Willy Ngoma is Dead But M23 is not Weakened

The spokesperson of the M23 rebel group, Willy Ngoma, was killed in a Congolese military attack near Rubaya in Masisi territory in North Kivu Province yesterday. Drones targeted M23 leaders, and reports suggest that others could be severely injured or dead, including the group’s military chief, Sultani Makenga.

These are significant personnel losses for M23. Would this shift the conflict in favour of the Congolese military and government?

The President Felix Tshisekedi administration seems to be intensifying its offensive to recapture the highly lucrative Rubaya mines from the M23 rebels. A week ago, reports indicated that the Congolese government had offered the Rubaya mines to the US as part of the minerals-for-security framework signed in Washington on December 4, 2025.

Rubaya makes up about 15% of the global coltan supply. A December 2024 report by UN experts indicates that coltan mining and trade generate approximately USD 800,000 per month for the M23. These figures illustrate the strategic significance of the Rubaya mines.

Congolese forces reserve the right to use any means, including force, to reclaim the territory occupied by the rebels. However, force may not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes. The Congolese military mirrors President Tshisekedi’s impatience. His impatience led to a wider rebel conflict in the Kivu region.

In 2023, Tshisekedi demanded the exit of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). The EACRF was succeeding in pacifying the war. Tshisekedi was unimpressed with the EACRF’s non-offensive mandate. He pushed for the deployment of the SAMIDRC (the Southern African Development Community peacekeeping mission) with an offensive mandate. The SAMIDRC suffered substantial losses and could not effectively combat the M23 rebels.

He also demanded the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces in 2023. The exit was paused in mid-2024 following an increase in violence in North Kivu.

Tshisekedi has failed to reform and transform the Congolese military into a formidably disciplined force. His administration heavily relies on militia groups, foreign mercenaries, and ad hoc alliances with regional forces and rebel groups.

What’s more, Tshisekedi has performed poorly diplomatically. His relations with the EAC and SADC states indicate his desire for quick, one-sided outcomes unaccompanied by concessions. The DRC is entitled to reclaim its sovereignty, but Tshisekedi should not ignore historical facts perpetuating the conflict that would be critical in prioritising diplomatic solutions to end fighting.

M23 enjoys the support of Kagame’s Rwanda. Kagame is highly experienced in conflicts in the region, an advantage that Tshisekedi does not have the benefit of. M23 is relatively disciplined and organised.

It would be reckless to pronounce M23’s weakening in the aftermath of Ngoma’s death and the attack on the group’s senior leaders. The dead and injured leaders will be replaced. This is a worst-case scenario that the group and its financiers anticipated.

Ngoma’s death could be a critical juncture in the conflict. The M23 could launch retaliatory attacks against Congolese government interests. Overall, these developments threaten ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire and long-term peace and stability. The M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Rubaya and other occupied areas in the Kivu region.

The US is unlikely to offer direct military assistance to the DRC to counter Rwanda at this time and in the future. Kagame has been a close ally of the US for decades. The US considers him a reliable and effective partner, particularly due to Rwanda’s peacekeeping role in the region. It would be a strategic faux pas for Washington to abandon Kagame for Tshisekedi.

Trump’s administration intends to get the Congo’s critical minerals to rival China. But Donald Trump’s foreign policy ambitions and geostrategic interests are infatuations at best with regard to the Congo. The security situation in Kivu is too complex for the US. Kagame is aware that any military assistance for the DRC by the US could create momentum for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels.

Tshisekedi fantasises about making riches out of the deal with the US, but he’s rushed to believe he’ll retake Rubaya or end the war by simply taking out a few M23 leaders. The war will persist.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks about geopolitics and governance issues.

February 25, 2026 0

Four Years of the Russia-Ukraine War: Africa Can’t Escape

The fourth anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war comes at a time when there is not so much to indicate an imminent ceasefire and a peace deal. Russia is hellbent on its stance to take over Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow is also unlikely to change its demand on Ukraine, maintaining neutrality over its relations with its allies, especially the European Union.

Ukraine, whilst generally outmatched by Russia throughout the conflict, has mounted significant defences and offensives. These have prevented some of Russia’s main objectives, especially regime change. A peace deal is likely to favour Russia, given US President Donald Trump’s much more favourable view of President Vladimir Putin. The war of attrition is expected to persist given the current circumstances.

Far from the frontlines, Africa cannot escape the impact of the war. The spillovers of the conflict are not as intense as they were four years ago. However, the war of attrition implies that African countries will continue to get sucked into the conflict in various ways.

Russia signed multiple defence, security, and economic agreements with several African countries in the course of the war. The Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are notable examples. The Russia-Ukraine war coincided with coups and anti-French/Western sentiments in these countries.

Little success has been registered through these cooperations. The deployments of Russian mercenaries in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have barely been revolutionary in combating armed groups. The exit of the French and other Western actors seems not to have fully restored the sovereignty of these Sahelian states.

Moscow recalled a host of its mercenaries multiple times from these countries and redeployed them on the frontlines in Ukraine and Russia in the course of the war.

We are yet to see another attempt by Ukraine to support armed groups against Russian mercenaries that are backing the military-led governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since July 2024. In July 2024, the Azawad rebels in northern Mali ambushed a convoy of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries. Ukraine claimed it supported the rebels to carry out the attack.

