Russia’s Wagner Exits Mali: The Bigger Picture

On June 6, the Russian Wagner private military company (PMC) announced its withdrawal from Mali. Wagner deployed its mercenaries in Mali around three and a half years ago to support the military-led government in counter-terrorism operations.

Wagner declared its mission in Mali as successful, noting its support in training Malian security forces and directly combating armed groups. But this is superficial, considering that Russian mercenaries will remain in Mali under the command of the Africa Corps PMC.

The Africa Corps is a rebranding of Wagner following the failed rebellion and death of the latter’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023. Structurally, Wagner and the Africa Corps differ in terms of their hierarchy. Functionally and operationally, the two PMCs are the same.

Wagner relied heavily on its civilian leaders. The Africa Corps is controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry. This highlights a key structural change by the Kremlin, with President Vladimir Putin seeking to prevent scenarios where state-contracted PMCs rebel against the regime.

Essentially, the Kremlin would have mercenaries deployed in Mali but under a fundamentally different command structure. This is also expected in five other African countries where the paramilitary officers are stationed.

Moscow’s continued deployment of mercenaries in Africa, now under higher state influence, demonstrates its overall foreign policy on the continent. Africa is too important to be neglected by Russia. It remains a strategic pawn in the global geostrategic power play. Russian PMCs are active in countries where Moscow has economic interests.

In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian mercenaries are deployed to safeguard Moscow’s interests in the mining and oil sectors. The mercenaries also offer guarding services to high-ranking politicians and government officials. I wrote about these countries and Wagner’s deployment and rebranding some time back.

At this juncture, it is important to reflect on Wagner’s touted success in Mali. At best, its mission in Mali was chequered. The threat of armed conflict persists in Mali. In fact, it has worsened in the course of Wagner’s deployment mission.

Data from the Global Terrorism Index indicates a steady increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in Mali since 2017. The data is even more intriguing if you consider the 2021-2025 period, 2021 being the year of Wagner’s deployment.

Wagner may have substantially supported the Malian security forces in counterinsurgency operations. But it collectively failed to effectively contain armed groups in the country. Multiple factors could be responsible for this.

First, the number of Wagner mercenaries deployed in Mali was/is too small to facilitate any meaningful combat against relatively well-equipped and highly mobile armed groups. The situation could perhaps be different if there were no war between Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of mercenaries, including those from Wagner, are on the frontlines.

Second, Wagner mercenaries highly rely on the intelligence shared by the Malian authorities. Before their withdrawals, Malian forces heavily depended on French troops and UN peacekeepers for intelligence. The exit of the French forces and the peacekeepers may have significantly affected intelligence gathering and sharing.

Third, Wagner mercenaries’ deployment is limited to strategic locations of interest. This, in addition to their small contingents, implies that they cannot sufficiently carry out security operations across the country.

Furthermore, Wagner may not be using highly advanced military equipment, munitions, and technology in its operations in Mali. This mirrors the overall defence and offense paradigm in the country. Despite Bamako and Moscow increasing their defence and military cooperation in the last four years, a significant amount of Russian arms/equipment supplied to Mali is of the Soviet era. And these are also limited if you consider the vastness of the Malian territory.

Additionally, some local communities are embedded in the ambitions of the armed groups and do not voluntarily share intelligence with the Russian mercenaries and Malian forces. This is particularly common in northern Mali, where the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebel group is active.

The FLA draws its support largely from the Tuareg ethnic group, and the quest for the creation of an autonomous Azawad state has persisted for over 60 years. Apart from the FLA, terrorist groups such as JNIM are gaining support among some local communities due to the attacks against civilians by Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries.

Can Russia and Its PMCs Improve Security in the Sahel?

The Sahel security environment is too complex for Russia and its PMCs to succeed. The Sahel military regimes pressured the French troops and UN peacekeepers to resign, but political instability and insecurity persist. The junta was perhaps excessively delusional to bank on Russia to replace the French and peacekeepers. They did this under the pretext of pursuing independence, intending to do away with neocolonialism.

