Russian arms/equipment supplied to Mali is of the Soviet era. And these are also limited if you consider the vastness of the Malian territory.

Additionally, some local communities are embedded in the ambitions of the armed groups and do not voluntarily share intelligence with the Russian mercenaries and Malian forces. This is particularly common in northern Mali, where the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebel group is active.

The FLA draws its support largely from the Tuareg ethnic group, and the quest for the creation of an autonomous Azawad state has persisted for over 60 years. Apart from the FLA, terrorist groups such as JNIM are gaining support among some local communities due to the attacks against civilians by Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries.

Can Russia and Its PMCs Improve Security in the Sahel?

The Sahel security environment is too complex for Russia and its PMCs to succeed. The Sahel military regimes pressured the French troops and UN peacekeepers to resign, but political instability and insecurity persist. The junta was perhaps excessively delusional to bank on Russia to replace the French and peacekeepers. They did this under the pretext of pursuing independence, intending to do away with neocolonialism.

I am not suggesting that the French soldiers and UN peacekeepers successfully contained armed groups in the Sahel. And of course, it is public knowledge that former French colonies are neo-colonially tied to Paris. But if the Sahel junta intended to avoid the neocolonial straps, then it would be more sensible for them to look inwards for domestic and regional solutions than to another foreign power.

Russia is misconstrued as friendlier than the West and perhaps less parasitic. This denotes naivety in power politics. Russia, like any other foreign power in Africa, is after its interests, usually at the expense of the client states. States cannot exist in isolation. Relations and coalitions are critical. Russia may not have colonised African countries, but this does not mean its power play in Africa is free of any power imbalance. Equality is utopian as far as state relations are concerned. Russia benefits more from its cooperation with African countries.

Credit should be given to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger for establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) regional bloc. I completely agree with the view of these states on the moribund nature of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc, which they exited. But the AES is unlikely to be a magic wand to address insecurity. AES states lack the financial muscle to sustain meaningful regionwide security operations.

In addition, these states have limited military capabilities, and at this point, they need additional support from ECOWAS or a regional force. Russia may not adequately finance the AES joint forces or supply them with enough equipment and munitions.

The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps is unlikely to change Russia’s security operations in the Sahel. The name has changed, the command structure altered a bit, but the substance is the same.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence has a more involved role in the operations of the Africa Corps compared to Wagner. Moscow is unlikely to deploy significant troop numbers in the Sahel despite this structural change. Any deployments of military officers are expected to be for training purposes.

As long as the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the Sahelian states should stop fantasizing about Russia deploying its military officers in the region. Russia cannot entangle itself in multiple conflicts at this point. This is the primary reason why Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria fell without any meaningful military support from the Russians.

It is safe to assume that Vladimir Putin is a good student of history. Apart from the Russia-Ukraine war, the West’s engagement in active combat in Africa without meaningful outcomes could restrain Russia’s deployment of military officers. The Kremlin would prefer deploying the mercenaries to avoid reputational damage. For instance, the Wagner mercenaries committed human rights abuses in Mali. Wagner takes the blame, and not necessarily the Russian government. Africa Corps would therefore be stationed at key sites and not actively pursuing armed groups countrywide.

Local sentiments could work against any hoped-for success of the Africa Corps mercenaries in Mali. The armed groups in Mali are unlikely to change their perception of the Russian mercenaries. The same applies to the local communities. The name change to Africa Corps is largely optical and not substantial enough to change local sentiments. Africa Corps mercenaries are expected to continue conducting joint operations with Malian forces. The existence of armed militants among the local communities makes the civilians vulnerable to extrajudicial killings. Such human rights abuses occur during security operations.

Stability is currently far-fetched in the Sahel region. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Wagner never succeeded in Mali, and neither will the Africa Corps. Restoring stability in the Sahel goes beyond the shouting of anti-neocolonial slogans. Governments and regional blocs should do things right and not sloganeering.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about governance, armed conflict, political risk, political economy, and foreign policy. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

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Russian Military Bases in Africa: The Bear’s Brisque Geostrategic Card

This is the last part of a four-article series on Russia’s geostrategic interests and presence in Africa. Parts one, two, and three can be accessed here, here, and here. Russia trails the US, China, the UK, and Turkiye in having established military bases in Africa. In 2020, reports suggested that Russia had finalised plans to build military bases in six African countries: Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Eritrea, Egypt, and the Central African Republic. Most of these countries share certain peculiarities. First, Russian PMCs have been present at different times in these countries, except in Egypt and Eritrea.

Second, these countries import Russian weapons, with Egypt as a major market for Russian arms on the continent. Third, these countries are endowed with natural resources: Sudan (gold), Mozambique (natural gas), Madagascar (chromite, uranium, among others), Egypt (gas), Eritrea (gold, oil, and gas), and the Central African Republic (gold).

Moreover, these countries are also geographically strategic. Sudan has a coastline along the Red Sea. Egypt overlooks the Mediterranean Sea. Eritrea is along the Red Sea. Madagascar and Mozambique offer access to the Indian Ocean. The Central African Republic is at the heart of Africa, guaranteeing strategic access to the DRC in the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the west, and Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo to the southwest. These countries are resource-rich, with some bordering the Atlantic Ocean.

Moscow has yet to establish a military base in Africa at the time of writing this article. The Sudanese military regime concluded a review of an agreement with Russia to put up a naval base in Suakin near Port Sudan along the Red Sea in February 2023. The ratification of the deal was subject to the establishment of a civilian-led government, including a legislative body. It is worth mentioning that initial agreements for a Russian naval base were mooted in 2017 when Omar el-Bashir was president and formalised in 2020.

Its establishment was derailed by Bashir’s ouster and later the war between the Sudanese army and the RSF. The agreement indicates Sudan’s provision of an area for the deployment of 300 Russian military personnel and four navy ships for around 25 years in exchange for weapons and military equipment. The agreement could be extended for another 10 years, subject to approval by both Khartoum and Moscow.

Russia cannot afford to refer to itself as a global power player without strategic military bases in key geographical locations. As such, Moscow is attempting to mirror the Soviet Union, which had naval bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have historically been strategic for major and rising power players in Africa and the Middle East. Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen, and Oman host military bases and other smaller facilities of foreign powers.

The US, China, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti. Saudi Arabia intends to establish a military base in Djibouti as it operates another one on the Socotra Island (Yemen). The UAE has bases on Socotra Island, Boosaaso in Somalia, and Assab in Eritrea near the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It intends to establish another military base in Berbera in Somaliland. Israel has a military base in Eritrea. The US and the UK operate military bases in Oman.

A naval base along the Red Sea would enable Russia to promote its regional and global interests. The region is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas, and key minerals such as gold. The Red Sea is also a geostrategic gateway for global trade, given the centrality of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

But is Russia in a position to develop its planned military bases in Africa? The building of these bases is subject to a myriad of factors in Africa as well as in Russia. In Sudan, for instance, the persistence of the civil war and the delayed formation of a new government could protract Russia’s hopes for fast-tracking the naval base, which is behind schedule. Russia’s intent to build a military base in the Central African Republic could be impacted by the interests of other major powers.

