Raila Odinga: A Remembrance

My earliest memories of the enigmatic Raila Odinga were in the late 1990s, when I was in my formative schooling years. This was shortly after the 1997 election, which Daniel Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party allegedly won.

Moi rigged votes in his favour, and 1997 was an opportunity for him to demonstrate his mastery of the cutbacks on electoral systems. These nascent memories are courtesy of my father, who religiously purchased copies of the three major newspapers then – the Daily Nation, the Standard, and the People’s Daily.

Around that time, my curiosity was also elevated by access to copies of contemporary political publications, such as the Society Magazine and the Weekly Review. My dad had copies of these publications, some dating to the early 1990s when multiparty politics was reintroduced. I cannot clearly recall some key political events that followed shortly after the elections. This includes the 1998 cooperation between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP), then led by Raila Odinga.

By 2001, I had a keen interest in political events. I recollect the June 2001 appointment of Raila Odinga and other NDP MPs to the Cabinet by Moi. The newspapers and radio stations extensively broadcast Raila’s appointment as energy minister. Others who joined the Cabinet were Adhu Awiti (planning minister), Orwa Ojode (education assistant minister), and Peter Odoyo (foreign affairs assistant minister).

Months later, in March 2002, one of the most consequential political events occurred: the KANU-NDP merger. I was in boarding school at that time, but managed to get access to newspapers. A month or so later, when schools closed for the April holiday, I went through newspapers page by page at home to keep up with the merger. Luckily, the media was still covering the significance of the event. It was unclear at that time if Moi would leave the presidency or extend his term despite his insistence on retiring by sticking to the two-term presidential term limit. A formidable, broad-based opposition movement was uncertain then.

Moi’s endorsement of Uhuru Kenyatta seven months later, on October 14, 2002, shifted the momentum and paved the way for the eventual formation of a united opposition coalition against Moi and KANU. Since then, Raila remained a highly influential political player, a colossus of sorts, until his death.

Following the death of the legendary Franco Luambo Makiadi on October 12, 1989, Sam Mangwana described him as “a man who comes once in 100 years.” Mangwana inherently referred to Franco’s combination of musical brilliance, leadership, innovation, and lyrical power that was so rare in a career that spanned four decades. Franco also commanded a religious following, and his music is immortal.

Parallels can be drawn between Raila Odinga and Luambo Makiadi. First, their souls departed in October. Three days before Odinga’s death, I had passionately celebrated Luambo’s 36th death anniversary. Probably great men, revolutionaries, die in October. Thomas Sankara and Samora Machel died on October 15, 1987, and October 19, 1986, respectively. Second, the two lives of these legends offer lessons in longevity. They mastered the art of reinventing themselves amid fierce competition and changing times.

Third, they commanded a cult-like following in life and in death. There are charismatic people all over, but very few are uniquely charming. Fourth, Luambo and Odinga were pragmatists and built their admirable careers by building alliances. They worked with their rivals, a typically Machiavellian power strategy.

Raila Odinga had power arrangements with Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Uhuru Kenyatta, and William Ruto. To many, these were personal and opportunistic. But they embodied the pragmatic sense of acquiring power. This is not an endorsement of the formation of the broad-based government. The Grand Master of Congolese rhumba and African music, Luambo Makiadi, forged alliances with one of his biggest rivals, Tabu Ley Rochereau. This union of legends produced one of the best music compositions.

My respect for Mwai Kibaki waned following the events of the controversial 2007 elections. While I was a high school student, I was politically conscious. I wondered why Kibaki would mastermind vote rigging when Odinga had won. It was confusing. A day or two before Chief Justice Evan Gicheru swore in Kibaki, I went to bed ecstatic, fantasizing about a Raila Odinga presidency.

The headline of the Saturday Standard the following day affirmed my conviction of Raila Odinga winning the presidential election. My father had sent me to purchase a copy of the dailies to keep track of the election developments. Odinga had polled 3.34 million votes against Kibaki’s 2.45 million. Later that evening, a tide swept, and votes apparently streamed in from the so-called Kibaki strongholds, including the infamous Tharaka Nithi.

Tensions were visibly high at the national tallying centre at the KICC. Odinga looked deeply frustrated with his lieutenants, James Orengo, William Ruto, et al., demanding fairness from the then chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu. Anyway, an Odinga presidency never materialised. I could not fathom why Odinga would let it go, having run one of the most remarkable and consequential political campaigns in Kenya’s political history.

In his autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, and multiple interviews, Odinga maintains that he chose to form the grand coalition government in 2008 for the sake of national unity. This was despite objections by hardliners in the ODM negotiating team at the Serena Hotel who wanted nothing less than Kibaki conceding or the formation of a transitional government leading to elections in a few months.

Odinga reiterated the need for national unity following his political reconciliation with Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2018 and William Ruto in 2024. I am convinced the 2008 Odinga was fundamentally different from the one in 2018 and 2024, and perhaps the 1998 one.

The 2008 Odinga was much more concerned about national unity, given the widespread post-election violence. But the Odinga of 1998, 2018, and 2024 was an opportunistic one who aimed at securing his political and economic interests. The 1998 KANU-NDP cooperation was a strategic maneuver by Odinga to position himself as a potential successor to Daniel Moi in 2002. Odinga played this card, having in mind a possible divided opposition and the fact that no high-ranking KANU leaders had experience in running in presidential elections.

It would be out of order to claim he pushed for his economic interests to secure the purchase of the Kisumu molasses factory in light of the political cooperation with KANU. A significant number of people claim that the land where the factory was located was illegally acquired by Spectre International, the Odinga family business. These allegations are traced to the 2003 Ndung’u Land Commission Report. According to the report, “direct allocation of alienated government land to the company (Spectre International) by the commissioner of lands was illegal.”

A few interesting facts! The Ndung’u Commission was established following a report by a task force Odinga formed in 2003, when he was the minister for roads, public works, and housing. The aim was to assess the status of government property and housing amid deeply entrenched corruption. Second, the government acquired the molasses factory land in 1982, but payments for the land were not made in full. Bidding for the factory gained momentum in the mid-1990s.

Foul play cannot be ruled out in the findings of the Ndung’u Report on Spectre’s illegal acquisition of the land. Lots of political witch-hunting was at play by mid-2003, a few months after the formation of the NARC administration. Two camps had emerged over the failure to implement the infamous power-sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Kibaki-led National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Raila-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These were the principal units that formed NARC.

Were it not for a court order sought by Spectre International in January 2006, perhaps the company, Odinga, and others would have been prosecuted. Kibaki’s acolytes were not leaving anything to chance, especially after the embarrassing defeat in the August 2005 constitutional referendum. It was evident by then that Odinga would be a force to reckon with in the 2007 elections.

Political and economic interests motivated the extra-constitutional power arrangements of 2018 and 2024. The 2018 one could have targeted cutting off William Ruto from Kenyatta and weakening him in the run-up to the 2017 election. It never worked with Ruto playing victim. The 2024 arrangement occurred when Ruto was extremely desperate following a wave of youth-led protests. The fact that this power deal was followed by the impeachment of then Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua raises suspicions.