I am not suggesting that the French soldiers and UN peacekeepers successfully contained armed groups in the Sahel. And of course, it is public knowledge that former French colonies are neo-colonially tied to Paris. But if the Sahel junta intended to avoid the neocolonial straps, then it would be more sensible for them to look inwards for domestic and regional solutions than to another foreign power.

Russia is misconstrued as friendlier than the West and perhaps less parasitic. This denotes naivety in power politics. Russia, like any other foreign power in Africa, is after its interests, usually at the expense of the client states. States cannot exist in isolation. Relations and coalitions are critical. Russia may not have colonised African countries, but this does not mean its power play in Africa is free of any power imbalance. Equality is utopian as far as state relations are concerned. Russia benefits more from its cooperation with African countries.

Credit should be given to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger for establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) regional bloc. I completely agree with the view of these states on the moribund nature of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc, which they exited. But the AES is unlikely to be a magic wand to address insecurity. AES states lack the financial muscle to sustain meaningful regionwide security operations.

In addition, these states have limited military capabilities, and at this point, they need additional support from ECOWAS or a regional force. Russia may not adequately finance the AES joint forces or supply them with enough equipment and munitions.

The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps is unlikely to change Russia’s security operations in the Sahel. The name has changed, the command structure altered a bit, but the substance is the same.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence has a more involved role in the operations of the Africa Corps compared to Wagner. Moscow is unlikely to deploy significant troop numbers in the Sahel despite this structural change. Any deployments of military officers are expected to be for training purposes.

As long as the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the Sahelian states should stop fantasizing about Russia deploying its military officers in the region. Russia cannot entangle itself in multiple conflicts at this point. This is the primary reason why Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria fell without any meaningful military support from the Russians.

It is safe to assume that Vladimir Putin is a good student of history. Apart from the Russia-Ukraine war, the West’s engagement in active combat in Africa without meaningful outcomes could restrain Russia’s deployment of military officers. The Kremlin would prefer deploying the mercenaries to avoid reputational damage. For instance, the Wagner mercenaries committed human rights abuses in Mali. Wagner takes the blame, and not necessarily the Russian government. Africa Corps would therefore be stationed at key sites and not actively pursuing armed groups countrywide.

Local sentiments could work against any hoped-for success of the Africa Corps mercenaries in Mali. The armed groups in Mali are unlikely to change their perception of the Russian mercenaries. The same applies to the local communities. The name change to Africa Corps is largely optical and not substantial enough to change local sentiments. Africa Corps mercenaries are expected to continue conducting joint operations with Malian forces. The existence of armed militants among the local communities makes the civilians vulnerable to extrajudicial killings. Such human rights abuses occur during security operations.

Stability is currently far-fetched in the Sahel region. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Wagner never succeeded in Mali, and neither will the Africa Corps. Restoring stability in the Sahel goes beyond the shouting of anti-neocolonial slogans. Governments and regional blocs should do things right and not sloganeering.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about governance, armed conflict, political risk, political economy, and foreign policy. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

June 16, 2025 0

Russian Military Bases in Africa: The Bear’s Brisque Geostrategic Card

This is the last part of a four-article series on Russia’s geostrategic interests and presence in Africa. Parts one, two, and three can be accessed here, here, and here. Russia trails the US, China, the UK, and Turkiye in having established military bases in Africa. In 2020, reports suggested that Russia had finalised plans to build military bases in six African countries: Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Eritrea, Egypt, and the Central African Republic. Most of these countries share certain peculiarities. First, Russian PMCs have been present at different times in these countries, except in Egypt and Eritrea.

Second, these countries import Russian weapons, with Egypt as a major market for Russian arms on the continent. Third, these countries are endowed with natural resources: Sudan (gold), Mozambique (natural gas), Madagascar (chromite, uranium, among others), Egypt (gas), Eritrea (gold, oil, and gas), and the Central African Republic (gold).

Moreover, these countries are also geographically strategic. Sudan has a coastline along the Red Sea. Egypt overlooks the Mediterranean Sea. Eritrea is along the Red Sea. Madagascar and Mozambique offer access to the Indian Ocean. The Central African Republic is at the heart of Africa, guaranteeing strategic access to the DRC in the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the west, and Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo to the southwest. These countries are resource-rich, with some bordering the Atlantic Ocean.