The government of the Central African Republic hired Bancroft, a US PMC. This denotes the possibility of US interests substantially increasing in the country, primarily to compete against Russia. The US is also good at sounding alarm bells to African countries associated with Russia. For instance, it previously warned Sudan of risking isolation from the international community were it to allow Russia to establish a military base along the Red Sea.

The major drawback to Russia’s ambition to establish military bases in Africa is the Russo-Ukrainian war. War is a costly affair, and certainly, Russia’s commitment to building these bases demands psychological and economic commitment. Economically, running a war economy may not give enough room for Russia to comfortably build and equip a military base in Africa.

Using existing military bases in the region could highlight why establishing them would be financially demanding for Moscow. For instance, the Chinese military base in Djibouti was constructed at USD 590 million over at least two years. The US military base in Djibouti attracts USD 63 million in rent annually, with Washington estimated to spend around USD 1.4 billion to upgrade it between 2014 and 2034.

As of September 2022, Russia incurred approximately USD 40 billion – around 84% of the 2021 national defence expenditure – due to the war. Other estimates highlight that Russia spends around 40% of the total government budget on war, with total military spending estimated at at least 10% of the GDP as of 2023.

These figures present an abstract picture of why Russia is unlikely to embark on the construction of military bases in Africa as long as the war against Ukraine persists. The bigger picture should be on the massive power of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) when the war ends. The MIC will have excess capacity and supply of weapons, and the exchequer will have a massive financial muscle. A significant number of sanctions imposed on Russia by the West are unlikely to be dropped after the war ends. Thus, the MIC could drive Russia’s economy post-war. This could lead to increased arms sales to Africa, and possibly, the fast-tracking of the construction of military bases in Africa for Russia to safeguard its economic interests on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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The Russian Military-Industrial Complex: A Fledgling Specter Haunting Africa?

This is part three of a four-part series of articles on Russia’s geostrategic involvement in Africa. Parts one and two can be accessed here and here. From a geostrategic perspective, Russia’s military-industrial complex (MIC) is central to Moscow’s ambition to upscale its influence in Africa. The Russia MIC’s arc of influence in Africa is exemplified by the defense and security cooperation agreements and the Russian arms imported by African countries. Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries since 2015. This again affirms the post-2014 period as an era of Russia seeking to enhance its footprint in Africa. These agreements have different objectives, such as facilitating access to civilian or military ports and airbases, promoting counter-terrorism operations, encouraging the supply of weapons, and supporting the training of military personnel.

It is perhaps important to interrogate the centrality of these agreements. Such interrogations need to go beyond the norms and fallacies of the Western perspective on why Moscow is on a mission to ratify military agreements with African countries. Typically, the Western view gravitates to the notion of emphasizing Russia’s push for these agreements in countries that have had coups in Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. But this does not represent the holistic picture on the ground, as evidence suggests. For instance, Russian influence in Gabon is minimal, if any, or non-existent despite the 2023 coup.

Most importantly, why are these agreements viewed as Moscow’s push for geostrategic supremacy in Africa, instead of the respective African countries seeking alternative partnerships? Russia’s endgame with the military agreements could be a matter of making a significant statement of being back in the game as a major global power in Africa, as power politics take centre stage on the continent. Another reason is that these agreements lay the basis for arms exports to African countries, and thus a key market to drive Russia’s economy in the wake of the post-2014 sanctions and, recently, the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Arms production for domestic use and exportation is a linchpin of Russia’s MIC. Consider the fact that Russia’s state expenditure for weapons and arms production has gradually increased over the years from 21.7% in 2016 to 22.6% in 2023, and is expected to rise to 26.8% in 2024. These increases are primarily attributed to the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, the initial increases before the war suggest Moscow’s push to position its MIC as a cog in its renewed push for global power supremacy.

 Russia’s surplus of rounds for tube and rocket artillery was tens of millions just before the commencement of the war against Ukraine in February 2022, and production was on an upward trend. This can be used as a proximal indicator to explain some of the arms export trends to Africa, given that a wide range of specific Russian MIC data is unavailable.

Data by the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that Russia supplied 40% of the total arms imports in Africa between 2018 and 2022. Additional data by SIPRI covering the 2019-2023 period highlights that Russia was Africa’s major supplier of weapons, accounting for 24% of the total imports. This was higher than imports from the US (16%), China (13%), and France (10%). Algeria, Egypt, and Libya are the leading importers of Russian arms in Africa. This trend is expected to persist given the threats to political stability in the region, with countries increasing their defence expenditures.

The conflict in Libya remains unresolved, in addition to the threat of armed insurgency and rebellion in the Sahel and across Sudan. Egypt stares at regional conflicts: the Israel-Hamas war, the threat of insurgency in the Sahel, armed rebellion in Libya, and war in Sudan. Algeria’s national security faces threats emanating from these aforementioned conflicts.

Russia’s growing influence in Africa through its MIC can be linked to political instability and armed conflicts in northern Africa and the Sahel region. The collapse of the Libyan state following the NATO-led offensive, as well as the first and second Libyan civil wars that gave rise to the threat of insurgency in the Sahel. The Tuareg rebels from Mali and also Niger, as well as Chad, who were hired to fight in the Libyan civil war were partly responsible for arms supply after the conflict.

The Libyan war was immediately followed by the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, which encouraged the spread of terrorism in the Sahel region. Did Russia have a role to play in the region’s instability in light of the Libyan war and armed conflict and coups in Mali? It can be easy to point fingers at Russia and accuse it of supplying weapons to the Gaddafi-led Libya.

Russia was a key arms supplier to Libya before and during the early days of the conflict fanned by NATO against Gaddafi. In March 2011, Russia banned arms sales to Libya to comply with a February 26, 2011, UN resolution. Russia lost approximately USD 3.8 billion in arms deals signed with Libya – USD 2 billion for weapons supply and USD 1.8 billion for anti-aircraft missiles and military aircraft. Libya still had stockpiles of Russian weapons before the ban. But the disintegration of the Libyan state paved the way for arms flow from Libya towards the Sahel. The arms flow may not have been made up entirely of Russian weapons, but this formed a significant proportion of it, as earlier noted that Russia was Libya’s leading arms supplier.