Ukraine is less likely to replicate such alliances of convenience and, in these Sahel countries, to target Russian interests. Russia, thanks largely to propaganda, is viewed as a messianic partner within these states and in several African countries. It is considered a better alternative to the West, although fundamentally, the interests of the West and Russia are driven by extractive motives. The West’s assistance to Ukraine reinforces the positive perception of Russia.

As the war of attrition persists and the conflict enters its fifth year, the recruitment of foreigners to fight in the war could intensify. Recently, there has been an uproar over Russia’s recruitment of Africans.

In November 2025, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said 1,400 people from 36 African countries were fighting for Russia, with a substantial number held as prisoners of war by Ukraine. Around 200 Kenyans had travelled to fight for Ukraine, according to the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs in November last year.

A recent report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) indicates that approximately 1,000 Kenyans have been enticed to fight for Russia. Employment agencies are recruiting financially desperate civilians and former police and military officers.

Russia has denied facilitating the recruitment of Kenyans and Africans. But of course, you do not expect Moscow to admit its role in enlisting and deploying foreigners on the frontlines. Kenyan authorities are unlikely to prosecute the proprietors of these agencies. There are numerous cases implicating employment agencies for rogue recruitment practices. However, prosecutions are delayed and abandoned, as the owners are close to the powers that be. This is anticipated for the proprietors of the agencies recruiting fighters for Russia.

Financial desperation and limited meaningful employment opportunities in Kenya and other African countries will incentivise more Africans to look forward to fighting for Russia. Very few would resist offers of monthly salaries of KES 350,000, bonuses of KES 900,000 to 1.2 million, and Russian citizenship.

Historically, major wars in the world have involved foreign fighters. This was the case during the World Wars and other armed conflicts post-World War II. Thousands of Africans were recruited and deployed on the frontlines in Africa, Asia, and Europe. So, the recruitment of Kenyans and other Africans is not a new phenomenon.

Kenya’s Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi is scheduled to visit Russia in March to negotiate the release and repatriation of Kenyans stuck in the war. This is positive. But the fact that Kenyans are recruited scandalously highlights the incompetence of the Kenya Kwanza coalition-led government. Where was the intelligence agency when the recruitment commenced? Certainly, cronies tied to the ruling coalition are making millions out of the venture. It is a Russian roulette for these African fighters!

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, writes and speaks on politics, geopolitics, and other governance-related issues.

February 24, 2026 0

Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius, and Power Politics

On January 24, 2026, I appeared on Egypt’s leading regional television network, Al-Qahera News. The discussion focused on the sovereignty of Mauritius. This is in light of US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks accusing the UK of planning to give away the Diego Garcia Island, alongside other islands in the Chagos Archipelago, to Mauritius.

Trump perceives the UK’s intention to surrender the islands as great stupidity, noting that China and Russia will take advantage of it and enhance their influence.

President Trump’s view of the UK’s handover of the archipelago to Mauritius as a case of great stupidity is a classic Trumpian tantrum, but it also reflects great power rivalry, colonial legacy, neocolonial footprints, and the relativism of international law.

Trump’s remarks on Diego Garcia and Chagos contradict his earlier position. In 2025, he praised the deal signed between the UK and Mauritius over the planned handover of Chagos and a 99-year lease of Diego Garcia as a momentous achievement. Power politics necessitate recalibrating commitments and flipping positions for self-interest.

Trump’s sidestepping of the 2019 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), highlighting the urgent return of Chagos to Mauritius, is intentional but woeful. He was in his first term as president. But that’s the bullish nature of great powers, which constantly undermine the sanctity of global institutions. Such is the Thucydidean power doctrine: “The strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.”

The Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, are central to America’s geostrategic interests in and across the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a military base established by the UK and the US in 1971 at the height of the Cold War. The US military used it in 1991 and 2003 during the military interventions in Iraq. These are not the only instances; the Diego Garcia base is used by US forces on reconnaissance missions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Trump’s paranoia about China and Russia seeking to fill the void in Chagos could be valid from Washington’s point of view. The Donroe Doctrine exemplifies Trump’s reimagined unipolarity of a highly globally powerful America, rivalled by none and feared by all. This is delusional, of course. It sticks out as any other power ambition, but it’s less likely to trigger nightmares in Beijing and sleepless nights in Moscow. China and Russia, in all fairness, learn a great deal from history, especially China. The Chinese are a step ahead or at par with the US on many aspects, bar military might and technology.

The Indian Ocean is just one of the key maritime and geographically strategic zones for major powers to enhance their security and economic interests. In addition, consider the fact that Diego Garcia is America’s only permanent military base in the Indian Ocean.

Eastern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are accessible via the Indian Ocean, more so, through Diego Garcia. From Diego Garcia, the US can flex its might and check its interests via other strategic maritime areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean, such as the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the South China Sea.

Key Indian Ocean sea lanes are the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global oil trade and 20% of global trade of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s busiest maritime chokepoint, accounting for around 23.7% of global oil trade and 35-40% of global LNG trade. The Bab-al Mandeb Strait accounts for at least 8% of the global oil trade. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean accounts for approximately 40% of global maritime trade.

With or without Trump, America will still want free and secure passage through these key chokepoints; hence the essence of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean. Hostile sentiments against Trump arise from his abrasive, often less statesmanly approach to guarding US geostrategic interests.

Washington cannot underestimate China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, justifying Trump’s ‘great stupidity’ remark against the UK. China has operational control of the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota. It also has a significant presence at the port of Djibouti.