Moscow has yet to establish a military base in Africa at the time of writing this article. The Sudanese military regime concluded a review of an agreement with Russia to put up a naval base in Suakin near Port Sudan along the Red Sea in February 2023. The ratification of the deal was subject to the establishment of a civilian-led government, including a legislative body. It is worth mentioning that initial agreements for a Russian naval base were mooted in 2017 when Omar el-Bashir was president and formalised in 2020.

Its establishment was derailed by Bashir’s ouster and later the war between the Sudanese army and the RSF. The agreement indicates Sudan’s provision of an area for the deployment of 300 Russian military personnel and four navy ships for around 25 years in exchange for weapons and military equipment. The agreement could be extended for another 10 years, subject to approval by both Khartoum and Moscow.

Russia cannot afford to refer to itself as a global power player without strategic military bases in key geographical locations. As such, Moscow is attempting to mirror the Soviet Union, which had naval bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have historically been strategic for major and rising power players in Africa and the Middle East. Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen, and Oman host military bases and other smaller facilities of foreign powers.

The US, China, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti. Saudi Arabia intends to establish a military base in Djibouti as it operates another one on the Socotra Island (Yemen). The UAE has bases on Socotra Island, Boosaaso in Somalia, and Assab in Eritrea near the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It intends to establish another military base in Berbera in Somaliland. Israel has a military base in Eritrea. The US and the UK operate military bases in Oman.

A naval base along the Red Sea would enable Russia to promote its regional and global interests. The region is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas, and key minerals such as gold. The Red Sea is also a geostrategic gateway for global trade, given the centrality of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

But is Russia in a position to develop its planned military bases in Africa? The building of these bases is subject to a myriad of factors in Africa as well as in Russia. In Sudan, for instance, the persistence of the civil war and the delayed formation of a new government could protract Russia’s hopes for fast-tracking the naval base, which is behind schedule. Russia’s intent to build a military base in the Central African Republic could be impacted by the interests of other major powers.

The government of the Central African Republic hired Bancroft, a US PMC. This denotes the possibility of US interests substantially increasing in the country, primarily to compete against Russia. The US is also good at sounding alarm bells to African countries associated with Russia. For instance, it previously warned Sudan of risking isolation from the international community were it to allow Russia to establish a military base along the Red Sea.

The major drawback to Russia’s ambition to establish military bases in Africa is the Russo-Ukrainian war. War is a costly affair, and certainly, Russia’s commitment to building these bases demands psychological and economic commitment. Economically, running a war economy may not give enough room for Russia to comfortably build and equip a military base in Africa.

Using existing military bases in the region could highlight why establishing them would be financially demanding for Moscow. For instance, the Chinese military base in Djibouti was constructed at USD 590 million over at least two years. The US military base in Djibouti attracts USD 63 million in rent annually, with Washington estimated to spend around USD 1.4 billion to upgrade it between 2014 and 2034.

As of September 2022, Russia incurred approximately USD 40 billion – around 84% of the 2021 national defence expenditure – due to the war. Other estimates highlight that Russia spends around 40% of the total government budget on war, with total military spending estimated at at least 10% of the GDP as of 2023.

These figures present an abstract picture of why Russia is unlikely to embark on the construction of military bases in Africa as long as the war against Ukraine persists. The bigger picture should be on the massive power of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) when the war ends. The MIC will have excess capacity and supply of weapons, and the exchequer will have a massive financial muscle. A significant number of sanctions imposed on Russia by the West are unlikely to be dropped after the war ends. Thus, the MIC could drive Russia’s economy post-war. This could lead to increased arms sales to Africa, and possibly, the fast-tracking of the construction of military bases in Africa for Russia to safeguard its economic interests on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

June 5, 2025 0

The Russian Military-Industrial Complex: A Fledgling Specter Haunting Africa?