As such, the US-led coalition is to blame for Russia’s influence in Libya and in the Sahel in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict and the multiple conflicts that sprang up in Mali and neighbouring countries. Therefore, Moscow and the Russian MIC are only attempting to capitalise on a vacuum that emanated from the offshoots of Western imperialism in the region. As long as Libya is abandoned by regional bodies and the international community, it will maintain its status as a lucrative market for weapons used by armed groups in the region. In essence, Russia’s MIC in Africa is driven by commercial interests and barely by the divide-and-rule tactics much fashioned by the Western powers. More importantly, African governments willingly sign the arms supply agreements with Russia without Moscow’s coercion. So, it is easy to overlook these issues while attempting to understand the role of the Russian MIC in fueling conflicts in Africa. Part four focuses on the Russian military bases in Africa.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Wagner Group in Africa: Deployments & Rebranding

This is part two of a four to five-article series examining Russia’s influence in Africa from a security and geostrategic viewpoint. Part one can be accessed here. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 paved the way for the rebranding of the Wagner Group. First, the name changed – but several names have since emerged: Africa Corps, Expeditionary Corps, and the Bear Brigade. These names could be used interchangeably by different sources documenting Russia’s geostrategic forays in Africa. This perhaps denotes the obscurity and mystery shrouding the group’s operations in Africa. Wagner’s functionalities were also restructured in tandem with the Kremlin’s vision for the outfit post-Prigozhin. However, the fundamental aspects of these transformations remain unchanged, and they are, at best, cosmetic patch-ups to rid the group of Prigozhin’s probable martyr-esque influence.

Wagner’s initial deployments in Africa were in Sudan (2017/2018), Libya (2018), Madagascar (2018), and the Central African Republic (2018). Later deployments were in Mali (2021) and as the Africa Corps in Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024. Around 500 Wagner mercenaries were deployed in the restive Darfur region in Sudan either in 2017 or 2018. The mercenaries were primarily tasked to train Sudanese security forces in light of the conflict in the region at that time. Wagner closely worked with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the aftermath of the 2019 ouster of President Omar el-Bashir.

The concentration of the training programmes in Darfur pre-war suggests that Wagner’s military aid to the RSF in the ongoing civil war in Sudan is not a surprise. However, this does not in any way imply any interests by Wagner or Russia in the outbreak of the war. Wagner is believed to have supplied surface-to-air missiles to the paramilitary group in its fight against the Sudanese army. Wagner’s presence in Sudan highlights the Kremlin’s interests in gold mining. These interests heightened from 2014 in the aftermath of the sanctions imposed on Russia following the Crimea Annexation. Though rarely mentioned, Russia’s pathways in Sudan were against the backdrop of the dwindling influence of the US.

The Central African Republic is touted as a Wagner success story. Around 1,400 mercenaries were deployed in 2018 in the wake of a prolonged conflict involving multiple armed groups. The deployment took place a year after Russia increased support for embattled President Faustin-Archange Touadera. The mercenaries’ objectives included offering close protection to President Touadera, training the country’s security forces, and protecting lucrative mines.

The exit of the French forces from the Central African Republic in 2016 presented an opportunity for Russia to increase its influence. The withdrawal of the French soldiers following a three-year military intervention to quell a civil war was not accompanied by effective capacity building of the security forces of the Central African Republic. This is attributed to the fragmentation of the security forces and affiliations arising from multiple armed groups. Russia and Sudan were instrumental in facilitating the ratification of peace agreements between 14 rebel groups and the Central African Republic government in 2018 and 2019.

Libya is one of Russia’s most strategic countries in Africa. Around 1,200 Wagner mercenaries are deployed in Russia, with the first deployment having been in 2018. The disintegration of Libya following the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave way to Russia’s involvement in Libya. Russia was vocal against the NATO offensive in 2011, and NATO’s exit after the fragmentation of the country presented opportunities for the political elite groupings to forge domestic, regional, and global alliances.

The Wagner group supports the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing conflict in Libya. The LNA backs the Tobruk-based Government of National Stability that rivals the UN-backed Government of National Unity. Russia’s strategic interests in Libya are hinged on the lucrative oil industry and the geographical proximity to the Middle East, Europe, and the Sahel.

Wagner’s failures in Mozambique are vivid. In September 2018, about 360 to 400 mercenaries were deployed with the main goal of training Mozambican security forces and conducting joint operations in the insurgency-hit Cabo Delgado Province. The joint operations collapsed after two months, resulting in the withdrawal of the mercenaries who were unfamiliar with the dynamics of the Cabo Delgado theatre.

Russia’s interests in Mozambique could have been heavily influenced by Mozambique’s rich resource endowment: gas, minerals, and indigenous forests. Wagner mercenaries arrived in Madagascar in April 2018, eight months before a high-stakes presidential election. The mercenaries were responsible for guarding the political consultants of the country’s then-President Marc Ravalomanana, who lost the election. It seems, though, that Russia was after mining interests in Madagascar. A Russian firm took over Kraoma, the national chromite producer.

Russia’s influence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is a result of growing insecurity characterised by the heightening threat of terrorism, military coups, and anti-French sentiments. Around 400 Wagner mercenaries were deployed in Mali in late 2021. The military-led government reached out to Russia for support against terrorist groups such as the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) and the Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), as well as the Tuareg rebel groups.

Courting Moscow was also against the backdrop of the perceived failures of the French troops and the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to combat terrorism despite a decade-long presence in the country. Russia has huge interests in Mali’s gold mining industry. Wagner conducts joint counter-terrorism operations with the Malian forces, but they have yet to succeed. This indicates the fact that the departure of the French troops and the UN peacekeepers has not improved security operations. Perhaps Mali’s bet on the deployment of additional mercenaries and potentially soldiers, as well as equipment, was thwarted by the Russo-Ukrainian war, with thousands of mercenaries deployed on the frontlines.

Burkina Faso has ideal conditions for Russia to increase its influence; coups, terrorism, and anti-French sentiments. It is not surprising that Moscow has upscaled its influence in Africa in the aftermath of the September 2022 military coup. Note that this does not mean Russia is responsible for the coup, contrary to claims by the West. The military-led government is seeking alternative strategic partnerships following the deterioration in relations with France. Burkina Faso nullified its military accord with France in 2023, resulting in the withdrawal of 400 French special forces.

The most notable threat to Burkina Faso’s stability is terrorism; thus, Ouagadougou’s decision to reach out to Russia and the Alliance of Sahel States to bolster counter-terrorism operations. According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, Burkina Faso ranked as the country worst affected by terrorism in the world in 2023 with a score of 8.571 out of 10. Around 100 Africa Corps mercenaries were deployed in Burkina Faso in January 2024, with 200 others set to be deployed in the course of the year. The 100 mercenaries were seemingly withdrawn later in August following the launch of the Kursk offensive by Ukraine. These mercenaries were tasked primarily with training the Burkinabe forces.

Niger’s enhanced cooperation with Russia is similar to Moscow’s relations with Mali and Burkina Faso. Dozens of Africa Corps mercenaries were deployed in Niamey in April 2024. The main objective of the deployment was to help the military regime enhance counter-terrorism operations. Niger’s decision to reach out to Russia was largely influenced by the military regimes in Ouagadougou and Bamako. Around 1,500 French forces withdrew from Niger in 2023 following a breakdown in relations between Niamey and Paris. Approximately 700 US troops withdrew from Niger by September 15, 2024. Part three focuses on the Russian military-industrial complex in Africa.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Russia’s Growing Influence in Africa: A Security & Geostrategic Outlook

This is part one of a four to five-article series examining Russia’s influence in Africa from a security and geostrategic viewpoint. Moscow’s influence in Africa waned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s influence in Africa in the post-Cold War period is characterised by two almost distinct epochs. First, the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 1999, and second, the Crimea Annexation in 2014.