Diego Garcia enables US naval deployments that allow forward presence near Chinese maritime supply lines, rapid deployment to potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific, and reassurances of allies (Australia, Japan, and India).

China doesn’t have an official or direct presence in the Chagos Archipelago. Trump’s fear emanates from strengthening economic relations between China and Mauritius. This is in view of the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in October 2019 and entered into force in January 2021.

What’s more, Beijing supports Mauritius over its long-standing claim for sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. While China has yet to reveal its plans for Chagos, hawkish Western perspectives point to the possibility of Beijing establishing a commercial and military presence on some of the islands of the archipelago.

Trump’s comment on the UK’s surrender of Diego Garcia is a bluff at best. The 99-year lease not only ensures America’s strong geostrategic positioning but also enhances its counterterrorism and regional security interests. Diego Garcia supports intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the region. Consider piracy threats off the Somali coast and armed groups (Al-Shabaab and the Houthis).

Central to the Chagos question is whether the UK government will hand over the islands in line with the ICJ’s ruling or not. The UK conservative politicians share the Trumpian view of China increasing its influence around the Chagos Archipelago and the Indian Ocean.

The UK may eventually hand over the archipelago to Mauritius, but multiple political and legal obstacles exist. America’s resistance and political opposition in the UK are likely to prolong the May 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty that cedes the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Political and legal challenges by Chagossians may also delay the handover.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com

January 29, 2026 0

South Sudan’s Perilous Path

On January 19, 2026, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Wisley Welebe Samson ordered forces to move to Juba from all directions. The advance aims at removing what Welebe describes as the “anti-peace regime.” Welebe called on disgruntled members of the South Sudanese People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) to defect. He further ordered civilians to evacuate military targets. Consequently, President Salva Kiir dismissed four Cabinet ministers, a governor, a deputy governor, and a senior intelligence officer.

Recent Clashes

The SPLA-IO’s call for its forces to advance to Juba is primarily an outcome of the persisting divisions in the fragile coalition government. It is also linked to the recent fighting between the opposition troops and government forces (SSPDF). On January 2, the Kit-Gang faction of the SPLA-IO took control of Uror County in Jonglei State, following clashes with the SSPDF. Reports indicate around 70 people died and thousands were displaced. President Kiir carried out a mini-reshuffle of the Cabinet on January 7, replacing opposition-aligned ministers with loyalists.

Heavy fighting occurred between the two groups in the northern part of Jonglei State from January 12 to 15. On January 16, the SPLA-IO announced the capture of the strategic town of Pajut in Duk County, approximately 300 km north of Juba. The seizure of Pajut enhances prospects of the SPLA-IO’s attack and capture of Bor. The SPLA-IO also issued a 72-hour ultimatum to aid workers and civilians in Duk, Bor, and Poktap to evacuate places near military installations. The group further demanded the unconditional release of the estranged First Vice President Riek Machar and leader of the SPLM-IO and others within two weeks.

Additional clashes occurred on January 17 and 18 in Pigi County in Jonglei State, prompting the government to deploy more troops to purposely defend Bor. Clashes persisted in Panyume in Central Equatoria State on January 19 and 20 following an offensive launched by the SPLA-IO.

The United Nations describes the clashes as the most intense since 2017. Clashes involving the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, and other armed groups, peaked in 2017, following the 2016 collapse of the transitional government.

Key Points

The main issues characterising South Sudan’s political environment are as follows:

The transitional framework has stalled: Repeated delays to elections and reforms reflect a shared elite preference for postponement over risk-taking, rather than an inability to move forward.
Violence functions as political signalling: Localised clashes serve to recalibrate power balances, test red lines, and assert relevance within the governing arrangement, rather than to trigger nationwide conflict.
Security forces remain factionalised: The absence of credible security sector reform continues to anchor political competition in armed leverage rather than institutions.
Succession concerns are shaping behaviour: Uncertainty over future leadership is encouraging pre-emptive positioning by key actors, increasing the likelihood of calibrated instability.
International leverage is diminishing: Diplomatic engagement persists, but enforcement mechanisms are weak and external attention is increasingly divided.

Outlook

A managed stalemate is the most likely scenario in the near term. As such, the state is expected to retain formal authority with uneven governance, a fragmented security architecture, and contested political legitimacy. Tolerance of instability and elites leveraging it for influence are anticipated. Further slippage of the transitional timelines and occasional outbreaks of violence are expected, particularly in the hotspots. A gradual erosion of tolerance and heightened tensions over suspicions linked to a mismanaged transition could trigger a full-blown conflict over time.

January 21, 2026 0

Sitati Wasilwa in the Media: East Africa, Ocean Access, and the Limits of Military Federation

These notes reflect my analytical views following a television interview with Al-Qahera News, a leading Egyptian regional media house, on regional politics, security, and geopolitical risk on November 29, 2025. The link for the conversation can be accessed here. This followed Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni’s controversial statement on possible conflicts in the future in relation to Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean, and the need for the EAC bloc to establish a military federation.

Big Picture

The debate around Uganda’s access to the Indian Ocean and calls for an East African military federation is being overstated and, in some cases, misinterpreted. While President Museveni frames the issue in terms of future conflict prevention and regional self-reliance, the structural realities of East African integration make interstate conflict over ocean access unlikely. Uganda’s strategic interests are already embedded within existing EAC economic and political frameworks, and the leap from cooperation to a full military federation remains politically unrealistic. The underlying issue is less about imminent conflict and more about how East Africa positions itself collectively amid growing external geopolitical competition.