This is part three of a four-part series of articles on Russia’s geostrategic involvement in Africa. Parts one and two can be accessed here and here. From a geostrategic perspective, Russia’s military-industrial complex (MIC) is central to Moscow’s ambition to upscale its influence in Africa. The Russia MIC’s arc of influence in Africa is exemplified by the defense and security cooperation agreements and the Russian arms imported by African countries. Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries since 2015. This again affirms the post-2014 period as an era of Russia seeking to enhance its footprint in Africa. These agreements have different objectives, such as facilitating access to civilian or military ports and airbases, promoting counter-terrorism operations, encouraging the supply of weapons, and supporting the training of military personnel.

It is perhaps important to interrogate the centrality of these agreements. Such interrogations need to go beyond the norms and fallacies of the Western perspective on why Moscow is on a mission to ratify military agreements with African countries. Typically, the Western view gravitates to the notion of emphasizing Russia’s push for these agreements in countries that have had coups in Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. But this does not represent the holistic picture on the ground, as evidence suggests. For instance, Russian influence in Gabon is minimal, if any, or non-existent despite the 2023 coup.

Most importantly, why are these agreements viewed as Moscow’s push for geostrategic supremacy in Africa, instead of the respective African countries seeking alternative partnerships? Russia’s endgame with the military agreements could be a matter of making a significant statement of being back in the game as a major global power in Africa, as power politics take centre stage on the continent. Another reason is that these agreements lay the basis for arms exports to African countries, and thus a key market to drive Russia’s economy in the wake of the post-2014 sanctions and, recently, the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Arms production for domestic use and exportation is a linchpin of Russia’s MIC. Consider the fact that Russia’s state expenditure for weapons and arms production has gradually increased over the years from 21.7% in 2016 to 22.6% in 2023, and is expected to rise to 26.8% in 2024. These increases are primarily attributed to the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, the initial increases before the war suggest Moscow’s push to position its MIC as a cog in its renewed push for global power supremacy.

Russia’s surplus of rounds for tube and rocket artillery was tens of millions just before the commencement of the war against Ukraine in February 2022, and production was on an upward trend. This can be used as a proximal indicator to explain some of the arms export trends to Africa, given that a wide range of specific Russian MIC data is unavailable.

Data by the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that Russia supplied 40% of the total arms imports in Africa between 2018 and 2022. Additional data by SIPRI covering the 2019-2023 period highlights that Russia was Africa’s major supplier of weapons, accounting for 24% of the total imports. This was higher than imports from the US (16%), China (13%), and France (10%). Algeria, Egypt, and Libya are the leading importers of Russian arms in Africa. This trend is expected to persist given the threats to political stability in the region, with countries increasing their defence expenditures.

The conflict in Libya remains unresolved, in addition to the threat of armed insurgency and rebellion in the Sahel and across Sudan. Egypt stares at regional conflicts: the Israel-Hamas war, the threat of insurgency in the Sahel, armed rebellion in Libya, and war in Sudan. Algeria’s national security faces threats emanating from these aforementioned conflicts.

Russia’s growing influence in Africa through its MIC can be linked to political instability and armed conflicts in northern Africa and the Sahel region. The collapse of the Libyan state following the NATO-led offensive, as well as the first and second Libyan civil wars that gave rise to the threat of insurgency in the Sahel. The Tuareg rebels from Mali and also Niger, as well as Chad, who were hired to fight in the Libyan civil war were partly responsible for arms supply after the conflict.

The Libyan war was immediately followed by the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, which encouraged the spread of terrorism in the Sahel region. Did Russia have a role to play in the region’s instability in light of the Libyan war and armed conflict and coups in Mali? It can be easy to point fingers at Russia and accuse it of supplying weapons to the Gaddafi-led Libya.

Russia was a key arms supplier to Libya before and during the early days of the conflict fanned by NATO against Gaddafi. In March 2011, Russia banned arms sales to Libya to comply with a February 26, 2011, UN resolution. Russia lost approximately USD 3.8 billion in arms deals signed with Libya – USD 2 billion for weapons supply and USD 1.8 billion for anti-aircraft missiles and military aircraft. Libya still had stockpiles of Russian weapons before the ban. But the disintegration of the Libyan state paved the way for arms flow from Libya towards the Sahel. The arms flow may not have been made up entirely of Russian weapons, but this formed a significant proportion of it, as earlier noted that Russia was Libya’s leading arms supplier.