It is worth noting, though, that Moscow was a dominant power player in Africa in the Cold War era alongside the US. The recent increase in Russian influence in Africa is attributed to the Western-led sanctions following Russia’s incursion and takeover of Crimea. Russia’s imprints in Africa in the last 10 decades have largely involved working through the Private Military Companies (PMCs) such as Wagner. These mercenaries have been deployed in strategic countries where Russia also had or has interests in natural resources such as gold, gas, among others. But Russia’s engagement with African countries goes beyond the security issues and includes other mutual areas of cooperation.

Historical Background of Moscow’s Influence in Africa

By accident or design, Moscow was excluded from having a share of Africa’s vast territory at the 1885 Berlin Congress. First, Russia did not have direct access to Africa, and this was geographically inconvenient to Moscow. Sailing around Asia, cutting through the Ottoman Empire, sailing through the Baltic Sea, and its frozen ports in the north created inconveniences.

Second, Russia was much more concerned about furthering its geostrategic interests in the neighbourhood; the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East. This explains Russia’s absent colonial legacy in Africa. Moscow’s interests in Africa were reignited by the commencement of the Cold War. Russia established alliances with several African countries as a geostrategic maneuver to counter the influence of the United States on the continent.

Moscow’s geostrategic currents in Africa at the height of the Cold War were characterised by the supply of arms as well as other soft power approaches such as education scholarships. African countries that benefited from the Soviet Union’s arms supply include Angola, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Morocco, Mozambique, and South Africa. Other countries, such as Guinea, exported their natural resources to the Soviet Union after signing military agreements with Moscow, as well as receiving Soviet aid. The People’s Friendship University was Moscow’s nerve centre in facilitating education scholarships to Africans.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dawn of unipolarity scaled down Moscow’s geostrategic power pursuits globally. A weakened Russia could not match the zeal of the Soviet Union due to domestic economic, political, and social pressures. Moscow’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Africa during the Cold War were facilitated by its diplomatic missions. The closure of nine embassies and three consulates in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union substantially dissipated Moscow’s influence in Africa.

The domestic challenges Russia experienced at that time demanded a reorientation of Moscow’s foreign policy with the President Boris Yeltsin’s administration heavily focused on resolving internal issues. The reduction of staff at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the termination of foreign aid, and closure of cultural institutions consequently impacted Russia’s influence in Africa.

Post-Cold War, two critical junctures define Russia’s reignited interest in Africa. First, the election of President Vladimir Putin in 1999, and second, the 2014 Crimea Annexation by Russia. The election of President Putin coincided with the growth and stability of the Russian economy after almost a decade of economic turbulence. Besides, Putin’s administration’s ambitions to restore Moscow’s lost glory in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union projected a state that sought to rediscover its global geostrategic footprints. Post-2000, Russia was involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa in the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan.

Moscow also enhanced its diplomatic engagements with African countries post-2000 as a strategy to project its geostrategic ambitions. President Putin visited South Africa in 2006, while President Dmitry Medvedev visited Angola, Egypt, Namibia, and Nigeria in 2009. The sanctions imposed by the West on Russia following the 2014 Crimea Annexation pushed Moscow to seek alternative economic partnerships. Russia’s increased influence in Africa and the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union were direct outcomes of this.

Russia’s post-2014 engagement with Africa is based on rivalry that defines global power politics. Moscow, like Beijing, rivals the US and other emerging powers in the reignited interest in Africa. African countries are obviously pawns in this great power rivalry game. Russia, on its part, charms African states with debt forgiveness and grain supply agreements.

The Kremlin also perceives Africa as a credible market for its arms, a significant portion of which were manufactured during the Soviet era. As such, it is not surprising that Russia accounted for 40% of Africa’s imports of major arms from 2018 to 2022, outstripping the US 16%, China 9.8%, and France 7.6%.

Russia signed 21 military agreements with African countries between 2015 and 2020, compared to four previously. The number increased to 43 as of February 2024. Some of the agreements have led to the deployment of Russian mercenaries in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan as later explored in this chapter. A hallmark of Russia’s growing military influence in Africa is the planned construction of a naval base in Sudan along the Red Sea territory.

The Russia-Africa Summits are strategically positioned to advance Moscow’s diplomatic, economic, and defence engagements in Africa. The first summit was held in 2019, and the second one in 2023. These summits mirror similar conferences initiated by China, the US, and Japan; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the United States-Africa Leaders’ Summit, and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development.

Contextualising Russia’s Mercenary Adventurism in Africa

Russia has attempted to perfect the use of PMCs in Africa rather than deploying its troops with the exception of its soldiers deployed under the UN missions on the continent. Yet, Russian troops deployed under these missions are fewer compared to the US and China. Additionally, the US and China have other troop deployments in strategic locations in Africa. While Russia is a bit distant from these powers in troop deployment, Moscow has nearly perfected the deployment of PMCs. Perhaps this highlights the benign distinctions of the foreign policies of Moscow and those of the US and China. It is important to note that Russia, contrary to what has been popularised in the public, is not the first country to fashion the use of PMCs as proxies for its interests in Africa.

A host of non-Russian PMCs have pitched camp in Africa. For instance, Blackwater, Triple Canopy, DynCorp, Academi, the Bancroft Development Group, and CACI are PMCs from the US. Chinese PMCs in Africa include HXZA, the China Overseas Group, the Frontier Services Group, and China Security and Protection Group. Xeless (Germany), Secopex (France), Omega Consulting Group (Ukraine), and the Aegis Defence Services (Britain) are other foreign PMCs in Africa.

As earlier indicated, Russia’s foreign policy for Africa is quite distinct in the use of the PMCs to drive Moscow’s interests. The statutory implication of this is the fact that the US and China largely use their militaries to project their foreign policies in Africa, unlike Russia, which outwardly projects its interests through the PMCs. However, this does not mean that the PMCs from the US or China have no link to state interests. For instance, the Chinese PMCs have scaled up their activities in Africa thanks to Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

DynCorp, prior to its acquisition by Amentum, supported the interests of the US in Niger. It was primarily involved in advising and training the Nigerien security forces and the government against the backdrop of securing contracts worth millions of dollars. Blackwater’s operations in Africa are hard to think about without linking them to Washington’s interests, given the company’s involvement in the DRC’s mining sector. Bancroft, known for bagging federal contracts in the US, at one time reached out to the government of the Central African Republic for security-related businesses.

An inescapable reality is premised on the growing popularity of PMCs in Africa, including non-Russian ones. This principally points to the strategic importance of Africa to foreign powers, with the renewed scramble for Africa having been organically reignited by China from 2000. Perhaps, we may see a shift in the approach by the US and China in projecting their interests in Africa by mirroring Russia’s heavy reliance on the PMCs in the coming years.