It is difficult to figure out the specific political goal Odinga was pursuing. Was he strategically positioning ODM to be a principal coalition partner with UDA in 2027? Or was he just playing the good guy card to cement his status as a statesman? On both occasions, the commercial interests of the Odinga family were on the table.

I embraced Odinga’s ideologies in the lead-up to the 2007 election, given the manner in which he packaged his campaign messaging. He built his manifesto on infrastructure as the key to transforming Kenya’s socioeconomic fortunes. Little credit is given to Raila Odinga for being the brainchild of some notable physical infrastructure projects. The Thika Superhighway, the LAPSETT corridor project, and multiple by-passes in Nairobi were conceptualised by Odinga. To me, he stands out as the most progressive roads minister in Kenya’s history.

At the onset of the NARC administration, Odinga, with gusto, oversaw the demolition of structures built on road reserves. He attempted to inject some sanity as Kenya was transitioning from an irredeemably corrupt Moi administration. The construction of the Raila Odinga Way, previously known as Mbagathi Way, highlights his legacy and embodies his high value for posterity. He was on record many times, noting that most of his decisions are based on posterity.

The Raila Odinga Way was initiated during his time as roads minister, and it was constructed from 2005 to 2007. It was a pilot project to assess the viability of concrete road technology in the country. The road is still in shape almost two decades later.

One has to admire Odinga for his resilience, willpower, and intellect. Few can survive eight years of detention, considering the physical and psychological torture victims are subjected to. It is even more agonizing to imagine Odinga’s mum and brother died and got buried while he was in detention. Odinga endured the loss of his four siblings and eldest son but chose to fight for a cause larger than his life. He lost the presidential election multiple times but stayed on course.

Odinga’s resilience resonates with Viktor Frankl’s thoughts in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning. This excerpt from the book’s preface highlights Frankl’s view on finding purpose in life even during moments of suffering:

“…The great task for any person is to find meaning in his or her life: in work (doing something significant), in love (caring for another person), and in courage in difficult times…Suffering in and of itself is meaningless; we give our suffering meaning by the way in which we respond to it…”

His autobiography, The Flame of Freedom, remains one of my favourite memoirs, especially in the Kenyan context. It is relatively rich in history. Most Kenyan autobiographies are quite shallow and read more like eulogies than texts meant to inspire thinking, belief, and action.

Raila also authored Quest for Nationhood – Roadmap to Our Future. As revealed by one of his sisters on the burial day, he was working on another book on Pan-Africanism. He had also instructed Anyang’ Nyong’o to work on a paper on nationhood and tribalism just before his demise.

I highly value people who have been in the limelight to pen down the intrigues of their lives, motivations, purpose, and achievements. In one of my blog posts, I stated the need for such figures to give us more books, but meaningful ones. I have read memoirs that left me cursing the authors for presenting underwhelming information despite having been in the corridors of power.

His father’s, Not Yet Uhuru, is also a remarkable autobiography. Raila Odinga stands out among the few Kenyan politicians who found meaning in writing books, again for posterity purposes. Apart from Anyang’ Nyong’o, it is difficult to easily identify politicians who are intellectually grounded. And I do not imply academic qualifications…We glorify the practice of acquiring academic certificates instead of valuing intellectualism. There is a high deficit of thinkers in Kenya.

It is a generational tragedy that politicians annoyingly talk of Kenya as the next Singapore, yet their woeful intellects tell of a limited understanding of the formidable thinker Lee Kuan Yew was. I am hopeless for a better Kenya.

Odinga was overall well-informed, not just about history, but about many issues. His parliamentary contributions and Cabinet briefings demonstrated a man who highly valued knowledge.

The most consequential deaths generally lead to destructive institutional episodes, largely due to internal contradictions. The ODM party will wane, and the political careers of Odinga’s hangers-on will die with his demise. Despite his intellect and strong belief in institutions, Odinga did not build ODM for posterity. He failed to overcome the Kenyan political party culture, where parties are built around personalities and not effective institutional elements.

I cannot blame him for this. This is a culture primarily associated with the political parties that emerged with the reintroduction of multiparty politics. However, this goes further back to the colonial era. Perhaps KANU, after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, escaped this. His successor, Moi, was deeply entrenched in the system, and an inherent succession plan was already in place before his death.

FORD-Kenya weakened significantly with Oginga Odinga’s death in 1994. Tragedy struck the party the second time within a decade in August 2003 with the death of Vice President Kijana Wamalwa. The party sank deeper. Currently, its leaders are proud to have it as the most popular party among the Bukusu people in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia counties.

KANU lost its allure with Daniel Moi’s exit from the presidency. Moi personalized KANU after Jomo’s death. One of the primary causes was the 1982 coup attempt that prompted him to consolidate power and resulted in the legal ban of other parties.

Multiple factions within ODM will eventually split and weaken it. Part of the leadership led by the Secretary General, Edwin Sifuna, opposes the broad-based government and vouches for the party to field a presidential candidate in 2027. Others strongly support the broad-based government and vow to support Ruto’s reelection.

Appointing Raila’s brother, Oburu Oginga, as the acting party leader may have been motivated by paranoia and interests. Large political parties in Kenya are extensively family enterprises. This, plus other factors, will hasten the party’s weakening.

ODM has been on a gradual downward trajectory in the past decade. This is supported by its performance in the 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, apart from presidential polls. Its agreement with UDA/KKA to form the broad-based government impacted it significantly. Weeks ago, its SG Sifuna raised concerns about the fading desire by aspirants to run for elections on ODM.

Oburu lacks the national appeal that Raila enjoyed. I am careful not to refer to Oburu as weak – and I do not mean physically – but he does not inspire confidence. There are leaders whose supporters can go to war for. At least not Oburu.

Raila’s eldest brother is safeguarding the interests of ODM ‘conservatives.’ Linked to this are Ruto’s interests and machinations to win ODM’s support for his unassured reelection. Ruto might have influenced the selection of Oburu as the acting party leader. Ruto’s political career could be a victim of Raila’s death. A fractured ODM and a united opposition spell doom for him.

I have keenly listened to Oburu’s speeches after assuming the party leader’s role of ODM. Fundamentally, it’s double-speak. His speeches carry a reconciliatory tone. But the power arrangement between ODM and UDA/KKA is intact. Oburu was a staunch supporter of this extra-constitutional arrangement when Raila was alive. (I will dedicate the next few weeks to digging deeper and understanding Oburu’s worldview and leadership. But the November 2nd, 2025, Sunday Nation’s Weekly Review was a good starting point. His autobiography is on my bucket list).

In September 2024, Raila Odinga, with the NEC’s endorsement, settled on Anyang’ Nyong’o as the party’s acting leader. This was at the onset of Odinga’s campaigns for the chairperson’s position of the African Union Commission (AUC).

Nyong’o is a near ideological twin to Raila and would make a better party leader than Oburu ideologically. But the two gentlemen are aging. They may resonate with the generational shift in Kenyan politics. Even so, Oburu should facilitate a transition to relatively youthful leadership for posterity.

For ODM to remain relevant and possibly become vibrant, it must embrace youthful leadership. It should brand itself as the political party of the present and the future. The present and the future of Kenya oscillate on political and economic solutions that address the plight of the youth.