Key Points:

Conflict narratives are exaggerated: Claims that Uganda could face future conflict over Indian Ocean access are overstated and often incorrectly likened to the Ethiopia–Eritrea case. The historical, legal, and institutional contexts are fundamentally different.
Uganda’s access is structurally secured: Uganda’s present and future access to the Indian Ocean is anchored in deepening partnerships with Kenya and Tanzania, reinforced by regional infrastructure projects (roads, railways, pipelines) and EAC frameworks such as the customs union and common market.
Military federation vs political reality: While rhetorically appealing, a military federation is improbable without a political federation. The EAC has not yet fully implemented the monetary union, making progression to political—and by extension military—federation premature.
Sovereignty remains the core obstacle: A political federation would require a common constitution and a significant surrender of sovereignty, a step no EAC member state is currently willing to take.
Federation is not the same as alliance: Museveni’s proposal implies a military federation with a single defence doctrine. This differs sharply from a military alliance (e.g. NATO), where collective defence does not require surrendering national sovereignty.
The strategic subtext is regional autonomy: Museveni’s references to Libya point to a broader concern: the need for regional mechanisms to protect East Africa’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests amid ongoing conflicts, natural resource competition, and intensifying involvement by external powers (USA, China, EU, India, Turkey, Gulf states).

The more relevant question is not whether East Africa needs a military federation, but how existing regional frameworks can be leveraged to safeguard shared strategic interests in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

January 18, 2026 0

Khartoum Is Back – But Sudan’s War Is Far From Over

On January 11, Sudan’s Prime Minister Kamil Idris announced the government’s return to the capital, Khartoum. The government relocated from Khartoum to Port Sudan in April 2023 when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Politically, it helps. Symbolically, it matters. Strategically, however, it changes far less than many expect. Control of a capital city does not equal control of a state.

The illusion of victory?

Khartoum is Sudan’s administrative and diplomatic centre. Controlling it enables the SAF to reassert its international legitimacy and speak authoritatively as Sudan’s legitimate government.

Even so, wars do not end with symbolism. They end when coercive power is consolidated – and in Sudan, it is not.

The RSF is active and controls large swathes of territory. This is particularly in the Darfur region and parts of the Kordofan region. These are strategically defensible areas and not peripheral backwaters.

Territory matters more than capitals

Khartoum would almost certainly be a top strategic priority for the RSF. But the SAF’s control of the capital pushes the RSF to recalibrate its strategic priorities. As such, the RSF seeks to control territory that allows it to function independently of the central state.

Darfur is historically and strategically crucial for the RSF. Historically, the RSF has its origins in the Janjaweed elements in Darfur.

The RSF seeks leverage by controlling cross-border trade routes into Chad and Libya, overseeing gold mining areas, and establishing alliances with local militia groups. These assets give the RSF an incentive not to pursue or submit to a central authority.

RSF’s pursuit of autonomy

A ceasefire is unlikely under the current circumstances. While the RSF agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire proposal on November 6, 2025, the SAF demanded the paramilitary group’s withdrawal from all occupied civilian areas and territories. The SAF also demanded the disarmament and surrender of the RSF weapons.

These demands are unrealistic, given the RSF’s deeply entrenched structures in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. The SAF is expected to maintain its position on the conditions for a ceasefire.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is the RSF’s fight for survival in some regions with less interest in attaining victory over the SAF in the country. Survival necessitates the RSF’s push for an autonomous or semi-autonomous region, especially in Darfur. This allows the RSF to:

Preserve its military structure
Retain control over revenue-generating resources
Rebrand its cause as decentralisation or regional self-rule
Force negotiations on its own terms

High-Impact Fragmentation?

This is a likely outcome linked to the RSF’s fight for survival and the SAF’s hardline positions. The following geographical and administrative indicators would characterise high-impact fragmentation:

The SAF governs Khartoum and eastern Sudan, backed by international recognition.
The RSF dominates western and central regions, exercising parallel authority.
Low-intensity fighting, humanitarian crises, and political deadlock persist.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

January 12, 2026 0

Conflicts, Coups & Disputed Elections: Africa in 2026

Here are the key issues that will define Africa’s geopolitical landscape in 2026:

The AFC/M23 rebellion in the DRC: The conflict in the eastern Congo has persisted for decades, much like a lingering bad smell. US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed role of world peacemaker is not a magic wand to end the rebellion by the AFC/M23 group. Deep mistrust and suspicions driven by paranoia and geostrategic interests could scuttle the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. The President Felix Tshisekedi-led administration is unlikely to welcome unhinged diplomatic negotiations with Paul Kagame’s Rwanda. Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Joseph Kabila, is expected to influence the course of Congolese politics as well as the rebellion.

War in Sudan: This is another opportunity for President Trump to fetishise his peacemaker role. The US presented a humanitarian ceasefire proposal to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in November 2025. The RSF agreed to it, while the SAF dismissed it, noting its bias and demanding the RSF’s withdrawal from occupied territories. Prospects are high for the war to continue into its fourth year by April 15. Power sharing and disarmament would be central to a mutually approved ceasefire and post-war governance. Other wild guesses would be the RSF’s push for the autonomy of the areas it controls, particularly the expansive Darfur region.