This projection is centred on the privatisation of the US federal programmes and activities, including homeland security. This is structurally linked to profiteering from disasters – otherwise known as disaster capitalism. The administrations of former Presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush extensively engaged PMCs such as Halliburton and Blackwater in the Balkans and Iraq.

The projected increased use of PMCs by China and the US in Africa, and obviously Russia, is linked to reputational and economic reasons. The use of the PMCs reduces or eliminates instances where these entities can be blamed in the event of human rights abuses and such. It would be damaging PR if the US or Russian, or Chinese military personnel deployed in Africa commit atrocities.

Furthermore, using the PMCs as proxies instead of deploying troops reduces the possibility of citizens of wherever African country they are deployed to demanding their exit, hence PR damage. The US troops were forced to exit Niger by September 15, 2024, following sustained pressure by the military junta and the Nigerien public. The use of PMCs also strategically prevents a public backlash, particularly if troop deployment is associated with failed military missions. Sentiments against failed military missions are usually laced with cost-benefit arguments.

As Washington and Beijing are playing catch-up to Moscow’s use of the PMCs in Africa, it is important to understand the extent of these Russian mercenaries in Africa. Russian PMCs were previously or are currently present in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan. Rumours of the presence of Russian mercenaries in the DRC surfaced in 2023. A common denominator of these countries is the presence of armed groups and persisting conflicts. As such, conflicts are potential markets for Russia and Russian PMCs. Part two focuses on the Wagner mercenary group in Africa, including its deployment and rebranding.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Pope Francis: Reflections

I admired Pope Francis for his humility, frugality, and simplicity. I mostly distance myself from religious discussions, debates, and engagements, given the extreme emotional attachment abound in most humans. Nonetheless, religion is as old as humanity and takes different forms; Supreme Beings, gods, spirits, rituals, and other perceived holy incantations.

Religion is inherently man’s creation and plays a significant role in maintaining social order. But it is also a powerful manipulation tool, which powerful kingdoms, states, and leaders have historically used to hoodwink and threaten the masses. Anyway, I do not want to get lost debating the sanctity or profanity arising from religion. I attempt to reflect on the essence of Pope Francis, his leadership, and some historical accounts related to the subject matter.

Around two decades ago, I flirted with the idea of embracing Roman Catholicism. However, I was unimpressed with the complex rituals one was required to go through before being considered a proper Roman Catholic. I attended multiple mass sessions, and since then, I have never entertained any flirtations with Catholicism. I am still fascinated by the history of Catholicism and, overall, other religious faiths.

My early intellectual exploits to understand the history and dominance of the Roman Catholic church led to reading a controversial book by Bill Hughes. The Secret Terrorists is a short, fascinating text attempting to link the Jesuits to various forms of ‘terrorism’, including the assassination of several US presidents, the sinking of the Titanic ship, the attack on the World Trade Centre, and the Waco Massacre, among others. Hughes attempts to present a compelling account of the Jesuits’ desire to restore the dominance of the pope in the world. This is an intriguing read, but some of its parts are full of conspiracy.

Pope Francis was a Jesuit. In fact, he was the first Jesuit pope. Jesuits are a religious order within the Roman Catholic Church, often referred to as the Society of Jesus. Not all Roman Catholics are Jesuits, but all Jesuits are Roman Catholics. The Vatican and the entire Roman Catholic order are primarily political, hence my interest in understanding its functioning. A pope is a global leader and bears lots of responsibilities to humanity.

Besides Catholicism, all religious doctrines and faiths are political. This goes beyond the organisational structure to the opportunistic use of religion by political leaders to achieve their political goals. Kenya’s ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition, a kakistocracy of sorts, illustrates the dangers of the obsession of self-proclaimed men of faith and God with regard to governance.

Among the highly cherished values of Christianity are humility, integrity, honesty, and hard work. These do not practically resonate with the President William Ruto administration. The Kenya Kwanza regime leaders consider themselves as saintly, holier-than-thou humans, but are the most corrupt, arrogant, and incompetent politicians to have ever existed.

What explains the existence of so many churches in Africa, yet the poverty levels are so high? Some of the wealthiest or richest individuals in Africa are church leaders. These are critical issues to think about if any semblance of mental emancipation is to permeate deep and wide in Africa.

I admire people and leaders who are non-conformist. Pope Francis was such. Independent-mindedness is a great virtue. Why would one conform to ordinary, routine thinking and practices? Failing to question or not attempting to disrupt the status quo does not guarantee progress. Many so-called leaders and humans either understand this and ignore it, or simply have no intellectual wherewithal to comprehend the essence of independent-mindedness. There can be no progress without non-conformity. Conformity, in some cases, equals mental slavery.

In 2017, Pope Francis hinted at the possibility of the Catholic Roman Church permitting married men to be ordained in areas with a shortage of priests. Two years later, he dismissed any potential changes to the celibacy rule. This stirred debate on allowing Catholic priests to marry. And these chaps should be allowed to marry. Not because marrying is cool or an achievement, but most of them have sexual affairs with women. In 2019, Pope Francis declined to approve marriage for priests, notwithstanding advocacy from some bishops to be permitted to marry.

Celibacy is a discipline and not a doctrine; hence, Pope Francis’ statement in 2023 that it is subject to revision. While making this statement, Pope Francis also referenced the practice of the Eastern Catholic Church, where married men are ordained as priests.

Sexual abuse is rife in the Roman Catholic Church as exemplified by numerous scandals implicating bishops and priests in the US, Chile, Germany, and Ireland. This was one of the major challenges that faced Pope Francis’ papacy. Three major reforms were enacted after the 2019 expulsion of former US Cardinal Theodore McCarrick and the May 2018 resignation of 34 bishops in Chile.

First, listening platforms were created in dioceses globally as channels where sexual abuses involving minors could be aired. Second, the abolishment of pontifical secrets covering sexual abuse crimes. Third, obligatory reporting of such issues by clerics to the church’s hierarchy. These measures were unlikely if Pope Francis had not apologised to victims and sought forgiveness in the aftermath of his 2018 visit to Chile, and the 2014 expert commission report that exonerated the perpetrators.

Initiatives by Pope Francis to reorganise the Vatican bureaucracy are some of the lesser talked about reforms he initiated. The Vatican’s financial position was long jeopardised by mismanagement, waste, and market catastrophe. He imposed salary cuts for cardinals, set a limit on gifts, emphasised competitive bidding procedures, insisted on modernity and transparency on books of accounts, and centralised assets and investments, among other measures.

The Pope’s pronouncements on other key and controversial issues illustrated his non-conformist nature and attempts at reform. In 2018, Pope Francis was criticised by conservative Catholics following his approval of an agreement with Beijing to regularise seven Chinese bishops. These were initially consecrated without the ratification of the Pope. The agreement is quite controversial. Its roots date back to 1951 when diplomatic relations broke down between the Vatican and China.

The Chinese government, after the Pope ratified the agreement, influences the people the Pope appoints as bishops. The seven bishops were appointed by the Chinese government and were recognised by the Pope without approval from the Vatican.