The three ODM deputy party leaders are not visionaries. The immediate former two deputy party leaders who were appointed as Cabinet Secretaries in the broad-based government are not good enough to lead ODM. Ideally, an ODM of the future should be built around Sifuna’s talents. He stands out as a visionary and the most qualified to lead the party.

I will forever miss Raila Odinga. His legacy for pro-democratic reforms is solid. His intellect is admirable. His decision-making for posterity is cherished. It is unbelievable that he died. Looks like a dream!

May his soul rest in eternal peace!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst and strategist. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

Pope Francis: Reflections

I admired Pope Francis for his humility, frugality, and simplicity. I mostly distance myself from religious discussions, debates, and engagements, given the extreme emotional attachment abound in most humans. Nonetheless, religion is as old as humanity and takes different forms; Supreme Beings, gods, spirits, rituals, and other perceived holy incantations.

Religion is inherently man’s creation and plays a significant role in maintaining social order. But it is also a powerful manipulation tool, which powerful kingdoms, states, and leaders have historically used to hoodwink and threaten the masses. Anyway, I do not want to get lost debating the sanctity or profanity arising from religion. I attempt to reflect on the essence of Pope Francis, his leadership, and some historical accounts related to the subject matter.

Around two decades ago, I flirted with the idea of embracing Roman Catholicism. However, I was unimpressed with the complex rituals one was required to go through before being considered a proper Roman Catholic. I attended multiple mass sessions, and since then, I have never entertained any flirtations with Catholicism. I am still fascinated by the history of Catholicism and, overall, other religious faiths.

My early intellectual exploits to understand the history and dominance of the Roman Catholic church led to reading a controversial book by Bill Hughes. The Secret Terrorists is a short, fascinating text attempting to link the Jesuits to various forms of ‘terrorism’, including the assassination of several US presidents, the sinking of the Titanic ship, the attack on the World Trade Centre, and the Waco Massacre, among others. Hughes attempts to present a compelling account of the Jesuits’ desire to restore the dominance of the pope in the world. This is an intriguing read, but some of its parts are full of conspiracy.

Pope Francis was a Jesuit. In fact, he was the first Jesuit pope. Jesuits are a religious order within the Roman Catholic Church, often referred to as the Society of Jesus. Not all Roman Catholics are Jesuits, but all Jesuits are Roman Catholics. The Vatican and the entire Roman Catholic order are primarily political, hence my interest in understanding its functioning. A pope is a global leader and bears lots of responsibilities to humanity.

Besides Catholicism, all religious doctrines and faiths are political. This goes beyond the organisational structure to the opportunistic use of religion by political leaders to achieve their political goals. Kenya’s ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition, a kakistocracy of sorts, illustrates the dangers of the obsession of self-proclaimed men of faith and God with regard to governance.

Among the highly cherished values of Christianity are humility, integrity, honesty, and hard work. These do not practically resonate with the President William Ruto administration. The Kenya Kwanza regime leaders consider themselves as saintly, holier-than-thou humans, but are the most corrupt, arrogant, and incompetent politicians to have ever existed.

What explains the existence of so many churches in Africa, yet the poverty levels are so high? Some of the wealthiest or richest individuals in Africa are church leaders. These are critical issues to think about if any semblance of mental emancipation is to permeate deep and wide in Africa.

I admire people and leaders who are non-conformist. Pope Francis was such. Independent-mindedness is a great virtue. Why would one conform to ordinary, routine thinking and practices? Failing to question or not attempting to disrupt the status quo does not guarantee progress. Many so-called leaders and humans either understand this and ignore it, or simply have no intellectual wherewithal to comprehend the essence of independent-mindedness. There can be no progress without non-conformity. Conformity, in some cases, equals mental slavery.

In 2017, Pope Francis hinted at the possibility of the Catholic Roman Church permitting married men to be ordained in areas with a shortage of priests. Two years later, he dismissed any potential changes to the celibacy rule. This stirred debate on allowing Catholic priests to marry. And these chaps should be allowed to marry. Not because marrying is cool or an achievement, but most of them have sexual affairs with women. In 2019, Pope Francis declined to approve marriage for priests, notwithstanding advocacy from some bishops to be permitted to marry.

Celibacy is a discipline and not a doctrine; hence, Pope Francis’ statement in 2023 that it is subject to revision. While making this statement, Pope Francis also referenced the practice of the Eastern Catholic Church, where married men are ordained as priests.

Sexual abuse is rife in the Roman Catholic Church as exemplified by numerous scandals implicating bishops and priests in the US, Chile, Germany, and Ireland. This was one of the major challenges that faced Pope Francis’ papacy. Three major reforms were enacted after the 2019 expulsion of former US Cardinal Theodore McCarrick and the May 2018 resignation of 34 bishops in Chile.

First, listening platforms were created in dioceses globally as channels where sexual abuses involving minors could be aired. Second, the abolishment of pontifical secrets covering sexual abuse crimes. Third, obligatory reporting of such issues by clerics to the church’s hierarchy. These measures were unlikely if Pope Francis had not apologised to victims and sought forgiveness in the aftermath of his 2018 visit to Chile, and the 2014 expert commission report that exonerated the perpetrators.

Initiatives by Pope Francis to reorganise the Vatican bureaucracy are some of the lesser talked about reforms he initiated. The Vatican’s financial position was long jeopardised by mismanagement, waste, and market catastrophe. He imposed salary cuts for cardinals, set a limit on gifts, emphasised competitive bidding procedures, insisted on modernity and transparency on books of accounts, and centralised assets and investments, among other measures.

The Pope’s pronouncements on other key and controversial issues illustrated his non-conformist nature and attempts at reform. In 2018, Pope Francis was criticised by conservative Catholics following his approval of an agreement with Beijing to regularise seven Chinese bishops. These were initially consecrated without the ratification of the Pope. The agreement is quite controversial. Its roots date back to 1951 when diplomatic relations broke down between the Vatican and China.

The Chinese government, after the Pope ratified the agreement, influences the people the Pope appoints as bishops. The seven bishops were appointed by the Chinese government and were recognised by the Pope without approval from the Vatican.

A few other examples stand out concerning Pope Francis’ attempts at reforms and going against the status quo. This article may not cover all of them. His attempt to strengthen relations between the Catholic Church – and Christianity to some extent – and Islam is historical. In 2019, Pope Francis met with Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar. They co-signed The Document on Human Fraternity to enhance tolerance and mutual respect between Christians and Muslims.

The death of Pope Francis and his succession are critical junctures for the Catholic Church and humanity. Pope Francis sought to elevate the Vatican’s relations with Catholics in Africa. He visited 10 African countries in his 12-year reign. These were 15 fewer than those visited by Pope John Paul II, whose era lasted 25 years. But they were seven more than the three visits by his immediate predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI. Pope Benedict XVI’s first and most notable visit was in Angola in 2009 for the 500th anniversary celebrations of Catholicism in the country. There is some interesting history on this.

But before sharing part of the history, there are high expectations among Roman Catholic faithful and other interested non-Catholics that the next pope should come from Africa. These expectations are dominant in the Global South countries. Some argue that since Pope Francis was the first non-European pope in modern history, the time is ripe for one whose country of origin is African. Inherently, Pope Francis had European roots. His father was an Italian immigrant from Piedmont, while his mother, though born in Buenos Aires, belonged to a family with origins in northern Italy. One could argue that he was not a pure or proper Argentinian.