As such, the US-led coalition is to blame for Russia’s influence in Libya and in the Sahel in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict and the multiple conflicts that sprang up in Mali and neighbouring countries. Therefore, Moscow and the Russian MIC are only attempting to capitalise on a vacuum that emanated from the offshoots of Western imperialism in the region. As long as Libya is abandoned by regional bodies and the international community, it will maintain its status as a lucrative market for weapons used by armed groups in the region. In essence, Russia’s MIC in Africa is driven by commercial interests and barely by the divide-and-rule tactics much fashioned by the Western powers. More importantly, African governments willingly sign the arms supply agreements with Russia without Moscow’s coercion. So, it is easy to overlook these issues while attempting to understand the role of the Russian MIC in fueling conflicts in Africa. Part four focuses on the Russian military bases in Africa.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

June 5, 2025 0

Wagner Group in Africa: Deployments & Rebranding

This is part two of a four to five-article series examining Russia’s influence in Africa from a security and geostrategic viewpoint. Part one can be accessed here. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 paved the way for the rebranding of the Wagner Group. First, the name changed – but several names have since emerged: Africa Corps, Expeditionary Corps, and the Bear Brigade. These names could be used interchangeably by different sources documenting Russia’s geostrategic forays in Africa. This perhaps denotes the obscurity and mystery shrouding the group’s operations in Africa. Wagner’s functionalities were also restructured in tandem with the Kremlin’s vision for the outfit post-Prigozhin. However, the fundamental aspects of these transformations remain unchanged, and they are, at best, cosmetic patch-ups to rid the group of Prigozhin’s probable martyr-esque influence.

Wagner’s initial deployments in Africa were in Sudan (2017/2018), Libya (2018), Madagascar (2018), and the Central African Republic (2018). Later deployments were in Mali (2021) and as the Africa Corps in Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024. Around 500 Wagner mercenaries were deployed in the restive Darfur region in Sudan either in 2017 or 2018. The mercenaries were primarily tasked to train Sudanese security forces in light of the conflict in the region at that time. Wagner closely worked with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the aftermath of the 2019 ouster of President Omar el-Bashir.

The concentration of the training programmes in Darfur pre-war suggests that Wagner’s military aid to the RSF in the ongoing civil war in Sudan is not a surprise. However, this does not in any way imply any interests by Wagner or Russia in the outbreak of the war. Wagner is believed to have supplied surface-to-air missiles to the paramilitary group in its fight against the Sudanese army. Wagner’s presence in Sudan highlights the Kremlin’s interests in gold mining. These interests heightened from 2014 in the aftermath of the sanctions imposed on Russia following the Crimea Annexation. Though rarely mentioned, Russia’s pathways in Sudan were against the backdrop of the dwindling influence of the US.

The Central African Republic is touted as a Wagner success story. Around 1,400 mercenaries were deployed in 2018 in the wake of a prolonged conflict involving multiple armed groups. The deployment took place a year after Russia increased support for embattled President Faustin-Archange Touadera. The mercenaries’ objectives included offering close protection to President Touadera, training the country’s security forces, and protecting lucrative mines.

The exit of the French forces from the Central African Republic in 2016 presented an opportunity for Russia to increase its influence. The withdrawal of the French soldiers following a three-year military intervention to quell a civil war was not accompanied by effective capacity building of the security forces of the Central African Republic. This is attributed to the fragmentation of the security forces and affiliations arising from multiple armed groups. Russia and Sudan were instrumental in facilitating the ratification of peace agreements between 14 rebel groups and the Central African Republic government in 2018 and 2019.

Libya is one of Russia’s most strategic countries in Africa. Around 1,200 Wagner mercenaries are deployed in Russia, with the first deployment having been in 2018. The disintegration of Libya following the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave way to Russia’s involvement in Libya. Russia was vocal against the NATO offensive in 2011, and NATO’s exit after the fragmentation of the country presented opportunities for the political elite groupings to forge domestic, regional, and global alliances.

The Wagner group supports the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing conflict in Libya. The LNA backs the Tobruk-based Government of National Stability that rivals the UN-backed Government of National Unity. Russia’s strategic interests in Libya are hinged on the lucrative oil industry and the geographical proximity to the Middle East, Europe, and the Sahel.