First post-independence general elections in South Sudan: Voting is scheduled for December 22, 2026. The elections were initially planned for December 2024 as per the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). Postponement of the elections beyond this year is possible. President Salva Kiir is attempting to manage his succession, but at the same time, he seems unwilling to hand over power. Kiir intends to cut off the estranged Vice President Riek Machar from any power networks that he could leverage. Clashes involving forces and militia groups allied to Kiir and Machar are highly likely to continue. A civil war cannot be ruled out.

Elections and terrorism in Somalia: Somalia’s stability and instability will have wider effects in the Horn of Africa and northwards in the Red Sea sphere. Elections are anticipated in the first half of 2026. Full universal suffrage is unlikely. Partial direct voting is expected due to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group controlling some parts of the country. Institutional weaknesses and logistical constraints will hinder large-scale direct polling. The legitimacy of the elections will largely depend on the support or lack thereof from Jubbaland and Puntland. Counterterrorism operations against Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia Province will persist. The US is expected to continue participating in these operations. But this will be alongside opportunistic attacks by these militant groups that utilise guerrilla tactics. Al-Shabaab’s collaboration of convenience with the Houthis will be one to watch out for in 2026. Key to Somalia’s stability is the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Its mandate was extended by a year until December 31, 2026. AUSSOM is unlikely to achieve its goals primarily due to limited finances. Funding constraints are likely to persist, with the US unwilling to reverse its opposition to financing peacekeeping missions. Trump’s recent executive order pulling the US out of 66 international organisations heightens financial constraints for AUSSOM.

Somaliland’s sovereignty and regional geostrategic interests: Israel’s official recognition of Somaliland’s independence on December 26, 2025, set the pace for intense diplomatic and geopolitical swings. Israel’s geostrategic interests in Somaliland focus on checking and countering the Iranian-backed Houthis’ influence, which is critical in securing the Red Sea shipping lanes. Furthermore, Israel seeks to strengthen its geopolitical and security cooperation with the UAE to enhance its interests in the Horn of Africa. The UAE operates Somaliland’s strategic port of Berbera. Lobbying by US groups, including pro-Israel ones, could intensify this year to push for Washington’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Trump’s administration is unpredictable, and a sudden change in its position on Somaliland is possible.

Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts and Red Sea access ambitions: The Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions will remain hotspots in the foreseeable future. The June 1, 2026, elections could exacerbate these conflicts. In Tigray, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal forces seems to be declining. The pro-government Tigray Peace Front (TPF), which split from the TPLF, would most likely engage militarily against the TPLF. Essentially, the federal government would fight a proxy war via the TPF. Ethiopia is unlikely to change its position to access the Red Sea via the port of Assab in Eritrea. However, this may remain rhetorical, implying that a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is less likely. Regional and international deterrence is a primary factor limiting the possibility of an all-out war. Second, it would be a strange gambit for Ethiopia to wage war against Eritrea, given the ongoing hostilities in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray.

Insurgencies and instability in the Sahel/West Africa: Little collective effort is expected from countries in this region to combat insurgent groups. Neither the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nor the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has demonstrated political and military willingness to effectively address insecurity and instability. Terrorist groups, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State, seek to expand their operational reach in the region. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to remain terrorism epicentres. Regime changes via coups cannot be ruled out in these countries as a result of insecurity. Nigeria’s recent welcoming of the US support to fight terrorist and bandit groups is one to watch out for this year. But it would likely be another prolonged, less successful external counterinsurgency supported by Washington.

Youth protests, coups, and controversial elections: Unprecedented youth-led protests occurred in Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar in the past two years. Similar protests also took place in Nigeria in 2024 and in Togo in 2025. Limited economic opportunities, a relatively highly exposed younger generation, and the ability to quickly organise via social media could trigger more protests in Africa. African governments less likely to promote accountability and the creation of economic opportunities are priming the instability pump. African politicians seem to ignore these risks. Eleven successful coups and at least 10 failed/thwarted coup attempts occurred in Africa in the last six years. Poor political accountability, disputed elections, and insecurity are likely to lead to additional coup attempts in 2026.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. Contact: sitatiwasilwa.sw@gmail.com.

January 8, 2026 0

DRC: Ex-President Kabila Sets Sights on a Comeback amid M23 Entanglement

On September 30, a military court in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sentenced former President Joseph Kabila Kabange to death in absentia. Kabila was convicted of multiple crimes, including insurrection, torture, sexual assault, murder, crimes against humanity, and treason.

In July 2025, Kabila went on trial in absentia for supporting the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. This must have precipitated the death sentence, with Kabila’s successor, Felix Tshisekedi, unable to contain the M23 offensive in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.

On October 15, Kabila and other political leaders opposing Tshisekedi met in Nairobi and launched the Sauvons le Congo (Save the Congo) movement. They said the movement will reach out to all the Congolese people opposed to the dictatorship. In addition, they stated that the formation seeks to “end the tyranny, restore state authority, reestablish democracy, and promote national reconciliation.”

Why is Kabila so invested in Congolese national politics?

Politics, whether at the local or global level, is dictated by interests. And Congo is not uniquely different from this maxim. Kabila’s interests and calculated return are motivated by Tshisekedi’s betrayal. Kabila’s exit from the presidency in 2019 and his subsequent succession by Tshisekedi were met with controversy.