According to scholarly research on the early church, some first-millennium popes were born in North Africa or were of African descent. Pope Gelasius I, Pope Miltiades, and Pope Victor I are believed to have belonged to the Berber/Amazigh ethnicity. Geographically, these popes and the Amazigh people then belonged to what historians refer to as the Roman Province of Africa. Rome’s influence resulted from the victory of the Roman Republic against Carthage following the Third Punic War. The Amazighs are in present-day Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia.

But these ancient times cannot neutralise the fact that the Catholic Church is yet to have a pope from Africa in modern history. One in five Catholics is African, and Africa is generally considered the future of the Catholic Church. It would be interesting to have an African pope, which would perhaps be a great reward for a continent with a high number of Catholics and a long history of allowing the Catholic Church to prosper.

The first black Catholic bishop in history was ordained in Rome after learning Portuguese and Latin in Lisbon, Portugal. The assumption here is that black refers to the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa. He was ordained at 11 years and was named Henrique. Henrique was one of the sons of Prince Nzinga Mvemba – named Afonso I by the Portuguese. I learned this from David Van Reybrouck’s book, Congo: The History of A People.

Mvemba was the king of the Kongo Empire from 1506 until 1543. Henrique’s journey to and residence in Portugal and eventual ordination were a reward for Mvemba’s cooperation with the Portuguese on socioeconomic issues, including supplying slaves. Mvemba was the son of King Nzinga Kuwu, who permitted the Portuguese missionaries in the Kongo Empire. The Kongo Empire stretched across parts of modern-day western DRC, northern Angola, southern Gabon, and the Congo Republic. Mbanza Kongo was the empire’s capital and is located in present-day Angola.

The Portuguese Jesuits and Italian Capuchins – orders within the Catholic Church – spread Catholicism and converted significant numbers of Congolese and Angolans from their African religious faith. This was a culmination of the consequences of the Portuguese’s first landing along the Kongo Empire’s coastline around 1482. The 500th anniversary visit by Pope Benedict XVI was tied to this.

Pope Francis was the quintessential powerful yet humble leader. To be a better leader, one has to learn different perspectives and practices from different leaders. This not only applies to leadership but also to humanity in general. Humility, simplicity, frugality, and integrity are values that are inherently despised by many. These values are rare in a world where humans are obsessively materialistic, power-hungry, and ruthlessly selfish.

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst. Email: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

Kenyan Leaders Owe Us Insightful Autobiographies

I wrote this article after reflecting on some of the Kenyan autobiographies I have read, some recently. Autobiographies, in the case of Kenya, are mostly written in a person’s sunset years. This is usually after retirement from a high-profile public life.

Overall, I have read a good number of autobiographies and biographies in my adult life. I found some compelling and insightful. Others turned out average, and disappointingly, some do not measure up for a second reading or recommendation to someone else to read.

The first book I read in January 2025 was Francis Ole Kaparo’s memoir, Calming the Storms. This book by Kenya’s second-longest serving Speaker of the National Assembly did not match my expectations. Kenyan libraries, publishers, and readers need to do some soul-searching and write brutally honest book reviews before books get to the shelves.

Kaparo stands out as one of Kenya’s best parliamentary speakers alongside his successor Kenneth Marende. The bar has since fallen so low in the post-Kaparo and post-Marende eras. Despite their respective memberships to their parent political parties KANU and ODM, Kaparo and Marende were largely impartial when presiding over parliamentary business.

This is unlike the bias demonstrated by their successors. I detest President William Ruto’s remarks labelling Justin Muturi as fairly incompetent during his tenure as the Attorney General. Is there any state officer who demonstrates incompetence than William Ruto? Anyway, Muturi was quite incompetent as a Speaker of the National Assembly. He was tyrannical and unprofessional. He subverted the principle of separation of powers as envisaged in the Constitution; Muturi permitted the Executive’s control over the Legislature.

Muturi’s successor and university mate, Moses Wetang’ula, has so far treated us to sycophantic and unconstitutional fits at the National Assembly. Wetang’ula first declared the minority Kenya Kwanza as the majority coalition party instead of the Azimio La Umoja following his election as Speaker. He still maintained this snobbish stance after the courts ruled against his decision! What’s even more unappealing constitutionally is the fact that Wetang’ula serves as the leader of the now-weak FORD Kenya party. You want to know how competent a Kenyan politician is? Do not look any further than the party he or she leads. FORD Kenya under Wetang’ula has fast regressed to a political outfit that cannot win any seats beyond the Bukusu-dominated counties of Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia.

The 2013-2017 Senate Speaker Ekwee Ethuro was a supremely uninspiring figure. His temperament was measured but there is little to write home about any heroic accolades attributed to his leadership in the Senate. His successor, Ken Lusaka, was a mark-timer who treated the speakership as a strategic retreat before seeking to recapture the Bungoma gubernatorial seat. Lusaka’s successor, Amason Kingi, is too superficial and this reflects in his leadership.

Kaparo’s autobiography is quite generic. It is more of a life history text or some extensive eulogy with the author not deeply dissecting historical events that readers would be intrigued to read. First, there are numerous grammatical and factual errors in the book. The author may not have done sufficient proofreading. The second and third parties he may have engaged for editorial and proofreading roles probably did so little to catch these errors. I’m not sure if they were motivated enough or were out to soothe Kaparo’s ego.

A current or former high-profile public figure or state officer deserves to go beyond the usual life history accounts when penning an autobiography. An autobiography is a grand opportunity to strongly project one’s philosophical beliefs and write successes and regrets memorably.

Regrettably, Kaparo’s explanations of critical historical junctures are relatively short and generic and do not offer any new information or perspective. Politicians or high-profile personalities who have been in political corridors should first think of bringing out unknown details or new perspectives when working on their autobiographies. They need to understand that Kenya’s history is patched up and this is a gap they should seek to fill.

Kaparo had a glorious opportunity to give readers and historians tangible stuff in chapters six, seven, eight, and ten. In chapter six, Kaparo reflects on his decision to contest for the speakership. He also uncovers the 1991 KANU conference in which former President Daniel Moi went against the wishes of the delegates to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution. Why would Kaparo squeeze the details of such important historical events into five to six pages?

I admire Oginga Odinga’s and Raila Odinga’s autobiographies save for the latter’s back-handed undemocratic political arrangements with ruling parties and coalitions. In Not Yet Uhuru, Oginga Odinga takes his time to thoroughly reflect and write on historical events, particularly the struggle for independence and the post-colonial era poor governance.

Not Yet Uhuru enriches Kenya’s historical discourse and literature. One reads it and certainly feels compelled to constantly reference it. Raila Odinga’s, The Flame of Freedom, is immaculate. Developments related to the post-Kenyatta era, the 1982 coup attempt, the fight for the Second Liberation, the multiparty era, the NARC years, the 2005 referendum, the post-election violence, and the Grand Coalition Government are comprehensively written.