Wagner’s failures in Mozambique are vivid. In September 2018, about 360 to 400 mercenaries were deployed with the main goal of training Mozambican security forces and conducting joint operations in the insurgency-hit Cabo Delgado Province. The joint operations collapsed after two months, resulting in the withdrawal of the mercenaries who were unfamiliar with the dynamics of the Cabo Delgado theatre.

Russia’s interests in Mozambique could have been heavily influenced by Mozambique’s rich resource endowment: gas, minerals, and indigenous forests. Wagner mercenaries arrived in Madagascar in April 2018, eight months before a high-stakes presidential election. The mercenaries were responsible for guarding the political consultants of the country’s then-President Marc Ravalomanana, who lost the election. It seems, though, that Russia was after mining interests in Madagascar. A Russian firm took over Kraoma, the national chromite producer.

Russia’s influence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is a result of growing insecurity characterised by the heightening threat of terrorism, military coups, and anti-French sentiments. Around 400 Wagner mercenaries were deployed in Mali in late 2021. The military-led government reached out to Russia for support against terrorist groups such as the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) and the Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), as well as the Tuareg rebel groups.

Courting Moscow was also against the backdrop of the perceived failures of the French troops and the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to combat terrorism despite a decade-long presence in the country. Russia has huge interests in Mali’s gold mining industry. Wagner conducts joint counter-terrorism operations with the Malian forces, but they have yet to succeed. This indicates the fact that the departure of the French troops and the UN peacekeepers has not improved security operations. Perhaps Mali’s bet on the deployment of additional mercenaries and potentially soldiers, as well as equipment, was thwarted by the Russo-Ukrainian war, with thousands of mercenaries deployed on the frontlines.

Burkina Faso has ideal conditions for Russia to increase its influence; coups, terrorism, and anti-French sentiments. It is not surprising that Moscow has upscaled its influence in Africa in the aftermath of the September 2022 military coup. Note that this does not mean Russia is responsible for the coup, contrary to claims by the West. The military-led government is seeking alternative strategic partnerships following the deterioration in relations with France. Burkina Faso nullified its military accord with France in 2023, resulting in the withdrawal of 400 French special forces.

The most notable threat to Burkina Faso’s stability is terrorism; thus, Ouagadougou’s decision to reach out to Russia and the Alliance of Sahel States to bolster counter-terrorism operations. According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, Burkina Faso ranked as the country worst affected by terrorism in the world in 2023 with a score of 8.571 out of 10. Around 100 Africa Corps mercenaries were deployed in Burkina Faso in January 2024, with 200 others set to be deployed in the course of the year. The 100 mercenaries were seemingly withdrawn later in August following the launch of the Kursk offensive by Ukraine. These mercenaries were tasked primarily with training the Burkinabe forces.

Niger’s enhanced cooperation with Russia is similar to Moscow’s relations with Mali and Burkina Faso. Dozens of Africa Corps mercenaries were deployed in Niamey in April 2024. The main objective of the deployment was to help the military regime enhance counter-terrorism operations. Niger’s decision to reach out to Russia was largely influenced by the military regimes in Ouagadougou and Bamako. Around 1,500 French forces withdrew from Niger in 2023 following a breakdown in relations between Niamey and Paris. Approximately 700 US troops withdrew from Niger by September 15, 2024. Part three focuses on the Russian military-industrial complex in Africa.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

June 5, 2025 0

Insecurity Surges in the Sahel amid Anti-Imperialism Fervour

The Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger triggered some excitement in several parts of Africa in the aftermath of military coups. Perhaps coups were not the ideal way to institutionalise power transfer. However, there were frustrations with the inability of civilian governments to decisively address insecurity in the region. Insecurity is the main cause of these coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Burkina Faso had two coups in 2022; in January and September. Several coup attempts have also been reported over the last two years. Mali had three coups between 2012 and 2021. Niger’s military takeover occurred in July 2023.

Insecurity is worsening in these countries. Terrorist groups active in the region, including the Islamic State Sahel Province (previously Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and others seem to be expanding their territorial reach. The fact that armed groups, including terrorists, are intensifying their activities highlights the failure of the military juntas to successfully combat them. These governments have noble intentions to fight insecurity but this remains a Herculean task given their limited resources among other factors.