A few other examples stand out concerning Pope Francis’ attempts at reforms and going against the status quo. This article may not cover all of them. His attempt to strengthen relations between the Catholic Church – and Christianity to some extent – and Islam is historical. In 2019, Pope Francis met with Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar. They co-signed The Document on Human Fraternity to enhance tolerance and mutual respect between Christians and Muslims.

The death of Pope Francis and his succession are critical junctures for the Catholic Church and humanity. Pope Francis sought to elevate the Vatican’s relations with Catholics in Africa. He visited 10 African countries in his 12-year reign. These were 15 fewer than those visited by Pope John Paul II, whose era lasted 25 years. But they were seven more than the three visits by his immediate predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI. Pope Benedict XVI’s first and most notable visit was in Angola in 2009 for the 500th anniversary celebrations of Catholicism in the country. There is some interesting history on this.

But before sharing part of the history, there are high expectations among Roman Catholic faithful and other interested non-Catholics that the next pope should come from Africa. These expectations are dominant in the Global South countries. Some argue that since Pope Francis was the first non-European pope in modern history, the time is ripe for one whose country of origin is African. Inherently, Pope Francis had European roots. His father was an Italian immigrant from Piedmont, while his mother, though born in Buenos Aires, belonged to a family with origins in northern Italy. One could argue that he was not a pure or proper Argentinian.

According to scholarly research on the early church, some first-millennium popes were born in North Africa or were of African descent. Pope Gelasius I, Pope Miltiades, and Pope Victor I are believed to have belonged to the Berber/Amazigh ethnicity. Geographically, these popes and the Amazigh people then belonged to what historians refer to as the Roman Province of Africa. Rome’s influence resulted from the victory of the Roman Republic against Carthage following the Third Punic War. The Amazighs are in present-day Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia.

But these ancient times cannot neutralise the fact that the Catholic Church is yet to have a pope from Africa in modern history. One in five Catholics is African, and Africa is generally considered the future of the Catholic Church. It would be interesting to have an African pope, which would perhaps be a great reward for a continent with a high number of Catholics and a long history of allowing the Catholic Church to prosper.

The first black Catholic bishop in history was ordained in Rome after learning Portuguese and Latin in Lisbon, Portugal. The assumption here is that black refers to the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa. He was ordained at 11 years and was named Henrique. Henrique was one of the sons of Prince Nzinga Mvemba – named Afonso I by the Portuguese. I learned this from David Van Reybrouck’s book, Congo: The History of A People.

Mvemba was the king of the Kongo Empire from 1506 until 1543. Henrique’s journey to and residence in Portugal and eventual ordination were a reward for Mvemba’s cooperation with the Portuguese on socioeconomic issues, including supplying slaves. Mvemba was the son of King Nzinga Kuwu, who permitted the Portuguese missionaries in the Kongo Empire. The Kongo Empire stretched across parts of modern-day western DRC, northern Angola, southern Gabon, and the Congo Republic. Mbanza Kongo was the empire’s capital and is located in present-day Angola.

The Portuguese Jesuits and Italian Capuchins – orders within the Catholic Church – spread Catholicism and converted significant numbers of Congolese and Angolans from their African religious faith. This was a culmination of the consequences of the Portuguese’s first landing along the Kongo Empire’s coastline around 1482. The 500th anniversary visit by Pope Benedict XVI was tied to this.

Pope Francis was the quintessential powerful yet humble leader. To be a better leader, one has to learn different perspectives and practices from different leaders. This not only applies to leadership but also to humanity in general. Humility, simplicity, frugality, and integrity are values that are inherently despised by many. These values are rare in a world where humans are obsessively materialistic, power-hungry, and ruthlessly selfish.

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst. Email: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

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Kenyan Leaders Owe Us Insightful Autobiographies

I wrote this article after reflecting on some of the Kenyan autobiographies I have read, some recently. Autobiographies, in the case of Kenya, are mostly written in a person’s sunset years. This is usually after retirement from a high-profile public life.

Overall, I have read a good number of autobiographies and biographies in my adult life. I found some compelling and insightful. Others turned out average, and disappointingly, some do not measure up for a second reading or recommendation to someone else to read.

The first book I read in January 2025 was Francis Ole Kaparo’s memoir, Calming the Storms. This book by Kenya’s second-longest serving Speaker of the National Assembly did not match my expectations. Kenyan libraries, publishers, and readers need to do some soul-searching and write brutally honest book reviews before books get to the shelves.

Kaparo stands out as one of Kenya’s best parliamentary speakers alongside his successor Kenneth Marende. The bar has since fallen so low in the post-Kaparo and post-Marende eras. Despite their respective memberships to their parent political parties KANU and ODM, Kaparo and Marende were largely impartial when presiding over parliamentary business.

This is unlike the bias demonstrated by their successors. I detest President William Ruto’s remarks labelling Justin Muturi as fairly incompetent during his tenure as the Attorney General. Is there any state officer who demonstrates incompetence than William Ruto? Anyway, Muturi was quite incompetent as a Speaker of the National Assembly. He was tyrannical and unprofessional. He subverted the principle of separation of powers as envisaged in the Constitution; Muturi permitted the Executive’s control over the Legislature.

Muturi’s successor and university mate, Moses Wetang’ula, has so far treated us to sycophantic and unconstitutional fits at the National Assembly. Wetang’ula first declared the minority Kenya Kwanza as the majority coalition party instead of the Azimio La Umoja following his election as Speaker. He still maintained this snobbish stance after the courts ruled against his decision! What’s even more unappealing constitutionally is the fact that Wetang’ula serves as the leader of the now-weak FORD Kenya party. You want to know how competent a Kenyan politician is? Do not look any further than the party he or she leads. FORD Kenya under Wetang’ula has fast regressed to a political outfit that cannot win any seats beyond the Bukusu-dominated counties of Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia.

The 2013-2017 Senate Speaker Ekwee Ethuro was a supremely uninspiring figure. His temperament was measured but there is little to write home about any heroic accolades attributed to his leadership in the Senate. His successor, Ken Lusaka, was a mark-timer who treated the speakership as a strategic retreat before seeking to recapture the Bungoma gubernatorial seat. Lusaka’s successor, Amason Kingi, is too superficial and this reflects in his leadership.

Kaparo’s autobiography is quite generic. It is more of a life history text or some extensive eulogy with the author not deeply dissecting historical events that readers would be intrigued to read. First, there are numerous grammatical and factual errors in the book. The author may not have done sufficient proofreading. The second and third parties he may have engaged for editorial and proofreading roles probably did so little to catch these errors. I’m not sure if they were motivated enough or were out to soothe Kaparo’s ego.

A current or former high-profile public figure or state officer deserves to go beyond the usual life history accounts when penning an autobiography. An autobiography is a grand opportunity to strongly project one’s philosophical beliefs and write successes and regrets memorably.