Kaparo is either mean with words, economical with the truth, or he was perhaps ostracised by the deep state not to have much information on the historical events he attempts to write about. Chapter six would be rich and engrossing had Kaparo documented the unknown intrigues during his time as Speaker and the struggle leading to the re-introduction of multipartyism. Chapter seven is not worth reading. It is a complete waste of time. Chapter eight is also underwhelming. Fifteen pages are too few as so much happened between 2002 and 2007.

In chapter ten, Kaparo writes about the founding and his chairmanship of the URP party led by William Ruto from around 2012 to 2017. Kaparo’s claims on what led to the formation of URP are quite ridiculous. He purports that URP’s founders were motivated by the need to field candidates countrywide and present it as a national party. He goes ahead to chide parties such as ODM, Wiper, FORD Kenya, FORD Asili, FORD People, and the Democratic Party for being ethnic-based outfits. Kaparo selectively sidesteps the fact that URP was formed to bring together the interests of the so-called pastoralist and Nilotic ethnic groups. URP’s ethnic base was among the Kalenjins and ethnic communities in the North Eastern region.

What’s more, Kaparo grandiosely claims that only KANU had a national appeal. This demonstrates his lack of appreciation of historical facts. What contributed to KANU having a nationwide presence? The events of August 1, 1982, transformed Moi from a somewhat humble and despised politician to a ruthless, authoritarian, paranoid one. A consequence of Moi’s insecurities and paranoia was the declaration of Kenya as a single-party state de jure (by law). Kaparo overlooks this in his criticism of the aforementioned parties as tribal outfits. Facts are stubborn; ODM had a much more nationwide presence compared to URP.

There are several half-witted, misrepresented, and outrageous arguments written by Kaparo in his memoirs. His argument for settling on the name of the URP party, especially the word “republican” (URP stands for United Republican Party), took me aback. According to Kaparo, URP founders were driven by the ambition to defeat the formation of a federalist (majimbo) system of government in Kenya. Mark you this was around two years after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution that institutionalised devolution and not federalism.

Kaparo goes ahead noting that the URP founders were worried about the introduction of socialism and communism in Kenya through the backdoor. This is extremely superficial and denotes a lack of intellectual wherewithal. Kaparo posits that the URP founders were uneasy about the Kenyan version of federalists merging American federalism with aspects of the former USSR’s governance, hence his unfounded claims on communism and socialism.

I squirmed while reading this bit and felt I had enough of such half-witted reflections from Kaparo. During the Cold War, there were attempts by the USSR just like the US to strengthen geostrategic interests in Kenya. But I think communism and socialism innuendos in Kenya are exaggerated. These were the outcomes of propaganda linked to the British and American governments and press after independence. One can easily conclude that URP was not in favour of the implementation of the 2010 Constitution. And you do not need to look far with its leader, William Ruto, having led campaigns against it prior to the 2010 referendum. So, we should not be surprised by the performance of the Ruto-led administration.

Leaders should give us compelling autobiographies that would significantly contribute to Kenya’s knowledge base. This is not limited to politicians. We have leaders in different sectors or areas; business, not-for-profits, security and defence, sports, and education among others.

I have had enough of reading sub-par books from personalities widely exposed in different sectors in Kenya. Kaparo’s Calming the Storms reminds me of Lee Njiru’s President’s Pressman. Lots of grammatical errors and superficial documentation of historical events. Njiru would rather not have written his memoirs.

And I will not fall short of expressing my displeasure against public figures who have retired, about to retire, or died without writing autobiographies. Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa, George Saitoti, and other high-profile politicians and non-political personalities who died without penning autobiographies failed Kenya. Autobiographies should not be post-retirement adventures. I hope to soon read some good ones from individuals I consider influential in my life. But they are showing little to no effort!

Sitati Wasilwa is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

Book Review: Moi’s Kleptocracy and Its Spillovers

In the book, Moi’s Kleptocracy and Its Spillovers, the author, Duncan Ndegwa attempts to relate Kenya’s social, political and economic challenges to Moi’s presidency. Ndegwa was the first post-independence Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public Service. He also served as Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya from 1967 to 1982.

Ndegwa argues, though unconvincingly in most cases, that Moi is squarely to blame for his kleptocratic tendencies and the after-effects two decades later.

Primarily, the book sounds more of an attempt by the author to settle scores with former president Moi, and is analytically shallow and jumbled up to measure up to its title. Perhaps much thought and effort were not put into writing it.

It is illogical to defend Moi’s presidency, but it’s irrational not to strongly condemn graft engineered by Jomo Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki. Ndegwa notes that Moi eroded all the advances made during Kenyatta’s presidency. He goes ahead to state how Moi resorted to divide-and-rule tactics to impoverish Kenyans.

In a way, Ndegwa tries to avoid the weight of history; Moi simply echoed Kenyatta’s tune of divide-and-rule! Isolating the Kenyatta presidency from Moi’s is historical backhandedness.

The author comes close to appreciating the role of Kenyatta’s era in laying the foundation for graft in Moi’s regime. First, he points out the recommendation of the Ndegwa Commission (chaired by the author) in aiding corruption – civil servants were allowed to engage in business even with the government as a measure to enable them to earn extra income thereby hindering corruption. This remains one of the biggest historical blunders in Kenya.

Second, Ndegwa points out the sentiments of Kenyatta to police officers who were on a go-slow a year or so before the valueless commission was formed; “President Kenyatta advised them to use the power of their crown to make ends meet…the police took Kenyatta’s advice to use their crown to extort bribes from lawbreakers…”. However, he does not call out any of these historical missteps. Anyway, he unapologetically profiles Kenyatta as “a giant of destiny.”

One thing Ndegwa somehow gets right is the power politics and the geopolitical landscape during the Cold War in light of the support of Moi’s regime by the so-called Western democratic states. He notes that the financial resources advanced to the Moi regime were used to facilitate corruption in Kenya.

In addition, Ndegwa points out some of the failed projects initiated by Moi such as the Nyayo Tea Zones, the Nyayo milk project, the Nyayo Bus Corporation and the Nyayo Pioneer Car Project. He hilariously describes the launch of the car project noting that “Once the ceremony ended it was found that the fuel pipe of the car was not connected to the pump neither was the distributor cable in place.”

However, he cantankerously mocks the products of Moi’s initiated 8-4-4 education system claiming that it “has produced hundreds of thousands of witless graduates who find no fault in destroying institutional property.”

It could be true that 8-4-4 was not the best education system compared with its predecessor the 7-4-2-3 system. But it is ingenuine for Ndegwa to unashamedly brand the witless nature of its products. The challenges of the 8-4-4 system should be holistically considered. In essence, the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank punctured the 8-4-4 system. The SAPs reduced spending on the social sector in favour of the much acclaimed economically productive sectors.

Ndegwa intentionally bypasses the furthering of corruption and other governance challenges under the Kibaki administration. He adopts the role of a fence sitter and goes to the extent of profiling the failures of Kibaki as spillovers from the Moi era which is somehow right. But Kibaki’s major failures include perpetuating systemic corruption and ethnic chauvinism which fanned the flames of the post-election violence (PEV).

Amid other half-truths on Kibaki’s political sainthood, the author claims that Western states were behind the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases in which Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as well as other four people were accused of facilitating the PEV. Ndegwa, intentionally or otherwise, fails to appreciate the fact that the ICC cases only materialised after joint efforts by Kibaki and Raila Odinga to champion the formation of a local tribunal collapsed on the floor of Parliament. In fact, Uhuru and Ruto were vocal on their preference for the ICC route.