Tshisekedi was third in the presidential election behind Emmanuel Shadary and Martin Fayulu, who won. Kabila maneuvered the systems and influenced the declaration of Tshisekedi as president. Kabila and his acolytes settled on Tshisekedi because he was a weak politician. Tshisekedi had a limited understanding of critical governance and military institutions.

Apart from his weak leadership, Tshisekedi had insufficient key internal and external power networks. These were fault lines that Kabila sought to capitalize on following an agreement with Tshisekedi. According to the agreement, Tshisekedi was to serve as president for one term and give way to the return of Kabila.

Sometimes, the average and below-average minds can be good at heeding Machiavelli’s advice of discarding allies who help them to secure power. Power consolidation demands ruthlessness, given that survival is the priority. Machiavelli emphasizes pragmatism over loyalty, implying that rulers can discard allies and break promises because sentiment is a luxury a ruler cannot afford in the power struggle.

Rulers perceived as weak are not necessarily foolish and can be very ruthless in consolidating power. In the early years of his presidency, Kenya’s second president, Daniel Moi, was considered weak. But he became ruthless after the failed 1982 coup attempt and remained in power until 2002.

Tshisekedi has targeted Kabila’s point men in the military and key political institutions in the last six years. The recent trial and sentencing of Kabila indicate Tshisekedi’s pursuit of former allies of convenience.

What are Kabila’s pathways to power?

Kabila will find it difficult to become president constitutionally. The death penalty and the possibility of other charges technically lock him out. General elections are scheduled for December 16, 2028. As such, Kabila may front a proxy candidate if all the legal loopholes remain sealed. It is too soon to predict the 2028 polls. However, vote rigging by Tshisekedi is possible. What’s more, Tshisekedi’s reelection depends on how he handles the M23 conflict.

The most likely pathway for Kabila to obtain presidential powers is through supporting armed groups, such as M23, against government forces. This cannot be ruled out. He may emulate his father’s ascendancy to the presidency through armed struggle that started and spawned in the volatile east before the long march to Kinshasa that culminated in the fall of the once indefatigable Mobutu Sese Seko.

Kabila enjoys extensive networks in the region and has good relations with battle-hardened politicians, i.e., Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. Museveni and Kagame were instrumental in the takeover of the government by Laurent Kabila (Kabange Kabila’s father) in May 1997.

This year, Kabange Kabila met with Museveni in Kampala, Uganda, in March 2025. Later in April, he was seen in Kigali, Rwanda, though it is unclear if he met Kagame. These are strategic relationships that Tshisekedi does not enjoy in the region. Broadly, Tshisekedi’s weak capabilities to cultivate and nurture strategic relationships are also evident in his poor handling of collective peace and security decisions made by regional blocs, which the DRC is a member; the EAC and SADC.

Outlook

War in the east of the Congo, especially in the Kivu region, is likely to persist in the long term. Kabila’s interests in national politics complicate the country’s political and security situation. The M23’s operations indicate a resolute force that will continue to present governance challenges for the Tshisekedi administration.

Currently, the prospects for a permanent ceasefire agreement are low. Parties to the conflict have missed key deadlines. The October 14 agreement between the M23 rebels and the DRC government to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism is not sufficient to fast-track a ceasefire at this time. Clashes are anticipated to continue in the Kivu region.

The failure to have a ceasefire in the short to medium term could potentially lead to the spread of the conflict to other territories. It is possible that the M23 will keep fantasizing about a grand march to Kinshasa and the eventual usurpation of power.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His writings are independent of his institutional affiliations.

October 24, 2025 0

Armed Conflict in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on the Edge

The junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are struggling to contain armed groups. When pressed for answers on their failures, they usually allude to foreign actors, among other reasons. Captain Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, General Assimi Goita of Mali, and General Abdourahamane Tchiani rose to power through coups, promising to effectively address insecurity.

In a recent interview, Traore, in his defence, claimed to have found approximately 100,000 AK-47 bullets in the country’s stocks when he took over three years ago. Whether this is figurative or not, Traore failed to restore security and order within three months of taking over.

Multiple factors are responsible for the prolongation of insecurity and political instability in the three Sahelian countries. The general incompetence of the military-led governments is a key factor. These regimes seem largely concerned about power consolidation rather than addressing pertinent issues affecting the people. This is done through propaganda campaigns that often chide the West, banning and suspending political parties and civil society groups, and extending transitional terms.

The anti-West sentiments, mostly against France, of these regimes are quite interesting. Historically, France is responsible for enabling extractive politico-economic and social institutions in the broader Francophone Africa. France is also responsible for the failures of Operation Barkhane and other related security missions in the Sahel. But these issues do not absolve the military regimes from worsening insecurity and instability.

UN peacekeepers and French forces withdrew from Mali. French troops also pulled out of Burkina Faso. Similar exits by the French, American, and German forces also occurred in Niger. The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger turned to Russia for security and defense support. So far, no tangible results can be linked to the Russian mercenaries in these countries.

These regimes, in a way, underestimated the intelligence gathering and sharing by foreign troops. They also overestimated the capabilities of their own security forces and those of the Russian mercenaries in combating armed groups.

Effective regional security solutions are yet to be decisively implemented. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after exiting from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a paper tiger. The AES is not fundamentally different from ECOWAS in that it fails to match aspirations with decisive actions.