The Fall of Gaddafi: An Accelerator of Insecurity in the Sahel

Muammar Gaddafi was a misunderstood personality. Perceptions about his so-called dictatorial and anti-West nature were shaped largely by Western propaganda. Ten years ago, I read Gaddafi’s “Green Book”, a brief text elaborating his political philosophy. Well, he was some intellectual of sorts. Obviously, his book is likely to be quickly dismissed for a propaganda instrument. Nonetheless, he explains the organisation and philosophy of his leadership.

In a world accustomed to Western standards of life, including political institutions, Gaddafi’s argument for popular conferences and people’s committees as better alternatives to modern-day parliaments kind of makes sense. It is drawn from the socio-political organisation of ancient societies. Rightly, traditional Africa, Arabic, and Asian societies chose rulers either through communal consensus or naturally via a kingship system. A host of Western societies also practiced such. But colonialism introduced and reinforced a system of governance that was contrarian to beliefs and practices of Africans and other nationalities in the Global South.

Anyway, NATO accomplished its long-held imperialistic dream of getting rid of Gaddafi, but this turned out to be another failed mission by Washington. Former President Barrack Obama has admitted his administration’s foreign policy failures in Libya. In hindsight, Gaddafi was arm-twisted by the US and its allies not to enrich Libya’s military-industrial complex. When the onslaught commenced, Gaddafi had no reliable warfare to counter NATO’s. He was exposed and relied on mercenaries from Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. It is estimated 10,000 mercenaries were recruited by Gaddafi.

These mercenaries retreated to their backyards with Gaddafi’s ouster and death in 2011 sealing their fate financially. Their retreat implied a flow of weapons across the region. Don’t get it wrong; terrorist networks and armed groups existed in several parts of Africa prior to Gaddafi’s fall. However, Libya’s rupture and the movement of these groups exacerbated the threat of insurgency.

Mali was the first casualty following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion which resulted in a military coup in the same year. Tuaregs formed the largest contingent of mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi. The rebellion further evolved into widespread terrorism. Terrorists took advantage of the political situation to expand their operational reach. The situation also worsened in Burkina Faso from 2015 due to political instability.

Unpopular Foreign Military Interventions

The Sahel military regimes blame foreign military interventions, especially by France, for insecurity. This perhaps stems from French troops cooperating with some armed groups as a strategy to prevent the spread of insurgency, especially in Mali. France takes the blame for the political and economic exploitation of Francophone African states. Historically, France has masterminded coups, rigged elections, and sucked the economies of these countries. The anti-French stances adopted as the official foreign policy of these junta states have roots in the imperial French colonial past.

A critical issue to think about at this juncture is whether military interventions failed in the Sahel region or not. Partly, yes. Partly, no. Affirmatively, Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane, particularly the latter, were perceived as France’s occupation instead of interventions aimed at combating insurgencies. Commonsensically, Operation Barkhane would be expected to be successful after its eight-year presence. But terrorist groups gained more ground in this period across the region. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) failed to restore security in Mali despite its ten-year presence.

In the wake of the failures of these interventions, the governments of Sahel countries shift blame to France, MINUSMA, and other external entities. They are responsible for the deteriorating security in the region. This highlights why the region has become a coup belt. Nonetheless, the military-led governments are yet to improve the security situation having previously blamed civilian-led regimes for not aggressively combating armed groups. This illustrates that military governments are not solutions to weaknesses in statecraft.

Alternative Security Arrangements Not Promising

Security initiatives hatched by the Sahel states seem ineffective. While foreign military interventions failed to combat armed groups, local and regional-driven measures have not improved the security situation. For instance, the G5 Sahel Joint Force was unsuccessful in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Fingers were pointed to France’s support of this joint force one of the reasons for its failure. However, none of these states want to take responsibility for persisting insecurity. Mali withdrew from the G5 in May 2022 and was later followed by Burkina Faso and Niger which exited in November 2023. These three states accused the joint force of failing to combat insurgents. But they did not assertively allocate enough resources towards the joint force. The military regimes and their supporters will quickly blame the civilian-led governments at that time but this is a lame argument since they have not improved the security situation. This issue will also cripple the operations of the joint force formed by the three countries under the Alliance of Sahel States.