A keen reader may easily lose interest in the book with Ndegwa’s lame description of Uhuru in the lead up to the 2013 elections as follows: “His political pedigree, his personal qualities and his journey (he was 52 in October 2013), all mark him as the youngest, the best and the brightest.” I wish these attributes would be positively correlated with competence and governmental performance. Uhuru and Ruto have so far performed dismally.

It is unclear what Ndegwa drives at by claiming that Kikuyus, especially of his generation, are great admirers of the ancient Jews and of the Old Testament. His analogy of Jewish entrepreneurial success with that of the Agikuyu exceptionalism is a factual blunder and borders on ethnic chauvinism.

Spuriously, the author castigates devolution insinuating it would increase marginalisation and thus the level of poverty. His argument is premised on the majimbo system of governance at the dawn of independence. Ndegwa incoherently argues against devolution without looking at the bigger picture of its benefits. Neither does he take into account the regional economic imbalances and ethnic dynamism of Kenya. Appreciating the regional and ethnic marginalisation advanced by the colonial and successive post-colonial governments would have prompted Ndegwa to embrace devolution.

Overall, the book is thin on historical facts given its weighty title. One would have expected it to portray well-defined contours of the plunder under Moi’s presidency and its generational effects. It passes as a rushed text that may not stand the test of time.

Free Lunch Thinking: A Book Review

By Sitati Wasilwa

Tom Bergin’s Free Lunch Thinking: How Economics Ruins the Economy is a remarkable book. Bergin presents convincing arguments about some of the long-held, yet misguiding ideologies in the discipline of economics. His impressive deconstruction of tenets enjoying a fanatical following among mainstream economists would certainly tempt one to read the book more than once, perhaps with the exception of neoliberals and libertarians. In debunking some of the myths at the centre of economics, Bergin constantly chides the notion of masking the discipline as a science, particularly the use of mathematical models founded on assumptions that hardly consider the effects of institutional factors that affect the functioning of an economy.

The branding of economics as the high priest of social sciences has its origins in the use of mathematical models which tend to satisfy more the egos of mainstream economists and work less for the majority whom are ideally meant to be the biggest beneficiaries of economic policies.

Evidently, Bergin’s book is a rich contribution to the decade-long debate on the need for the discipline of economics to be reformed. More importantly, it is a primal text on the policy missteps of neoliberalism, and may not attract favourable readership from neoliberals or individuals incapable of questioning the conventional wisdom propagated by most economics faculties and schools around the world.

Bergin’s thesis is summed up in the introduction section where he confidently expresses his desire “to demonstrate how a dangerous blend of political ideology, professional self-interest and unwavering adherence to long-held intellectual frameworks has led to policies that have not only failed to help society as a whole but have also actively harmed it”. And he means business.

There is no discipline religiously corrupted and heavily influenced by politics such as economics. Bergin effectively demonstrates this in the entire book starting with chapter one which is wholly dedicated to the deconstruction of the economic ideology of Arthur Laffer, a revered supply-side economist.

Before challenging Laffer’s notion on the significance of lower taxes as a policy measure to stimulate economic growth, Bergin first outlines the historical origins and political consequences of the Laffer Curve which he refers to as voodoo economics. Following the stagflation of the 1970s characterised by slow economic growth, high inflation and high unemployment, economic policy wonks largely in the Western world were in search for economic frameworks that would hopefully restore the prosperity witnessed after World War II often referred to as the Golden Age of Capitalism. But one has to be careful when making reference to the Golden Age of Capitalism because it obviously suits the Western world; Africa was choking from colonialism and its wanton legacy during this epoch.

Laffer’s crusade in support for lower taxes as put forth by Bergin was influenced by the Canadian economist and Nobel memorial prize winner for economics Robert Mundell. Mundell’s growing scepticism about the “increasing role of the state in the economy” in the 1960s evidenced by a rise in government spending and tax as a proportion of total output in Western countries mesmerised Laffer. Laffer was a leading voice against high taxes in the 1970s arguing, as stated by Bergin, “that prevailing tax rates were so damaging to the economy as a whole that they were actually producing less revenue than lower tax rates would have done”.

The ideas of Laffer – represented by the Laffer Curve – were embraced by right-wing and right-of-centre politicians in the USA (majorly in the Republican Party), the UK (the Conservative Party) and Australia among other developed economies. As noted by Bergin, Laffer’s ideas are still popular with today’s Western right-wing leaning politicians such as UK’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson and former US President Donald Trump “whom Laffer has advised during his candidacy and presidency”.

Do lower taxes lead to higher growth? Or, do higher taxes lead to lower growth? What about the expanding role of the government? Bergin weaves historical evidence from the USA, UK, France and Japan noting that they experienced higher growth when they had high tax- or government-spending-to-GDP ratio and vice versa. To further elaborate his argument, he poses the question: “…why do cross-country comparisons show that having a low tax- or government-spending-to-GDP has been a feature common to poor countries, not rich ones?”

While acknowledging the harmful nature of wasteful government spending, Bergin points out the lack of consistent evidence documenting high taxes and high government spending as causes of slow growth mostly in the developed economies. He sums it up by admonishing the cultish free lunch tendency to cut taxes with the expectation of a long-term increase in revenues. Tax cuts may only boost growth in the short-term.

Bergin proceeds by deflating the mainstream thinking that high taxes make people lazy. At the outset, he notes that this notion neglects the ambitions and hard-working nature of most individuals. By using tons of evidence, Bergin demonstrates that an increase in taxes barely prompts business leaders and wealthy individuals to move out of their countries of origin, but mostly in the developed or fast developing countries. He further notes that there is no empirical evidence indicating that business leaders and the wealthy worked less hard when taxes are increased.

He again pokes holes in the argument fronted by supply-siders regarding the need to cut taxes, affirming the essence of such a policy to only boosting growth in the short-term. Bergin notes that “tax cuts now will lead to tax increases later, and that the effect of such measures will be contractionary, because governments will spend that money servicing debt in the future rather than funding stimulative programmes…”.

According to Bergin, the fear of levying high taxes especially on the wealthy depicts the irrational nature of human beings; it also encapsulates the dogma of trickle-down economics with worries that an economy may experience a downward spiral if high taxes are imposed on the rich.

Contrary to the prevailing economic orthodoxy, Bergin patches up evidence arguing that less labour market protections do not automatically lead to creation of more jobs. In a world where neoliberalism seems to be the blueprint of economic policy, labour unions and the labour market protections are fast becoming irrelevant largely due to the politicisation of the discipline of economics especially in the West, and the successful exportation of such ideas to other parts of the world by missionaries from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In exploring the hiring and firing debate, Bergin empirically argues that liberalised labour markets may not after all be good for business for various reasons. First, such markets are prone to high staff turnover and thus “increased training and recruitment costs”. In essence, labour rules act as a disincentive for employees to switch jobs due to the high hypothetical cost they are likely to experience. Second, fluid labour markets are less likely to enhance skills deepening with Bergin noting that employment protection is highly likely to promote upskilling especially if an employee is bound to work at a given place for a long time. As such, more productivity and thus an increase in growth is highly likely to be achieved with employment protections than under the liberalised regime. Bergin notes that employment protections reduce “unfair dismissals” and lead to better payment and thus an improvement in the welfare of employees. This is contrary to the fluid labour market characterised by faster dismissals with Bergin arguing that “easy firing is associated by some with the growth of low-skill, low-productivity and inevitably low-income jobs”.