Armed groups in the region have demonstrated improved operational capabilities. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels and the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) occasionally use drones in their attacks. Drone attacks by armed groups have substantially increased in the region, especially in Mali, in the last two years.

In addition, armed groups in the Sahel are getting more access to rifles and ammunition. While illicit trafficking channels in West Africa and North Africa were the primary ways of acquiring weapons, increasing attacks against military installations are enabling easy access. Seizures and looting of these facilities facilitate the supply of weapons.

Insecurity and instability will persist in the Sahel region, given the incapabilities of the security apparatus of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat armed groups. Of course, the three states are good at propaganda to sanitize their incompetence while pointing fingers at domestic, regional, and extra-continental imaginary enemies. Propaganda is a delusionary reprieve for these military regimes. However, this is not a magic bullet by any means to resolve the governance crises in these countries.

Traore, Goita, and Tchiani are on borrowed time. Their regimes, besides the perfection of propaganda, are likely to face a backlash from the public due to worsening insecurity. While elections of civilian-led governments may not be necessary conditions for robust economic growth, the delayed return to constitutional order creates the ideal conditions for an increase in anti-junta sentiments. These sentiments are germs for intensified attacks by armed groups or coup attempts.

Consider Mali. JNIM has imposed an economic blockade since early September 2025. The blockade, featuring attacks against fuel tankers, was in place at the time of writing this article. While some tankers have successfully been escorted by security forces to Bamako and other parts, growing frustrations among the public are possible. Unrest cannot be ruled out under these circumstances.

A significant number of people are in awe of Traore and generally the junta in these three countries for supposedly giving neocolonialism and Western influence a back foot. I find this impractical, unreasonable, and infantile. If they indeed cherish neocolonialism, then they should absolutely pursue total independence. This is unrealistic in a highly globalized world. What’s more, claiming Western influence to be neocolonialism while at the same time strengthening relations with Russia is shifting goalposts. Is it that Russia does not seek to influence these governments by pursuing its geostrategic interests?

Russian mercenaries have proven ineffective in helping these military-led governments to contain insecurity. In fact, Western troops and UN peacekeepers in the region appear to have been more competent than the mercenaries. One could argue that the mercenaries are fewer than the Western troops and peacekeepers. Well, fair enough. But this does not excuse the failure of the mercenaries. It is a matter of time before these mercenaries fully withdraw from the region, like they did in Mozambique a few years ago.

The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas expect to remain in power until at least 2030, based on the collectively calculated extensions over the past year. Coups are ugly, and they fight back. Traore, Goita, and Tchiani rose to power via coups, justifying the takeovers due to worsening insecurity. These conditions persist, and additional coup attempts are anticipated. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a history of coups, and a farcical recurrence of these events in the future is possible. Remarkable political leaders who rose to power via coups, for instance, Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara, were victims of the fight back.

Newer armed groups are likely to be formed in the region, while the existing ones could become bolder with enhanced operational capabilities. These groups are also likely to strengthen alliances.

External and regional military interventions cannot be ruled out in the future, but these are highly unlikely at the moment. The positions of the three military regimes against UN forces and other European troops, including the French, limit the likelihood of a UN peacekeeping force. What’s more, the recent decisions by the UN to reduce peacekeepers by 25% globally and cut the peacekeeping budget by 15% technically rule out a global peacekeeping mission in the region.

This also means that security and stabilisation initiatives by the African Union (AU) are in jeopardy. Such initiatives historically rely on UN funding. This raises questions regarding the AU’s effectiveness, given its Agenda 2063, which ambitiously aimed at silencing guns – to end wars and civil conflicts – on the continent by 2020.

UN peacekeeping missions are criticized for their passive responses to violent conflicts in Africa. They are present in the DRC, South Sudan, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, and the Abyei region. While these missions have multiple shortcomings, their effectiveness cannot be overruled. Perhaps the funding cuts and force reduction could impact security and stability in Africa. I’ll discuss this in my next article after reflecting on the Malawi presidential election. But the fragility of the Sahel states and these UN decisions could be marked by a significant increase in the flow of arms and movement of armed groups on the continent.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst. His opinions are independent of his institutional affiliations.

October 12, 2025 0

East Congo’s Relentless War Machine, Fading Peace

On the weekend of September 19 to September 21, intense clashes occurred between the Congolese forces and the M23 rebels. Fighting took place in Masisi (North Kivu), Walikale (North Kivu), and Kalehe (South Kivu). This marks the most substantial escalation in the last five or six months.

The escalation is not a surprise, given the occasional flare-ups involving the rebels and the pro-government Wazalendo militia group. Indicators of an impending escalation were visible. The missing of the August 8^th and 18^th deadlines for commencing direct negotiations and signing a peace agreement. These deadlines were prescribed by the Declaration of Principles signed by the Congolese government and M23 in Doha, Qatar, on July 19, 2025.

The key provisions of the Declaration of Principles include an immediate and permanent ceasefire, restoration of state authority in areas under M23, the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and the alignment of the principles with the June 27 Washington agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The rebels maintain a presence in multiple territories, including some that were seized in recent weeks.

There are no effective incentives for M23 to halt fighting and conquests. In the past, especially following the Second Congo War, rebel groups sought inclusion in the government. This seems not to be the case with the M23. The M23 recently unveiled 7,000 newly trained fighters. The rebel group stated that 12,000 recruits are currently in training. This indicates its readiness for a protracted conflict. It also hints at the rebel group enhancing its force and order capabilities to effectively oversee local administrative systems in conquered territories.