Regrettably, Kaparo’s explanations of critical historical junctures are relatively short and generic and do not offer any new information or perspective. Politicians or high-profile personalities who have been in political corridors should first think of bringing out unknown details or new perspectives when working on their autobiographies. They need to understand that Kenya’s history is patched up and this is a gap they should seek to fill.

Kaparo had a glorious opportunity to give readers and historians tangible stuff in chapters six, seven, eight, and ten. In chapter six, Kaparo reflects on his decision to contest for the speakership. He also uncovers the 1991 KANU conference in which former President Daniel Moi went against the wishes of the delegates to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution. Why would Kaparo squeeze the details of such important historical events into five to six pages?

I admire Oginga Odinga’s and Raila Odinga’s autobiographies save for the latter’s back-handed undemocratic political arrangements with ruling parties and coalitions. In Not Yet Uhuru, Oginga Odinga takes his time to thoroughly reflect and write on historical events, particularly the struggle for independence and the post-colonial era poor governance.

Not Yet Uhuru enriches Kenya’s historical discourse and literature. One reads it and certainly feels compelled to constantly reference it. Raila Odinga’s, The Flame of Freedom, is immaculate. Developments related to the post-Kenyatta era, the 1982 coup attempt, the fight for the Second Liberation, the multiparty era, the NARC years, the 2005 referendum, the post-election violence, and the Grand Coalition Government are comprehensively written.

Kaparo is either mean with words, economical with the truth, or he was perhaps ostracised by the deep state not to have much information on the historical events he attempts to write about. Chapter six would be rich and engrossing had Kaparo documented the unknown intrigues during his time as Speaker and the struggle leading to the re-introduction of multipartyism. Chapter seven is not worth reading. It is a complete waste of time. Chapter eight is also underwhelming. Fifteen pages are too few as so much happened between 2002 and 2007.

In chapter ten, Kaparo writes about the founding and his chairmanship of the URP party led by William Ruto from around 2012 to 2017. Kaparo’s claims on what led to the formation of URP are quite ridiculous. He purports that URP’s founders were motivated by the need to field candidates countrywide and present it as a national party. He goes ahead to chide parties such as ODM, Wiper, FORD Kenya, FORD Asili, FORD People, and the Democratic Party for being ethnic-based outfits. Kaparo selectively sidesteps the fact that URP was formed to bring together the interests of the so-called pastoralist and Nilotic ethnic groups. URP’s ethnic base was among the Kalenjins and ethnic communities in the North Eastern region.

What’s more, Kaparo grandiosely claims that only KANU had a national appeal. This demonstrates his lack of appreciation of historical facts. What contributed to KANU having a nationwide presence? The events of August 1, 1982, transformed Moi from a somewhat humble and despised politician to a ruthless, authoritarian, paranoid one. A consequence of Moi’s insecurities and paranoia was the declaration of Kenya as a single-party state de jure (by law). Kaparo overlooks this in his criticism of the aforementioned parties as tribal outfits. Facts are stubborn; ODM had a much more nationwide presence compared to URP.

There are several half-witted, misrepresented, and outrageous arguments written by Kaparo in his memoirs. His argument for settling on the name of the URP party, especially the word “republican” (URP stands for United Republican Party), took me aback. According to Kaparo, URP founders were driven by the ambition to defeat the formation of a federalist (majimbo) system of government in Kenya. Mark you this was around two years after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution that institutionalised devolution and not federalism.

Kaparo goes ahead noting that the URP founders were worried about the introduction of socialism and communism in Kenya through the backdoor. This is extremely superficial and denotes a lack of intellectual wherewithal. Kaparo posits that the URP founders were uneasy about the Kenyan version of federalists merging American federalism with aspects of the former USSR’s governance, hence his unfounded claims on communism and socialism.

I squirmed while reading this bit and felt I had enough of such half-witted reflections from Kaparo. During the Cold War, there were attempts by the USSR just like the US to strengthen geostrategic interests in Kenya. But I think communism and socialism innuendos in Kenya are exaggerated. These were the outcomes of propaganda linked to the British and American governments and press after independence. One can easily conclude that URP was not in favour of the implementation of the 2010 Constitution. And you do not need to look far with its leader, William Ruto, having led campaigns against it prior to the 2010 referendum. So, we should not be surprised by the performance of the Ruto-led administration.

Leaders should give us compelling autobiographies that would significantly contribute to Kenya’s knowledge base. This is not limited to politicians. We have leaders in different sectors or areas; business, not-for-profits, security and defence, sports, and education among others.

I have had enough of reading sub-par books from personalities widely exposed in different sectors in Kenya. Kaparo’s Calming the Storms reminds me of Lee Njiru’s President’s Pressman. Lots of grammatical errors and superficial documentation of historical events. Njiru would rather not have written his memoirs.

And I will not fall short of expressing my displeasure against public figures who have retired, about to retire, or died without writing autobiographies. Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa, George Saitoti, and other high-profile politicians and non-political personalities who died without penning autobiographies failed Kenya. Autobiographies should not be post-retirement adventures. I hope to soon read some good ones from individuals I consider influential in my life. But they are showing little to no effort!

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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Insecurity Surges in the Sahel amid Anti-Imperialism Fervour

The Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger triggered some excitement in several parts of Africa in the aftermath of military coups. Perhaps coups were not the ideal way to institutionalise power transfer. However, there were frustrations with the inability of civilian governments to decisively address insecurity in the region. Insecurity is the main cause of these coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Burkina Faso had two coups in 2022; in January and September. Several coup attempts have also been reported over the last two years. Mali had three coups between 2012 and 2021. Niger’s military takeover occurred in July 2023.

Insecurity is worsening in these countries. Terrorist groups active in the region, including the Islamic State Sahel Province (previously Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and others seem to be expanding their territorial reach. The fact that armed groups, including terrorists, are intensifying their activities highlights the failure of the military juntas to successfully combat them. These governments have noble intentions to fight insecurity but this remains a Herculean task given their limited resources among other factors.

The Fall of Gaddafi: An Accelerator of Insecurity in the Sahel

Muammar Gaddafi was a misunderstood personality. Perceptions about his so-called dictatorial and anti-West nature were shaped largely by Western propaganda. Ten years ago, I read Gaddafi’s “Green Book”, a brief text elaborating his political philosophy. Well, he was some intellectual of sorts. Obviously, his book is likely to be quickly dismissed for a propaganda instrument. Nonetheless, he explains the organisation and philosophy of his leadership.

In a world accustomed to Western standards of life, including political institutions, Gaddafi’s argument for popular conferences and people’s committees as better alternatives to modern-day parliaments kind of makes sense. It is drawn from the socio-political organisation of ancient societies. Rightly, traditional Africa, Arabic, and Asian societies chose rulers either through communal consensus or naturally via a kingship system. A host of Western societies also practiced such. But colonialism introduced and reinforced a system of governance that was contrarian to beliefs and practices of Africans and other nationalities in the Global South.