Most individuals are guilty of entertaining thoughts that higher pay can make one an effective manager, a claim advanced by American economist Michael Jensen. In his iconoclast fashion, Bergin posits that there is “no evidence that bonuses push executives to work harder or better than their natural inclinations would prompt them to do”. He goes to the extent of referring to the works of a former CEO who became a faculty member at Harvard Business School stating that CEOs cannot be transformed into better decision makers by financial incentives. Bergin questions the share-based compensation popularised by Jensen by making reference to a research paper authored in 2004 by Jensen himself and Kevin Murphy; “that shares could be overvalued, and that in such situations…share-based pay could be value destructive for a company”.

As if to further annoy adherents of neoliberalism, Bergin presents a strong argument against the long-held view that minimum wage leads to the creation of few jobs. Based on empirical evidence, Bergin notes that “The inevitable answer to the question of why minimum wages can lift wages for millions of workers without killing jobs is that labour markets are far more complex and nuanced than the rigid supply-and-demand graph would suggest”.

Bergin furthers his case against orthodox economic thinking and practice questioning the validity of sin taxes meant to predict and control human behaviour. He argues out that increasing taxes on certain commodities to increase their prices in order to reduce their consumption is not as effective as it is perceived. He presents other convincing mechanisms that can be explored to discourage bad behaviour or encourage good behaviour.

In what may sound as an affront on neoliberals and libertarians alike, Bergin challenges the notion that government regulation dampens economic growth. His remarks are largely influenced by the fact that most anti-regulation economists base their policy arguments on ideologies and not on empirical evidence. In his nonconformist manner, he calls out the World Bank’s “Doing Business” report specifically noting “the grumbling tone it adopts when talking about regulation”. Bergin states that it is not obvious that all regulations are constructive and insists on the evaluation of the prevailing situations by looking at the grand scheme of things.

What’s more, Bergin reflects on the craze to slash corporate taxes particularly in Western countries convincingly arguing – neoclassicals/neoliberals may not be convinced – that tax cuts do not boost investment and “Tax cuts today must translate into spending cuts or tax rises later”.

Bergin concludes by making reference to a few economic thinkers who have questioned some of the mainstream ideas and practices dominant in the discipline of economics. For instance, he recounts his meeting with Paul Romer who referred to the leaders of the Chicago School – a notorious economics faculty – as pseudo-scientists and frauds. Additionally, Bergin revisits Romer’s view that most economists mostly hide the flaws of their theories and hence policies in complex mathematical models. In recalling his encounter with Romer, the meeting never ended without a serious lash on the Chicago School noting that it “was a libertarian, anti-government ideological project rather than a scientific endeavour”. Bergin also recalls the thoughts of Alfred Marshall and John Maynard Keynes with regards to an institutionalist approach in understanding the functioning of an economy. Lastly, referring to Ronald Coase who suggested the need for economics “to step away from the econometric models”, Bergin quotes him: “It is suicidal for the field (economics) to slide into a hard science of choice, ignoring the influences of society, history, culture, and politics on the working of the economy”.

Should I say that Bergin presents a compelling case against tenets of neoliberalism? Fashionably, yes. But also, an exemplary account for reformation of the discipline of economics and policymaking. Free Lunch Thinking is a book worth reading!

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist, consultant, writer and moderator. He is a youth leader at Kenya YMCA and a member of the Local Solutions Youth Panel at the Global Youth Mobilization. Twitter: @SitatiWasilwa LinkedIn: Sitati Wasilwa Blog: The Kavirondo Facebook: Sitati Wasilwa

My 2020 Reading List

My 2020 reading list comprises of sixteen books which are insightful and pretty remarkable, and they include:

“How Life Imitates Chess: Making the Right Moves from the Board to the Boardroom” by Garry Kasparov.

This is an intriguing text on the striking similarities between life and chess. One striking lesson from the book:

Aggressiveness is as much of an asset in politics, business, and other walks of life as it is in chess.

Garry Kasparov

“The Company of the Future: Meeting the Management Challenges of the Communications Revolution” by Frances Cairncross.

Amid the ever-changing technological landscape, organisations are bound to either respond effectively to the disruption, or risk decaying and collapsing. Cairncross offers ten rules for survival: manage knowledge; make decisions; focus on customers; manage talent; manage collaboration; build the right structure; manage communications; set standards; foster openness; and develop leadership.

“Global Discontents: Conversations on the Rising Threats to Democracy” by Noam Chomsky with David Barsamian.

This is an unhinged conversation on the triumph of global anarchy manifested through imperialism, interventions, colonial legacy, nefarious private capital and corporatism. It is an elaborate discussion on global geopolitics – a candid view of the activities of the “masters of the universe.”

“A Leap Into the Future: A Vision for Kenya’s Socio-Political and Economic Transformation” by Anyang’ Nyong’o.

Undoubtedly, this book is an illuminating account and blueprint for transforming Kenya’s political economy. Such transformation, according to Nyong’o, rests on the quality of political leadership, and he illustrates this by stating that:

What Lee Kwan Yew meant to convey to us was that leadership matters in development, particularly leaders with clear ideas and vision about the future of their nation, those who can fix their eyes on some distant star that guides their action towards clear developmental goals…

Anyang’ Nyong’o

“Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life” by Robert Reich.

I can’t think of any other book that outlines the history of the rise of neoliberalism in America and across the world quite magnificently like Reich’s “Supercapitalism”. To him, the rise, and rise of corporate power poses a danger to democracy. There’s no doubt that political campaigns across the world have been taken over by wealthy merchants with citizens banished to the fringes of the socio-political systems.

“The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make A Big Difference” by Malcolm Gladwell.

To illustrate how little things can make a big difference, Gladwell explores the nature of epidemics by looking at what he primes as the three agents of change – the Law of the Few; the Stickiness Factor; and the Power of Context.

According to Gladwell, the tipping point (or change) is realized when: a handful of rarely gifted people are heavily involved (the Law of the Few); a contagious message is made memorable and irresistible (the Stickiness Factor); and the right environment or situation for change is created (the Power of Context).

“The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World” by Jonathan Powell.

Niccolo Machiavelli is a classic instructor of the game of power. “The New Machiavelli” is a candid illustration of Machiavelli’s lessons about power. It is an essential text on the intricacies and intrigues of political power. Brilliant!

“Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy in Kenya: Choices to Be Made” by Anyang’ Nyong’o.

Nyong’o admonishes the presidential system in Kenya and fervently advocates for institutionalization of the parliamentary system of democracy. He offers ten reasons, among them: a troubled post-independence history as a result of the presidential system; presidential politics hardly builds political parties; better nurturing of national development policies; effective administration of devolution; and better inclusivity of disenfranchised groups among others.

“Tom Mboya” The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget” by David Goldsworthy.