The Sahel juntas anticipated strategic assistance from Russia through defense and security cooperation, which has increased over the last three years. Moscow has delivered more military equipment. Russia has organized strategic training and other capacity-building and development initiatives for the Sahel forces. Russian mercenaries have been deployed in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Yet, the security situation remains precarious. The juntas perhaps anticipated the mercenaries to succeed as they did in the Central African Republic. However, they ignored the dynamics of these comparative security environments.

At the time of the deployment of the first contingent of Wagner mercenaries in Mali in December 2021, the Russo-Ukrainian war had not broken out. It is possible the situation could be different if there was no war. The Sahel states would be almost guaranteed near-unfettered access to the Russian military-industrial complex’s weapons and personnel. Who knows if Russian military personnel would be deployed on Sahelian soil? Quite cagey though as Moscow prefers mercenaries to avoid reputational hazards associated with troop deployment and misconduct. Maybe huge armies of mercenaries could be deployed instead of Russian soldiers. But these mercenaries are on the frontlines in the war. Even in the long run, the mercenaries do not hold any magic bullet in helping the Sahel states combat armed groups.

The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is a lame institution with respect to addressing insecurity in the region. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States illustrates slow progress or none in improving the security situation by the ECOWAS. ECOWAS loudly threatened military intervention against the military regime in Niger prior to Burkina Faso and Mali ratifying their exit from the West African regional bloc. These were tantrums at best given that ECOWAS has all along been spineless since insurgencies intensified over a decade ago. At this moment and in the long term, ECOWAS can at best cooperate with the Alliance of Sahel States against insecurity in the region. Such cooperation seems unlikely due to multiple interests and factors.

The African Union (AU) lacks ambition and purpose against armed conflict. The AU excels at formulating policy blueprints regarding the continent’s future. However, the AU lacks the intellectual, personnel, and financial commitment to implement these blueprints. The Agenda 2063 formulated in 2013 envisaged the silencing of guns across Africa by 2020. Five years after the deadline, armed conflicts are a norm across Africa. Apart from the insurgencies in the Sahel, wars persist in Sudan and eastern DRC. Terrorism is on an upward trajectory in Somalia, Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique, and eastern DRC among other regions. Rebellions continue threatening Ethiopia’s unity. Libya’s instability and insecurity seem not to give sleepless nights to the AU’s hierarchy. The AU’s complacency is not shocking though. For a continental institution whose headquarters was built by China and whose members are unbothered to fully finance its operations, nothing much can be expected from it. The AU’s response to armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel is poor.

Outlook

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are technically on their own to address insecurity. Their best shot at meaningful cooperation to enhance joint counter-insurgency operations is Russia. But Moscow is entangled in a war against Ukraine. The anti-French sentiments fundamentally echo anti-cooperation with Western countries. The US is unlikely to take the front seat to attempt to succeed where the French failed. The prospects are so low for Trump’s administration to meddle in additional armed conflicts in Africa. On February 11, the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Washington’s partners in Africa must take the lead on their security. China’s involvement in such conflicts is unthinkable. Turkiye could be tempted but it is currently best placed to be a supplier of military equipment for its emerging military-industrial complex.

Terrorism will persist in the Sahel. This implies that political instability will continue in the region. Additional coups and coup attempts are certain. The joint force by the Alliance of Sahel States is not a security nostrum. This effort must be backed up with broad, well-coordinated security operations by ECOWAS and the AU. It is important to note though that tackling insecurity in the Sahel should not be an isolated affair. Pursuing and restoring stability in Libya, Sudan, the Lake Chad region, the Horn, and other parts of Africa is critical for Sahel’s stability. Yet, African state and non-state agencies are not acting fast enough to stem the insecurity crisis in the Sahel. The region’s military governments are attempting to thrive on the anti-imperialism mantra. But time is catching up with them on this amorphous management of state affairs. They may not be competent enough to transform their countries.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a geopolitical and governance analyst.

February 12, 2025 0