Anyway, NATO accomplished its long-held imperialistic dream of getting rid of Gaddafi, but this turned out to be another failed mission by Washington. Former President Barrack Obama has admitted his administration’s foreign policy failures in Libya. In hindsight, Gaddafi was arm-twisted by the US and its allies not to enrich Libya’s military-industrial complex. When the onslaught commenced, Gaddafi had no reliable warfare to counter NATO’s. He was exposed and relied on mercenaries from Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. It is estimated 10,000 mercenaries were recruited by Gaddafi.

These mercenaries retreated to their backyards with Gaddafi’s ouster and death in 2011 sealing their fate financially. Their retreat implied a flow of weapons across the region. Don’t get it wrong; terrorist networks and armed groups existed in several parts of Africa prior to Gaddafi’s fall. However, Libya’s rupture and the movement of these groups exacerbated the threat of insurgency.

Mali was the first casualty following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion which resulted in a military coup in the same year. Tuaregs formed the largest contingent of mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi. The rebellion further evolved into widespread terrorism. Terrorists took advantage of the political situation to expand their operational reach. The situation also worsened in Burkina Faso from 2015 due to political instability.

Unpopular Foreign Military Interventions

The Sahel military regimes blame foreign military interventions, especially by France, for insecurity. This perhaps stems from French troops cooperating with some armed groups as a strategy to prevent the spread of insurgency, especially in Mali. France takes the blame for the political and economic exploitation of Francophone African states. Historically, France has masterminded coups, rigged elections, and sucked the economies of these countries. The anti-French stances adopted as the official foreign policy of these junta states have roots in the imperial French colonial past.

A critical issue to think about at this juncture is whether military interventions failed in the Sahel region or not. Partly, yes. Partly, no. Affirmatively, Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane, particularly the latter, were perceived as France’s occupation instead of interventions aimed at combating insurgencies. Commonsensically, Operation Barkhane would be expected to be successful after its eight-year presence. But terrorist groups gained more ground in this period across the region. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) failed to restore security in Mali despite its ten-year presence.

In the wake of the failures of these interventions, the governments of Sahel countries shift blame to France, MINUSMA, and other external entities. They are responsible for the deteriorating security in the region. This highlights why the region has become a coup belt. Nonetheless, the military-led governments are yet to improve the security situation having previously blamed civilian-led regimes for not aggressively combating armed groups. This illustrates that military governments are not solutions to weaknesses in statecraft.

Alternative Security Arrangements Not Promising

Security initiatives hatched by the Sahel states seem ineffective. While foreign military interventions failed to combat armed groups, local and regional-driven measures have not improved the security situation. For instance, the G5 Sahel Joint Force was unsuccessful in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Fingers were pointed to France’s support of this joint force one of the reasons for its failure. However, none of these states want to take responsibility for persisting insecurity. Mali withdrew from the G5 in May 2022 and was later followed by Burkina Faso and Niger which exited in November 2023. These three states accused the joint force of failing to combat insurgents. But they did not assertively allocate enough resources towards the joint force. The military regimes and their supporters will quickly blame the civilian-led governments at that time but this is a lame argument since they have not improved the security situation. This issue will also cripple the operations of the joint force formed by the three countries under the Alliance of Sahel States.

The Sahel juntas anticipated strategic assistance from Russia through defense and security cooperation, which has increased over the last three years. Moscow has delivered more military equipment. Russia has organized strategic training and other capacity-building and development initiatives for the Sahel forces. Russian mercenaries have been deployed in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Yet, the security situation remains precarious. The juntas perhaps anticipated the mercenaries to succeed as they did in the Central African Republic. However, they ignored the dynamics of these comparative security environments.

At the time of the deployment of the first contingent of Wagner mercenaries in Mali in December 2021, the Russo-Ukrainian war had not broken out. It is possible the situation could be different if there was no war. The Sahel states would be almost guaranteed near-unfettered access to the Russian military-industrial complex’s weapons and personnel. Who knows if Russian military personnel would be deployed on Sahelian soil? Quite cagey though as Moscow prefers mercenaries to avoid reputational hazards associated with troop deployment and misconduct. Maybe huge armies of mercenaries could be deployed instead of Russian soldiers. But these mercenaries are on the frontlines in the war. Even in the long run, the mercenaries do not hold any magic bullet in helping the Sahel states combat armed groups.

The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is a lame institution with respect to addressing insecurity in the region. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States illustrates slow progress or none in improving the security situation by the ECOWAS. ECOWAS loudly threatened military intervention against the military regime in Niger prior to Burkina Faso and Mali ratifying their exit from the West African regional bloc. These were tantrums at best given that ECOWAS has all along been spineless since insurgencies intensified over a decade ago. At this moment and in the long term, ECOWAS can at best cooperate with the Alliance of Sahel States against insecurity in the region. Such cooperation seems unlikely due to multiple interests and factors.

The African Union (AU) lacks ambition and purpose against armed conflict. The AU excels at formulating policy blueprints regarding the continent’s future. However, the AU lacks the intellectual, personnel, and financial commitment to implement these blueprints. The Agenda 2063 formulated in 2013 envisaged the silencing of guns across Africa by 2020. Five years after the deadline, armed conflicts are a norm across Africa. Apart from the insurgencies in the Sahel, wars persist in Sudan and eastern DRC. Terrorism is on an upward trajectory in Somalia, Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique, and eastern DRC among other regions. Rebellions continue threatening Ethiopia’s unity. Libya’s instability and insecurity seem not to give sleepless nights to the AU’s hierarchy. The AU’s complacency is not shocking though. For a continental institution whose headquarters was built by China and whose members are unbothered to fully finance its operations, nothing much can be expected from it. The AU’s response to armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel is poor.

Outlook

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are technically on their own to address insecurity. Their best shot at meaningful cooperation to enhance joint counter-insurgency operations is Russia. But Moscow is entangled in a war against Ukraine. The anti-French sentiments fundamentally echo anti-cooperation with Western countries. The US is unlikely to take the front seat to attempt to succeed where the French failed. The prospects are so low for Trump’s administration to meddle in additional armed conflicts in Africa. On February 11, the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Washington’s partners in Africa must take the lead on their security. China’s involvement in such conflicts is unthinkable. Turkiye could be tempted but it is currently best placed to be a supplier of military equipment for its emerging military-industrial complex.

Terrorism will persist in the Sahel. This implies that political instability will continue in the region. Additional coups and coup attempts are certain. The joint force by the Alliance of Sahel States is not a security nostrum. This effort must be backed up with broad, well-coordinated security operations by ECOWAS and the AU. It is important to note though that tackling insecurity in the Sahel should not be an isolated affair. Pursuing and restoring stability in Libya, Sudan, the Lake Chad region, the Horn, and other parts of Africa is critical for Sahel’s stability. Yet, African state and non-state agencies are not acting fast enough to stem the insecurity crisis in the Sahel. The region’s military governments are attempting to thrive on the anti-imperialism mantra. But time is catching up with them on this amorphous management of state affairs. They may not be competent enough to transform their countries.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

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