This is one of the most definitive political biographies, particularly about Kenya’s most brilliant politician. It is an engrossing documentation of a man who certainly came before his time, and did all he can to acquire power – such a strong-willed character.

“The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for A Human Future at the New Frontier of Power” by Shoshana Zuboff.

According to Shoshana Zuboff, surveillance capitalism refers to “A new economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales.”

We love technology, but hardly think of the dangers that it poses to humanity. This book is one of the finest texts on the intricacies of the political economy of capitalism in the face of rapid technological development.

“Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything” by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner.

Freakish. Comical. Hilarious.

“Think Like A Freak” by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner

A sequel to “Freakonomics”, and definitely a breath-taking and intriguing text!

“On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons From the Twentieth Century” by Timothy Snyder.

This is a refreshing account on confronting political tyranny and enhancing societal progress. Simple, yet relevant.

“Mastery” by Robert Greene

The rigor and almost-philosophical intensity with which Greene writes the book is engrossing. The book is a dynamo – deeply reflective, thoroughly informative, and richly instructive.

“My Life in Red and White” by Arsene Wenger.

The French economist and football coach/manager offers insights on what it takes to be at the top for long – a great deal of obsession, strong sense of conviction, discipline, being demanding, setting high standards, and physical fitness. I wrote a review of the book (click here to read) and outlined some of the most crucial lessons offered by the former Arsenal F.C manager including:

…The common denominator for any success is a combination of attitude, talent and external luck. People at the top are also capable of objectively analysing their own performance and are hard on themselves. A good balance between intelligence and constant motivation and a good dose of humility…

Arsene Wenger

“Managing With Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations” by Jeffrey Pfeffer.

This is one of the most intimate books I have read on leadership and management. All crucial lessons on Politics and Power 101 are captured in the text. Pfeffer’s in-depth writing about the centrality of power in organizations is bewitching!

Happy New Year 2021.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist and contributing writer of The African Executive Magazine.

A Look at Arsene Wenger’s Autobiography, “My Life in Red and White”

“Life is a journey punctuated with afflictions that help us progress with our fears, our inner moods and emotions.” By Arsene Wenger.

Arsene Wenger’s autobiography, “My Life in Red and White,” is a grand summary of the life of a revolutionary and icon who dared to dream about conquering the world of football. Despite not having an illustrious and flowery career as a professional footballer, Wenger made his mark as a thoroughbred football manager, and currently serves as Head of Global Football Development at FIFA.

I love reading books about sports, particularly on managers and coaches, which are always enriching in terms of what it takes to create a winning team and institutionalising a performance culture. Although we have different interests and passions, I strongly believe that individuals who are not ardent fans of team sport tend to miss out on something really interesting. Still, a good number of the fanatics and fervent supporters never take keen interest on the intricacies of power, management and leadership in sports.

In short, team sport offers interesting and intriguing insights on leadership and management that current and future organizational leaders and managers will find helpful.

“My Life in Red and White” personifies Wenger’s character: a resolute, highly ambitious personality with a great eye for detail, an embodiment of strong conviction, and an uncompromising believer in philosophy.

Wenger’s book is as thoughtful and expressive as other autobiographies of great leaders in sports such as Sir Alex Ferguson’s. But I really hope that Wenger plans to write a more engrossing text specifically on leadership and management just like “Leading” – authored by Alex Ferguson with Michael Moritz. His current trade at FIFA will be a rich experience to read about, and such a book will uncannily stretch, though subtly, rivalry between two great men who shaped English and global football in general.

The University of Strasbourg trained economist writes at length about the centrality of a performance culture in a team, and extensively, in an organisation. Wenger notes:

“It is also important to instil a performance culture. By this, I mean a culture that requires the leader and the players to ask themselves the fundamental questions that I have already mentioned:

How can I get better?

Have I achieved my full potential?

What can I do to get there?”

Wenger comes across as a professional who recognises the intimate value of details, and in effect, detail matters:

“Everything mattered, including and especially the state of the grass! The groundsmen at Monaco must have popped up champagne when I left.”

For Arsenal’s former manager, the buck stops with the leader if he or she expects to implement his or her vision and values. A leader should be demanding and ruthlessly efficient at times. He notes:

“…And I managed to win players over by being committed, by being demanding, even severe, too, sometimes. I waged a bit of a war on the rebels. I wanted involvement from everybody that was equal to mine and up to the standards of the game.”

“…I was very demanding in training. I was very vocal. I’m sure some of them will remember my shouting and our arguments. I had no tolerance for poor passing or lack of willpower…”

“…I was also in great physical shape: I worked hard, I led from the front, and that had an impact on the players…”

Wenger extensively writes about the power of conviction in achieving goals and dreams, and attaches great value on a high sense of self-belief and hard work to attain the set objectives:

“…That has always been a lesson for me: setting the highest ambition and believing in it, sowing the seeds one year and harvesting two years later.”

“At the start of the 2003-04 season, I repeated to the players what I had declared earlier: they could win the title without losing. I believed in it, and it was our goal.”

The iconic Frenchman, an iconoclast of his own standing, reveals that decision making is an enduring attribute in leadership and management. He acknowledges making unpopular decisions, but nonetheless, in management, decisions count, whether good or bad – popular or unpopular.

Additionally, Wenger highlights the importance of questioning oneself, not as an expression of self-doubt, but as a fundamental approach towards having honest self-assessment. He notes:

“…Even today, I still have this need to question myself in order to progress…”

Furthermore, Wenger places premium on competence as a tidbit of organisational success, a key factor that is nowadays taken for granted. He emphasizes on the importance of a leader surrounding himself or herself with competent, brilliant and honest individuals.

Nevertheless, Arsene Wenger’s autobiography demonstrates his streak of obsessiveness with football, a fiery passion that definitely propelled him to the apogee of the world’s most popular sport. And certainly:

“Football determined the pace of my whole life. At night, when I got home after a long day at the club, I’d watch more matches that would throw me back into the work I was planning to do the following day with the team – how I was going to settle certain problems, how I was going to keep making progress. When I went to bed, I would be thinking over my day, and the next: the players, the matches and the training sessions populated my nights.”

Wenger’s tenacity is revealed in his religious adherence to a life-long routine characterised by iron discipline. He writes:

“…I get up at 5.30 a.m., do my exercises, train, eat and drink the way my former players did…”

“Today I still have the discipline I acquired over all those years. As I often say, freedom is the discipline you impose on yourself. I start my day with an hour and a half in the gym, without exception, even Saturday and Sunday. When I get the chance, I’m always ready to do another hour of cardio. This iron discipline, I have to acknowledge, helps me maintain my energy levels and stay in shape, because I’m still travelling a lot and I have other activities besides my role with FIFA.”  

And his thoughts on what it takes to be successful:

“…The common denominator for any success is a combination of attitude, talent and external luck. People at the top are also capable of objectively analysing their own performance and are hard on themselves. A good balance between intelligence and constant motivation and a good dose of humility…”

I recommend Wenger’s autobiography for football lovers and individuals interested in leadership and management. His life is a true manifestation of what it means to trust the process while putting in the hours and iron discipline. It’s a nice read.

Sitati Wasilwa is a political economist with great interest in leadership and management.

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