M23’s motive to keep fighting and control several areas in Kivu is linked to the region’s mineral wealth. Masisi’s mineral deposits include coltan, gold, tourmaline, and diamonds. The Rubaya mine in Masisi is the largest producer of coltan in the DRC. It supplies approximately half of the DRC’s total coltan output and 15% of the global coltan supply. Rubaya’s coltan is processed into tantalum that is used in electronic devices, including laptops and mobile phones.

Of course, there are sociocultural and political factors perpetuating the conflict in the east of the Congo. While these factors that are tied to ethnic groups are still significant in the conflict, they are superseded by geoeconomic interests. Following the M23’s takeover of Goma, North Kivu’s capital, I argued that the conflict had evolved from one driven by ethno-political interests to one fueled by geoeconomic interests.

The conflict in the east not only highlights the DRC’s central role in the global mineral supply chains but also demonstrates the country’s long, troubled history of natural resource curses. An excerpt from David Van Reybrouck’s book, “Congo: The Epic History of A People,” aptly summarizes the DRC’s tribulations despite its rich natural resource endowment:

“There is no other country in the world as fortunate as Congo in terms of its natural wealth. During the last century and a half, whenever acute demand has risen on the international market for a given raw material – ivory in the Victorian era; rubber after the invention of the inflatable tire; copper during the full-out industrial and military expansion; uranium during the Cold War; alternative electrical energy during the oil crisis of the 1970s; coltan in the age of portable telephonics – Congo has turned out to contain huge supplies of the coveted commodity. It has easily been able to meet demand. The economic history of Congo is one of improbably lucky breaks. But also of improbably great misery. As a rule, not a drop of the fabulous profits trickled down to the larger part of the population.“

M23’s significant force capabilities is an impetus for the group to push to establish and retain local administrative systems in the occupied territories. Kinshasa’s incentive is national stability that has been elusive for decades. Achieving this under President Felix Tshisekedi seems illusory in light of his administration’s ineffective handling of the M23 conflict.

Tshisekedi’s administration mismanaged the entire deployment of regional troops from the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He demanded the exit of the EAC Regional Force for not engaging the M23 and other armed groups in direct combat. This is despite the regional force’s mandate to supervise the withdrawal of armed groups from captured territories.

The formal exit of the EAC force and the subsequent deployment of the SADC troops in December 2023 did not remedy the situation. And this is the problem with Tshisekedi’s fascination with moments of delusional reprieve. The SADC forces failed to restore stability in the east. The M23 rebels seized Sake, Goma, and Bukavu a year later, in January 2025.

Multiple factors contributed to the failure of the SADC force, which was intended to engage in direct combat with the rebels alongside Congolese troops. The highly limited capabilities of the Congolese forces and the geographical unfamiliarity of the combat zones to the SADC troops stand out.

Tshisekedi turned to the Trump administration for a minerals-for-security support deal signed by the DRC and Rwanda in Washington on June 27, 2025. Its failure was almost certain. On September 22, 2025, President Tshisekedi acknowledged the failure of the deal to end the fighting. He also reiterated that the agreement does not pave the way for auctioning the DRC’s minerals to the US. In mid-September, DRC and Rwanda agreed to start implementing the security measures of the agreement from October 1. This includes the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and disarming and eliminating the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

The FDLR aims to overthrow the Kagame-led Tutsi majority government in Rwanda. It is active in eastern DRC and is largely made up of the Hutu. The DRC supports the FDLR; the FDLR is to the DRC as the M23 is to Rwanda. It is unlikely that FDLR’s disarmament and elimination will succeed, especially if Rwanda maintains its troops in the DRC and the M23 does not give up its controlled territories. Kinshasa is bound to feel insecure if FDLR is wound up.

The EAC and SADC forces are out, and the US-brokered minerals-for-security deal is unlikely to materialize. This is an ugly juncture for Tshisekedi. His administration is better off sticking with the UN peacekeepers at the moment. While they have primarily been ineffective in containing armed groups in the east over the last 25 years, their presence could help share intelligence with the low-morale Congolese forces.

Tshisekedi’s administration pushed for the exit of the peacekeepers but requested the renewal of the mission’s mandate in December 2024. The departure of UN peacekeepers alongside French forces from Mali without replacement by highly capable security forces has significantly contributed to the escalation of armed conflict. This is probably a key lesson for Tshisekedi.

Some complex possibilities await the Tshisekedi administration. It may consider engaging in a war of attrition against the rebels. But this would require boosting the morale of a poorly paid and equipped military. It is unlikely that the Congolese government will substantially increase the payments for the troops and purchase adequate military equipment in the short term. This means a continued reliance on militia groups whose fighters would be much happier to pocket some francs than eke out a living as overworked miners or desperate small-scale traders. At least looting is guaranteed for militia fighters as a means of survival.

A war of attrition or not (if maneuver warfare is preferred), the recruitment of more foreign mercenaries to fight alongside the Congolese forces and militia fighters is highly likely. Eastern European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and some African countries are potential sources of mercenaries. Rwandan forces and dozens of armed groups could fight alongside the M23 if Kinshasa opts for a scorched-earth policy. But this would elevate the DRC’s political instability, recalling that conflicts in the east previously led to transitional governments.

The writer, Sitati Wasilwa, is a political risk analyst.

September 26, 2025 0